The Irony of Great Power Politics

by **havanagilla** » Wed Apr 12, 2006 2:58 am

<a href="http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/pages/ShArt.jhtml?itemNo=705070&contrassID=2">www.haaretz.com/hasen/pag...ntrassID=2</a> The Irony of Great Power Politics By Ned Lazarus Who said in 2001, "Conquering and controlling land... remains the supreme political objective in a world of territorial states"? If you answered "Benjamin Netanyahu," guess again-- although he should save the quote for his stump speech. Who argued that the military power of states-- not the economic, environmental, or political welfare of citizens-- is the only index of "national security"? Not Yuval Steinitz, though the Likud's token PhD might attach the citation to his next jeremiad about the size of Egypt's armored divisions. Give up? These sound bites of bitkhonism come from International Relations (IR) scholars John J. Mearsheimer and Stephen Walt - the same pair whose recent essay "The Israel Lobby" harshly criticizes the American-Israeli alliance. Mearsheimer and Walt ignited the blogosphere by blaming American pro-Israel advocates, rather than oil dependence, geopolitical dominance or questionable intelligence, for dragging the US into its Iraqi imbroglio. In the ensuing controversy, commentators have assessed "The Israel Lobby" in terms of the Israeli/Palestinian war over Washington, rather than the ivory tower from whence it came. By overlooking the authors' academic oeuvre, they are missing the irony of the situation. Mearsheimer and Walt's paper trail points in precisely the same unilateral direction that consistently leads the US and Israel astray. In their portrayal of Israel as the tail that wags the American dog, Mearsheimer and Walt understate the influence of their own ideas in Washington - and Jerusalem. Before leaping into the minefield of the Middle East debate, Mearsheimer and Walt built reputations as standard bearers of the self styled "Realist" school of power politics. As academic theories go, Realism is exceptionally straightforward. Its tenets can be summarized in plain language: It's a jungle out there. All the important animals are states, and states are all animals. The game is survival of the fittest, it's every state for itself, and it's always a zero-sum game. Military supremacy isn't everything - it's the only thing. Conflict resolution, ethics, human rights, international law and peace treaties amount to kalam fadi, in a world governed only by the balance of power. Mearsheimer admits this is a "pessimistic approach," but insists there's no alternative in an international system "rife with constant security competition and war... where states are willing to lie, cheat, and use brute force to gain advantage over their rivals." He makes the cutthroat confrontations of states sound nearly as nasty as academic politics, in which Mearsheimer has himself resorted to the time-honored intellectual tradition of smearing critics with a broad brush. Years before Karl Rove made a mockery of Democrats' alleged "pre-9/11 mentality," Mearsheimer dismissed his own liberal and radical rivals as so many yafei nefesh, emasculating the IR opposition with his footnoted diatribe, "The False Promise of International Institutions." Should scholarly literature seem an academic issue, it is important to recognize that IR theories shape the worldviews of the architects of "national security". It has behooved Henry Kissinger, Brent Scowcroft and Condoleeza Rice, among other holders of America's highest strategic offices, to identify as Realists; the realpolitik label is synonymous with clear-headed statecraft. As Walt asserts, "for good or ill," his brand of security studies "has had more real-world impact than most branches of social science," especially among the foreign policy intelligentsia of the Republican Party. "The Israel Lobby" reveals that debates over Iraq and Israel have divided the GOP between President George W. Bush's missionary "neo-cons" and the orthodox old guard, who argue that father Bush knew best. Yet their differences should not be exaggerated; all equate American security with cheap oil and the most expensive arsenal in history. All advocate using that arsenal to dominate others whenever it is in the "national interest"-- which relative power alone should determine, not international norms, human needs, or a flawed, democratic political process. Notwithstanding Mearsheimer and Walt's stand on the Middle East, the influence of their ideas is nowhere more real than Israel. Realist rhetoric is the lingua franca of the generals, ministers and military correspondents who glory in the IDF's "deterrent capability" and "strategic advantage" at the pilgrimage festival of modern Israel's ruling elites, the annual "Herzliya Conference on the Balance of Israel's National Security". Bibi and Barak, Steinitz and Shavit, Yatom and Ya'alon may differ on the balance of unilateral withdrawal versus unilateral occupation, but today they all speak the same language of force-- like model graduates of Mearsheimer and Walt's policy academy. What if Mearsheimer and Walt were to offer their Machiavellian advice to an Israeli "Prince"? After careers spent arguing that military power wielded by states is the ultima ratio of international politics, it is difficult to imagine them risking "strategic depth" in the West Bank to show respect for UN resolutions, international opinion, or the human rights of stateless Palestinians. To the contrary, their writings echo Netanyahu's tired refrain of "Don't give them a state." Mearsheimer's 2001 magnum opus, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, hints at what he might advise in Israeli shoes. He writes that "Israel's strategic position was certainly enhanced in June 1967 with the acquisition of the Sinai peninsula, the Golan Heights and the West Bank," yet neglects to mention the country's greatest security achievement-- the 1979 peace treaty with Egypt, Israel's most lethal enemy, earned by respectful negotiation and total withdrawal. In a historical precursor to the Palestinian track, Mearsheimer cites with favor "brutally frank comments that Prussian statesman Otto Van Bismarck made... when it appeared that [neighboring] Poland, which was not an independent state at the time, might regain its sovereignty... he advocated that Prussia should 'smash those Poles till, losing all hope, they lie down and die; I have every sympathy for their situation, but if we wish to survive we have no choice but to wipe them out.'" Perhaps a contemporary Bismarck would be content with "Shock and Awe" a la Donald Rumsfeld, or "searing" the Polish "consciousness" a la Moshe Ya'alon. Mearsheimer and Walt have discovered the downsides of domination, for occupied Iraqis and Palestinians in their homes, and American and Israeli soldiers sent away from theirs. One hopes their newfound opposition to occupation will prove as popular in the corridors of power as their previous teachings have been. A rejection of "Realist" unilateralism in the US and Israel would be a silver lining of "The Israel Lobby." Ned Lazarus is the former Program Director of the Seeds of Peace Center for Coexistence in Jerusalem. He is currently a PhD Candidate at American University's School of International Service.

The Irony of Great Power Politics

The Irony of Great Power Politics

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