by antiaristo » Sat Oct 22, 2005 11:11 am
This is From the Butler Report, which is the most official of official reports on WMD (HMSO).<br><br>I'm not going to editorialise, apart from highlighting certain passages.<br> <br>Was Plame a victim when she was outed, or was she secretly very relieved?<br><br>2.2 AQ KHAN<br><br>INTRODUCTION<br><br>64. AQ Khan directed Pakistan’s nuclear programme for 25 years and is known as the ‘father of the Pakistani nuclear bomb’. After studying in Europe, Khan worked for a company involved with the construction of an enrichment facility in the Netherlands. In 1976, he obtained Dutch and German designs for uranium centrifuges and took them to <br>Pakistan.<br><br>Based on these designs, Khan built a uranium enrichment facility at Khan Research Laboratories, where he successfully produced enough highly enriched uranium for Pakistan to test its first nuclear device in 1998. Khan subsequently exploited the supply network he developed to support the Pakistani programme in order to sell nuclear technologies to countries of concern. In this Section of our Report, we describe the significant help his activities gave to the nuclear programmes of several countries of concern, particularly Libya, and actions taken by the British Government in conjunction with others to close down Khan’s network.<br><br>WHAT WAS KNOWN<br><br>65. During the 1990s, there were intermittent clues from intelligence that AQ Khan was discussing the sale of nuclear technology to countries of concern. By early 2000, intelligence revealed that these were not isolated incidents. It became clear that Khan was at the centre of an international proliferation network.<br><br>66. By April 2000, the Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC) was noting that there was an evolving, and as yet incomplete, picture of the supply of uranium enrichment equipment to at least one customer in the Middle East, thought to be Libya, and evidence linking this activity to Khan. <!--EZCODE BOLD START--><strong>By September 2000, it was pointing out that the network was expanding to mass-produce components for large-scale centrifuge cascades.</strong><!--EZCODE BOLD END--><br><br>67. During 2001, the JIC continued to track AQ Khan’s activities. An assessment in March 2002 pulled together all the strands of intelligence on AQ Khan then available. The conclusions showed the wide spread of Khan’s network and that he had moved his base outside Pakistan and was now controlling it through his associates in Dubai. At the same time, intelligence showed that he had now established his own production facilities, in Malaysia. He was being helped in his activities by a network of associates and suppliers, including BSA Tahir (a Sri Lankan businessman operating out of Dubai).<br><br>68. By July 2002, the JIC had concluded that AQ Khan’s network was central to all aspects of the Libyan nuclear weapons programme. Since Khan had access to nuclear weapon designs and had been involved in the development of Pakistani missiles, the Government feared that he might not only pass on the technology for enriching uranium but that he<br>might also enable his customers to build nuclear warheads for missiles. <br><br>As intelligence continued to build up, the JIC assessed that this was the first case of a private enterprise offering a complete range of services to enable a customer to acquire highly enriched uranium for nuclear weapons.<br><br>69. lntelligence also identi.ed further individuals in the supply chain, and more intelligence was also becoming available on finance and transportation methods, including <!--EZCODE BOLD START--><strong>details of banks in a number of countries</strong><!--EZCODE BOLD END--> and the names of the shipping companies involved. Khan was also continuing to develop his business through his overseas facilities. By January 2003, the JIC was becoming particularly concerned at the progress Libya might be able to make as a result of the assistance it had received from the network.<br><br><!--EZCODE BOLD START--><strong>70. Action to close down the network had until this stage been deferred to allow the intelligence agencies to continue their operations to gather further information on the full extent of the network. This was important to gain a better understanding of the nuclear programmes of other countries which Khan was supplying. But Khan’s activities had now<br>reached the point where it would be dangerous to allow them to go on.</strong><!--EZCODE BOLD END--><br><br>71. At the tactical level, action was taken to interdict supplies of components moving from Khan’s manufacturing facility in Malaysia to Libya. The various stages in this supply chain had been tracked through intelligence reports. In October 2003, the BBC China, a German-registered ship carrying centrifuge parts, was diverted to Italy as part of a carefully-planned intelligence operation in co-operation with the Italian and German authorities. On the basis of the material found on board the BBC China, in November 2003 the UK and US Governments approached the Malaysian authorities to investigate a Malaysian company run by BSA Tahir. <br><br>According to the official Malaysian police report: His [Tahir’s] involvement . . . started in 1994/1995. That year the [Pakistani nuclear expert] had asked B S A Tahir to send two containers of used centrifuge units from Pakistan to Iran. B S A Tahir organised the transshipment of the two containers from Dubai to Iran using a merchant ship owned by a company in Iran. B S A Tahir said the payment for the two containers of centrifuge units,amounting to about US$3 million,was paid in UAE Dirham currency by the Iranians. The cash was brought intwo briefcases.<br><br>72. At the strategic level, action was taken in co-operation with President Musharraf of Pakistan to stop Khan from continuing his activities. Khan subsequently appeared on national television on 4 February 2004 to: <!--EZCODE ITALIC START--><em>. . . offer my deepest regrets and unquali.ed apologies to a traumatised nation . . . and admitted that an investigation by the Pakistani government: . . . has established that many of the reported activities did occur,and that these were inevitably initiated at my behest.</em><!--EZCODE ITALIC END--><br><br>VALIDATION<br><br>73. Key individuals in the network have provided veriication of the intelligence (for example, as indicated by the press release issued on 20 February 2004 by the Inspector-General of the Royal Malaysian Police after an investigation into BSA Tahir’s activities). The discovery of centrifuge parts on the BBC China bore out the intelligence on the supply chain. Libyan co-operation following Colonel Qadhafi's decision to abandon his nuclear weapons programme has produced firm evidence that the intelligence on AQ Khan’s support for this programme was accurate.<br><br>CONCLUSIONS<br><br>74. The uncovering and dismantlement of this network is a <!--EZCODE BOLD START--><strong>remarkable tribute to the work of the intelligence agencies</strong><!--EZCODE BOLD END-->. As we looked at the reasons behind this <!--EZCODE BOLD START--><strong>success</strong><!--EZCODE BOLD END-->, several key points became apparent. First, a team of experts worked together over a period of years, overcoming setbacks and patiently piecing together the parts of the jigsaw. Although an element of luck was important in providing a breakthrough, this was not a flash in the pan. It was the result of a clear strategy, meticulously implemented, which included the identification of key members of the network and sustained work against their business activities. Secondly, there was close co-operation between UK and US agencies, with both sides working to the same agenda. <!--EZCODE BOLD START--><strong>But most importantly of all, there was strong integration in the UK between all the agencies. A decision was taken early on that at working level all information, however sensitive, would be shared.</strong><!--EZCODE BOLD END--><br><br>75. There was also a high degree of co-operation between the agencies and policy-makers in departments. <!--EZCODE BOLD START--><strong>This enabled swift and effective action to be taken at the right time</strong><!--EZCODE BOLD END-->. The action was intelligence-led. The agencies uncovered the activities of the network. The development of policy and action to close it down followed<!--EZCODE EMOTICON START :b --><img src=http://www.ezboard.com/images/emoticons/tongue.gif ALT=":b"><!--EZCODE EMOTICON END--> y interdicting shipments; seeking co-operation from the Pakistani authorities; taking action with the recipients of AQ Khan’s products, most notably Libya; and by encouraging legal action, where possible, against members of the network.<br><br><!--EZCODE AUTOLINK START--><a href="http://www.butlerreview.org.uk/">www.butlerreview.org.uk/</a><!--EZCODE AUTOLINK END--> <br><br> <p></p><i></i>