Earl Brian

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Earl Brian

Postby chiggerbit » Fri Dec 23, 2005 3:16 pm

Earl Brian's role in the theft of the 1980's software program PROMIS always fascinated me for some reason. PROMIS was a product of the Inslaw company, which had been contracted to the Justice Department (sic)as a management information system for case tracking and workflow management applications. It turned out that the program had applications way beyond tracking workflow. Inslaw owner Hamilton had requested and received the rights to any updates his company made to the program. Apparently, the Justice Department realized its mistake and tried to steal back the rights to the improvements by bankrupting the Inslaw company. The whole theft story is interesting in and of itself, but of particular interest to me was the involvement of Dr. Earl Brian.<br><br><br><!--EZCODE AUTOLINK START--><a href="http://www.american-buddha.com/mystery.death.htm">www.american-buddha.com/m....death.htm</a><!--EZCODE AUTOLINK END--><br><!--EZCODE QUOTE START--><blockquote><strong><em>Quote:</em></strong><hr>...Allegations about the theft of PROMIS have suggested three possible motives: To fund off-the-shelf covert operations; to market a "trojan horse" database which could then be easily monitored by the National Security Agency; [18] and to pay off Reagan attorney General Edwin Meese's political crony, Dr. Earl Brian. Now president of the floundering United Press International, Earl Brian has longstanding ties to Reagan and served in his cabinet when Reagan was governor of California....<hr></blockquote><!--EZCODE QUOTE END--><br><br>Earl Brian was involved in multiple companies over the years, and it always puzzled me why he chose the ones he did. Here's a sampling. Were they his or the government's?<br><br>American Cytogenetics<br><br> <!--EZCODE AUTOLINK START--><a href="http://www.american-buddha.com/last.circle.11.htm">www.american-buddha.com/l...cle.11.htm</a><!--EZCODE AUTOLINK END--><br><br><!--EZCODE QUOTE START--><blockquote><strong><em>Quote:</em></strong><hr>"...Dr. Brian ultimately directed his energies towards biological technology. Another of his companies, Biotech Capital Corporation of New York, became 50% owner of American Cytogenetics, which was planning in 1982 to create a subsidiary to engage in genetic research. One notable investor in Biotech, when it went public in 1981, was Edwin Meese. Today, American Cytogenetics in North Hollywood, California, conducts Pap tests for cervical cancer. It also tests tissue samples for cancer and related diseases. Sales in 1985 were $3.4 million...."<hr></blockquote><!--EZCODE QUOTE END--><br><br>American Systology Inc.<br>(Consider the source, this is a Moonie rag)<br><!--EZCODE AUTOLINK START--><a href="http://www.insightmag.com/main.cfm?include=detail&storyid=213410">www.insightmag.com/main.c...yid=213410</a><!--EZCODE AUTOLINK END--><br><br><!--EZCODE QUOTE START--><blockquote><strong><em>Quote:</em></strong><hr>For example, months before McDade and Buffam came looking for answers in the United States, they had established a working relationship with John Belton, a Canadian living in Ontario who had become involved with PROMIS as a result of a 1980s securities-fraud scheme in Canada allegedly involving Earl Brian and companies he owned or controlled, such as Hadron Inc., Clinical Sciences Inc., Biotech Capital Corp. (renamed Infotechnology Corp. in 1987); and American Systology Inc. Belton's securities-fraud claims resulted in a 1986 RCMP investigation and civil litigation that are ongoing today...."<hr></blockquote><!--EZCODE QUOTE END--><br><br><br>(Consider the source here, quoting Michael Riconoscuito in The Last Circle)<br>Bio-Rad (?)<br><br><!--EZCODE AUTOLINK START--><a href="http://www.american-buddha.com/last.circle.11.htm">www.american-buddha.com/l...cle.11.htm</a><!--EZCODE AUTOLINK END--> <!--EZCODE UNDERLINE START--><span style="text-decoration:underline">The Last Circle</span><!--EZCODE UNDERLINE END--> <br><br><!--EZCODE QUOTE START--><blockquote><strong><em>Quote:</em></strong><hr>"...Michael: "Check out Bio-Rad Laboratories. Their international headquarters are on half of the property that used to be the Hercules plant, in Hercules, California. Do you understand what I'm saying? Bio-Rad makes the most toxic biological and radioactive compounds known to man. And they're now located in the town of Hercules. Bio-Rad Industrial Park. That building of theirs, the headquarters, doesn't look like much, but it goes 20 stories down into the ground. It's a huge underground complex. <br><br>"See, Bio-Rad was the flagship company, and then they [Earl Brian] started InfoTech, and then they got mired in lawsuits and then Hadron was formed to be a cutout parent corporation, you know, just to be a firewall from law suits ..."<br><br>I asked, "What do they do at Bio-Rad?"<br><br>"Well, they make the most hazardous biological and nuclear chemicals in the world, for medical research."<br><br>"Who do they sell it to?"<br><br>"Well, front line researchers all over the world. Bio-Rad is the single source for this stuff ... actually Aldrich Chemical sells it, there's about 100 companies, but Bio-Rad is head and shoulder above all of them by a factor of ten on many things like Cytotoxins."<br><br>I remembered reading about Cytotoxins in the Wackenhut/Cabazon biological warfare letters to Dr. Harry Fair.<br><br>Michael continued ... "You look at Cytotoxic TLymphocytes. You go ask any medical professional what they're doing on the leading edge of research there? What the full implications to humanity are, OK?"<br><br>I wanted clarification from Michael, so I answered, "It looks to me like research on a cure for cancer."<br><br>Michael took the bait. "Go ask a professional. I'd rather have you hear it from a collateral source other than from me."<br><br>"Well, give me some indication ..."<br><br>Michael responded hesitantly, "It would have been Hitler's wet dream. It's selective to such a degree that it's awesome. With the appropriate genetic material, you can wipe out whole segments of humanity. There's no stopping it."<br><br>"I asked, "You mean you could selectively wipe out certain races of people?"<br><br>"Sure."<br><br>"Jeez."<br><br>Mike continued ..."And, also, from the beneficial side, you can very specifically wipe out disease cells, cancer cells. Look at the patents. Look at Immunix (phonetic sp.) Corporation, look at the patent portfolios on Bio-Rad."<br><br>"Who's Bio-Rad's main buyer?"<br><br>"Well, the National Institute of Health, you know, every hospital in the world buys Bio-Rad products."<hr></blockquote><!--EZCODE QUOTE END--><br><br><br>Clinical Sciences<br><br><!--EZCODE AUTOLINK START--><a href="http://www.american-buddha.com/orlin.vince.27.htm">www.american-buddha.com/o...nce.27.htm</a><!--EZCODE AUTOLINK END--><br><br><!--EZCODE QUOTE START--><blockquote><strong><em>Quote:</em></strong><hr>"...Brian also acquired control of a Canadian company called Clinical Sciences..."<hr></blockquote><!--EZCODE QUOTE END--><br><br> <p></p><i>Edited by: <A HREF=http://p216.ezboard.com/brigorousintuition.showUserPublicProfile?gid=chiggerbit@rigorousintuition>chiggerbit</A> at: 12/23/05 12:51 pm<br></i>
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Re: Earl Brian

Postby chiggerbit » Fri Dec 23, 2005 3:37 pm

Ok, on that last one, Clinical Sciences, I hope I have the right Clinical Sciences, but I thought this was interesting, consider how the PROMIS program has been alleged to be a trojan horse. Can you imagine the porential for snooping on researchers' projects with this, if this company is actually involved with Brian?<br><br> <!--EZCODE AUTOLINK START--><a href="http://www2.warwick.ac.uk/fac/med/clinsci/induction/laboratoryservices/dnasequencehandling/">www2.warwick.ac.uk/fac/me...ehandling/</a><!--EZCODE AUTOLINK END--><br><br><!--EZCODE QUOTE START--><blockquote><strong><em>Quote:</em></strong><hr>...GeneMan handles sequence database access, including remote sites. The package incorporates on-line help and the manuals are available from Stores. <!--EZCODE BOLD START--><strong>The programme is installed on individual PC's by the IT staff</strong><!--EZCODE BOLD END-->.<hr></blockquote><!--EZCODE QUOTE END--><br><br><br><br><br><br>OK, the link is dead. Hold on.<br><br><!--EZCODE AUTOLINK START--><a href="http://www2.warwick.ac.uk/fac/med/clinsci/induction/laboratoryservices/dnasequencehandling/">www2.warwick.ac.uk/fac/me...ehandling/</a><!--EZCODE AUTOLINK END--><br><br> <!--EZCODE QUOTE START--><blockquote><strong><em>Quote:</em></strong><hr><br><br>DNA Sequence Handling, WMS, division of Clinical Sciences website<br><br> "...a) Clone Manager <br><br>The main functions of Clone Manager are to create, view and print graphical plasmid maps, and to allow "virtual cloning" based on restriction enzyme sites in these maps...."<br><br> <br><br>"...b) Lasergene (DNAStar) <br><br>Lasergene is a full-featured DNA and protein sequence analysis package, split into a number of modules: Editseq handles sequence file import and format conversions; GeneQuest performs DNA sequence analysis including ORF prediction and RNA folding; PrimerSelect allows the design of oligonucleotide primers for PCR and sequencing; Protean performs amino acid sequence analysis, such as secondary structure prediction; Megalign performs multiple sequence alignments and generates phylogenetic trees; Mapdraw performs similar functions to Clone Manager; Seqman allows the management of large sequencing projects; GeneMan handles sequence database access, including remote sites. The package incorporates on-line help and the manuals are available from Stores. The programme is installed on individual PC's by the IT staff.<br><br>c) Advanced sequence manipulations<br><br>Until recently, a suite of programmes known as 'GCG' was widely used in the Department for a variety of advanced sequence manipulations. GCG is still available for those who need to use it, however it is increasingly being superseded by other facilities, including Lasergene and also programmes available free over the Internet. Examples of the latter include Blast searches, for testing new sequences against the accumulated sequence database. Detailed advice on these is beyond the scope of this general guidance....."<hr></blockquote><!--EZCODE QUOTE END--><br><br><br> <br><br> <p></p><i>Edited by: <A HREF=http://p216.ezboard.com/brigorousintuition.showUserPublicProfile?gid=chiggerbit@rigorousintuition>chiggerbit</A> at: 12/23/05 1:22 pm<br></i>
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Earl Brian

Postby mother » Fri Dec 23, 2005 5:39 pm

If only we knew what all the dead scientist knew. My sense is that "they" have felt the more "evolved" approach to populatin control is the more polite, less violent one. <p></p><i></i>
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Michael Riconosciuto on Encryption - PROMIS technology

Postby Hugh Manatee Wins » Sat Dec 24, 2005 8:30 am

<!--EZCODE AUTOLINK START--><a href="http://orlingrabbe.com/ricono.htm">orlingrabbe.com/ricono.htm</a><!--EZCODE AUTOLINK END--><br><br>Michael Riconosciuto on Encryption<br>by J. Orlin Grabbe<br><br>Michael Riconosciuto is one of the original architects of the PROMIS backdoor. PROMIS was a people-tracking software system sold to intelligence organizations and government drug agencies worldwide. The global dispersion of PROMIS was part of a U.S. plot to spy on other spy agencies.<br><br>Riconosciuto, who was Director of Research for a Wackenhut-Cabazon Indian joint venture, oversaw a group of several dozen people who worked out of business offices in nearby Indio, California. According to the testimony of Robert Booth Nichols, a CIA agent associated with Meridian International Logistics and connected to Music Corporation of America (MCA), Riconosciuto was in frequent contact with Bobby Inman, Director of the National Security Agency (NSA) and then Deputy Director of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), during this time.<br><br>Since intelligence computers are, for security reasons, usually not connected to external networks, the original backdoor was a broadcast signal. The PROMIS software was often sold in connection with computer hardware (such as a Prime computer) using a specialized chip. The chip would broadcast the contents of the existing database to monitoring vans or collection satellites using digital spread spectrum techniques whenever the software was run.<br><br>Spread spectrum techniques offer a way to mask, or disguise, a signal by making it appear as "noise" with respect to another signal. For example, one may communicate covertly on the same spectrum as a local TV broadcast signal. From the point of view of a TV receiver, the covert communication appears as noise, and is filtered out. From the point of view of the covert channel, the TV signal appears as noise. In the case of the PROMIS broadcast channel, the signal was disguised as ordinary computer noise--the type of stuff that must be reduced for TEMPEST certification in the U.S.<br><br>In spread spectrum frequency communication, the transmitted spectrum is much wider than what is really necessary. In digital communication, the transmission widths of digital signals are expanded so that many "bit periods" are needed to represent one bit at baseband. This results in an improvement in the signal-to-noise- ratio. Spread spectrum techniques are used extensively in covert military communications and secure satellite systems.<br><br>The covert communication channel operates off a pseudo-random binary sequence, such as a stream cipher. Stream ciphers differ from block ciphers such as DES (the Data Encryption Standard) widely used in banking.<br><br>A block cipher applies a static transformation to a fixed block of data. The DES algorithm, for example, encrypts a 64-bit block of data using 64-bit keys. (The effective key size is actually 56 bits, since every eighth bit is considered a parity bit and is disgarded.) In DES electronic code book (ECB) mode, each 64-bit block of data is encrypted separately from every other block. In cipher block chaining (CBC) and cipher feedback (CFB) mode, the encryption of the current data block is dependent on previous data blocks. But under any one of these three DES modes, the transformation of a given data sequence with a given DES key will nevertheless result in the same ciphertext, regardless of the time the encryption takes place.<br><br>A stream cipher, by contrast, applies a time- varying transformation to individual digits or bits of data. "Time-varying" means the same sequence of plaintext data bits seen at two different points in time will be encrypted to a different sequence of ciphertext data bits.<br><br>To illustrate this for a simple case, suppose we are doing encryption using simple XOR rules of addition, adding keybits k to plaintext bits x on a bit by bit basis to obtain cipher bits y: y = x + k. XOR addition follows the rules<br><br>0+0 = 0 <br>0+1 = 1 <br>1+0 = 1 <br>1+1 = 0. <br><br>Suppose the plaintext data is "1011". The current key might be "1010". Then the ciphertext data is<br><br>1011+1010 = 0001.<br><br>The ciphertext "0001" gives no information about the original plaintext. The plaintext could have been any one of 2^4 = 16 possible sequences of 0s and 1s. To restore the original plaintext, we XOR the ciphertext "0001" again with the key "1010" to obtain<br><br>0001+1010 = 1011.<br><br>In a stream cipher, the keystream will typically be different at different points of time. This the encryption of a repeated plaintext "1011" might take the form<br><br> <br>time 1: 1011 + 1010 = 0001 <br>time 2: 1011 + 1111 = 0100 <br>time 3: 1011 + 0011 = 1000 <br><br>and so on for other times. In this example, the "time- varying transformation" takes the simple form of a time- varying keybit stream.<br><br>The most famous stream cipher is the Verdam cipher, or "one-time pad", which follows the encryption scheme just described. If the current time is i, the current plaintext bit is x(i), and the current key bit is k(i), then the ciphertext bit is y(i) = x(i) + k(i). The number of key bits, N, must exceed the number of plaintext bits M: N>M. The bits in the keystream sequence k(1), k(2), . . . , k(N) must be independently and uniformly distributed, and are used only once and then disgarded (hence "one- time pad"). Of course, this scheme--while not breakable by cryptanalysis--has other security problems. It requires both parties to have a copy of the current key, and the key to be kept secret from all hostile parties. This in turn requires that the keys be generated, stored, and communicated in a totally secure manner--a massive problem in itself. So one-time pads are typically only used in "hot lines", such as the old Red Telephone between Moscow and Washington, D.C. that was installed with the hope that a little jawboning could help avert nuclear war. ("Can we talk?")<br><br>Practical cryptography for digital and analog communication thus uses "keystream generators" which typically determine the keystream as some function f of an underlying key K, and the current state of the system s(i):<br><br>k(i) = f(K, s(i)).<br><br>This key stream k(i) can be added to the original bit stream to produce a new (encrypted) stream (as is done in "direct sequence" spread spectrum systems). Or the key stream can be used to make the carrier frequency hop around within the spread sprectrum bandwidth (as is done in "frequency hopping" systems). Many variations and combinations are possible.<br><br>Like many people associated with PROMIS (including Earl Brian, the man who sold it around the world), Michael Riconosciuto is in jail. Riconosciuto was convicted on charges relating to the construction of a methamphetamine lab.<br><br>Michael Riconosciuto appears in a recent manuscript The Last Circle by "Carol Marshall" (whose real name is Seymour). Much of the book is based on interviews with, and files purloined from, Riconosciuto. Part of the subject matter of The Last Circle involves the West Coast activities of "The Company", a paramilitary drug dealing operation using ex-law enforcement and ex-intelligence personel that was based in Lexington, KY, in the late 70s and early 80s. However, because The Last Circle makes extensive use of Riconosciuto's files, it is also concerned with many other activities, including in particular a biowarfare project undertaken by the Wackenhut-Cabazon Indian joint venture. ("The Company" itself is the subject of another book entitled The Bluegrass Conspiracy by Sally Denton.)<br><br>Riconosciuto wrote me in regard to a speech I gave to the Libertarian Party of Colorado on digital cash on April 20, 1997. I have added some comments with respect to the issues mentioned.<br><br>May 8, 1997<br><br>M. Riconosciuto<br>21309-086 Med. A-1<br>Box 819<br>Coleman, FL 33521<br><br>"Orlin,<br><br>"[Name omitted] has been sending me some of your published material for some time. I have some questions concerning your talk on digital cash.<br><br>"First a little of my background. I started with computers when a "laptop" was an IBM porta-punch. My first serious computing experience was on an IBM system 1620. I went from there to the IBM 7090/7094 systems and from there to the then "new" IBM 360 family. I missed the 370 generations, because during that time my responsibilities had me in a position where comp center staff handled all my data processing. I have been on the DEC/PDP systems since they first came out (PDP 8, PDP 10, PDP 11) and stayed with them as they matured into the VAX system. My programming experience runs the gamut from absolute coding sheets in unit record type systems, to top down/structured programming. I have been at this for awhile. I am not impressed by the Intel/MS standard that has taken over the computing world. Although I might note that Windows NT has suspicious similarity to the VAX/VMS operating system.<br><br>"Up until six months ago I had access to a computer and the latest literature because of my inmate job assignments in facilities management and prison industries. We had a high end Pentium CAD set up in facilities and a network connection on a Data General Avion system in Unicor prison industries. I also had the responsibility of maintenance on a Honeywell building automation control DDC-HVAC system.<br><br>"As a direct result of the TV interview with the Germans I was pulled off my premium inmate job and re- assigned to the duty of picking up cigarette butts in the recreation yard for $5 per month. This was inspite of exemplary job assignment reports and no disruptive behavior incidents."<br><br> [Comment: Riconosciuto is referring here to an interview he gave on the PROMIS backdoor to German television.]<br><br>"[paragraph omitted]<br><br>"The point of all this is to make it clear that I am not that far out of touch with the current state of the art.<br><br>"This brings me to the first question that I want to ask about your digital cash speech.<br><br>"1) In your reference to the "discrete logarithm problem" are you taking into consideration the Donald Coppersmith work? Coppersmith developed a computationally feasible way to take discrete logarithms back in the 80s. Needless to say, this work has been played down, but it has been in the open literature."<br><br> [Comment: The discrete log problem is the problem of finding x such that g^x =y mod n, for a given y, g, and n. Here x is the discrete logarithm of y to the base g. Since this is hard to do, one can form a public/private key system with x as the private (secret) key and y = g^x mod n as the public key.<br><br> [Of course, the hard-to-do job of taking discrete logarithms may not be the only way to approach a given problem. The security of Diffie-Hellman, to which I referred in my speech, is apparently based on discrete logarithms, but is susceptable to a simple attack by a person in the middle of the communication process. In Diffie- Hellman, Alice generates x and send Bob g^x mod n. Bob generates y and sends Alice g^y mod n. They both then calculate g^(xy) mod n as the session key. (The best an observer can do is calculate g^(x+y), without taking discrete logarithms.) However, if Eve controls all communication between the two, she can substitute her own parameters, and decrypt both sides of the conversation before forwarding the messages. Be this as it may, Diffie introduced a simple variant of this process--called Station to Station (STS) protocol--which completely eliminates the man-in-the-middle attack.<br><br> [Riconosciuto refers to the work of Coppersmith [1], [2] in finding discrete logarithms. Coppersmith greatly increased the efficiency of finding discrete logs in fields of characteristic 2 (which use digits 0 and 1, and thus are efficient in programming), so that the modulus has to be of the order of n = 2^1000 to be secure.]<br><br>"2) You of course are aware that RSA type algorithms are no more secure that the modulus is difficult to factor. Are you aware of the latest advances in . . . differential cryptanalysis and meet in the middle techniques? Are you aware of the work by Lenstra . . . et al with their methods of quadratic sieves etc?"<br><br> [Comment: Riconosciuto is refering here are to several types of cryptanalytic attacks. Differential cryptanalysis and meet-in-the- middle generally refer to attacks on DES, while the work of Lenstra is directly relevant to RSA.<br><br> [The methods of Lenstra [3], Cohen and Lenstra [4], and Pomerance, Rumely, and Adleman [5], use Fermat's Little Theorem (or its analog in extension fields of rational numbers) and Gauss and Jacobi sums to test for primality.<br><br> [The quadratic sieve for factoring n has running time of the order of exp((ln n ln ln n)^.5). A slightly faster method is [6] the number field sieve, which has running time of the order of exp((ln n)^(1/3) (ln ln n)^(2/3)).]<br><br>"3) Have you ever heard of the Hilbert spectral processing technique and its application to high speed factoring systems?<br><br> [Comment: I'm not sure exactly what Riconosciuto has in mind here. But communication signals can be decomposed into addable parts using systems of orthogonal functions such as Fourier series or Walsh functions.<br><br> [Riconosciuto may be referring to the results of Xiao and Massey [9], who characterize correlation-immune functions in terms of their Walsh transforms.]<br><br>"4) Are you familiar with fast elliptical encryption methods?"<br><br> [Comment: I did not refer to these in my speech as they are fairly complex. Elliptic curve cryptosystems stem from the work of Neal Koblitz [7] and others.<br><br> [The analog of taking a power in modular arithmetic is multiplication on elliptic curves. So the analog of the Diffie- Hellman problem in the elliptic curve world is to find the integer n such that nB = P, where B and P are points on an elliptic curve. Here n can be thought of as the "discrete logarithm" of P to the base B. Elliptic curve cryptosystems are believed to offer equal security at shorter key lengths.]<br><br>"5) Do you remember the hard knapsack problems of Merkle and Hellman and how they fell?"<br><br> [Comment: Knapsack problems were so- named because they resemble the problem of fitting a number of items k into a total volume V--like packing a knapsack.. They have the characteristic that they are NP- complete, so that theoretically an encryption scheme could be constructed from them that is not solvable in polynomial time (with respect to k). However, the original Merkle-Hellman knapsack was broken by Shamir. So Riconosciuto is suggesting that implemented discrete log systems may have hidden weaknesses much like the original knapsack encryption systems. There is a knapsack system due to Chor and Rivest that hasn't been broken yet, to my knowledge.]<br><br>"This should be a good place to start. Let me know if you receive my letter. [sentence omitted.]<br><br>"Michael Riconosciuto<br>"21309-086"<br><br> [Comment: Encryption issues are important. However, I doubt they will be the deciding security issue in most systems of digital cash. Ross Anderson [8] has accumulated a lot of evidence from the financial services industry that demonstrates that most security failures involve errors in protocol or in implementation. Equally important, most current systems that have been called "digital cash" have been designed with deliberate security holes to allow monitoring of transactions at critical points.]<br><br>References<br>[1] D. Coppersmith, "Fash Evaluation of logarithms in fields of characteristic two," IEEE Transactions on Information Theory, 30, 1984, 587-594.<br><br>[2] D. Coppersmith, A. Odlyzko, and R. Schroeppel, "Discrete Logarithms in GF(p)," Algorithmica 1, 1986, 1- 15.<br><br>[3] A. Lenstra, "Primality testing," Cryptology and Computational Number Theory, Proc. Symp. Appl. Math, 42, 1990, 13-25.<br><br>[4] H. Cohen and H. W. Lenstra, Jr., "Primality testing and Jacobi sums," Math. Comp. 42, 1984, 297-330.<br><br>[5] L.M. Adleman, C. Pomerance, and R.S. Rumely, "On Distinguishing prime numbers from composite numbers," Annals of Math. 177, 1983, 173-206.<br><br>[6] A. Lenstra and H. W. Lenstra, Jr., eds. The Development of the Number Field Sieve, Springer-Verlag, 1993.<br><br>[7] Neal Koblitz, A Course in Number Theory and Cryptography, Springer-Verlag, 1994.<br><br>[8] Anderson, Ross, "Why Cryptosystems Fail," Association for Computing Machinery, 1st Conf.- Computer and Comm. Security `93, November 1993.<br><br>[9] G. Z. Xiao and J. L. Massey, "A spectral characterization of correlation-immune functions," IEEE Transactions on Information Theory, 34, 1988, 569-571.<br><br>Posted September 2, 1997<br>Web Page: <!--EZCODE AUTOLINK START--><a href="http://orlingrabbe.com/">orlingrabbe.com/</a><!--EZCODE AUTOLINK END--> <p></p><i></i>
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Postby chiggerbit » Mon Nov 23, 2009 2:38 pm

http://www.aph.gov.au/House/committee/e ... twelve.pdf

Unit 5/108 Days Road
Grange 4051
Queensland
11th July 2001
Ms Bev Forbes
Secretary
Joint Standing Committee on Electoral Matters
Parliament House
Canberra ACT 2600
Dear Ms Forbes
Submission to the Electoral Funding and Disclosure Inquiry
I refer to your advertisement inviting submissions to the Inquiry into the Electoral
Funding of Political Parties, with a closing date of 3rd August 2001.
This submission outlines information relating to allegations of major impropriety
involving electoral funding and disclosure. The key allegation is that in 1987 a US$6
million donation was made to the Labor Party by a company controlled by the CIA.
The donation allegedly was in return for the use of Australian soil to illegally transfer
arms from the US to Iran as part of what became known as the ‘Iran-Contra Affair’.
I believe that there is adequate evidence to warrant close scrutiny of whether this
donation was made and what the circumstances surrounding it were. If such a large
foreign donation can be made for allegedly corrupt purposes and remain undisclosed
and undetected, then this exposes a major defect in Australia’s political donations
disclosure laws and their enforcement.
In short, the Australian Government at that time is alleged to have assisted the US
Government in actions that were found to be illegal in the USA, and a payoff for that
assistance allegedly went to the political party that then formed government. If the
donation was an inducement or a reward for the Government’s complicity in illegal
arms trading, then serious questions arise as to the adequacy of the auditing regime
governing political donations.
Ari Ben-Menashe
These allegations originated from claims made by Ari Ben-Menashe. Ben-Menashe is
a former Israeli military intelligence officer. I have flown to Canada to interview Mr
Ben-Menashe on behalf of my newspaper and have several tapes recording his
allegations. He remains available to discuss his experiences. In his book Profits of
War (see Appendices), he claims:
“In February 1987 a “contribution” was made to the West Australian Labor Party by
our US counterparts in the CIA. In gratitude for the use of Australian soil for the
transfer of arms to Iran, Richard Babayan, a contract operative for the CIA, received a
cheque for $6 million US from Earl Brian, who was acting on behalf of Hadron1, a
CIA “cut-out”. Babayan travelled to Perth and stayed at the home of Yosef Goldberg,
an Australian businessman of Israeli origin who was well connected to Israeli
intelligence and to the local Labor Party headed by Brian Burke, then premier of
Western Australia. Babayan handed the cheque to Goldberg, who in turn gave it to
Alan Bond in his role as the guardian of the John Curtin Foundation funds. This
money was passed on by one of Robert Maxwell’s companies in Australia to be held
by the Pergamon Press Trust Fund in Moscow. Babayan later corroborated the details
of this operation in a sworn affidavit.”
The publishers of Ben-Menashe’s book have confirmed that they hold an affidavit
from Babyan supporting Ben-Menashe’s account of his role in the making of the
donation.
In my taped interview with Ben-Menashe he elaborates on the detail of these events.
He is adamant that senior members of the ALP at that time knew about this payment.
He claims that Prime Minister Hawke was aware of it, but was at pains to say that
Treasurer Keating did not. No mention was made about whether or not the Minister
for Defence, Mr Beazley, knew of the payment.
Ben-Menashe also suggests that a bribe was involved.
It is a fact that arms were transferred through concealed routes from the USA to Iran.
As a close ally of the USA, it is quite plausible that Australia was part of one of those
routes. Ben-Menashe claims that payoffs and bribes were a routine part of these
illegal arms deals throughout the world, and in that respect there was nothing unique
about the payment to the Labor Party.
US$ 6 million from the CIA to the ALP
• Hadron Inc is a US company with ties to the CIA.
• Hadron Inc’s Earl Brian gives $6 million cheque to Richard Babayan, a
contract operative for the CIA.
• Babayan gives cheque to Yosef Goldberg, an Australian businessman of
Israeli origin well connected to Israeli intelligence and the ALP.
• Goldberg gives cheque to Alan Bond in his capacity as guardian of the ALP’s
John Curtin Foundation fund-raising entity.
1 Hadron Inc. is a US company
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