by proldic » Wed Sep 28, 2005 1:49 pm
"The Nation's about-face on the Middle East is typical of current writers on the Left. They describe the Middle East conflict as an Arab struggle for National Liberation, and, to make this view credible, they accept (or invent) fables about what happened in 1948, thus obscuring politics then and now. <br><br>The politics of Arab leaders was the subject of a 7 December 1946 Nation column by Julio Alvarez del Vayo. Mr. Del Vayo, a socialist who had been Foreign Minister of the Spanish Republic before it was overthrown by Francisco Franco's thugs, knew fascism first hand. He did not view Arab leaders such as Haj Amin al-Husseini, the former Mufti of Jerusalem, as heroes of National Liberation. That perspective was imposed after the fact, starting in the 1960s, when young leftists adopted a starry-eyed view of anything that smacked of Third World revolution. Rather, he saw them as fascists, experts in antisemitism and murder, offering their expertise to Big Power patrons. Observing that the British were utilizing notorious Nazi operatives such as Haj Amin al-Husseini in their divide-and-conquer strategy, del Vayo wrote that the Fascists did not then have a significant political base:<br><br>[Excerpt from Julio Alvarez del Vayo's 7 December 1946 Nation column, The People's Front, starts here]<br><br>[...]<br><br>But in general the strength of the [Arab] league is based on the suppression of all progressive movements and civil rights at home. Only last week an eminent Moslem liberal, Fawzi al Husseini, cousin and opponent of the Mufti [i.e., Haj Amin al-Husseini], was assassinated because he advocated friendly relations with the Jews. <br><br>The so-called irreconcilable conflict between Arabs and Jews is another bluff invented out of whole cloth by the big powers to serve their special interests. I remember the day at Geneva, in the early twenties, when at a private dinner Feisal [Emir Feisal, son of the leader of the Arab revolt against the Turks [2]] openly expressed himself in support of the Zionist cause. At that time the other Arab countries were much less concerned about Palestine. The "war" between Jews and Arabs started later, as a result of the work done by [Anglican] Bishop [Rennie] Macinnes, a notorious anti-Semite who was sent by the British to Jerusalem, and by Cardinal Barlassina, the Vatican representative. With the aid of General Storrs, who was then governor of Jerusalem, they brought the Mufti's family to power, supplying funds and other forms of help in an effort to delay the logical solution of the Palestine problem.<br><br>To suggest that the Arab League is a British invention designed solely to combat Zionism would be to narrow the issue and ignore the great dangers involved. After all, the Palestine problem will sooner or later be solved. But there will remain the Arab states, which today, because of Anglo-Soviet rivalry in the Middle East, are playing an international role out of all proportion to their importance. Ultimately they may prove a nuisance to both the major powers. The present pro-British orientation of the Arabs is, to say the least, ephemeral; replying to the charge that the Arab League "speaks Arabic with a British accent," Secretary General Accam [Azzam] Pasha said: "This suit is made of British cloth, but I am wearing it." As for Russia, if it plays ball with the Arab states, it will come off no better than it did in Peron's Argentina. Fascists remain fascists, and nothing can change them. --DEL VAYO [3]<br>[My emphasis]<br><br>[Excerpt from Julio Alvarez del Vayo's 7 December 1946 Nation column, The People's Front, ends here]<br><br><br>Original 1948 Article:<br><br>The Nation<br><br><br>Volume 166 New York * Saturday * May 8, 1948 No. 19, Part II<br><br><br>=====================<br><br>Introduction<br><br>=====================<br><br>***<br><br>The General Assembly of the United Nations, for the third time in twelve months, is meeting to discuss "the future government of Palestine." Discussions are taking place in an atmosphere of violence which may touch off an explosion far beyond the boundaries of the Holy Land. <br><br>The question which the General Assembly must face, and world opinion as well, is this: was an inherent injustice in the November 29 resolution of the General Assembly responsible for the current explosion? <br><br>The Nation Associates presents the facts in this memorandum as essential to a wise and just decision. An examination of the facts will show that the present violence in Palestine results from: <br><br>1) British sabotage of Partition -- This British sabotage was deliberately undertaken in order to insure British base rights in Palestine in perpetuity, as well as to safeguard British oil and trade and military interests in the Middle East. <br><br>2) British Alliance with Arab League -- To achieve these ends, the British have embarked on an alliance with the Arab League, composed of the governments of Egypt, Syria, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, Iraq, Transjordan, and Yemen. The Arab League, and not the Arab Higher Committee, controls the military and political developments among the Arabs of Palestine. Representatives of the British government were present at the meetings of the Arab League where the revolt was planned and organized and are in continuous connection with it. Within a month after the November 29th resolution, the Arabs were encouraged to believe partition would be substituted by a Federal State, and arms shipments continued to the Arab States despite their known use for Palestine warfare. On April 28 [1948] Foreign Minister Bevin was still refusing to halt them. <br><br>The facts will show, moreover, that: <br><br>The British have allowed 10,000 foreign invaders to enter Palestine, offering the feeble excuse that the British armed forces, consisting, at the outset, of over 80,000 men, could not adequately protect the border. <br><br>Although since December 11, 1947 the British have been promising to return to Transjordan the contingents of the Arab Legion brought to Palestine for police duty, they have allowed the members of that force to remain in Palestine and to attack Jewish communities. The only conclusion to be drawn is that the Arab Legion constitutes a major part of the effort to coerce the Jews into accepting less than the Jewish State granted by the United Nations. <br><br>At no time has the British government, in spite of its alleged impotence, requested any help from the United Nations; in fact, as the record shows, the British have continued to deprecate the situation, refused to identify the invaders, and have consistently denied that the Arab states as such are involved. <br><br>Through their action they have admitted into Palestine Arabs of known Nazi allegiance in command of the invading forces, and have even admitted escaped Nazi prisoners of war, now to be found in command of Arab detachments. <br><br>From secret British intelligence reports, which are quoted extensively in this record, it is clear that the British know and have always known of every single Arab troop movement in Palestine, and that their relations with the Arabs are such that they could ask Arab leaders to request the invading forces to remain unobtrusive. <br><br>British sabotage has resulted in turning Jerusalem into an armed camp, has permitted the Arabs to seize the Old City and to hold as hostages some 2000 Jews. <br><br>The British have failed to take any action to insure that Haifa should remain an open city, even though they were fully aware of the desire of local Arabs to achieve this and that the Jews wanted only to be safe from attack. <br><br>Their prejudice against the Jews has been clearly indicated in their refusal to allow the Jews to arm for defense against Arab attack, and their blowing up of Jewish defense posts; in their turning over to the Arabs - and to certain death - members of the Haganah; in their confiscation of Haganah arms; in their treatment of Jewish defense personnel as criminals. The British have connived at the starving of the Jewish population of Jerusalem by their failure to keep the highways open. They have refused armed escorts to the Jews. <br><br>Their attitude to the Arab community is quite different. By British admission, the Arab community has been armed by the British. Arab train robberies, which have been frequent, have been met with shooting over the heads of the robbers. Arab desertions from the police, for the purpose of joining the attackers, accompanied by the stealing of arms, have never been prevented, and Arab violators of the peace go unpunished. <br><br>To this record can be added the detailed facts concerning the fashion in which the British have destroyed central authority, and, under the guise of establishing greater local authority, turned over in largest part to the Arabs the various services of the Palestine government created and maintained chiefly by taxation of the Jewish community. Simultaneously, assets have been dissipated and vital communications disposed of to foreign agencies. The effect of this has been to seal the Jewish community in a limited area, cut off its access to the outside world by land and sea, and surround it by Arabs in order to create such a state of siege as would cause the Jews to send up a white flag. <br><br>By arrangement with the Arab League, if partition is shelved through any one of several schemes to assure Arab dominance in Palestine, the British are to receive base rights in Haifa, the Negev and Galilee. <br><br>But the British are not depending on Arab promises alone. They have already taken the necessary steps to assure the permanent rights in Palestine to air bases and land and sea communications. To be able to carry out this program, the Mandatory has required a free hand. That is why it has kept the United Nations Commission out of Palestine and refused it cooperation. <br><br>The facts contained in this document come for the most part from the confidential reports of British Intelligence.<br><br>So intent are the British upon destroying partition that they have shown themselves oblivious to the fact that with it they may destroy the authority of the United Nations, and even the peace of the world.<br><br>Freda Kirchwey, President<br>The Nation Associates<br><br>===============================================<br><br>I. British Pledge of <br>Cooperation not Carried out<br><br>===============================================***what is this<br><br>On November 13, 1947, Sir Alexander Cadogan, British delegate, told Sub-committee I of the Ad Hoc Committee on Palestine, in reply to a question as to whether the United Kingdom would accept the recommendations of the General Assembly:<br><br>"If the Assembly by a two-thirds majority approves any solution, His Majesty's Government would not take any action contrary to it."<br><br>On December 11, 1947, Arthur Creech Jones, British Colonial Secretary, told the House of Commons:<br><br>"I could not easily imagine circumstances in which the United Kingdom would wish to prevent the application of the settlement recommended by the General Assembly."<br><br>A day later, Foreign Minister Bevin told the House of Commons:<br><br>"I am not going and His Majesty's Government is not going to oppose the United Nations' decision. . . . There that decision is of that world organism whether we agree with it or not. It is on the statute book of that great organisation. May it be possible to implement it! If it is, and if my colleagues or I can render any assistance, with advice, with help, with our officials, with our administrative ability, with our historical knowledge, to smooth out the transition, to try to prevent the divisions from being widened - in other words to do anything possible to promote concord, friendship and amity between these peoples - we shall do it."<br><br>British pledge to maintain peace and security<br><br>A specific promise that the British would maintain law and order in Palestine was made by Colonial Secretary Creech Jones. In the House of Commons on December 11, 1947, he said:<br><br>"So long as the British remained in any part of Palestine they would maintain law and order in the area of which they were still in occupation. . .. It has been made quite clear by the High Commissioner to the leaders of the Jewish and Arab communities that so long as the Mandate continues the Mandatory Government is responsible for law and order and will do its duty in protecting the life and property of citizens irrespective of race. . .. Between now and the termination of the Mandate, the British Government in Palestine will remain responsible for law and order."<br><br>None of these pledges have been fulfilled.<br><br>Colonial Secretary Gives Preview of British Non-Cooperation<br><br>Actually, a preview of the form British non-cooperation would take was offered by Creech Jones on December 11, 1947, in the very same speech in which he assured the House of Commons of British compliance with the Assembly's resolution. He then made clear that the primary objective would be an orderly withdrawal of the British from Palestine. Then he set down the following principles:<br><br>1. "In order that the withdrawal may be conducted in the most orderly manner and with the least destruction of the ordinary life of the country, it is essential that the Mandatory Power should retain undivided control of the country until the evacuation is well under way. It will be appreciated that Mandatory responsibility for government in Palestine cannot be relinquished piecemeal. The whole complex of governmental responsibility must be relinquished by the Mandatory Government for the whole of Palestine on an appointed day. . . . And the date we have in mind for this, subject to negotiations with the United Nations Commission, is 15 May". . . .<br><br>2. "As His Majesty's Government have made it clear that they cannot take part in the implementation of the United Nations plan, it will be undesirable for the Commission to arrive in Palestine until a short period before the termination of the Mandate. For reasons of Administrative efficiency, responsibility, and security, this overlap period should be comparatively brief." . . . .<br><br>3. "Other matters on which negotiations with the United Nations Commission will have to be made include the proposal in the partition plan that an area situated in the Jewish state, including a seaport and hinterland, shall be evacuated by February 1, 1948. This presents considerable difficulty and must be studied further with the UN Commission in connection with the thorny problem of immigration. . . . If the traffic (immigration) is encouraged during the next few months a grave situation in Palestine will arise which will make an orderly withdrawal and transfer of authority extremely difficult. The camps in Cyprus also have to be emptied.<br><br>"The Government are aware of the strong resentment already expressed by the Arab States in regard to what may appear to them as encouragement to immigration for strengthening the Jewish State. It is essential to maintaining orderly life in Palestine, while at the same time, preparing, in accordance with international decision, to transfer authority."<br><br>Bevin Refuses to Assign Port<br><br>The following day, December 12, 1947, Ernest Bevin, Foreign Secretary, made clear that there would be no consultations with the United Nations Commission, declaring: "that the date for the termination of the Mandate had been fixed."<br><br>He told the House of Commons:<br><br>(1) "We have fixed, after the most careful consideration, the date of May 15. (2) We should have liked to have accepted the suggested date in February but we found it physically impossible to do so. [The reference being to the clearance of a port and area for Jewish immigration].<br><br>"I cannot agree to open a port until we lay down the Mandate. We cannot have two administrations at one time. Really, it is impossible."<br><br>The security situation was further offered as an excuse for failing to open a port for Jewish immigration, for refusing to permit recruitment of a Jewish militia as provided in the Assembly's resolution.<br><br>On March 10, 1948, Creech Jones again told the House of Commons:<br><br>"We have been unable on grounds of security to make a port available for the Jews from 1 February for immigration of men and arms. We could not thus render our authority over a part of Palestine while still retaining responsibility for law and order in the country."<br><br>He said further:<br><br>"We were also asked whether we would agree to allow the provisional councils of the two successor states to recruit armed militias from their residents, leaving political and military control to the Commission. We have made it clear that we could not permit any authority other than our own to exercise governmental functions in Palestine before the end of the Mandate. To allow the recruitment of militias would involve two distinct authorities in the country at one time, one of them taking steps to implement the United Nations plan. Further, such a procedure could not fail to increase immeasurably the possibility of grave disturbances while the Mandate still ran. The suggestion did not take account of the realities of the situation. The possible result of an attempt to form a representative militia for the proposed Jewish State, which includes some 400,000 Arabs in its area, when the Arabs were strongly resisting the implementation of the partition plan, should be apparent to everybody. The objections to this step, of course, apply with even greater force to the Jewish request that the Commission should immediately start to establish a purely Jewish militia for the Jewish State, with full training facilities and the acquisition of the necessary equipment and stores."<br><br>British Declare November 29 Resolution Unworkable<br><br>That same day, moreover, he told the House of Commons the decision was unworkable and forecast that the Commission would be unable to go to Palestine.<br><br>"The situation in Palestine has tragically deteriorated since the Assembly resolution. Consequently, the Assembly's plan, conceived as it was in conditions of strong partiality, has in some respects proved impractical and unworkable. . . . It is possible that the Palestine Commission of the UN may find itself unable to proceed to Palestine because suitable arrangements have not been made either by the Security Council or by other organs of the United Nations for it to take up its duties there."<br><br>On March 2, 1948, Creech Jones, in the Security Council of the United Nations, openly charged the partition plan with prejudice, declaring:<br><br>"It is not for me to comment on certain obvious defects in the partition plan which arose from its being conceived in conditions of strong partiality.<br><br>"The United States asks us to endorse the plan adopted by the General Assembly. For reasons which we have so often explained, we cannot do so. . .. We cannot participate in any way in the implementation of a plan which involves the coercion of one of the Communities, and in Palestine, that is the larger community."<br><br>Small wonder that on April 10 the Palestine Commission reported to the General Assembly that:<br><br>(1) Security has not been maintained and that "unless security is restored in Palestine, implementation of the resolution of the General Assembly will not be possible."<br><br>(2) That as a consequence of the non-cooperation of the Mandatory power:<br><br>"(a) The provisions of the Assembly's resolution for a progressive transfer of administration from the Mandatory Power to the Commission have not been complied with. The Mandatory Power has insisted on retaining undivided control of Palestine until the date of termination of the Mandate and on relinquishing the whole complex of governmental responsibilities on that day, except for the areas still occupied by British troops. In the view of the Mandatory Power the progressive transfer of authority refers only to those areas.<br><br>"(b) The Commission could not proceed to Palestine until two weeks prior to the termination of the Mandate. The insistence of the Mandatory Power on this point, even though the Commission has been prepared to restrict its activities in Palestine prior to 15 May 1948, to preparatory work and would not attempt to exercise any authority there, made it impossible for the Commission to take the necessary preparatory measure to ensure continuity in administration after the date of termination of the Mandate.<br><br>"(c) The Commission could not take any measures to establish the frontiers of the Arab and Jewish States and the City of Jerusalem, since the Mandatory Power informed the Commission that it could not facilitate the delimitation of frontiers on the ground.<br><br>"(d) The refusal of the Mandatory Power to permit any Provisional Council of Government, whether Arab or Jewish, if selected, to carry out any functions prior to the termination of the Mandate, made it necessary for the Commission, in accordance with Part I, B, 4 of the resolution of the General Assembly, to communicate that fact to the Security Council and to the Secretary-General.<br><br>"(e) The refusal of the Mandatory Power to permit the taking of preparatory steps toward the establishment of the armed militia, envisaged by the resolution for the purpose of maintaining internal order and preventing frontier clashes, has made it impossible to implement the Assembly's resolution in that respect."<br><br>=================================================<br><br>II. The Intention behind British Policy in Palestine<br><br>=================================================<br><br>On December 29, 1947, exactly one month following the United Nations decision on partition with economic union, the Lebanese Envoy in London, reporting to the Foreign Minister of Lebanon on a meeting between himself and Foreign Secretary Ernest Bevin, quoted Mr. Bevin as telling him the following: "Now that the question has reached this stage, we are determined to withdraw from Palestine so that Arabs and Jews should remain alone to face each other and the hard facts."<br><br>British Aim: A Federal State<br><br>In the same report, the Lebanese envoy wrote: "Official circles here believe that if America. . .were to change its position. . .the Arabs and Jews would remain alone face-to-face with the facts. The result would then be the attainment of a solution of the question on the basis of a federal state."<br><br>United States Minister to Beirut Tells About Federal Plan or Abdullah Conquest<br><br>On February 11, 1948, the United States Minister in Beirut, Mr. Lowell C. Pinkerton, informed the United States State Department of the plans being discussed in Lebanon for substituting the partition plan with a new scheme either in the form of a federal state or in the form of a Jewish state within a Greater Palestine. In his communication Mr. Pinkerton wrote:<br><br>"Many Lebanese feel that they have already shown an earnest of their intention to prevent partition at all costs, and that Jews now doubt their own ability to defend the territory allotted to them by the partition plan. <br><br>"Two proposals, at least, have been discussed, either of which might be acceptable to a sizeable number of the Arabs. If adopted, the first might be only prelude to the second:<br><br>"'1. Revival of the eleventh hour Arab compromise suggestion at Lake Success - cantonisation, or a federal state.<br><br>"'2. An autonomous Jewish state within a Greater Palestine, under King Abdullah, which would have all its own machinery of government. It has even been suggested that such a state might take all of the Jews now in displacement camps in Europe, since the question of a majority would not arise. This proposal would certainly meet widespread opposition in Syria, [Saudi] Arabia and possibly Egypt.'<br><br>"Visitors recently arrived in Lebanon from the United States are all eagerly questioned on the possibility of a change in the attitude of the United States towards partition, but no satisfactory reply has been received."<br><br>British Knowledge of Abdullah Plan to Occupy Palestine<br><br>On April 17, a day after the Security Council had adopted a resolution calling for a truce between the Arab Higher Committee and the Jewish Agency, and upon the neighbouring states to refrain from activity which would upset the truce, King Abdullah of Transjordan let it be known that he would send the Arab Legion into Palestine to defend the Arabs allegedly against the Jews.<br><br>On January 31, The Nation had reported a plan whereby King Abdullah of Transjordan would be permitted to overrun Palestine in exchange for giving up his ambition to establish the Greater Syrian Federation through the annexation of Syria and Lebanon.<br><br>On February 13 the British Fortnightly Intelligence Newsletter No. 61 Hq. Palestine confirmed The Nation's story and anticipated the April 17 declaration of Abdullah. British Intelligence reported that Musa Al Ami, head of the Iraqi-supported Arab Office, who had been living abroad for a year, had returned to the Middle East. <br><br>This is its explanation:<br><br>"Apart from the question of the Arab officers, there is reason to believe that Musa Al Ami's visit had certain political implications. It has been rumoured that in return for the shelving of the Greater Syria scheme, Syria and the Lebanon may be asked to consent to King Abdullah's occupying Palestine. Musa Al Ami's recent visit to the King may well have something to do with this."<br><br>==========================================================<br><br>III. British Representatives Present <br>When Arab League Projected Revolt<br><br>==========================================================<br><br>The Arab revolt was openly projected in the fall of 1947 at the very time when the United Nations were meeting in the regular Assembly session and discussing the Palestine issue. The decision to launch the revolt was made at a meeting of the Council of the Arab League in Sofar, Lebanon.<br><br>This meeting was attended not only by the heads of the Arab governments constituting the League, the Mufti and Fawzi Kawukji, later of the Arab liberation army in Palestine, but by Brigadier P. A. Clayton, the British representative in Egypt, and a number of his associates from Cairo and Jerusalem. It was at this meeting that the formation of a so-called volunteer force for the liberation of Palestine was decided upon, as against the use of regular troops of the Arab governments. The decision to substitute so-called volunteer forces for the regular armies was adopted under the influence of Brigadier Clayton and his associates. [My emphasis - J.I.] <br><br>The Arab League was in fact first projected in 1943 by Brigadier Clayton who was able to convince Anthony Eden, then Foreign Minister of England, of its usefulness. The League was formed in 1945 and Brigadier Clayton continues to be the only non-Moslem who regularly attends the meetings of the Arab League.<br><br>The participation of British representatives in Arab League meetings was confirmed by Richard H. S. Crossman, British MP in the House of Commons on December 11, 1947. He said:<br><br>"British diplomacy has, alas concentrated Arab attention to the Zionist issue. At meetings of the Arab League British representatives have been in attendance regularly even when the most violent anti-Jewish actions were approved. We are now suffering the consequences of creating the Arab League on the basis of a single programme of denying a Jewish state to the Jews." [My emphasis - J.I.] <br><br>Arabs careful not to attack the British<br><br>On March 6, 1948, E. D. Horn, acting for the Chief Secretary of Palestine, addressed a communication to the District Commissioner of Jerusalem, copies of which were dispatched to all district commissioners, asking them to request Arab leaders to see to it that the foreign soldiers in Palestine remained as unobtrusive as possible. In this communication, numbered C.S.749 and marked "top secret," Mr. Horn wrote:<br><br>"It is the opinion of the Committee that this development greatly increases the risk of clashes taking place between these persons and the security forces and I am to request that you will take whatever steps are possible to bring this danger to the notice of Arab leaders who would be well advised to secure that the foreign soldiers remain as unobtrusive as possible."<br><br>British condone invaders<br><br>British Intelligence in Palestine is authority for the statement that the Arabs have careful instructions not to fight the British. Fortnightly Intelligence Newsletter No. 61 of February 13, 1948, issued by Hq. British Troops in Palestine, reported that the Arab irregulars are "anxious to avoid being involved with the British troops, in fact, they have orders to surrender rather than fight their way out if challenged by British troops." <br><br>The Fortnightly Intelligence Newsletter No. 62, Hq. Palestine, dated February 27, 1948, further says:<br><br>"The Arab leaders are anxious not to aggravate the British in any way but the question is whether so many men, possibly ten thousand of them at present in this country, with their bitter hatred of the Jews and their excitable character, whose sole raison d'etre is the killing of Jews, can hold themselves in check until the British forces have quitted."<br><br>In proof of this careful Arab attitude, the Fortnightly Intelligence Newsletter No. 63 dated March 12, by the Hq. British Troops in Palestine, reported the following:<br><br>"18. On three different occasions, the GOC's car and escort were attacked in the vicinity of Bab el Wad on the Jerusalem-Jaffa road. On the first occasion a Brigadier travelling from Sarafand to Jerusalem in the car was shot at and a bullet penetrated the bonnet. On the second occasion the car was hit three times, once through the door, once through the window and once through the petrol tank. Fortunately there were no passengers and no one was hurt. Two days later the car ran into the line of fire when at Kilo 21 on the same road a Jewish convoy was engaged by fire from Arabs. Doctor Hussein Khalidi of the Arab Higher Executive told an officer of this Headquarters that in his opinion the car had not been attacked by Arabs as they had been instructed to avoid conflict with the security forces. A phone call received by this Headquarters from a person who claimed to be Abdul Kadir el Husseini, denied that Arabs had fired at the GOC's car. Arabs held great respect for the British and especially the GOC, the speaker claimed."<br><br>==============================================<br><br>IV. British know every Arab invasion plan<br><br>==============================================<br><br>On April 10 the Palestine Commission of the United Nations, in its report to the General Assembly, stated that violence in Palestine as of April 3 has resulted in 6,187 killed and wounded, including 121 British dead, 309 wounded; 959 Arabs dead, 2,118 wounded; 875 Jews dead, 1,858 wounded.<br><br>The casualties were inflicted in the course of Arab attacks and Jewish reprisals. Responsibility for the violence rests in chief part on some 10,000 Arab invaders who have entered Palestine as members of the Arab Army of Liberation formed by the Arab League and representing incursions from Egypt, Syria, Lebanon, Iraq, and Transjordan, and upon members of the Transjordan Arab Legion, units of which are stationed in Palestine.<br><br>The British government, which maintains a number of liaison officers with the Palestine Commission, has reported to that Commission only six incursions involving small numbers. And it has offered as the excuse for not stopping these incursions the length of the frontier, the difficult nature of the terrain, and therefore the impossibility of one hundred percent frontier control.<br><br>Secret British Reports Give Full Data<br><br>The fact is, however, that the British are fully aware of every incursion of foreign invaders and their exact deployment. This is indicated in the reports of British Military Intelligence in Palestine and the Middle East. A few typical excerpts from these reports indicate as early as last January the full knowledge of British Military Intelligence, and therefore of the Palestinian administration, the British Colonial Office, and the British Foreign Office.<br><br>A report on Arab infiltration was offered on January 30, 1948, in the Fortnightly Intelligence Newsletter No. 60 issued by HQ Palestine:<br><br>"19. The main item of interest is undoubtedly the arrival of Arab bands from outside Palestine. The figures have varied considerably, but it is thought that they can be put at between 1,000 and 1,500. They are almost certainly members of Fawzi Qauqji's [Kawukji - EC] Yarmuk Division, to which reference has been made in previous newsletters. Contrary to numerous rumors, however, Fawzi himself has not entered Palestine. He has constantly stated that he has no intention whatever of returning to this country like a thief in the night as the head of a rabble, and that he will come when preparations are complete and he can do so openly as a soldier."<br><br>On February 13, 1948, the Fortnightly Intelligence Newsletter No. 61 issued by HQ British Troops in Palestine, reported:<br><br>"More and more Arab irregulars have crossed the Syrian and Lebanese borders and moved into villages in the Safed area and the Galilee hills."<br><br>British Intelligence Reports Detailed Invasion Plan<br><br>On March 5, in a secret report entitled "Intelligence Summary No. 68" by the Sixth Airborne Division, a detailed record of the Arab invasion was presented:<br><br>"12. The infiltration of Arab bands from the neighbouring Arab States is continuing and an Arab source thought reliable has estimated the strength of the Arab Liberation Army in Samaria as being approximately 5,000, organised into four detachments:<br><br>"'(a) The Yarmuk: This was the first to arrive and is now located in the Jenin sub-district with its Headquarters at Sir 179196.<br><br>"'(b) The Huttein: (Named after the battle of the Horns of Huttin 1187), located in the Tulkarm sub-district and reported to be commanded by an Iraqi named Nashed Bey.<br><br>"'(c) The Hussein: (Probably named after the Mufti), occupying the Tubas area but believed to be incomplete. This detachment is said to be equipped with a British type rifle, and to be about 800 strong at present.<br><br>"'(d) The Circassian: Composed of about 300 men - a further draft of 300 is expected shortly. This detachment is commanded by an ex-Captain of the Syrian Regular Army, and is reported to be moving into the hills to the west of Nablus.'<br><br>"Whilst the main Arab forces are located in the Nablus-Jenin-Tulkarm area, it is known that a strong force is being built up in the Galilee hills and further reports have been received of the movement of small Arab bands across the Lebanese frontier into the villages of Upper Galilee.<br><br>"13. According to a reliable source, approximately 1,000 men crossed the Transjordan and Lebanese frontiers into Palestine on 25 February in 100 trucks. These Arab irregulars are reported to be dressed in American type battle dress with orange hattas. One detachment of some 500 men went to the Nablus area via Tubas and was received by members of the National Committee. A parade was held in their honour attended by Arab Scouts and Youth Organisations. More than 10,000 local Arabs are said to have been present and the Mayor of Nablus and the President of the National Committee both made short addresses to the assembly. Mohd Saffar, Arab Commander in the Nablus area, then lectured this detachment of newly-arrived irregulars in the Palestine Hotel, Nablus. Following this address which lasted for two hours, the group is reported to have left for the Beisan area where the report states, they will be used in attacks on Jewish colonies which are expected to take place in the near future.<br><br>"14. The second detachment, also of approximately 599, are reported to have crossed the Lebanese frontier in the area of Bint Jhall 190280 where they were met by high-ranking officers in the 'National Liberation Army.' This detachment later dispersed into villages in the Upper Galilee area. The report indicates that these two contingents are the most well-equipped to cross the frontier to date. They are armed with rifles, Brens and other automatic weapons, and heavier type gun of unspecified calibre for use in the hills. Each man is said to be carrying arms sufficient for two persons, as the band is hoping to be backed up by local guerillas who will be recruited throughout the area. The leader of the force is an Iraqi officer, who informed local leaders in the Acre sub-district that the detachment would remain in the villages in Galilee as a force available for defence, until orders are received from the Arab Liberation Army Headquarters in Damascus to start the offensive."<br><br>British Reveal Kawukji's 's Entry into Palestine<br><br>On March 12, Fortnightly Intelligence Newsletter No. 63 issued by Hq. British Troops in Palestine, supplemented his report with the following:<br><br>"13. The arrival in Samaria of Fauzi Qauqji [Kawukji - EC] is definitely confirmed, but he is believed to be paying a short visit only this time. He has indicated his desire not to embarrass the authorities in any way, but when in Transjordan recently it was reported that he talked about renewed activity against Jewish settlements, possibly with the intention of influencing the UN Security Council. It has not yet been confirmed which route he used to enter Palestine although strong rumor has it that he came across Allenby bridge at night."<br><br>German Officers and Jugoslav Moslems Join Liberation Army<br><br>On January 19, C. T. Evans, the District Commissioner for the Galilee District, wrote to the Chief Secretary of Palestine, Sir Henry Guerney, that the training of the Arab Liberation army is by European volunteers and that, in fact, one of the incursions was led by a German officer. In this connection, Mr. Evans wrote:<br><br>"There is no doubt that well equipped volunteers are coming across the Lebanese frontier and bivouacking in Palestine in such inaccessibly places as Wadi Kurn. They appear to be bound mainly to Jaffa and that such local Arabs trying to join have been turned away. The volunteers are not coming down on the villages for provisioning.<br><br>"It is reported that European volunteers are being brought to Syria and the Lebanon as instructors and one of the parties who have crossed the frontier is stated to have been led by a German officer."<br><br>On March 12, in the Fortnightly Intelligence Newsletter No. 63, issued by the HQ British Troops in Palestine, the British revealed the presence in Palestine of non-Arab volunteers as members of the Arab Liberation army, including German officers and Yugoslav Moslems. The report declares:<br><br>"11. An observer of the Arab scene in Palestine has given an appreciation of the non-Arab volunteers who have been working with Arabs in Palestine owing to allegiance to the Mufti. Firstly there are the Jugoslav Moslems, estimated at less than a dozen in number who are attached to Abdul Qadir Al Husseini in the Jerusalem area. They have had experience in warfare and have expert knowledge of underground activities. Their number is almost certain to be increased later. Then there are three or four German Officers attached to Sheikh Hassan Salameh in areas around Jaffa and Lydda. One popular rumor has it that they are survivors of the Germans who parachuted down during the last war in the Jericho region to contact Salameh, with whom they have kept in touch ever since. These Germans refuse to meet any British volunteers. Thirdly, there are constant rumors of some British nationals, but little or nothing is known about them." *A<br><br>"12. The infiltration of the Arab Liberation Army into Palestine continues, particularly in the Ras el Ain area *B and Jaffa, where the new commander, Abdel Bey Najin ed Din, who took over from Abdul Wahab Bey when the latter went to Syria, probably has some 1,500 regulars under his command. The Jaffa-Tel Aviv struggle has already entered a new phase, the Arabs having adopted a plan of attack as opposed to their former policy of defence."<br><br>*A Despite this, Foreign Minister Bevin still says he has no knowledge of non-Arab fighters in Palestine.<br><br>*B Area of the water pipe line to Jerusalem, mined by Arabs on April 8. <br><br>British Know Every Detail of Invaders' Deployment<br><br>On March 19, British Intelligence put out a document on the Arab liberation army detailing its location in every area of Palestine, its numbers, and its command as follows:<br><br>- ARAB LIBERATION ARMY -<br><br>Information as at 19.3.48<br><br>General: - G.O.C. Gen. Ismail Safwat Pasha, formerly Deputy Chief of Staff to the Iraqi Army, H.Q. DAMASCUS<br><br>Commands in Palestine: - <br><br>North Pal: O.C. Fawzi Al Kaukji Bey.<br><br>2. i/c Mohd Bey As Safa.<br><br>[I assume this means that Fawzi Al Qauqji Bey was the Commanding Officer and Mohd Bey As Safa was his Deputy- Emperor's Clothes<br>- Jared Israel ]<br><br>East Pal: O.C. Abdul Qadir Husseini.<br><br>West Pal: O.C. Sheik Hassan Salama.<br><br>2. i/c a German Engineer Officer.<br><br>South Pal: Acting O.C. Col. Tarik Bey, a Sudanese.<br><br>Detail - <br><br>North Pal:<br><br>Forces at present in this area are mainly concentrated in the Samaria district. They consist of four regiments, each of two or three battalions. Total strength is reported as about 4,000. The Safad-Nazareth-Acre area does not seem to be garrisoned by A.L.A. troops, but is used by troops in transit. Attacks in this area would appear to be the work of local gangs or troops on sorties from Syria. <br><br>Yarmuk Regt. - O.C. Mohd Bey As Safa, Lebanese.<br><br>Located in the Jenin area with an H.Q. at Sir 179176. Responsible for the attack on Tirat Tsevi on 16 February.<br><br>Huttein Regt. - O.C. Nashed Bey.<br><br>Located in the area south of Tulkarm, with a battalion 600 strong under an Iraqi at Ras Al Ain 144167. Responsible for the attack on Magdiel 141 174.<br><br>Hussein Regt. - O.C. Abdul Wahab.<br><br>Located north of Tulkarm, with an H.Q. at Attil 157197. Responsible for the attack on Marbata 15282070 on 28 February.<br><br>Circassian Regt. - O.C. Issan Bey.<br><br>Located in the Nablus area. Reported to have made no attacks as yet.<br><br>East Pal:<br><br>Forces are mainly in the Jerusalem area. They consist of Husseini gangsters and do not appear to be properly organised or disciplined.<br><br>West Pal:<br><br>Area corresponds to the Civil District of Lydda together with that part of the Gaza District North of a line Al Majdal 111119 to Falluja 126114.<br><br>Jaffa area - O.C. Lt. Col. Abdel Najn Ad Din Bey.<br><br>Strength reported to be more than 2,000 men, possibly part of the Yarmuk regiment. This garrison includes Yugoslavs trained in sabotage. <br><br>Ramle area<br><br>Strength two battalions of 500 men, each commanded by an Iraqi captain. One battalion H.Q. reported at 13671504; the other at Salama village.<br><br>South Pal:<br><br>H.Q. of the district is at Mughazi camp 091092. <br><br>Julis area.<br><br>1,000 men reported to be forming up at Julis camp 119122, which is at present commanded by Capt. Ibrahim Isdar, a Syrian. This area may be used as a base hospital. <br><br>Gaza area - Mustafa Al Wakil bn, an Egyptian unit, is at Gaza air field 199198. 200 men are reported at Maghazi.<br><br>A training camp is in the process of being established at Nabi Husein 108118.<br><br>===============================================<br><br>V. Arab Legion cannot Move without British Signal<br><br>===============================================<br><br>On December 12, 1947, Foreign Minister Bevin told the House of Commons that the units of the Transjordan Arab Legion would be withdrawn from Palestine. He said:<br><br>"I was asked a question about the Arab Legion. I should explain that this is a Force, which owes allegiance to the King of Transjordan, but units of it have, for some time, been serving under the orders of the British G.O.C. in accordance with a long-standing arrangement with King Abdullah. It has been decided that all these units will be withdrawn from Palestine at the same time as the withdrawal of the British Forces. That withdrawal will be completed when the withdrawal of the British Forces is completed."<br><br>British Promise to Withdraw Arab Legion from Palestine<br><br>But on April 16, these units numbering some thousands were still in Palestine, encamped near the units of Arab invading forces, still engaged in a series of unprovoked aggressions on peaceful Jewish residents and passersby. On that date Sir Alexander Cadogan told the Security Council: "We have already announced that the units of the Arab League in Palestine will be withdrawn before the Mandate comes to an end."<br><br>The following day, however, on April 17, King Abdullah of Transjordan announced that he would send his Arab Legion into Palestine to help the Arabs, and was seconded by his Foreign Minister, a threat which has since been repeated. On April 26, King Abdullah announced that on May 1st he would march into Palestine in personal command of the armies of Transjordan, Syria and Lebanon.<br><br>Could King Abdullah carry out his threat without British knowledge and consent? The facts show that Transjordan is a military appendage of the British and could not act without their knowledge and consent.<br><br>The Arab Legion, regarded as the finest military force in the Middle East, is under the command of a Britisher, Brigadier J.B. Glubb. The Legion is organized, trained, officered, and paid for by the British government at a cost of more than $7,500,000 annually. Nonetheless, Foreign Minister Bevin told the House of Commons on April 28:<br><br>"I am not going to be drawn into promises and commitments about the Transjordan Force until I know the final decision of the U.N. on Palestine."<br><br>Do the British Control the Arab Legion?<br><br>The first partition of Palestine took place in 1922 when the British separated Transjordan from it. In January 1946, Great Britain, without the consent of the United Nations, announced the independence of Transjordan which, since 1922, had been governed under the Palestine Mandate.<br><br>On March 22, 1946, the British Government announced the conclusion of a Treaty of Alliance with Transjordan, which recognized Transjordan as an independent Kingdom, and the Emir Abdullah as its sovereign. In an annex to the Treaty, provision was made for British bases in Transjordan and the training of the armed forces of that country by British military personnel. <br><br>On March 15, 1948 a new Treaty of Alliance was signed between Transjordan and Great Britain. Under the new Treaty, Britain continues its annual grant for the maintenance of Transjordan's armed forces. Brigadier John Bagot Glubb, commander of the Transjordan Arab Legion, retains his post under King Abdullah. The British are responsible as well for equipping the Legion, and supply, in addition to Brigadier Glubb, more than 40 British senior officers. <br><br>Provisions of 1948 Treaty with Transjordan<br><br>Under the March Treaty, the British receive the right to maintain units of the R.A.F. in Transjordan. The British finance the maintenance and development of airfields, ports, roads and other lines of communication. The British undertake to train Transjordan Forces in the United Kingdom or in any British colony. In Transjordan joint training operations are to be maintained with the British providing training personnel. The British undertake to provide arms, ammunition, equipment, aircraft and other war materials; all Transjordan war materials to be standardized with that of the British. The British receive port rights. To carry out the military alliance a permanent Joint Defense Board has been set up.<br><br>=================================================<br><br>VI. The British "Protection" of Jerusalem<br><br>=================================================<br><br>On December 11, 1947 Arthur Creech-Jones, Secretary of State for the Colonies, told the House of Commons: <br><br>"Up to the date of the relinquishment of the Mandate the Palestine Government remains responsible for the security of Jerusalem and its Holy places."<br><br>But not even the special position of Jerusalem has deterred the British from sacrificing it to its own plans for an Arab alliance.<br><br>To be sure, soon after the passage of the November 29 resolution, the British government did cooperate with the Trusteeship Council of the United Nations in drawing up a draft statute for Jerusalem establishing it as an international city under international trusteeship. But when the Arab Higher Committee objected to its efforts on the score that it was implementing one of the November 29 General Assembly resolutions, the line of cooperation was dropped and supplanted by the line of capitulation. <br><br>Under the guise of spurious neutrality it made possible a series of events initiated by the Arabs which have splattered the sanctity of the Holy City with blood.<br><br>Thus, thanks to British neutrality:<br><br>1. Ben Yahuda Street, the chief commercial center of Jewish Jerusalem, was bombed.<br><br>2. A band of the Mufti's henchmen, calling itself the Arab National Guard, could seize and hold with impunity the Old City of Jerusalem, where the ancient shrines of all the religions are to be found; and keep 2,000 Jews as hostages. The British have even concluded an agreement with this band permitting passage to distribute food and other supplies.<br><br>3. Thus the Arabs could bomb the offices of the Jewish Agency on March 11, killing 13 and wounding forty-five.<br><br>4. The Arabs could on April 13, within full sight of a British army post, attack a Hadassah medical convoy flying a medical symbol in the course of which 76 persons were killed and 20 wounded. The casualties included the Director of the Hadassah Hospital, Dr. H. Yassky, doctors, nurses, and other medical personnel, as well as academic staff including scientists attached to the Hebrew University of Mt. Scopus. <br><br>This attack took place within two hundred yards of a British Army Post. Iraqi soldiers were among the Arab gangs which attacked the convoy. The attack lasted for six hours before the eyes of the British Military, who not only failed to halt the attack, but prevented the Haganah from coming to the rescue. <br><br>The April 13 attack was the climax of a series begun on December 30, 1947. Continuous complaints and a request for protection of the road, which leads to the Hadassah Hospital and the Hebrew University, had been made by the Jewish Community Council of Jerusalem and by Hadassah itself.<br><br>The area requiring protection was half a mile in length on the Scopus Road. Between March 26 and April 6 no incidents occurred. On December 27 the Arab Higher Committee, and on January 13 the Palestine Arab Medical Association issued memoranda asking the Arabs to refrain from attacking hospitals, ambulances, doctors, nurses. None the less, these attacks were accelerated. On March 17 Abdel Kadi el-Husseini, then the Arab Military Commander in the Jerusalem area (subsequently killed by the Haganah) publicly announced that he would occupy or even demolish the Hadassah Hebrew University Medical Center. <br><br>Despite the full evidence concerning this, no effective action was taken by the British. <br><br>On April 13 British soldiers watched the Arab onslaught, and instructed the Haganah not to send reinforcements. When Jewish reinforcements finally reached the scene, they were blocked by the British. When British troops ultimately intervened they fired mortar shells not only at the Arabs, but at Jews trying to defend themselves from the Arabs. <br><br>When Jacques de Reynier, representative of the International Red Cross, attempted to arrange a truce, it took the British five and one half hours to bring M. de Reynier to the scene of the attack, which is not more than a 10 minute ride from the heart of Jerusalem.<br><br>Not even the events of April 13 caused the British to safeguard the road, with the result that on April 24 the Hadassah Hospital had been, for a week, without food replenishments. <br><br>When on April 25, the Haganah attempted to insure safe passage on the road and captured a key Arab attacking post, Sheikh Jarrah village, the British in force encircled the Haganah and compelled their evacuation. <br><br>5. Though the Mufti's Organization, the Arab Higher Committee, with its headquarters in Jerusalem is directing the whole operation, not one of its leaders has been arrested.<br><br>On the contrary, the British have refused permission to the Jewish population to organize their own defense. <br><br>They have blown up Jewish defense posts. <br><br>They have advised the Jews to evacuate the commercial section of Jerusalem. <br><br>The British authorities are conniving at the starving of the Jewish population of Jerusalem. <br><br>They have failed to protect the highways and refused to allow armed escorts and self-arming by the Jews.<br><br>British Attack Jews<br><br>When the Jewish Agency told the UN Palestine Commission that the Jews of Jerusalem were starving because of Arab road blocks on the road from Tel-Aviv to Jerusalem, and that the British Government had neither offered to escort food convoys nor stipulated conditions under which escort might be provided, J. Fletcher Cooke, British Liaison with the UN Commission, replied on April 12, 1948 with an attack on the Jews.<br><br>He said:<br><br>"It should be emphasized again that the problem is not one of food shortage in Palestine as a whole. The Government of Palestine has reported that there is food available in Palestine to maintain the necessary supplies for Jerusalem. The problem is entirely one of the transport of this food from the ports to Jerusalem.<br><br>"It may be added that transport by rail to Jerusalem is ruled out because, even if trains succeeded in escaping Arab attacks or sabotage en route, the railway station at Jerusalem is in a predominantly Arab area, and the Arabs would not permit off-loading of food destined for the Jews. Any attempt to do this would result in a major engagement."<br><br>He then proceeded to place the blame on the Jews.<br><br>"(2) Very early in the disturbances which have occurred in Palestine since 29 November, 1947, attacks on traffic using this road were made by both Jews and Arabs. It is difficult to say who initiated these attacks, but it is fairly certain that firing action was first taken by the Jews after their vehicles had been stoned by Arabs in Ramleh.<br><br>"(3) The situation then developed into a fight for control of the road. The Arabs, no doubt in order to facilitate action by their troops, withdrew all their own vehicles from the stretch of the road in question and were then secure in the knowledge that any civilian traffic which they cared to attack must be Jewish.<br><br>"(4) The Jews then appealed for assistance. During December certain escorts were provided by the Army and the Police; but it became the Jewish practice to produce at the convoy rendezvous more vehicles than had been arranged for, with the result that the escort provided was insufficient. The blame for this was laid by the Jews on the Government of Palestine."<br><br>He then charged the Jews with being responsible for the failure of their food convoys to get through because of "the employment by Jews of long slow columns of armored and unarmoured vehicles."<br><br>The British representative also disclosed an attempt to get Arab permission for Jewish food convoys, "provided nothing but food was carried; that Jewish accompanying personnel were reduced to a minimum and that convoys were subject to search at some selected point."<br><br>Mr. Fletcher Cooke was greatly surprised that Jewish Agency officials refused this offer of capitulation to the Arabs.<br><br>British Draft Capitulation Under Truce Guise<br><br>Last month the British were agents for another proposal for capitulation by the Jews. Mr. R. Graves, nominated by the Palestine government as the Chairman of the Municipal Commission of Jerusalem, drafted a peace project for Jerusalem, later amended by Sir Henry Gurney [Guerney - EC], the Chief Secretary of Palestine. <br><br>This peace project proposed that "all armed men should leave the portion of the Old City occupied by Orthodox Jews whose safety would be guaranteed by the Arabs if this were done. And the old Montefiore quarter should be similarly evacuated by all armed men and placed under the protection of British forces and the municipality." <br><br>Other provisions of the plan were:<br><br>"(a) Each Community should for the time being restrict the movement of its members to its own areas which will be policed by its own members of the Municipal Police Force.<br><br>"(b) Each Community should solemnly undertake not to attack the other by sending armed men into that Community's area or by firing from one area into another.<br><br>"(c) Each Community should bind itself to exercise the utmost self restraint and control the violent elements in its midst.<br><br>"(d) Each Community should refrain from retaliation and reprisals, which can only make it more difficult for the leaders of either Community to prevent further attacks and counter reprisals. This recommendation is the most difficult of fulfilment, but it is the most important of all.<br><br>"(e) Each Community should fully respect all vehicles carrying the Red Cross, Red Crescent or Red Shield, and should undertake that any such vehicle would not be used for any purpose not authorized by these signs.<br><br>"(f) Passage by members of one Community through the territory of the other would be permitted in the case of funeral parties or revictualling parties under a flag of truce. A minimum number of omnibuses should be permitted to operate.<br><br>"(g) No armed men should be permitted to live within any area reserved for the other Community." <br><br>On March 9 Mr. Graves told the Chief Secretary, Sir Henry Gurney [Guerney]:<br><br>"I have the honor to inform you that I have handed copies of my Peace Project for Jerusalem as amended by you, and with a few minor additions, to Dr. Hussein Khalidi, Secretary of the Arab Higher Committee, and Mr. David Ben Gurion, Chairman of the Executive Committee of the Jewish Agency for Palestine. <br><br>"2. Dr. Khalidi was very polite and thanked me for my initiative, promising to submit the Project to his Executive. He has now sent me a letter, of which I enclose a copy, stating that he and the Higher Executive consider that the arrangements contemplated are premature at the present stage. <br><br>"3. I saw Mr. Ben Gurion yesterday and discussed the Project which had been in his hands for a few days.<br><br>"4. He disagreed with the number and the variety of the clauses, and would not accept the proposal that the Jews of the Old City should be guaranteed by the Arabs after the withdrawal of the Haganah which he said was insulting to Jewry, and considered that the proposed restriction of Jews to Jewish areas and Arabs to Arab areas was undesirable and offensive to both Communities. <br><br>"5. However, he said that he and the Yishuv were very anxious for the peace of Jerusalem and were prepared to undertake that not a shot would be fired by any Jew in the City for a specified agreed period – a week, a month or a year – if the Arabs would make and observe a similar undertaking. When I mentioned that he might have some difficulty in making Jewish dissidents comply with such an undertaking, he said that he would be able to do so.<br><br>"6. I promised to convey his views to the Arab Higher Executive."<br><br>The Breakdown of the Jerusalem Water Supply<br><br>On April 8, 1948 an Arab mine blew up the main water pipeline to Jerusalem at Ras-el-Ain. For seven hours water flooded the fields. The line was finally repaired by the Haganah and British army engineers. <br><br>The British authorities claimed that the destruction of the pipeline was accidental and that the Arabs did not know that the pipeline passed under the road at the point where the mining operation took place. But the revelations of British Intelligence on March 12 contradicts the British assertion. <br><br>Until the end of World War I Jerusalem was dependent upon wells and cisterns. After World War I, Jerusalem began to bring its water from two nearby sources, Solomon's Pools, south of Bethlehem, and the spring of Ein Farah, six miles from Jerusalem. In 1937, to meet the needs of a growing population, the Palestine government built a pipeline bringing water from the coastal plain, Ras-el-Ain, forty miles from Jerusalem, which was pumped through the hills to Jerusalem and supplies Jerusalem with 1,500,000 cubic meters of water annually. <br><br>The pipeline runs entirely through Arab territory. Part of the area through which the pipeline runs was captured by the Jews, but a 20-mile section from Ras-el-Ain to Bab el Wad remains under Arab control, exposing the pipeline to continuous danger of being cut. <br><br>The chief victim of an interruption of the water supply would be the Jewish community of Jerusalem. Most of the Arabs in Jerusalem have cisterns and wells. <br><br>But the fact of the matter is that the threat to the Jerusalem water supply has been so serious and constant that as far back as January 1948 negotiations were begun by the chairman of the Municipal Commission, Mr. R. N. Graves, in an effort to safeguard the water supply station. Ultimately the station at Ras-el-Ain was abandoned to Iraqi armed troops which took over the military camp there. And Mr. Graves withdrew his demands for protection when the Lydda District Commissioner and the military commander of the South Palestine District explained that security forces were not inclined to drive them out by force and the Haganah probably could not do so. <br><br>Today, the sole deterrent to another attack on the pipeline is the supposed desire of the Arabs to maintain the water supply for their own use. <br><br>=========================================================<br><br>VII. Mufti Turned down Request that Haifa be Declared an Open City<br><br>=========================================================<br><br>On April 22, the city of Haifa was captured by the Haganah and the Arabs sued for peace. That same afternoon the representative of Syria, Faris el-Khouri, complained to the Political Committee of the General Assembly of the United Nations at Lake Success concerning what he called the massacre of Arabs. But the fact is that it was the Mufti, Chairman of the Arab Higher Committee, who prevented Haifa from being declared an open city. And it is the British Intelligence in Palestine which is the authority for that statement. <br><br>Nor did the British make any attempt to assure this even though as far back as December, Creech Jones in the House of Commons, anticipated disturbances in that city.<br><br>In its Fortnightly Newsletter No. 61, dated February 13, 1948, the British Intelligence reported the Arab effort to make Haifa an open city.<br><br>"Toward the end of January a delegation representing all classes of Arabs from Haifa, headed by Archbishop Hakim, visited the Mufti in Cairo with the intention, it was rumored, of obtaining support for a plan to declare Haifa an ‘open city.' It was unsuccessful. (However, it is learned that all sections of the Arab community have been placed under the command of the Haifa Arab national committee, who feel that it is in their own interest to maintain peace in the city for as long as possible. This, and the fact that the moneyed Jewish community in Haifa wishes for peace, provides some grounds for the hope that order may be maintained there for some time. Both communities are well armed and tension of course exists. The situation depends entirely upon the control the leaders of both factions are able to maintain over their more irresponsible followers.)" <br><br>On April 24, Sir Alexander Cadogan told the Security Council that the Syrian charges were without justification and that in fact only about 100 Arabs had been killed. <br><br>From Jerusalem, Sir Allen Cunningham, British High Commissioner, informed the British Foreign Offic
