Surveillance

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United States Air Force 70th ISR Wing, Cryptology

Postby Allegro » Thu Aug 29, 2013 10:33 pm

RESOURCE

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    WIKI excerpt | 70th Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance Wing is a United States Air Force unit assigned to the Air Force Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance Agency (AF ISR Agency). It is stationed at Fort George G. Meade, Maryland.

    Known as “America’s Cryptologic Wing”, is the only Air Force wing that supports the National Security Agency, AF ISR Agency and the entire United States Air Force (USAF) with cryptologic intelligence.

    The 70th Reconnaissance Group conducted observation, artillery adjustment and fighter and bomber support training with United States Army ground forces during World War II. The group served as a reserve unit for two years later in the decade. During the Cold War, the 70th was a component wing of Strategic Air Command’s (SAC) deterrent force as a strategic reconnaissance organization and heavy bombardment wing. It is commanded by Colonel Mary F. O’Brien[1]; its Command Chief Master Sergeant is Chief Master Sergeant Danny L. Crudup[2]

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    WIKI excerpt | Cryptography (or cryptology; from Greek κρυπτός, "hidden, secret"; and γράφειν, graphein, "writing", or -λογία, -logia, "study", respectively)[1] is the practice and study of techniques for secure communication in the presence of third parties (called adversaries).[2] More generally, it is about constructing and analyzing protocols that overcome the influence of adversaries[3] and which are related to various aspects in information security such as data confidentiality, data integrity, authentication, and non-repudiation.[4] Modern cryptography intersects the disciplines of mathematics, computer science, and electrical engineering. Applications of cryptography include ATM cards, computer passwords, and electronic commerce.

    Cryptography prior to the modern age was effectively synonymous with encryption, the conversion of information from a readable state to apparent nonsense. The originator of an encrypted message shared the decoding technique needed to recover the original information only with intended recipients, thereby precluding unwanted persons to do the same. Since World War I and the advent of the computer, the methods used to carry out cryptology have become increasingly complex and its application more widespread.

    Modern cryptography is heavily based on mathematical theory and computer science practice; cryptographic algorithms are designed around computational hardness assumptions, making such algorithms hard to break in practice by any adversary. It is theoretically possible to break such a system but it is infeasible to do so by any known practical means. These schemes are therefore termed computationally secure; theoretical advances, e.g., improvements in integer factorization algorithms, and faster computing technology require these solutions to be continually adapted. There exist information-theoretically secure schemes that provably cannot be broken even with unlimited computing power—an example is the one-time pad—but these schemes are more difficult to implement than the best theoretically breakable but computationally secure mechanisms.

    Cryptology-related technology has raised a number of legal issues. In the United Kingdom, additions to the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000 require a suspected criminal to hand over his or her decryption key if asked by law enforcement. Otherwise the user will face a criminal charge.[5] The Electronic Frontier Foundation (EFF) was involved in a case which questioned whether requiring suspected criminals to provide their decryption keys to law enforcement is unconstitutional. The EFF argued that this is a violation of the right of not being forced to incriminate oneself, as given in the fifth amendment.[6]
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U.S. Air Force cadets win cyber war game with NSA hackers

Postby Allegro » Sun Sep 01, 2013 12:04 am

Allegro » Sun Jul 14, 2013 2:04 am wrote:U.S. Air Force cadets win cyber war game with NSA hackers
Reuters, Andrea Shalal-Esa | April 19, 2013

HANOVER, Maryland (Reuters) - A U.S. Air Force Academy team on Friday beat out rivals from other elite military colleges after a three-day simulated cyber “war” against hackers from the National Security Agency that is meant to teach future officers the importance of cybersecurity.

Nearly 60 government experts - sitting under a black skull and crossbones flag - worked around the clock this week to break into computer networks built by students at the Air Force, Army, Navy, Coast Guard and Merchant Marine academies. Two military graduate schools also participated.

The annual Cyber Defense Exercise (CDX), now in its 13th year, gives students real world practice in fighting off a increasing barrage of cyber attacks aimed at U.S. computer networks by China, Russia and Iran, among others.

It also allows the NSA’s top cyber experts and others from military reserves, National Guard units and other agencies hone their offensive skills at a time when the Pentagon is trying to pump up its arsenal of cyber weapons.

While the students sleep or catch up on other work, some of the NSA’s “Red cell” attackers use viruses, so-called “Trojan horses” and other malicious software to corrupt student-built networks or steal data - in this case, long sets of numbers dreamt up by the officials coordinating the exercise.

But the job gets tougher every year, says Raphael Mudge, an Air Force reservist who develops software and training to protect private computer networks.

“It’s challenging. The students are hungry to win,” said Mudge. “It forces all of us to get better.”

Army General Keith Alexander, who heads both the Pentagon’s Cyber Command and the NSA, stopped by to see the “red cell” hackers in action at a Lockheed Martin Corp facility near NSA headquarters on Thursday, said spokeswoman Vanee Vines.

Alexander often speaks about the need to get more young people engaged in cybersecurity given the exponential growth in the number and intensity of attacks on U.S. networks.

The Pentagon’s budget for cyber operations rose sharply in the fiscal 2014 request sent to Congress, reflecting heightened concerns about an estimated $400 billion in intellectual property stolen from U.S. computer networks in recent years.

Martin Carlisle said his 28-member team fought hard for first place after a hardware failure the first day. It was their fourth win in 13 years.

“Our nation is under attack. We need to train up a new generation of leaders,” he said.

Shawn Turskey, a senior NSA official, said the goal was to raise awareness among future military commanders.

“The real payoff of this program is going to be seen 10, 15 years down the road when these individuals are admirals and generals,” he said.

(Reporting by Andrea Shalal-Esa; Editing by Lisa Shumaker)
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Federation of American Scientists | drones

Postby Allegro » Sun Sep 01, 2013 12:05 am

Allegro » Sun Aug 18, 2013 11:49 am wrote:Just because I post this information doesn’t mean I endorse the learning tool described herein. Quite the opposite, as you might know. Links in original; personally significant keywords have been underscored.

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WIKI excerpt | Games and Simulations

    FAS [Federation of American Scientists] is working to help create learning tools that help bring about major gains in learning and training. The most recent FAS project is Immune Attack, a fully 3-D game in which high school students discover the inner workings of the body’s circulatory and immune systems, as they pilot a tiny drone through the bloodstream to fight microscopic invaders.

    Immune Attack[20] is funded by the National Science Foundation and jointly developed by the Federation of American Scientists, the University of Southern California, Brown University, and Escape Hatch Entertainment. It teaches immunology in a fun and engaging way that is different from the traditional classroom setting, making use of the “challenge and rewardparadigm found in most video games.

    Immune Attack is a supplemental teaching tool, designed to be used in addition to middle school and high school biology textbooks. Immune Attack introduces molecular biology and cellular biology in detail that is usually reserved for college students. However, it uses the familiar and motivational video game format to introduce the strange and new world of cells and molecules.[21]
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Surveillance

Postby Allegro » Fri Sep 06, 2013 1:39 am

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ECHELON | GCHQ

Postby Allegro » Fri Sep 06, 2013 1:39 am

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Refer Government Communications Headquarters for Her Majesty (GCHQ)

WIKI excerpt | Tempora, as exposed by The Guardian newspaper, is a clandestine security electronic surveillance program trialled in 2008, established in 2011 and operated by the British Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ).

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EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT 1999 - 2004 | 194 pp. pdf
Session document FINAL
A5-0264/2001 | PAR1, 11 July 2001

REPORT on the existence of a global system for the interception of private and commercial communications (ECHELON interception system) (2001/2098(INI))

Part 1: Motion for a resolution | Explanatory statement
Temporary Committee on the ECHELON Interception System
Rapporteur: Gerhard Schmid

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1.6. Characteristics ascribed to the ECHELON system | p. 23

    The system known as ECHELON is an interception system which differs from other intelligence systems in that it possesses two features which make it quite unusual: The first such feature attributed to it is the capacity to carry out quasi-total surveillance. Satellite receiver stations and spy satellites in particular are alleged to give it the ability to intercept any telephone, fax, Internet or e-mail message sent by any individual and thus to inspect its contents. The second unusual feature of ECHELON is said to be that the system operates worldwide on the basis of cooperation proportionate to their capabilities among several states (the UK, the USA, Canada, Australia and New Zealand), giving it an added value in comparison to national systems: the states participating in ECHELON (UKUSA states) can place their interception systems at each other’s disposal, share the cost and make joint use of the resulting information. This type of international cooperation is essential in particular for the worldwide interception of satellite communications, since only in this way is it possible to ensure in international communications that both sides of a dialogue can be intercepted. It is clear that, in view of its size, a satellite receiver station cannot be established on the territory of a state without that state’s knowledge. Mutual agreement and proportionate cooperation among several states in different parts of the world is essential.

    Possible threats to privacy and to businesses posed by a system of the ECHELON type arise not only from the fact that is a particularly powerful monitoring system, but also that it operates in a largely legislation-free area. Systems for the interception of international communications are not usually targeted at residents of the home country. The person whose messages were intercepted would have no domestic legal protection, not being resident in the country concerned. Such a person would be completely at the mercy of the system. Parliamentary supervision would also be inadequate in this area, since the voters, who assume that interception only affects people abroad, would not be particularly interested in it, and elected representatives chiefly follow the interests of their voters. That being so, it is hardly surprising that the hearings held in the US Congress concerning the activities of the NSA were confined to the question of whether US citizens were affected by it, with no real concern expressed regarding the existence of such a system in itself. It thus seems all the more important to investigate this issue at European level.

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    13. Conclusions and recommendations

    13.1. Conclusions | p. 132

      The existence of a global system for intercepting private and commercial communications (the ECHELON interception system)

      That a global system for intercepting communications exists, operating by means of cooperation proportionate to their capabilities among the USA, the UK, Canada, Australia and New Zealand under the UKUSA Agreement, is no longer in doubt. It may be assumed, in view of the evidence and the consistent pattern of statements from a very wide range of individuals and organisations, including American sources, that the system or parts of it were, at least for some time, code-named ECHELON. What is important is that its purpose is to intercept private and commercial communications, and not military communications.

      Analysis has revealed that the technical capabilities of the system are probably not nearly as extensive as some sections of the media had assumed. Nevertheless, it is worrying that many senior Community figures, in particular European Commissioners, who gave evidence to the Temporary Committee, claimed to be unaware of this phenomenon.

      The limits of the interception system

      The surveillance system depends, in particular, upon worldwide interception of satellite communications. However, in areas characterised by a high volume of traffic only a very small proportion of those communications are transmitted by satellite. This means that the majority of communications cannot be intercepted by earth stations, but only by tapping cables and intercepting radio signals. However, inquiries have shown that the UKUSA states have access to only a very limited proportion of cable and radio communications, and, owing to the large numbers of personnel required, can analyse only an even smaller proportion of those communications. However extensive the resources and capabilities for the interception of communications may be, the extremely high volume of traffic makes exhaustive, detailed monitoring of all communications impossible in practice.

      The possible existence of other interception systems

      Since intercepting communications is a method of spying commonly employed by intelligence services, other states might also operate similar systems, provided that they have the required funds and the right locations. France, thanks to its overseas territories, is the only EU Member State which is geographically and technically capable of operating a global interception system by itself. There is ample evidence that Russia also operates such a system.

      Compatibility with EU law

      As regards the question of the compatibility of a system of the ECHELON type with EU law, it is necessary to distinguish between two scenarios. If a system is used purely for intelligence purposes, there is no violation of EU law, since operations in the interests of state security are not subject to the EC Treaty, but would fall under Title V of the Treaty on European Union (CFSP), although at present that title lays down no provisions on the subject, so no criteria are available. If, on the other hand, the system is misused for the purposes of gathering competitive intelligence, such action is at odds with the Member States’ duty of loyalty and with the concept of a common market based on free competition. If a Member State participates in such a system, it violates EC law.

      At its meeting of 30 March 2000 the Council made clear that it cannot agree to the creation or existence of an interception system which does not comply with the rules laid down in the laws of the Member States and which breaches the fundamental principles designed to safeguard human dignity.

      Compatibility with the fundamental right to respect for private life (Article 8 of the ECHR)

      Any interception of communications represents serious interference with an individual’s exercise of the right to privacy. Article 8 of the ECHR, which guarantees respect for private life, permits interference with the exercise of that right only in the interests of national security, in so far as this is in accordance with domestic law and the provisions in question are generally accessible and lay down under what circumstances, and subject to what conditions, the state may undertake such interference. Interference must be proportionate: thus competing interests need to be weighed up and it is not enough that the interference should merely be useful or desirable.

      An intelligence system which intercepted communications permanently and at random would be in violation of the principle of proportionality and would therefore not be compatible with the ECHR. It would also constitute a violation of the ECHR if the rules governing the surveillance of communications lacked a legal basis, if the rules were not generally accessible or if they were so formulated that their implications for the individual were unforeseeable. Since most of the rules governing the activities of US intelligence services abroad are classified, compliance with the principle of proportionality is at least doubtful and breaches of the principles of accessibility and foreseeability laid down by the European Court of Human Rights probably occur. Although the USA is not itself an ECHR contracting party, the Member States must nevertheless act in a manner consistent with the ECHR. The Member States cannot circumvent the requirements imposed on them by the ECHR by allowing other countries’ intelligence services, which are subject to less stringent legal provisions, to work on their territory, since otherwise the principle of legality, with its twin components of accessibility and foreseeability, would become a dead letter and the case law of the European Court of Human Rights would be deprived of its substance.

      In addition, the lawful operations of intelligence services are consistent with fundamental rights only if adequate arrangements exist for monitoring them, in order to counterbalance the risks inherent in secret activities performed by a part of the administrative apparatus. As the European Court of Human Rights has expressly stressed the importance of an efficient system for monitoring intelligence operations, there are grounds for concern in the fact that some Member States do not have parliamentary monitoring bodies of their own responsible for scrutinising the secret services.

      Are EU citizens adequately protected against intelligence services?

      As the protection enjoyed by EU citizens depends on the legal situation in the individual Member States, which varies very substantially, and since in some cases parliamentary monitoring bodies do not even exist, the degree of protection can hardly be said to be adequate. It is in the fundamental interests of European citizens that their national parliaments should have a specific, formally structured monitoring committee responsible for supervising and scrutinising the activities of the intelligence services. But even where monitoring bodies do exist, there is a strong temptation for them to concentrate more on the activities of domestic intelligence services, rather than those of foreign intelligence services, since as a rule it is only the former which affect their own citizens.

      In the event of cooperation between intelligence services under the CFSP and between the security authorities in the spheres of justice and home affairs, the institutions must introduce adequate measures to protect European citizens.

      Industrial espionage

      Part of the remit of foreign intelligence services is to gather economic data, such as details of developments in individual sectors of the economy, trends on commodity markets, compliance with economic embargoes, observance of rules on supplying dual-use goods, etc. For these reasons, the firms concerned are often subject to surveillance. The US intelligence services do not merely gather general economic intelligence, but also intercept communications between firms, particularly where contracts are being awarded, and they justify this on the grounds of combating attempted bribery. Detailed interception poses the risk that information may be used as competitive intelligence, rather than combating corruption, even though the US and the United Kingdom state that they do not do so. However, the role of the Advocacy Center of the US Department of Commerce is still not totally clear and talks arranged with the Center with a view to clarifying the matter were cancelled. It should also be pointed out that an agreement on combating the bribery of officials, under which bribery is criminalised at international level, was adopted by the OECD in 1997, and this provides a further reason why individual cases of bribery cannot justify the interception of communications. At all events, it must be made clear that the situation becomes intolerable when intelligence services allow themselves to be used for purposes of gathering competitive intelligence by spying on foreign firms with the aim of securing a competitive advantage for firms in the home country. Although it is frequently maintained that the global interception system considered in this report has been used in this way, no such case has been substantiated.

      The fact is that sensitive commercial data are mostly kept inside individual firms, so that competitive intelligence-gathering primarily involves efforts to obtain information through members of staff or through people planted in the firm for this purpose or else, more and more frequently, by hacking into internal computer networks. Only if sensitive data are transmitted externally by cable or radio (satellite) can a communications surveillance system be used for competitive intelligence-gathering. This applies systematically in the following three cases:
      - in the case of firms which operate in three time zones, so that interim results are sent from Europe to America and on to Asia;
      - in the case of videoconferencing within multinationals using VSAT or cable;
      - if vital contracts are being negotiated on the spot (e.g. for the building of plants, the development of telecommunications infrastructure, the creation of new transport systems, etc.) and it is necessary to consult the company’s head office.

      Risk and security awareness in small and medium-sized firms is unfortunately often inadequate and the dangers of economic espionage and the interception of communications are often not recognised.

      Since security awareness is likewise not always well developed in the European institutions (with the exception of the European Central Bank, the Council Directorate-General for External Relations and the Commission Directorate-General for External Relations), immediate action is therefore necessary.

      Possible self-protection measures

      Firms must secure the whole working environment and protect all communications channels which are used to send sensitive information. Sufficiently secure encryption systems exist at affordable prices on the European market. Private individuals should also be urged to encrypt e-mails: an unencrypted e-mail message is like a letter without an envelope. Relatively user-friendly systems exist on the Internet which are even made available for private use free of charge.

      Cooperation among intelligence services within the EU

      In December 1999 in Helsinki the European Council decided to develop more effective European military capabilities with a view to undertaking the full range of Petersberg tasks in support of the CFSP. In order to achieve this goal, by the year 2003 the Union was to be able to rapidly deploy units of about 50 000 ñ 60 000 troops which should be self-sustaining, including the necessary command, strategic reconnaissance and intelligence capabilities. The first steps towards such an autonomous intelligence capability have already been taken in the framework of the WEU and the standing Political and Security Committee. Cooperation among intelligence services within the EU seems essential on the grounds that, firstly, a common security policy which did not involve the secret services would not make sense and, secondly, it would have numerous professional, financial and political advantages. It would also accord better with the idea of the EU as a partner on an equal footing with the United States and could bring together all the Member States in a system which complied fully with the ECHR. The European Parliament would of course have to exercise appropriate monitoring. The European Parliament is in the process of implementing the Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001 on public access to European Parliament, Council and Commission documents by revising the provisions of its Rules of Procedure as regards access to sensitive documents.

      13.2. Recommendations begin at the bottom of page 136.
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2013 mass surveillance disclosures

Postby Allegro » Fri Sep 20, 2013 2:49 pm

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Highlights mine. Many links in original.

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    WIKI introduction | The 2013 mass surveillance disclosures refer to media reports which revealed operational details of the U.S. National Security Agency (NSA) and its international partners’ mass surveillance of foreign nationals and U.S. citizens. Aside from its partnership with federal agencies, the NSA-led surveillance involves extensive cooperation with foreign governments and intelligence agencies of Australia, Canada, New Zealand, the United Kingdom and Germany, the latter classified in NSA documents as both a partner and a target. The existence of such intelligence gathering activities date from the Cold War era and have been referred to by names such as ECHELON and, more recently, PRISM. These terms describe intelligence gathering programs with an international scope. Countries around the world, including Western Allies and Member states of NATO, have been cited as spying targets of the so-calledFive Eyes” - a strategic alliance of five English-speaking Western democracies maintaining a secret global surveillance operation with the following targets as of September 2013: Argentina, Austria, Belgium, Brazil, China, Costa Rica, Ecuador, El Salvador, France, Germany, Greece, India, Italy, Japan, Mexico, Pakistan, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, the Philipines, Qatar, Russia, Singapore, South Africa, South Korea, Spain, Taiwan, Turkey and Venezuela.[1][2]

    Disclosure of international intelligence gathering of data about private citizens entered public discourse in 1988 with initial reports about the “ECHELON” program. The existence of that program was further documented in a report to the European Parliament in 2000.[3] Disclosures of the general scope of a mass surveillance program involving U.S. citizens were made in the U.S. media in 2006.[4] A series of articles attracted significant public attention on 6 June 2013, when documents made public by Edward Snowden were first published simultaneously by The Washington Post and The Guardian. These documents included operational details of the “scale of domestic surveillance”, according to journalist Glenn Greenwald.[5]

    On 14 June 2013, the main source of these disclosures, Edward Snowden, was formally charged by U.S. federal prosecutors for violating the Espionage Act of 1917 due to his unauthorized communication and theft of government property. Several weeks later, Snowden, who subsequently fled to Russia via Hong Kong, was granted temporary asylum by the Russian government. This contributed to a deterioration of Russia–United States relations. On 6 August, President Obama made a public appearance on national television where he reiterated that “We don’t have a domestic spying program” and “There is no spying on Americans”.[6]

    Despite Obama’s reassurances, however, social movements such as Restore the Fourth have arisen as a form of protest against mass surveillance. Domestic spying programmes in other countries such as France, the UK, and India have also been brought to light. On the legal front, the EFF [Electronic Frontier Foundation] joined a coalition of diverse groups filing lawsuits against the NSA. Several human rights organizations have urged the Obama administration not to persecute, but to protect “whistleblower Snowden”. These groups include Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch, Transparency International, and the Index on Censorship.[7][8][9][10]

Contents of the entire page.

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1 Historical context
    1.1 Origins of clandestine surveillance in the United States (1919–78)
    1.2 Mass surveillance in a global context (1988–2000)
    1.3 9/11 and its implications on mass surveillance (2001–2009)
    1.4 Acceleration of media leaks (2010–present)
2 Summary of NSA surveillance
    2.1 Purposes
    2.2 Targets
    2.3 International cooperation
    2.4 Methods
    2.4.1 Infiltration of smartphones
3 2013 Disclosures by category
    3.1 Court Orders, Memos and Policy Documents
    3.2 Reports
    3.3 SIGADs
    3.3.1 Glossary of terms in SIGAD table
    3.4 Collection and Analysis Programs or Hardware
    3.5 Relationships with Corporate Partners
    3.6 NSA Databases
    3.7 Signals Intelligence Directorates (SIDs)
    3.8 Technical Directorates
    3.9 Names associated with specific targets
    3.10 Uncategorized or insufficiently described codenames.
    3.11 GCHQ Operations
    3.12 NSA Operations
    3.13 NSA Relationships with Foreign Intelligence services
    3.14 Unrelated to Edward Snowden
4 Media reports
    4.1 Chronology
    4.2 Disclosures
    4.3 Violation of civil liberties and international law
5 Fallout
    5.1 Counter-terrorism and national security
    5.2 Public comments
    5.3 Impact on foreign relations
    5.4 Amash/Conyers Amendment
    5.5 Public reaction
    5.5.1 Petitions
    5.5.2 Protests
6 Media related to the disclosures
7 See also
8 References
9 Further reading
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AUSCANNZUKUS | Five Eyes

Postby Allegro » Fri Sep 20, 2013 2:51 pm

RESOURCE

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    WIKI excerpt | AUSCANNZUKUS is a naval Command, Control, Communications and Computers (C4) interoperability organization involving the Anglosphere nations of Australia, Canada, New Zealand, the United Kingdom, and the United States. The acronym is also used as security caveat in the UKUSA Community, where it is also known as “Five Eyes”.[1][2][3]

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    WIKI excerpt | The Air and Space Interoperability Council (ASIC) is a formal five nation military organisation with a mandate to enhance coalition warfighting capability through air and space interoperability. Member nations are those within the Five Eyes[1] community and consist of representation from their respective Air Force, and also includes the United States Navy. Based in Washington DC, the Council’s Management Committee[2] oversees the execution of the Vision and Mission with the cooperation of experts from member nations’ defence departments.[3]

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    WIKI excerpt | The United Kingdom – United States of America Agreement[1][2] (UKUSA) is a multilateral agreement for cooperation in signals intelligence between the United Kingdom, the United States, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand. The alliance of intelligence operations is also known as Five Eyes (FVEY).[3][4][5] It was first signed in March 1946 by the United Kingdom and the United States and later extended to encompass the three Commonwealth realms of Canada, Australia and New Zealand. The UKUSA Agreement was a follow-up of the 1943 BRUSA Agreement, the World War II agreement on cooperation over intelligence matters.[6] This was a secret treaty, allegedly so secret that it was kept secret from the Australian Prime Ministers until 1973.[citation needed]

    The agreement established an alliance of five English-speaking countries for the purpose of sharing intelligence, especially signals intelligence. It formalized the intelligence sharing agreement in the Atlantic Charter, signed in 1941, before the entry of the U.S. into the conflict.[7]

    On 11 September 2013, The Guardian released a leaked document provided by Edward Snowden which reveals a similar agreement between the NSA and Israel’s Unit 8200.[8]

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    Collection mechanisms [a section on same page linked above]
    The UKUSA alliance is often associated with the ECHELON system; however, processed intelligence is reliant on multiple sources of information and the intelligence shared is not restricted to signals intelligence.

    The “Five Eyes” in question are –

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Central Security Service

Postby Allegro » Tue Oct 01, 2013 10:42 pm

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Highlights mine. Links in original.

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    WIKI full page | The Central Security Service (CSS) is an agency of the United States Department of Defense, established in 1972 by a Presidential Directive to promote full partnership between the National Security Agency (NSA) and the Service Cryptologic Elements (SCE) of the United States Armed Forces in the field of signals intelligence.[1]

    Emblem

    The blue background of the CSS emblem represents “fidelity” and “steadfastness”, with the symbols for the cryptologic service elements provided shown clockwise from top right as follows: Army Intelligence and Security Command, United States Marine Corps, Naval Security Group, United States Coast Guard and Air Force Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance Agency with the symbol of the NSA/CSS in the center.[1]

    Tasks

    The Central Security Service was established by Presidential Directive in 1972 to promote full partnership between the National Security Agency (NSA) and the Service Cryptologic Elements (SCE) of the United States Armed Forces.

    According to James Bamford, NSA/CSS was initially conceived as a separate “fourth service” beside the three US armed services. The latter resisted this idea, and therefore the CSS was founded as an inter-service organization. The day-to-day work of the CSS is to capture enemy signals (radar, telemetry, radio/satellite communications) using the means of the involved service. For example, the Navy has special submarines for tapping undersea cables; the Air Force operates aircraft with sophisticated antennas and processing gear to listen to enemy radar and radio; and on the ground, the Army operates similar eavesdropping equipment.[2]

    Special Collection Service

      This section needs additional citations for verification. Please help improve this article by adding citations to reliable sources. Unsourced material may be challenged and removed. (June 2013) Main article: Special Collection Service

    The Special Collection Service (SCS) is a group within the Central Security Service[citation needed] that is not officially recognized. Its purpose is to put sophisticated eavesdropping equipment—from bugs to parabolic antennas—in difficult-to-reach places. It also attempts to target for recruitment key foreign communications personnel such as database managers, systems administrators, and IT specialists.[3] The SCS facility is located in Beltsville, Maryland.[4]

    The specialized intelligence gathering capabilities of the Special Collection Service include:

    ⋅ Clandestine operations involving surveillance and penetration of target facilities, including “black bag” style operations.[citation needed]
    ⋅ Cryptographic side channel and key recovery attacks involving EMSEC and COMSEC specialties.[citation needed]
    ⋅ Covert communication capture and relay of target information.[citation needed]
    ⋅ Operation of unmanned aerial vehicles for surveillance and perimeter penetration.[citation needed]

    The combination of Central Intelligence Agency and National Security Agency resources are used to cover the requisite speciality skills tasked of this agency into a single clandestine intelligence organization that falls under director of NSA and secretary of defense oversight. Given the nature of post 9/11 counter terrorism strategies employed by the United States of America the operations of the Special Collection Service have experienced significant growth in scale and complexity.
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Special Collection Service

Postby Allegro » Tue Oct 01, 2013 10:42 pm

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Highlights mine. Links in original.

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    WIKI full page | The Special Collection Service (SCS) is a highly classified joint U.S. Central Intelligence Agency-National Security Agency program charged with inserting eavesdropping equipment in difficult-to-reach places, such a foreign embassies, communications centers, and foreign government installations. Established in the late 1970s and headquartered in Beltsville, Maryland, the SCS has been described as the United States’ “Mission Impossible force”. The SCS has been involved in operations ranging from the Cold War to the Global War on Terrorism.

    Mission

    The SCS is a U.S. black budget program that has been described as the United States’ “Mission Impossible force”, responsible for “close surveillance, burglary, wiretapping, breaking and entering”.[1][2][3][4] It is headquartered in Beltsville, Maryland, next door to the U.S. Department of State’s Beltsville Communications Annex, and is jointly staffed by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and National Security Agency (NSA).[4][5] SCS operatives are based out of U.S. embassies and consulates overseas, and operatives often use Foreign Service or Diplomatic Telecommunications Service cover when deployed.[4][6][7] Their mission is to intercept sensitive information on espionage, nuclear arms, terrorist networks, drug trafficking and other national-security-related issues.[1]

    The SCS was established to overcome a problem in that the NSA typically intercepts communications “passively” from its various intercept facilities throughout the world, yet the increasing sophistication of foreign communications equipment renders passive interception futile and instead requires direct access to the communications equipment. The CIA, meanwhile, has access to agents specializing in clandestine operations and thus is more able to gain access to foreign communication equipment, yet lacks the NSA’s expertise in communications eavesdropping. Hence, the SCS was born, combining the communications intelligence capabilities of the NSA with the covert action capabilities of the CIA in order to facilitate access to sophisticated foreign communications systems.[1][8][9]

    The SCS employs exotic covert listening device technologies to bug foreign embassies, communications centers, computer facilities, fiber-optic networks, and government installations.[1][2] The U.S. government has never officially acknowledged its existence, and little is known about the technologies and techniques it employes.[1] The sole inside account of SCS comes from a Canadian, Mike Frost, whose 1994 book Spyworld (ISBN 978-0385254946) revealed that the program was known to insiders at the time as “College Park”.[10] As of 2008, the SCS is reported to target for recruitment key foreign communications personnel such as database managers, systems administrators, and information technology specialists.[11]

    History

    Cold War

    The SCS program was established in the late 1970s during the Cold War between the United States and the Soviet Union.[1][10] Around this time, SCS operatives reportedly hid eavesdropping devices in pigeons perched on the windowsills of the Soviet Embassy in Washington, D.C.[4]

    Expansion

    As encryption technology increased in sophistication, by the end of the 20th century many coded signals proved unbreakable. Due to this problem, bugging techniques and technologies saw a revival: unable to easily intercept and decrypt foreign communications through passive means, the U.S. government needed to instead intercept the communications at their source, and thus the SCS program was expanded in the 1990s to fulfill this need.[12][13][14]

    Infiltration

    The SCS program was compromised by infamous Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) mole Robert Hanssen in the 1990s, which provided Moscow with sensitive information about highly sophisticated U.S. overseas bugging operations.[2][15] However, the program was so secret that, after Hanssen’s arrest, the FBI would only describe it in general terms, as a “program of enormous value, expense, and importance to the U.S. government”.[1][3]

    Afghanistan

    In 1999, as the Clinton Administration sought to kill Osama bin Laden following the 1998 U.S. embassy bombings, SCS operatives covertly entered Afghanistan to place eavesdropping devices within range of Al-Qaeda’s tactical radios.[16]

    China

    The SCS was rumored to have been involved in the 2001 operation that planted 27 satellite-controlled bugs in the Boeing 767-300ER that was to be used as Chinese President Jiang Zemin’s official jet. The bugs were discovered, however, before they could be switched on.[17]

    Iraq

    Prior to the 2003 U.S. invasion of Iraq, SCS was described as the “prime mover” of electronic surveillance in the country.[18] SCS operatives built numerous antennae, spaced throughout the Iraqi countryside, capable of intercepting Iraqi microwave communications. These communications would have been otherwise difficult to intercept, because they beamed hilltop to hilltop in a narrow band, with an angle too oblique and thus too dissipated to be intercepted by air or spacecraft.[19] In 1998, the U.S. government recruited an Australian operative under SCS and deployed him to Iraq. The operative reported concerns about what was transpiring in Iraq, in that there was “a very high volume of data, and that he was getting no feedback about whether it was good, bad, or useful”. He further reported that “this was a massive intelligence collection operation—one that was not in accordance with what UNSCOM was supposed to be doing” at the time.[18]

    After the invasion, SCS operatives were employed in the hunt for Saddam Hussein, planting sophisticated eavesdropping equipment in target areas to intercept communications that were then analyzed by voice analysis experts.[20][21]

    War on Terror

    The SCS was heavily involved in eavesdropping to advance the Global War on Terrorism, setting up eavesdropping posts around Middle Eastern capitals and figures close to Osama bin Laden’s terrorism network.[4][22]

    When the United States zeroed in on Osama bin Laden’s compound in Abbottabad, Pakistan, SCS operatives established a base in an apartment that the CIA had rented a mile away from the compound. They focused lasers on the compound windows and, by analyzing the vibrations, were able to count the number of people inside and outside, and also ascertained that there was one person whom never ventured outside the compound. Bin Laden was killed inside the compound during a raid by U.S. special forces on May 2, 2011.[23][24]
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Bundesnachrichtendienst | BND

Postby Allegro » Sat Oct 05, 2013 2:20 am

RESOURCE

Highlights mine. Links in original.

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    WIKI excerpt | Bundesnachrichtendienst (BND) is the foreign intelligence agency of Germany, directly subordinated to the Chancellor’s Office. Its headquarters are in Pullach near Munich, and Berlin (planned to be centralised in Berlin by 2014). The BND has 300 locations in Germany and foreign countries. In 2005, the BND employed around 6,050 people, 10% of them Bundeswehr soldiers; those are officially employed by the “Amt für Militärkunde” (Office for Military Sciences). The annual budget of the BND for 2009 was €460,000,000.[1]

    The BND acts as an early warning system to alert the German government to threats to German interests from abroad. It depends heavily on wiretapping and electronic surveillance of international communications. It collects and evaluates information on a variety of areas such as international non-state terrorism, weapons of mass destruction proliferation and illegal transfer of technology, organized crime, weapons and drug trafficking, money laundering, illegal migration and information warfare. As Germany’s only overseas intelligence service, the BND gathers both military and civil intelligence. While the Kommando Strategische Aufklärung (KSA, Strategic Reconnaissance Command) of the Bundeswehr also fulfills this mission, but is not an intelligence service. There is close cooperation between the BND and the KSA.

    The domestic secret service counterparts of the BND are the Bundesamt für Verfassungsschutz (Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution, BfV) and 16 counterparts at the state level Landesämter für Verfassungsschutz (State Offices for the Protection of the Constitution); there is also a separate military intelligence organisation, the Militärischer Abschirmdienst (lit. military shielding service, MAD).

    The BND is a successor to the Gehlen Organization. The most central figure in its history was Reinhard Gehlen, its first president.

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Re: Surveillance

Postby Allegro » Fri Oct 11, 2013 1:57 am

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DMCA | Digital Millennium Copyright Act

Postby Allegro » Mon Oct 14, 2013 11:14 pm

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DMCA | Digital Millennium Copyright Act
Electronic Frontier Foundation

    The Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA) contains two main sections that have been a source of particular controversy since they went into effect in 2000. The “anti-circumvention” provisions (sections 1201 et seq. of the Copyright Act) bar circumvention of access controls and technical protection measures. The “safe harbor” provisions (section 512) protect service providers who meet certain conditions from monetary damages for the infringing activities of their users and other third parties on the net.

    In enacting the “anti-circumvention” provisions of the DMCA Congress ostensibly intended to stop copyright pirates from defeating DRM and other content access or copy restrictions on copyrighted works and to ban the “black box” devices intended for that purpose. In practice the DMCA anti-circumvention provisions have done little to stop “Internet piracy.” Yet the DMCA has become a serious threat that jeopardizes fair use impedes competition and innovation chills free expression and scientific research and interferes with computer intrusion laws. If you circumvent DRM locks for noninfringing fair uses or create the tools to do so you might be on the receiving end of a lawsuit.

    The DMCA “safe harbors” protect service providers from monetary liability based on the allegedly infringing activities of third parties. To receive these protections service providers must comply with the conditions set forth in Section 512 including “notice and takedown” procedures that give copyright holders a quick and easy way to disable access to allegedly infringing content. Section 512 also contains provisions allowing users to challenge improper takedowns. Without these protections the risk of potential copyright liability would prevent many online intermediaries from providing services such as hosting and transmitting user-generated content. Thus the safe harbors, while imperfect, have been essential to the growth of the Internet as an engine for innovation and free expression.

    EFF has fought hard against the DMCA circumvention provisions in the courts, Congress and other forums, and has fought equally hard to make sure the DMCA safe harbors shelter innovation and creativity. Learn more through the links below.

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MUSCULAR is a tool to exploit data links

Postby Allegro » Fri Nov 08, 2013 10:53 am

RESOURCE

Allegro » Tue Nov 05, 2013 7:10 am wrote:I searched for MUSCULAR just now, found this hit https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/NSA_surve ... code_names with its snippet:
    MUSCULAR[edit]. MUSCULAR is a tool to exploit the data links from Google and Yahoo, operated jointly by the National Security ...,

and here’s the text on that page as of the time stamp of this post.

    This [MUSCULAR] page has been deleted. The deletion and move log for the page are provided below for reference.

    01:15, 4 November 2013 Mark Arsten (talk | contribs) deleted page USA surveillance tools (Wikipedia:Articles for deletion/USA surveillance tools)
    18:31, 31 October 2013 Pde (talk | contribs) moved page USA surveillance tools to NSA surveillance code names (This article is primarily about disentangling the code names for NSA programs)

Refer this page, too.
Wikipedia:Articles for deletion/USA surveillance tools
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MUSCULAR (surveillance program)

Postby Allegro » Fri Nov 08, 2013 11:14 am

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The following WIKI page was last modified on 6 November 2013 at 22:20. More links in original.

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    WIKI introduction | MUSCULAR (DS-200B), located in the United Kingdom,[1] is the name of a spying program of the GCHQ and National Security Agency that was revealed by documents which were released by Edward Snowden and interviews with knowledgeable officials.[2] GCHQ is the primary operator of the program.[1] GCHQ and the National Security Agency have secretly broken into the main communications links that connect Yahoo and Google data centers around the world, according to documents obtained from former NSA contractor Edward Snowden and interviews with knowledgeable officials.

    According to the leaked document the NSA’s acquisitions directorate sends millions of records every day from internal Yahoo and Google networks to data warehouses at the agency’s headquarters at Fort Meade, Maryland.

    Closely related programs are called INCENSER and TURMOIL. TURMOIL, belonging to the NSA, is a system for processing the data collected from MUSCULAR.[1]

    See also

    PRISM (surveillance program)
    2013 mass surveillance disclosures
    List of government surveillance projects
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List of government surveillance projects

Postby Allegro » Fri Nov 08, 2013 12:09 pm

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In the right side bar in the below web page is an at-a-glance index of surveillance programs and their dates.

More links in original.

_________________
WIKI | List of government surveillance projects

    Main article: Surveillance

    This is a list of government surveillance projects and related databases throughout the world.

    International

    ECHELON: A signals intelligence (SIGINT) collection and analysis network operated on behalf of the five signatory states to the UKUSA Security Agreement.

    European Union

    Data Retention Directive: A directive requiring EU member states to store citizens' telecommunications data for six to 24 months and allowing police and security agencies to request access from a court to details such as IP address and time of use of every email, phone call, and text message sent or received.
    INDECT: Research project funded by the European Union to develop surveillance methods (e.g. processing of CCTV camera data streams) for the monitoring of abnormal behaviours in an urban environment.[1]
    Schengen Information System: A database kept for national security and law enforcement purposes.

    National

    China

    Golden Shield Project: Also known as the "Great Firewall of China", it is a censorship and surveillance project operated by the Ministry of Public Security (MPS) division of the government of the People's Republic of China. The project was initiated in 1998 and began operations in November 2003.[2]
    ⋅ Monitoring Bureau[2]
    ⋅ Public Information Network Security[2]

    France

    Frenchelon: A data collection and analysis network operated by the French Directorate-General for External Security.[3]

    India

    Centralized Monitoring System (CMS): A data collection system similar to the NSA's PRISM program[4] It enables the government of India to listen to phone conversations, intercept e-mails and text messages, monitor posts on social networking service and track searches on Google.[5]
    DRDO NETRA: Network that is capable of tracking online communications on a real time basis by harvesting data from various voice-over-IP services, including Skype and Google Talk. It is run by the Research and Analysis Wing of India.
    NATGRID: An intelligence grid that links the databases of several departments and ministries of the Government of India.

    Russia

    SORM: A technical system used by the Federal Security Service of the Russian Federation to monitor internet and telephone communication.

    Sweden

    Titan traffic database: A database established by the Swedish National Defence Radio Establishment where call detail records (CDRs) of telephony and internet traffic and transaction data (IPDRs) concerning international telecommunications are stored.

    Switzerland

    Onyx: A data gathering system maintained by several Swiss intelligence agencies to monitor military and civilian communications, such as e-mails, telefax and telephone calls. In 2001, Onyx received its second nomination for the ironically-named "Big Brother Award".[6]

    United Kingdom

    Further information: Mass surveillance in the United Kingdom

    Impact Nominal Index: The Impact Nominal Index or INI is a computer system that enables the UK police force to establish whether other relevant authorities are holding information regarding a person of interest.[7]
    Interception Modernisation Programme: An initiative to extend the UK government's capability to lawfully intercept and store communications data in a central database.[8]
    Mastering the Internet (MTI): A clandestine mass surveillance program led by the British intelligence agency GCHQ. Data gathered by the GCHQ include the contents of email messages, entries on the social networking platform Facebook and the web browsing history of internet users.[9]
    UK National DNA Database (NDNAD): It is also the oldest national DNA database in the world.[10] Since its establishment in 1995, the database has grown to include DNA samples from 2.7 million individuals, or 5.2% of the UK's population, many of whom have neither been charged with, or convicted of, any offence.[10]
    Tempora: Launched in the autumn of 2011, this initiative allows the GCHQ to set up a large-scale buffer that is capable of storing internet content for 3 days and metadata for 30 days.[11]

    United States

    Further information: Mass surveillance in the United States

    Boundless Informant: A system deployed by the National Security Agency to analyze global electronic information. In March 2013, Boundless Informant gathered 14 billion data reports from Iran, 6.3 billion from India, and 2.8 billion from the United States.[12]
    BULLRUN, a highly classified U.S. National Security Agency program to preserve its ability to eavesdrop on encrypted communications by influencing and weakening encryption standards, by obtaining master encryption keys, and by gaining access to data before or after it is encrypted either by agreement, by force of law, or by computer network exploitation (hacking).
    Carnivore: A system implemented by the Federal Bureau of Investigation that was designed to monitor email and electronic communications. Apparently replaced by commercial software such as NarusInsight.
    Comprehensive National Cybersecurity Initiative
    DCSNet: The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI)'s point-and-click surveillance system that can perform instant wiretaps on any telecommunications device located in the United States.[13]
    Fairview: A mass surveillance program directed at foreign mobile phone users.
    Financial Crimes Enforcement Network: A bureau of the Department of the Treasury that collects and analyzes financial transactions in order to combat financial crimes.
    Magic Lantern: A keystroke logging software deployed by the FBI in the form of an e-mail attachment. When activated, it acts as a trojan horse and allows the FBI to decrypt user communications.[14]
    Main Core: A personal and financial database storing information of millions of U.S. citizens believed to be threats to national security.[15] The data mostly comes from the NSA, FBI, CIA, as well as other government sources.[15]
    MUSCULAR: Overseas wiretapping of Google's and Yahoo's unencrypted internal networks by the NSA.
    Nationwide Suspicious Activity Reporting Initiative: Under this government initiative, a Suspicious Activity Report (SAR) may be filed by law enforcers, public safety personnel, owners of critical infrastructure or the general public.
    NSA call database
    PRISM: A clandestine national security electronic surveillance program operated by the United States National Security Agency (NSA) which can target customers of participating corporations outside or inside the United States.
    Room 641A: A telecommunication interception facility operated by AT&T for the U.S. National Security Agency.
    Special Collection Service (SCS): A black budget program that is responsible for "close surveillance, burglary, wiretapping, breaking and entering." It employs covert listening device technologies to bug foreign embassies, communications centers, computer facilities, fiber-optic networks, and government installations.[16]
    Stellar Wind (code name): The open secret code name for four surveillance programs.
    Tailored Access Operations: Intelligence-gathering unit of the NSA that is capable of harvesting approximately 2 petabytes of data per hour.[17][18]
    Terrorist Finance Tracking Program: A joint initiative run by the CIA and the Department of the Treasury to access the SWIFT (Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunication) transaction database as part of the Bush administration's "Global War on Terrorism". According to the U.S. government, its efforts to counter terrorist activities were compromised after the existence of the Terrorist Finance Tracking Program was leaked to the media.[19]
    Intelligence Community (IC): A cooperative federation of 16 government agencies working together, but also separately, to gather intelligence and conduct espionage.
    Utah Data Center: The Intelligence Community's US$1.5 billion data storage center that is designed to store extremely large amounts of data, on the scale of yottabytes.[20][21][22]
    X-Keyscore: A system used by the United States National Security Agency for searching and analysing internet data about foreign nationals.

    Unclear origin

    GhostNet: A fictitious code name given to a large-scale surveillance project that is believed to be operated by the People's Republic of China.[23]
    Stuxnet: It is the first discovered malware that spies on industrial systems, and it was used to attack Iran's nuclear facilities.[24] It is believed to have originated from the United States under the Bush administration.[25]

    Recently discontinued

    Information Awareness Office: An office established to bring together several DARPA projects focused on applying surveillance and information technology to track and monitor terrorists and other threats to U.S. national security.
    Multistate Anti-Terrorism Information Exchange (MATRIX): A data mining system originally developed for the Florida Department of Law Enforcement.
    Terrorist Surveillance Program: Replaced by PRISM.
    ThinThread: A U.S. National Security Agency (NSA) program involved wiretapping and sophisticated analysis of the resulting data.
    Trailblazer Project: U.S. National Security Agency (NSA) program intended to develop a capability to analyze data carried on communications networks including cell phone networks and the Internet.

    See also

    2013 Public disclosures of surveillance and espionage activities
    Electronic police state
    List of public disclosures of classified information
    NSA warrantless surveillance (2001–07)
    Politico-media complex
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