Alternative Forms of Warfare

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Alternative Forms of Warfare

Postby chiggerbit » Thu Aug 11, 2005 11:55 pm

Psychological Operations in Guerilla Warfare<br>by "Tacayán"<br><br><!--EZCODE AUTOLINK START--><a href="http://www.webcom.com/pinknoiz/covert/tacayan.html">www.webcom.com/pinknoiz/c...cayan.html</a><!--EZCODE AUTOLINK END--><br><br>This book is a manual for the training of guerrillas in psychological operations, and its application to the concrete case of the Christian and democratic crusade being waged in Nicaragua by the Freedom Commandos.<br><br>In effect, the human being should be considered the priority objective in a political war. And conceived as the military TARGET of guerrilla war, the human being has his most critical point in his mind. Once his mind has been reached, the "political animal" has been defeated, without necessarily receiving bullets.<br><br>Guerrilla warfare is born and grows in the political environment; in the constant combat to dominate that area of political mentality that is inherent to all human beings and which collectively constitutes the "environment" in which guerrilla warfare moves, and which is where precisely its victory or failure is defined.<br><br>This conception of guerrilla warfare as political war turns Psychological Operations into the decisive factor of the results. The target, then, is the minds of the population, all the population: our troops, the enemy troops and the civilian population.<br><br>This book is a manual for the training of guerrillas in psychological operations, and its application to the concrete case of the Christian and democratic crusade being waged in Nicaragua by the Freedom Commandos.<br><br>Welcome!<br><br><br><br>Generalities<br>The purpose of this book is to introduce the guerrilla student to the psychological operations techniques that will be of immediate and practical VALUE to him in guerrilla warfare. This section is introductory and general; subsequent sections will cover each point set forth here in more detail.<br><br>The nature of the environment of guerrilla warfare does not permit sophisticated psychological operations, and it becomes necessary for the chiefs of groups, chiefs of detachments and squadron leaders to have the ability to carry out, with minimal instructions from the higher levels, psychological ACTION operations with the contacts that are thoroughly aware of the situation, i.e. the foundations.<br><br><br>Combatant-Propagandist Guerrillas<br>In order to obtain the maximum results from the psychological operations in guerrilla warfare, every combatant should be as highly motivated to carry out propaganda face to face as he is as a combatant. This means that the individual political awareness of the guerrilla of the reason for his struggle will be as acute as his ability to fight.<br><br>Such a political awareness and motivation is obtained through the dynamic of groups and self-criticism, as a standard METHOD of instruction for the guerrilla training and operations. Group discussions raise the spirit and improve the unity of thought of the guerrilla squads and exercise social pressure on the weak members to carry out a better role in future training or in combative action. Self-criticism is in terms of one's contribution or defects in his contribution to the cause, to the movement, the struggle, etc.; and gives a positive individual commitment to the mission of the group.<br><br>The desired result is a guerrilla who can persuasively justify his actions when he comes into contact with any member of the People of Nicaragua, and especially with himself and his fellow guerrillas in dealing with the vicissitudes of guerrilla warfare. This means that every guerrilla will be persuasive in his face-to-face communication–propagandist-combatant–in his contact with the people; he should be able to give 5 or 10 logical reasons why, for example, a peasant should give him cloth, needle and thread to mend his clothes. When the guerrilla behaves in this manner, enemy propaganda will never succeed in making him an enemy in the eyes of the people. It also means that hunger, cold, fatigue and insecurity will have a meaning, psychologically, in the cause of the struggle due to his constant orientation.<br><br><br>Armed Propaganda<br>Armed propaganda includes every act carried out, and the good impression that this armed force causes will result in positive attitudes in the population toward that force; and it does not include forced indoctrination. Armed propaganda improves the behavior of the population toward them, and it is not achieved by force.<br><br>This means that a guerrilla armed unit in a rural town will not give the impression that arms are their strength over the peasants, but rather that they are the strength of the peasants against the Sandinista government of repression. This is achieved through a close identification with the people, as follows: hanging up weapons and working together with them on their crops, in construction, in the harvesting of grains, in fishing, etc.; explanations to young men about basic weapons, e.g. giving them an unloaded weapon and letting them touch it, see it, etc.; describing in a rudimentary manner its operation; describing with simple slogans how weapons will serve the people to win their freedom; demanding the requests by the people for hospitals and education, reducing taxes, etc.<br><br>All these acts have as their goal the creation of an identification of the people with the weapons and the guerrillas who carry them, so that the population feels that the weapons are, indirectly, their weapon to protect them and help them in the struggle against a regime of oppression. Implicit terror always accompanies weapons, since the people are internally "aware" that they can be used against them, but as long as explicit coercion is avoided, positive attitudes can be achieved with respect to the presence of armed guerrillas within the population.<br><br><br>Armed Propaganda Teams<br>Armed Propaganda Teams (EPA) are formed through a careful selection of persuasive and highly motivated guerrillas who move about within the population, encouraging the people to support the guerrillas and put, up resistance against the enemy. It combines a high degree of political awareness and the "armed" propaganda ability of the guerrillas toward a planned, programmed, and controlled effort.<br><br>The careful selection of the staff, based on their persuasiveness in informal discussions and their ability in combat, is more important than their degree of education or the training program. The tactics of the Armed Propaganda Teams are carried out covertly, and should be parallel to the tactical effort in guerrilla warfare. The knowledge of the psychology of the population is primary for the Armed Propaganda Teams, but much more intelligence data will be obtained from an EPA program in the area of operations.<br><br><br>Development and Control of the "Front" Organizations<br>The development and control of "front" (or façade) organizations is carried out through subjective internal control at group meetings of "inside cadres," and the calculations of the time for the fusion of these combined efforts to be applied to the masses.<br><br>Established citizens–doctors, lawyers, businessmen, teachers, etc.–will be recruited initially as "Social Crusaders" in typically "innocuous" movements in the area of operations. When their "involvement" with the clandestine organization is revealed to them, this supplies the psychological pressure to use them as "inside cadres" in groups to which they already belong or of which they can be members.<br><br>Then they will receive instruction in techniques of persuasion over control of groups to support our democratic revolution, through a gradual and skillful process A cell control system isolates individuals from one another, and at the appropriate moment, their influence is used for the fusion of groups in a united national front.<br><br><br>Control of Meetings and Mass Assemblies<br>The control of mass meetings in support of guerrilla warfare is carried out internally through a covert commando element, bodyguards, messengers, shock forces (initiators of incidents), placard carriers (also used for making signals), shouters of slogans, everything under the control of the outside commando element.<br><br>When the cadres are placed or recruited in organizations such as labor unions, youth groups, agrarian organizations or professional associations, they will begin to manipulate the objectives of the groups. The psychological apparatus of our movement through inside cadres prepares a mental attitude which at the crucial moment can be turned into a fury of justified violence.<br><br>Through a small group of guerrillas infiltrated within the masses this can be carried out; they will have the mission of agitating by giving the impression that there are many of them and that they have a large popular backing. Using the tactics of a force of 200 – 300 agitators, a demonstration can be created in which 10,000 – 20,000 persons take part.<br><br><br>Support of Contacts with Their Roots in Reality<br>The support of local contacts who are familiar with the deep reality is achieved through the ex ploitation of the social and political weaknesses of the target society, with propagandist-combatant guerrillas, armed propaganda, armed propaganda teams, cover organizations and mass meetings.<br><br>The combatant-propagandist guerrilla is the result of a continuous program of indoctrination and motivation. They will have the mission of showing the people how great and fair our movement is in the eyes of all Nicaraguans and the world. Identifying themselves with our people, they will increase the sympathy towards our movement, which will result in greater support of the population for the freedom commandos, taking away support for the regime in power.<br><br>Armed propaganda will extend this identification process of the people with the Christian guerrillas, providing converging points against the Sandinista regime.<br><br>The Armed Propaganda Teams provide a several-stage program of persuasive planning in guerrilla warfare in all areas of the country. Also, these teams are the "eyes and ears" of our movement.<br><br>The development and control of the cover organizations in guerrilla warfare will give our movement the ability to create a "whiplash" effect within the population when the order for fusion is given. When the infiltration and internal subjective control have been developed in a manner parallel to other guerrilla activities, a comandante of ours will literally be able to shake up the Sandinista structure, and replace it.<br><br>The mass assemblies and meetings are the culmination of a wide base support among the population, and it comes about in the later phases of the operation. This is the moment in which the overthrow can be achieved and our revolution can become an open one, requiring the close collaboration of the entire population of the country, and of contacts with their roots in reality.<br><br>The tactical effort in guerrilla warfare is directed at the weaknesses of the enemy and at destroying their military resistance capacity, and should be parallel to a psychological effort to weaken and destroy their sociopolitical capacity at the same time. In guerrilla warfare, more than in any other type of military effort, the psychological activities should be simultaneous with the military ones, in order to achieve the objectives desired.<br><br><br><br>COMBATANT-PROPAGANDIST GUERRILLA<br>1. Generalities<br>The objective of this section is to familiarize the guerrilla with the techniques of psychological operations, which maximizes the social-psychological effect of a guerrilla movement, converting the guerrilla into a propagandist, in addition to being a combatant. The nature of the environment in guerrilla warfare does not permit sophisticated facilities for psychological operations, so that use should be made of the effective face-to-face persuasion of each guerrilla.<br><br>2. Political Awareness<br>The individual political awareness of the guerrilla, the reason for his struggle, will be as important as his ability in combat. This political awareness and motivation will be achieved:<br><br>*By improving the combat potential of the guerrilla by improving his motivation for fighting.<br><br>*By the guerrilla recognizing himself as a vital tie between the democratic guerrillas and the people, whose support is essential for the subsistence of both.<br><br>*By fostering the support of the population for the national insurgence through the support for the guerrillas of the locale, which provides a psychological basis in the population for politics after the victory has been achieved.<br><br>*By developing trust in the guerrillas and in the population, for the reconstruction of a local and national government.<br><br>*By promoting the value of participation by the guerrillas and the people in the civic affairs of the insurrection and in the national programs.<br><br>*By developing in each guerrilla the ability of persuasion face-to-face, at the local level, to win the support of the population, which is essential for success in guerrilla warfare.<br><br><br>3. Group Dynamics<br>This political awareness-building and motivation are attained by the use of group dynamics at the level of small units. The group discussion method and self-criticism are a general guerrilla training and operations technique.<br><br>Group discussions raise the spirit and increase the unity of thought in small guerrilla groups and exercise social pressure on the weakest members to better carry out their mission in training and future combat actions. These group discussions will give special emphasis to:<br><br>*Creating a favorable opinion of our movement. Through local and national history, make it clear that the Sandinista regime is "foreignizing," "repressive" and "imperialistic," and that even though there are some Nicaraguans within the government, point out that they are "puppets" of the power of the Soviets and Cubans, i.e., of foreign power.<br><br>*Always a local focus. Matters of an international nature will be explained only in support of local events in the guerrilla warfare.<br><br>*The unification of the nation is our goal. This means that the defeat of the Sandinista armed forces is our priority. Our insurrectional movement is a pluralistic political platform from which we are determined to win freedom, equality, a better economy with work facilities, a higher standard of living, and a true democracy for all Nicaraguans without exception.<br><br>*Providing to each guerrilla a clear understanding about the struggle for national sovereignty against Soviet-Cuban imperialism. Discussion guides will lead the guerrillas so that they will see the injustices of the Sandinista system.<br><br>*Showing each guerrilla the need for good behavior to win the support of the population. Discussion guides should convince the guerrillas that the attitude and opinion of the population play a decisive role, because victory is impossible without popular support.<br><br>*Self-criticism will be in constructive terms that will contribute to the mission of the movement, and which will provide the guerrillas with the conviction that they have a constant and positive individual responsibility in the mission of the group. The method of instruction will be:<br><br><br>a) Division of the guerrilla force into squads for group discussions, including command and support elements, whenever the tactical situation permits it. The makeup of the small units should be maintained when these groups are designated. <br><br><br>b) Assignment of a political cadre in the guerrilla force to each group to guide the discussion. The squad leader should help the cadre to foster study and the expression of thoughts. If there are not enough political cadres for each squad or post, leaders should guide the discussions, and the available cadres visit alternate groups. <br><br><br>c) It is appropriate for the cadre (or the leader) to guide the discussion of a group to cover a number of points and to reach a correct conclusion. The guerrillas should feel that it was their free and own decision. The cadre should serve as a private teacher. The cadre or leader will not act as a lecturer, but will help the members of the group to study and express their own opinions. <br><br><br>d) The political cadre will at the end of every discussion make a summary of the principal points, leading them to the correct conclusions. Any serious difference with the objectives of the movement should be noted by the cadre and reported to the comandante of the force. If necessary, a combined group meeting will be held and the team of political cadres will explain and rectify the misunderstanding. <br><br><br>e) Democratic conduct by the political cadres: living, eating and working with the guerrillas, and if possible, fighting at their side, sharing their living conditions. All of this will foster understanding and the spirit of cooperation that will help in the discussion and exchange of ideas. <br><br><br>f) Carry out group discussions in towns, and areas of operations whenever possible with the civilian population, and not limit them to camps or bases. This is done to emphasize the revolutionary nature of the struggle and to demonstrate that the guerrillas identified with the objectives of the people move about within the population. The guerrilla projects himself toward the people, as the political cadre does toward the guerrilla, and they should live, eat and work together to realize a unity of revolutionary thought. <br><br>The principles for guerrilla and political-cadre group discussions are:<br><br>*Organize discussion groups at the post or squad level. A cadre cannot be sure of the comprehension and acceptance of the concepts and conclusions by guerrillas in large groups. In a group of the size of a squad of 10 men, the judgment and control of the situation is greater. In this way, all students will participate in an exchange among them; the political leader, the group leader, and also the political cadre. Special attention will be given to the individual ability to discuss the objectives of the insurrectional struggle. Whenever a guerrilla expresses his opinion, he will be interested in listening to the opinions of others, leading as a result to the unity of thought.<br><br>*Combine the different points of view and reach an opinion or common conclusion. This is the most difficult task of a political guerrilla cadre. After the group discussions of the democratic objectives of the movement, the chief of the team of political cadres of the guerrilla force should combine the conclusions of individual groups in a general summary. At a meeting with all the discussion groups, the cadre shall provide the principal points, and the guerrillas will have the opportunity to clarify or modify their points of view. To carry this out, the conclusions will be summarized in the form of slogans, wherever possible.<br><br>*Face with honesty the national and local problems of our struggle. The political cadres should always be prepared to discuss solutions to the problems observed by the guerrillas. During the discussions, the guerrillas should be guided by the following three principles:<br><br><br>-Freedom of thought <br><br><br>-Freedom of expression. <br><br><br>-Concentration of thoughts on the objectives of the democratic struggle. <br><br>The result desired is a guerrilla who in a persuasive manner can justify all of his acts whenever he is in contact with any member of the town/people, and especially with himself and with his guerrilla companions by facing the vicissitudes of guerrilla warfare.<br><br>This means that every guerrilla will come to have effective face-to-face persuasion as a combatant/propagandist in his contact with the people, to the point of giving 5-10 logical reasons why, e.g., a peasant should give him a piece of cloth, or a needle and thread to mend his clothes. When a guerrilla behaves in this manner, no type of propaganda of the enemy will be able to make a "terrorist" of him in the eyes of the people.<br><br>In addition, hunger, cold, fatigue and insecurity in the existence of the guerrilla acquire meaning in the cause of the struggle due to the constant psychological orientation.<br><br><br>4. Camp Procedures<br>Encamping the guerrilla units gives greater motivation, in addition to reducing distractions, and increases the spirit of cooperation of small units, relating the physical environment to the psychological one. The squad chief shall establish the regular camping procedure. Once they have divested themselves of their packs, the chief will choose the appropriate ground for camping. He should select land that predominates over the zone with two or three escape routes. He will choose among his men and give them responsibilities such as:<br><br>*Clean the camp area<br><br>*Provide adequate drainage in case of rain. Also build some trenches or holes for marksmen in case of emergency. In addition, he will build a stove, which will be done by making some small trenches and placing three rocks in place; in case the stove is built on a pedestal, it will be filled with clay and rocks.<br><br>*Build a windbreaking wall, which will be covered on the sides and on top with branches and leaves of the same vegetation of the zone. This will serve for camouflaging and protecting it from aerial visibility or from enemy patrols around.<br><br>*Construct a latrine and a hole where waste and garbage will be buried, which should be covered over at the time of abandoning the camp.<br><br>*Once the camp has been set up, it is recommended that a watchman be positioned in the places of access at a prudent distance, where the shout of alarm can be heard. In the same moment the password will be established, which should be changed every 24 hours. The commander should establish ahead of time an alternate meeting point, in case of having to abandon the camp in a hurried manner, and they will be able to meet in the other already established point, and they should warn the patrol that if at a particular time they cannot meet at the established point, they should have a third meeting point.<br><br>These procedures contribute to the motivation of the guerrilla and improve the spirit of cooperation in the unit. The danger, sense of insecurity, anxiety and daily concern in the life of a guerrilla require tangible evidence of belonging in order for him to keep up his spirit and morale.<br><br>In addition to the good physical conditions in which the guerrilla should find himself, good psychological conditions are necessary, for which group discussions and becoming a self-critic are recommended, which will greatly benefit the spirit and morale of the same.<br><br>Having broken camp with the effort and cooperation of everyone strengthens the spirit of the group. The guerrilla will be inclined then towards the unity of thought in democratic objectives.<br><br><br>5. Interaction with the People<br>In order to ensure popular support, essential for the good development of guerrilla warfare, the leaders should induce a positive interaction between the civilians and the guerrillas, through the principle of "live, eat, and work with the people," and maintain control of their activities. In group discussions, the leaders and political cadres should give emphasis to positively identifying themselves with the people.<br><br>It is not recommendable to speak of military tactical plans in discussions with civilians. The Communist foe should be pointed out as the number one enemy of the people, and as a secondary threat against our guerrilla forces.<br><br>Whenever there is a chance, groups of members should be chosen who have a high political awareness and high disciplinary conduct in the work to be carried out, in order to be sent to the populous areas in order to direct the armed propaganda, where they should persuade the people through dialogue in face-to-face confrontations, where these principles should be followed:<br><br><br>Respect for human rights and others' property. <br><br><br>Helping the people in community work. <br><br><br>Protecting the people from Communist aggressions. <br><br><br>Teaching the people environmental hygiene, to read, etc., in order to win their trust, which will lead to a better democratic ideological preparation. <br><br>This attitude will foster the sympathy of the peasants for our movement, and they will immediately become one of us, through logistical support, coverage and intelligence information on the enemy or participation in combat. The guerrillas should be persuasive through the word and not dictatorial with weapons. If they behave in this way, the people will feel respected, will be more inclined to accept our message and will consolidate into popular support.<br><br>In any place in which tactical guerrilla operations are carried out in populous areas, the squad should undertake psychological actions parallel to these, and should proceed, accompany and consolidate the common objective and explain to all the people about our struggle, explaining that our presence is to give peace, liberty and democracy to all Nicaraguans without exception, and explaining that our struggle is not against the nationals but rather against Russian imperialism. This will serve to ensure greater psychological achievements which will increase the operations of the future.<br><br><br>6. Conclusions<br>The nature of the environment in guerrilla warfare does not permit sophisticated facilities for psychological operations, and the face-to-face persuasion of the guerrilla combatant-propagandists with the people is an effective and available tool which we should use as much as possible during the process of the struggle.<br><br><br><br>ARMED PROPAGANDA<br>1. Generalities<br>Frequently a misunderstanding exists on "armed propaganda," that this tactic is a compulsion of the people with arms. In reality, it does not include compulsion, but the guerrilla should know well the principles and methods of this tactic. The objective of this section is to give the guerrilla student an understanding of the armed propaganda that should be used, and that will be able to be applied in guerrilla warfare.<br><br><br>2. Close Identification with the People<br>Armed propaganda includes all acts carried out by an armed force, whose results improve the attitude of the people toward this force, and it does not include forced indoctrination. This is carried out by a close identification with the people on any occasion. For example:<br><br>*Putting aside weapons and working side by side with the peasants in the countryside: building, fishing, repairing roofs, transporting water, etc.<br><br>*When working with the people, the guerrillas can use slogans such as "many hands doing small things, but doing them together."<br><br>*Participating in the tasks of the people, they can establish a strong tie between them and the guerrillas, and at the same time a popular support for our movement is generated.<br><br>During the patrols and other operations around or in the midst of villages, each guerrilla should be respectful and courteous with the people. In addition he should move with care and always be well prepared to fight, if necessary. But he should not always see all the people as enemies, with suspicions or hostility. Even in war, it is possible to smile, laugh or greet people. Truly, the cause of our revolutionary base, the reason why we are struggling, is our people. We must be respectful to them on all occasions that present themselves.<br><br>In places and situations wherever possible, e.g., when they are resting during the march, the guerrillas can explain the operation of weapons to the youths and young men. They can show them an unloaded rifle so that they will learn to load it and unload it; their use, and aiming at imaginary targets since they are potential recruits for our forces.<br><br>The guerrillas should always be prepared with simple slogans in order to explain to the people, whether in an intentional form or by chance, the reason for the weapons.<br><br><br>"The weapons will be for winning freedom; they are for you." <br><br><br>"With weapons we can impose demands such as hospitals, schools, better roads, and social services for the people, for you." <br><br><br>"Our weapons are, in truth, the weapons of the people, yours." <br><br><br>"With weapons we can change the Sandino-Communist regime and return to the people a true democracy so that we will ail have economic opportunities." <br>All of this should be designed to create an identification of the people with the weapons and the guerrillas who carry them. Finally, we should make the people feel that we are thinking of them and that the weapons are the people's, in order to help them and protect them from a Communist, totalitarian, imperialist regime, indifferent to the needs of the population.<br><br><br>3. Implicit and Explicit Terror<br>A guerrilla armed force always involves implicit terror because the population, without saying it aloud, feels terror that the weapons may be used against them. However, if the terror does not become explicit, positive results can be expected.<br><br>In a revolution, the individual lives under a constant threat of physical damage. If the government police cannot put an end to the guerrilla activities, the population will lose confidence in the government, which has the inherent mission of guaranteeing the safety of citizens. However, the guerrillas should be careful not to become an explicit terror, because this would result in a loss of popular support.<br><br>In the words of a leader of the Huk guerrilla movement of the Philippine Islands: "The population is always impressed by weapons, not by the terror that they cause, but rather by a sensation of strength/force. We must appear before the people, giving them support with our weapons; that will give them the message of the struggle." This is, then, in a few words, the essence of armed propaganda.<br><br>An armed guerrilla force can occupy an entire town or small city that is neutral or relatively passive in the conflict. In order to conduct the armed propaganda in an effective manner, the following should be carried out simultaneously:<br><br>*Destroy the military or police installations and remove the survivors to a "public place."<br><br>*Cut all the outside lines of communication: cables, radio, messengers.<br><br>*Set up ambushes in order to delay the reinforcements in all the possible entry routes.<br><br>*Kidnap all officials or agents of the Sandinista government and replace them in "public places" with military or civilian persons of trust to our movement; in addition, carry out the following:<br><br>*Establish a public tribunal that depends on the guerrillas, and cover the town or city in order to gather the population for this event.<br><br>*Shame, ridicule and humiliate the "personal symbols" of the government of repression in the presence of the people and foster popular participation through guerrillas within the multitude, shouting slogans and jeers.<br><br>*Reduce the influence of individuals in tune with the regime, pointing out their weaknesses and taking them out of the town, without damaging them publicly.<br><br>*Mix the guerrillas within the population and show very good conduct by all members of the column, practicing the following:<br><br><br>Any article taken will be paid for with cash. <br><br><br>The hospitality offered by the people will be accepted and this opportunity will be exploited in order to carry out face-to-face persuasion about the struggle. <br><br><br>Courtesy visits should be made to the prominent persons and those with prestige in the place, such as doctors, priests, teachers, etc. <br><br><br>The guerrillas should instruct the population that with the end of the operative, and when the Sandinista repressive forces interrogate them, they may reveal EVERYTHING about the military operation carried out. For example, the type of weapons they use, how many men arrived, from what direction they came and in what direction they left, in short, EVERYTHING. <br><br><br>In addition, indicate to the population that at meetings or in private discussions they can give the names of the Sandinista informants, who will be removed together with the other officials of the government of repression. <br><br>When a meeting is held, conclude it with a speech by one of the leaders of guerrilla political cadres (the most dynamic), which includes explicit references to:<br><br>The fact that the "enemies of the people"–the officials or Sandinista agents–must not be mistreated in spite of their criminal acts, although the guerrilla force may have suffered casualties, and that this is done due to the generosity of the Christian guerrillas.<br><br>Give a declaration of gratitude for the "hospitality" of the population, as well as let them know that the risks that they will run when the Sandinistas return are greatly appreciated.<br><br>The fact that the Sandinista regime, although it exploits the people with taxes, control of money, grains and all aspects of public life through associations, which they are forced to become part of, will not be able to resist the attacks of our guerrilla forces.<br><br>Make the promise to the people that you will return to ensure that the "leeches" of the Sandinista regime of repression will not be able to hinder our guerrillas from integrating with the population.<br><br>A statement repeated to the population to the effect that they can reveal everything about this visit of our commandos, because we are not afraid of anything or anyone, neither the Soviets nor the Cubans. Emphasize that we are Nicaraguans, that we are fighting for the freedom of Nicaragua and to establish a very Nicaraguan government.<br><br><br>4. Guerrilla Weapons Are the Strength of the People over an Illegal Government<br>The armed propaganda in populated areas does not give the impression that weapons are the power of the guerrillas over the people, but rather that the weapons are the strength of the people against. a regime of repression.<br>Whenever it is necessary to use armed force in an occupation or visit to a town or village, guerrillas should emphasize making sure that they:<br><br>*Explain to the population that in the first place this is being done to protect them, the people, and not themselves.<br><br>*Admit frankly and publicly that this is an "act of the democratic guerrilla movement," with appropriate explanations.<br><br>*That this action, although it is not desirable, is necessary because the final objective of the insurrection is a free and democratic society, where acts of force are not necessary.<br><br>*The force of weapons is a necessity caused by the oppressive system, and will cease to exist when the "forces of justice" of our movement assume control.<br><br>If, for example, it should be necessary for one of the advanced posts to have to fire on a citizen who was trying to leave the town or city in which the guerrillas are carrying out armed propaganda or political proselytism, the following is recommended:<br><br>*Explain that if that citizen had managed to escape, he would have alerted the enemy that is near the town or city, and they would carry out acts of reprisal such as rapes, pillage, destruction, captures, etc., in this way terrorizing the inhabitants of the place for having given attention and hospitalities to the guerrillas of the town.<br><br>*If a guerrilla fires at an individual, make the town see that he was an enemy of the people, and that they shot him because the guerrillas recognized as their first duty the protection of citizens.<br><br>*The commando tried to detain the informant without firing because he, like all Christian guerrillas, espouses nonviolence. Firing at the Sandinista informant, although it is against his own will, was necessary to prevent the repression of the Sandinista government against innocent people.<br><br>*Make the population see that it was the repressive system of the regime that was the cause of this situation, what really killed the informer, and that the weapon fired was one recovered in combat against the Sandinista regime.<br><br>*Make the population see that if the Sandinista regime had ended the repression, the corruption backed by foreign powers, etc., the freedom commandos would not have had to brandish arms against brother Nicaraguans, which goes against our Christian sentiments. If the informant hadn't tried to escape he would be enjoying life together with the rest of the population, because he would not have tried to inform the enemy. This death would have been avoided if justice and freedom existed in Nicaragua, which is exactly the objective of the democratic guerrilla.<br><br><br>5. Selective Use of Violence for Propagandistic Effects<br>It is possible to neutralize carefully selected and planned targets, such as court judges, mesta judges, police and State Security officials, CDS chiefs, etc. For psychological purposes it is necessary to take extreme precautions, and it is absolutely necessary to gather together the population affected, so that they will be present, take part in the act, and formulate accusation against the oppressor.<br><br>The target or person should be chosen on the basis of:<br><br>*The spontaneous hostility that the majority of the population feels toward the target.<br><br>*Use rejection of potential hatred by the majority of the population affected toward the target, stirring up the population and making them see all the negative and hostile actions of the individual against the people.<br><br>*If the majority of the people give their support or backing to the target or subject, do not try to change these sentiments through provocation.<br><br>*Relative difficulty of controlling the person who will replace the target.<br><br>The person who will replace the target should be chosen carefully, based on:<br><br>*Degree of violence necessary to carry out the change.<br><br>*Degree of violence acceptable to the population affected.<br><br>*Degree of violence possible without causing damage or danger to other individuals in the area of the target.<br><br>*Degree of predictable reprisal by the enemy on the population affected or other individuals in the area of the target.<br><br>The mission to replace the individual should be followed by:<br><br>*Extensive explanation within the population affected of the reason why it was necessary for the good of the people.<br><br>*Explain that Sandinista retaliation is unjust, indiscriminate, and above all, a justification for the execution of this mission.<br><br>*Carefully test the reaction of the people toward the mission, as well as control this reaction, making sure that the population's reaction is beneficial towards the Freedom Commandos.<br><br><br>6. Conclusions<br>Armed propaganda includes all acts executed and the impact achieved by an armed force, which as a result produces positive attitudes in the population toward this force, and it does not include forced indoctrination. However, armed propaganda is the most effective available instrument of a guerilla force.<br><br><br><br>Armed Propaganda Teams (APTs)<br>1. Generalities<br>In contact with the very reality of their roots, in a psychological operation campaign in guerilla warfare, the comandantes will be able to obtain maximum psychological results from an Armed Propaganda Team program. This section is to inform the guerilla student as to what Armed Propaganda Teams are in the environment of guerilla warfare.<br><br><br>2. Combination: Political Awareness and Armed Propaganda<br>The Armed Propaganda Teams combine political awareness-building with armed propaganda, which will be carried out by carefully selected guerrillas (preferably with experience in combat), for personal persuasion within the population.<br><br>The selection of the staff is more important than the training, because we cannot train guerrilla cadres just to show the sensations of ardor and fervor, which are essential for person-to-person persuasion. More important is the training of persons who are intellectually agile and developed.<br><br>An Armed Propaganda Team includes from 6 to 10 members; this number or a smaller number is ideal, since there is more camaraderie, solidarity and group spirit. The themes to deal with are assimilated more rapidly and the members react more rapidly to unforeseen situations.<br><br>In addition to the combination as armed propagandist-combatant each member of the team should be well prepared to carry out permanent person-to-person communication, face-to-face.<br><br>The leader of the group should be the commando who is the most highly motivated politically and the most effective in face-to-face persuasion. The position, hierarchy or range will not be decisive for carrying out that function, but rather who is best qualified for communication with the people.<br><br>The source of basic recruitment for guerrilla cadres will be the same social groups of Nicaraguans to whom the psychological campaign is directed, such as peasants, students, professionals, housewives, etc. The campesinos (peasants) should be made to see that they do not have lands; the workers that the State is putting an end to factories and industries; the doctors, that they are being replaced by Cuban paramedics, and that as doctors they cannot practice their profession due to a lack of medicines. A requirement for recruiting them will be their ability to express themselves in public.<br><br>The selection of the personnel is more important than the training. The political awareness-building and the individual capabilities of persuasion will be shown in the group discussions for motivation of the guerrilla as a propagandist-combatant chosen as cadres to organize them in teams, that is, those who have the greatest capacity for this work.<br><br>The training of guerrillas for Armed Propaganda Teams emphasizes the method and not the content. A two-week training period is sufficient if the recruitment is done in the form indicated. If a mistaken process of recruitment has been followed, however good the training provided, the individual chosen will not yield a very good result.<br><br>The training should be intensive for 14 days, through team discussions, alternating the person who leads the discussion among the members of the group.<br><br>The subjects to be dealt with will be the same, each day a different theme being presented, for a varied practice.<br><br>The themes should refer to the conditions of the place and the meaning that they have for the inhabitants of the locality, such as talking of crops, fertilizers, seeds, irrigation of crops, etc. They can also include the following topics:<br><br><br>-Sawed wood, carpenters' tools for houses or other buildings. <br>-Boats, roads, horses, oxen for transportation, fishing, agriculture. <br>-Problems that they may have in the place with residents, offices of the regime, imposed visitors, etc. <br>-Forced labor, service in the militias. -Forced membership in Sandinista groups, such as women's clubs, youth associations, workers' groups, etc. <br>-Availability and prices of consumer articles and of basic needs in the grocery stores and shops of the place. <br>-Characteristics of education in the public schools. <br>-Anxiety of the people over the presence of Cuban teachers in the schools and the intrusion of politics, i.e. using them for political ends and not educational ones as should be. <br>-Indignation over the lack of freedom of worship, and persecution, of which priests are victims; and over the participation of priests such as Escoto and Cardenal in the Sandinista government, against the explicit orders of his Holiness, the Pope. <br><br>NOTE: Members of the team can develop other themes.<br><br>The target groups for the Armed Propaganda Teams are not the persons with sophisticated political knowledge, but rather those whose opinions are formed from what they see and hear. The cadres should use persuasion to carry out their mission. Some of the persuasive methods that they can use are the following:<br><br>Interior Group/Exterior Group. It is a principle of psychology that we humans have the tendency to form personal associations from "we" and "the others," or "we" and "they," "friends" and "enemies," "fellow countrymen" and "foreigners," "mestizos " and "gringos."<br><br>The Armed Propaganda Team can use this principle in its activities, so that it is obvious that the "exterior" groups ("false" groups) are those of the Sandinista regime, and that the "interior" groups ("true" groups) that fight for the people are the Freedom Commandos.<br><br>We should inculcate this in the people in a subtle manner so that these feelings seem to be born of themselves, spontaneously.<br><br>"Against" is much easier than "for." It is a principle of political science that it is easier to persuade the people to vote against something or someone than to persuade them to vote in favor of something or someone. Although currently the regime has not given the Nicaraguan people the opportunity to vote, it is known that the people will vote in opposition, so that the Armed Propaganda Teams can use this principle in favor of our insurrectional struggle. They should ensure that this campaign is directed specifically against the government or its sympathizers, since the people should have specific targets for their frustrations.<br><br>Primary Groups and Secondary Groups. Another principle of sociology is that we humans forge or change our opinions from two sources: primarily, through our association with our family, comrades, or intimate friends; and secondarily, through distant associations such as acquaintances in churches, clubs or committees, labor unions or governmental organizations. The Armed Propaganda Team cadres should join the first groups in order to persuade them to follow the policies of our movement, because it is from this type of group that the opinions or changes of opinion come.<br><br>Techniques of Persuasion in Talks or Speeches:<br><br>Be Simple and Concise. You should avoid the use of difficult words or expressions and prefer popular words and expressions, i.e. the language of the people. In dealing with a person you should make use of concise language, avoiding complicated words. It is important to remember that we use oratory to make our people understand the reason for our struggle, and not to show off our knowledge.<br><br>Use Lively and Realistic Examples. Avoid abstract concepts, such as are used in universities in the advanced years, and in place of them, give concrete examples such as children playing, horses galloping, birds in flight, etc.<br><br>Use Gestures to Communicate. Communication, in addition to being verbal, can be through gestures, such as using our hands expressively, back movements, facial expressions, focusing of our look and other aspects of "body language," projecting the individual personality in the message.<br><br>Use the Appropriate Tone of Voice. If, on addressing the people, you talk about happiness, a happy tone should be used. If you talk of something sad, the tone of the voice should be one of sadness; on talking of a heroic or brave act, the voice should be animated, etc.<br><br>Above All, Be Natural. Imitations of others should be avoided, since the people, especially simple people, easily distinguish a fake. The individual personality should be projected when addressing the population.<br><br><br>3. "Eyes and Ears" Within the Population<br>The amount of information for intelligence that will be generated by the deployment of the Armed Propaganda Teams will allow us to cover a large area with our commandos, who will become the eyes and ears of our movement within the population:<br><br>The combined reports of an Armed Propaganda Team will provide us with exact details on the enemy activities.<br><br>The intelligence information obtained by the Armed Propaganda Teams should be reported to the chiefs. However, it is necessary to emphasize that the first mission of the Armed Propaganda Teams is to carry out psychological operations, not to obtain data for intelligence.<br><br>Any intelligence report will be made through the outside contact of the Armed Propaganda Team, in order not to compromise the population.<br><br>The Armed Propaganda cadres are able to do what others in a guerrilla campaign cannot do: determine personally the development or deterioration of the popular support and the sympathy or hostility that the people feel toward our movement.<br><br>The Armed Propaganda Team program, in addition to being very effective psychologically, increases the guerrilla capacity in obtaining and using information.<br><br>In addition, the Armed Propaganda cadre will report to his superior the reaction of the people to the radio broadcasts, the insurrectional flyers, or any other means of propaganda of ours.<br><br>Expressions or gestures of the eyes, or face, the tone and strength of the voice, and the use of the appropriate words greatly affect the face-to-face persuasion of the people.<br><br>With the intelligence reports supplied by the Armed Propaganda Teams, the comandantes will be able to have exact knowledge of the popular support, which they will make use of in their operations.<br><br><br>4. Psychological Tactics, Maximum Flexibility<br>Psychological tactics will have the greatest flexibility within a general plan, permitting a continuous and immediate adjustment of the message, and ensuring that an impact is caused on the indicated target group at the moment in which it is the most susceptible.<br><br>Tactically, an Armed Propaganda Equipment program should cover the majority and if possible all of the operational area. The communities in which this propaganda is carried out should not necessarily form political units with an official nature. A complete understanding of their structure or organization is not necessary because the cadres will work by applying socio-political action and not academic theory.<br><br>The target populations of the Armed Propaganda Teams will be chosen for being part of the operational area, and not for their size or amount of land.<br><br>The objective should be the people and not the territorial area.<br><br>In this respect, each work team will be able to cover some six towns approximately, in order to develop popular support for our movement.<br><br>The Team should always move in a covert manner within the towns of their area.<br><br>They should vary their route radically, but not their itinerary. This is so that the inhabitants who are cooperating will be dependent on their itinerary, i.e., the hour in which they can frequently contact them to give them the information.<br><br>The danger of betrayal or an ambush can be neutralized by varying the itinerary a little, using different routes, as well as arriving or leaving without previous warning.<br><br>Whenever the surprise factor is used, vigilance should be kept in order to detect the possible presence of hostile elements.<br><br>No more than three consecutive days should be spent in a town.<br><br>The limit of three days has obvious tactical advantages, but it also has a psychological effect on the people, on seeing the team as a source of current and up-to-date information. Also, it can overexpose the target audience and cause a negative reaction.<br><br>Basic tactical precautions should be taken. This is necessary for greater effectiveness, as was indicated in dealing with the subject of "Armed Propaganda," and when it is carried out discreetly, it increases the respect of the people for the team and increases their credibility.<br><br>The basic procedures are: covert elements that carry out vigilance before and after the departure and in intervals. There should be two at least, and they should meet at a predetermined point upon a signal, or in view of any hostile action.<br><br>The team's goal is to motivate the entire population of a place, but to constantly remain aware that defined target groups exist within this general configuration of the public.<br><br>Although meetings may be held in the population, the cadres should recognize and keep in contact with the target groups, mixing with them before, during and after the meeting. The method for holding this type of meeting was included in the topic "Armed Propaganda," and will be covered in greater detail under the title "Control of Mass Meetings and Demonstrations."<br><br>The basic focus of the Armed Propaganda cadres should be on the residents of the town, where their knowledge as formers of opinion can be applied.<br><br>In the first visits of identification with the inhabitants, the guerrilla cadres will be courteous and humble. They can work in the fields or in any other form in which their abilities can contribute to the improvement of the living style of the inhabitants of the place, winning their trust and talking with them; helping to repair the fences of their cattle; the cleaning of the same, collaborating in the vaccination of their animals; teaching them to read, i.e., closely together in all the tasks of the peasant or the community.<br><br>In his free time, our guerrilla should mix in with the community groups and participate with them in patronal activities, parties, birthdays, and even in wakes or burials of the members of said community; he will try to converse with both adults and adolescents. He will try to penetrate to the heart of the family, in order to win the acceptance and trust of all of the residents of that sector.<br><br>The Armed Propaganda Team cadres will give ideological training, mixing these instructions with folkloric songs, and at the same time he will tell stories that have some attraction, making an effort to make them refer to heroic acts of our ancestors. He will also try to tell stories of heroism of our combatants in the present struggle so that listeners try to imitate them. It is important to let them know that there are other countries in the world where freedom and democracy cause those governing to be concerned over the well-being of their people, so that the children have medical care and free education; where also they are concerned that everyone have work and food, and all freedoms such as those of religion, association and expression; where the greatest objective of the government is to keep its people happy.<br><br>The cadres should not make mention of their political ideology during the first phase of identification with the people, and they should orient their talks to things that are pleasing to the peasants or the listeners, trying to be as simple as possible in order to be understood.<br><br>The tactical objectives for identification with the people are the following:<br><br>*To establish tight relations through identification with the people, through their very customs.<br>*To determine the basic needs and desires of the different target groups.<br>*To discover the weaknesses of the governmental control.<br>*Little by little, to sow the seed of democratic revolution, in order to change the vices of the regime towards a new order of justice and collective well-being.<br><br>In the motivation of the target groups, by the Armed Propaganda Teams, the cadre should apply themes of "true" groups and themes of"false" groups. The true group will correspond to the target group and the false one to the Sandinista regime.<br><br>For the economic interest groups, such as small businessmen and farmers, it should be emphasized that their potential progress is "limited" by the Sandinista government, that resources are scarcer and scarcer; the earnings/profits minimal, taxes high, etc. This can be applied to entrepreneurs of transportation and others.<br><br>For the elements ambitious for power and social positions, it will be emphasized that they will never be able to belong to the governmental social class, since they are hermetic in their circle of command. Example, the nine Sandinista leaders do not allow other persons to participate in the government, and they hinder the development of the economic and social potential of those like him, who have desires of overcoming this, which is unjust and arbitrary.<br><br>Social and intellectual criticisms. They should be directed at the professionals, professors, teachers, priests, missionaries, students and others. Make them see that their writings, commentaries or conversations are censored, which does not make it possible to correct these problems.<br><br>Once the needs and frustrations of the target groups have been determined, the hostility of the people to the "false" groups will become more direct, against the current regime and its system of repression. The people will be made to see that once this system or structure has been eliminated, the cause of their frustrations would be eliminated and they would be able to fulfill their desires. It should be shown to the population that supporting the insurrection is really supporting their own desires, since the democratic movement is aimed at the elimination of these specific problems.<br><br>As a general rule, the Armed Propaganda teams should avoid participating in combat. However, if this is not possible, they should react as a guerrilla unit with tactics of "hit and run," causing the enemy the greatest amount of casualties with aggressive assault-fire, recovering enemy weapons and withdrawing rapidly.<br><br>One exception to the rule to avoid combat will be when in the town they are challenged by hostile actions, whether by an individual or whether by a number of men of an enemy team.<br><br>The hostility of one or two men can be overcome by eliminating the enemy in a rapid and effective manner. This is the most common danger.<br><br>When the enemy is equal in the number of its forces, there should be an immediate retreat, and then the enemy should be ambushed or eliminated by means of sharpshooters.<br><br>In any of the cases, the Armed Propaganda Team cadres should not turn the town into a battleground. Generally, our guerrillas will be better armed, so that they will obtain greater respect from the population if they carry out appropriate maneuvers instead of endangering their lives, or even destroying their houses in an encounter with the enemy within the town.<br><br><br>5. A Comprehensive Team Program – Mobile Infrastructure<br>The psychological operations through the Armed Propaganda Teams include the infiltration of key guerilla communicators (i.e., Armed Propaganda Team cadres) into the population of the country, instead of sending messages to them through outside sources, thus creating our "mobile infrastructure."<br><br>A "mobile infrastructure" is a cadre of our Armed Propaganda Team moving about, i.e., keeping in touch with six or more populations, from which his source of information will come; and at the same time it will serve so that at the appropriate time they will become integrated in the complete guerilla movement.<br><br>In this way, an Armed Propaganda Team program in the operational area builds for our comandantes in the countryside constant source of data gathering (infrastructure) in all the area. It is also a means for developing or increasing popular support, for recruiting new members and for obtaining provisions.<br><br>In addition, an Armed Propaganda Team program allows the expansion of the guerrilla movement, since they can penetrate areas that are not under the control of the combat units. In this way, through an exact evaluation of the combat units they will be able to plan their operations more precisely, since they will have certain knowledge of the existing conditions.<br><br>The comandantes will remember that this type of operation is similar to the Fifth Column, which was used in the first part of the Second World War, and which through infiltration and subversion tactics allowed the Germans to penetrate the target countries before the invasions. They managed to enter Poland, Belgium, Holland and France in a month, and Norway in a week. The effectiveness of this tactic has been clearly demonstrated in several wars and can be used effectively by the Freedom Commandos.<br><br>The activities of the Armed Propaganda Teams run some risks, but no more than any other guerrilla activity. However, the Armed Propaganda Teams are essential for the success of the struggle.<br><br><br>6. Conclusions<br>In the same way that the explorers are the "eyes and ears" of a patrol, or of a column on the march, the Armed Propaganda Teams are also the source of information, the "antennas" of our movement, because they find and exploit the sociopolitical weaknesses in the target society, making possible a successful operation.<br><br><br>DEVELOPMENT AND CONTROL OF FRONT ORGANIZATIONS<br>1. Generalities<br>The development and control of front organizations (or "façade" organizations) is an essential process in the guerrilla effort to carry out the insurrection. That is, in truth, an aspect of urban guerrilla warfare, but it should advance parallel to the campaign in the rural area. This section has as its objective to give the guerilla student an understanding of the development and control of front organizations in guerrilla warfare.<br><br><br>2. Initial Recruitment<br>The initial recruitment to the movement, if it is involuntary, will be carried out through several "private" consultations with a cadre (without his knowing that he is talking to a member of ours). Then, the recruit will be informed that he or she is already inside the movement, and he will be exposed to the police of the regime if he or she does not cooperate.<br><br>When the guerrillas carry out missions of armed propaganda and a program of regular visits to the towns by the Armed Propaganda Teams, these contacts will provide the commandos with the names and places of persons who can be recruited. The recruitment, which will be voluntary, is done through visits by guerrilla leaders or political cadres.<br><br>After a chain of voluntary recruitments has been developed, and the trustworthiness of the recruits has been established by their carrying out small missions, they will be instructed about increasing/widening the chain by recruiting in specific target groups, in accordance with the following procedure:<br><br>*From among their acquaintances or through observation of the target groups–political parties, workers' unions, youth groups, agrarian associations, etc.–finding out the personal habits, preferences and biases, as well as the weaknesses of the "recruitable" individuals.<br><br>*Make an approach through an acquaintance, and if possible, develop a friendship, attracting him through his preferences or weaknesses: it might be inviting him for lunch in the restaurant of his choice or having a drink in his favorite cantina or an invitation to dinner in the place he prefers.<br><br>Recruitment should follow one of the following guidelines:<br><br>*If in an informal conversation the target seems susceptible to voluntary recruitment based on his beliefs and personal values, etc., the political cadre assigned to carry out the recruitments will be notified of this. The original contact will indicate to the cadre assigned, in detail, all he knows of the prospective recruit, and the style of persuasion to be used, introducing the two.<br><br>*If the target does not seem to be susceptible to voluntary recruitment, meetings can be arranged which seem casual with the guerrilla leaders or with the political cadres (unknown by the target until that moment). The meetings will be held so that "other persons" know that the target is attending them, whether they see him arrive at a particular house, seated at the table in a particular bar or even seated on a park bench. The target, then, is faced with the fact of his participation in the insurrectional struggle and it will be indicated to him also that if he fails to cooperate or to carry out future orders, he will be subjected to reprisals by the police or soldiers of the regime.<br><br>*The notification of the police, denouncing a target who does not want to join the guerrillas, can be carried out easily, when it becomes necessary, through a letter with false statements of citizens who are not implicated in the movement. Care should be taken that the person who recruited him covertly is not discovered.<br><br>*With the carrying out of clandestine missions f
chiggerbit
 
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Re: A Study of Assassination

Postby chiggerbit » Fri Aug 12, 2005 12:20 am

(Comments NOT mine)<br><br><!--EZCODE AUTOLINK START--><a href="http://groups.yahoo.com/group/KoreshX98/message/405">groups.yahoo.com/group/Ko...essage/405</a><!--EZCODE AUTOLINK END--><br><br>"....The theater of this WAR is our cities and its nature is Guerilla Warfare. At this stage, it is essential that we have a sound understanding of the… <br><br><br>*Psychological Operations in Guerilla Warfare*<br><br><!--EZCODE AUTOLINK START--><a href="http://www.webcom.com/pinknoiz/covert/tacayan.html#1.%20Generalities">www.webcom.com/pinknoiz/c...neralities</a><!--EZCODE AUTOLINK END--><br><br><br><br>This is a tactical manual for the revolutionary that was published by the Central Intelligence Agency and distributed to the Contras in Central America. <br><br><br><br>Also they published this:<br><br>A Study of Assassination<br><!--EZCODE AUTOLINK START--><a href="http://www.kimsoft.com/korea/cia-0.htm">www.kimsoft.com/korea/cia-0.htm</a><!--EZCODE AUTOLINK END--><br><br><br><br>I suggest that you read it, so that you can better defend yourselves and your families......"<br><br><br><br><br><br><br><br><!--EZCODE AUTOLINK START--><a href="http://www.kimsoft.com/korea/cia-0.htm">www.kimsoft.com/korea/cia-0.htm</a><!--EZCODE AUTOLINK END--><br>A Study of Assassination<br><br><br>DEFINITION<br>Assassination is a term thought to be derived from "Hashish", a drug similar to marijuana, said to have been used by Hasan-Dan-Sabah to induce motivation in his followers, who were assigned to carry out political and other murders, usually at the c ost of their lives. It is here used to describe the planned killing of a person who is not under the legal jurisdiction of the killer, who is not physically in the hands of the killer, who has been selected by a resistance organization for death, and who has been selected by a resistance organization for death, and whose death provides positive advantages to that organization. <br>EMPLOYMENT<br>Assassination is an extreme measure not normally used in clandestine operations. It should be assumed that it will never be ordered or authorized by any U.S. Headquarters, though the latter may in rare instances agree to its execution by members of an ass ociated foreign service. <br>This reticence is partly due to the necessity for committing communications to paper. No assassination instructions should ever be written or recorded. Consequently, the decision to employ this technique must nearly always be reached in the field, at the area where the act will take place. <br><br>Decision and instructions should be confined to an absolute minimum of persons. Ideally, only one person will be involved. No report may be made, but usually the act will be properly covered by normal news services, whose output is available to all concer ned. <br><br>JUSTIFICATION<br>Murder is not morally justifiable. Self-defense may be argued if the victim has knowledge which may destroy the resistance organization if divulged. Assassination of persons responsible for atrocities or reprisals may be regarded as just punishment. Killi ng a political leader whose burgeoning career is a clear and present danger to the cause of freedom may be held necessary. <br>But assassination can seldom be employed with a clear conscience. Persons who are morally squeamish should not attempt it. <br><br>CLASSIFICATIONS<br>The techniques employed will vary according to whether the subject is unaware of his danger, aware but unguarded, or guarded. They will also be affected by whether or not the assassin is to be killed with the subject hereafter, assassinations in which the subject is unaware will be termed "simple"; those where the subject is aware but unguarded will be termed "chase"; those where the victim is guarded will be termed "guarded." <br>If the assassin is to die with the subject, the act will be called "lost." If the assassin is to escape, the adjective will be "safe." It should be noted that no compromises should exist here. The assassin must not fall alive into enemy hands. <br><br>A further type division is caused by the need to conceal the fact that the subject was actually the victim of assassination, rather than an accident or natural causes. If such concealment is desirable the operation will be called "secret"; if concealment is immaterial, the act will be called "open"; while if the assassination requires publicity to be effective it will be termed "terroristic." <br><br>Following these definitions, the assassination of Julius Caesar was safe, simple, and terroristic, while that of Huey Long was lost, guarded and open. Obviously, successful secret assassinations are not recorded as assassination at all. [Illegible] of Tha iland and Augustus Caesar may have been the victims of safe, guarded and secret assassination. Chase assassinations usually involve clandestine agents or members of criminal organizations. <br><br>THE ASSASSIN<br>In safe assassinations, the assassin needs the usual qualities of a clandestine agent. He should be determined, courageous, intelligent, resourceful, and physically active. If special equipment is to be used, such as firearms or drugs, it is clear that he must have outstanding skill with such equipment. <br>Except in terroristic assassinations, it is desirable that the assassin be transient in the area. He should have an absolute minimum of contact with the rest of the organization and his instructions should be given orally by one person only. His safe evac uation after the act is absolutely essential, but here again contact should be as limited as possible. It is preferable that the person issuing instructions also conduct any withdrawal or covering action which may be necessary. <br><br>In lost assassination, the assassin must be a fanatic of some sort. Politics, religion, and revenge are about the only feasible motives. Since a fanatic is unstable psychologically, he must be handled with extreme care. He must not know the identities of the other members of the organization, for although it is intended that he die in the act, something may go wrong. While the Assassin of Trotsky has never revealed any significant information, it was unsound to depend on this when the act was planned. <br><br>PLANNING<br>When the decision to assassinate has been reached, the tactics of the operation must be planned, based upon an estimate of the situation similar to that used in military operations. The preliminary estimate will reveal gaps in information and possibly ind icate a need for special equipment which must be procured or constructed. <br>When all necessary data has been collected, an effective tactical plan can be prepared. All planning must be mental; no papers should ever contain evidence of the operation. <br><br>In resistance situations, assassination may be used as a counter-reprisal. Since this requires advertising to be effective, the resistance organization must be in a position to warn high officials publicly that their lives will be the price of rep risal a ction against innocent people. Such a threat is of no value unless it can be carried out, so it may be necessary to plan the assassination of various responsible officers of the oppressive regime and hold such plans in readiness to be used only i f provok ed by excessive brutality. Such plans must be modified frequently to meet changes in the tactical situation. <br><br>TECHNIQUES<br>The essential point of assassination is the death of the subject. A human being may be killed in many ways but sureness is often overlooked by those who may be emotionally unstrung by the seriousness of this act they intend to commit. The specific techniq ue employed will depend upon a large number of variables, but should be constant in one point: Death must be absolutely certain. The attempt on Hitler's life failed because the conspiracy did not give this matter proper attention. <br>Techniques may be considered as follows: <br><br><br>Manual - It is possible to kill a man with the bare hands, but very few are skillful enough to do it well. Even a highly trained Judo expert will hesitate to risk killing by hand unless he has absolutely no alternative. However, the simplest local too ls are often much the most efficient means of assassination. A hammer, axe, wrench, screw driver, fire poker, kitchen knife, lamp stand, or anything hard, heavy and handy will suffice. <br>A length of rope or wire or a belt will do if the assassin is strong and agile. All such improvised weapons have the important advantage of availability and apparent innocence. The obviously lethal machine gun failed to kill Trotsky where an item of sport ing goods succeeded. <br><br>In all safe cases where the assassin may be subject to search, either before or after the act, specialized weapons should not be used. Even in the lost case, the assassin may accidentally be searched before the act and should not carry an incriminating de vice if any sort of lethal weapon can be improvised at or near the site. If the assassin normally carries weapons because of the nature of his job, it may still be desirable to improvise and implement at the scene to avoid disclosure of his identity. <br><br><br>2. Accidents - For secret assassination, either simple or chase, the contrived accident is the most effective technique. When successfully executed, it causes little excitement and is only casually investigated. <br>The most efficient accident, in simple assassination, is a fall of 75 feet or more onto a hard surface. Elevator shafts, stair wells, unscreened windows and bridges will serve. Bridge falls into water are not reliable. In simple cases a private meeting wi th the subject may be arranged at a properly-cased location. The act may be executed by sudden, vigorous [excised] of the ankles, tipping the subject over the edge. If the assassin immediately sets up an outcry, playing the "horrified witness", no alibi o r surreptitious withdrawal is necessary. In chase cases it will usually be necessary to stun or drug the subject before dropping him. Care is required to insure that no wound or condition not attributable to the fall is discernible after death. <br><br>Falls into the sea or swiftly flowing rivers may suffice if the subject cannot swim. It will be more reliable if the assassin can arrange to attempt rescue, as he can thus be sure of the subject's death and at the same time establish a workable alibi. <br><br>If the subject's personal habits make it feasible, alcohol may be used [2 words excised] to prepare him for a contrived accident of any kind. <br><br>Falls before trains or subway cars are usually effective, but require exact timing and can seldom be free from unexpected observation. <br><br>Automobile accidents are a less satisfactory means of assassination. If the subject is deliberately run down, very exact timing is necessary and investigation is likely to be thorough. If the subject's car is tampered with, reliability is very low. The su bject may be stunned or drugged and then placed in the car, but this is only reliable when the car can be run off a high cliff or into deep water without observation. <br><br>Arson can cause accidental death if the subject is drugged and left in a burning building. Reliability is not satisfactory unless the building is isolated and highly combustible. <br><br><br>Drugs - In all types of assassination except terroristic, drugs can be very effective. If the assassin is trained as a doctor or nurse and the subject is under medical care, this is an easy and rare method. An overdose of morphine administered as a se dative will cause death without disturbance and is difficult to detect. The size of the dose will depend upon whether the subject has been using narcotics regularly. If not, two grains will suffice. <br>If the subject drinks heavily, morphine or a similar narcotic can be injected at the passing out stage, and the cause of death will often be held to be acute alcoholism. <br><br>Specific poisons, such as arsenic or strychine, are effective but their possession or procurement is incriminating, and accurate dosage is problematical. Poison was used unsuccessfully in the assassination of Rasputin and Kolohan, though the latter case i s more accurately described as a murder. <br><br><br>4. Edge Weapons: Any locally obtained edge device may be successfully employed. A certain minimum of anatomical knowledge is needed for reliability. <br>Puncture wounds of the body cavity may not be reliable unless the heart is reached. The heart is protected by the rib cage and is not always easy to locate. <br><br>Abdominal wounds were once nearly always mortal, but modern medical treatment has made this no longer true. <br><br>Absolute reliability is obtained by severing the spinal cord in the cervical region. This can be done with the point of a knife or a light blow of an axe or hatchet. <br><br>Another reliable method is the severing of both jugular and carotid blood vessels on both sides of the windpipe. <br><br>If the subject has been rendered unconscious by other wounds or drugs, either of the above methods can be used to insure death. <br><br><br>Blunt Weapons: As with edge weapons, blunt weapons require some anatomical knowledge for effective use. Their main advantage is their universal availability. A hammer may be picked up almost anywhere in the world. Baseball and [illeg] bats are very wi dely distributed. Even a rock or a heavy stick will do, and nothing resembling a weapon need be procured, carried or subsequently disposed of. <br>Blows should be directed to the temple, the area just below and behind the ear, and the lower, rear portion of the skull. Of course, if the blow is very heavy, any portion of the upper skull will do. The lower frontal portion of the head, from the eyes to the throat, can withstand enormous blows without fatal consequences. <br><br><br>Firearms: Firearms are often used in assassination, often very ineffectively. The assassin usually has insufficient technical knowledge of the limitations of weapons, and expects more range, accuracy and killing power than can be provided with reliabi lity. Since certainty of death is the major requirement, firearms should be used which can provide destructive power at least 100% in excess of that thought to be necessary, and ranges should be half that considered practical for the weapon. <br>Firearms have other drawbacks. Their possession is often incriminating. They may be difficult to obtain. They require a degree of experience from the user. They are [illeg]. Their [illeg] is consistently over-rated. <br><br>However, there are many cases in which firearms are probably more efficient than any other means. These cases usually involve distance between the assassin and the subject, or comparative physical weakness of the assassin, as with a woman. <br><br>(a) The precision rifle. In guarded assassination, a good hunting or target rifle should always be considered as a possibility. Absolute reliability can nearly always be achieved at a distance of one hundred yards. In ideal circumstances, the range may be extended to 250 yards. The rifle should be a well made bolt or falling block action type, handling a powerful long-range cartridge. The .300 F.A.B. Magnum is probably the best cartridge readily available. Other excellent calibers are .375 M.[illeg]. Magn um, .270 Winchester, .30 - 106 p.s., 8 x 60 MM Magnum, 9.3 x. <br><br>62 kk and others of this type. These are preferable to ordinary military calibers, since ammunition available for them is usually of the expanding bullet type, whereas most ammunition for military rifles is full jacketed and hence not sufficiently lethal. Military ammunition should not be altered by filing or drilling bullets, as this will adversely affect accuracy. <br><br>The rifle may be of the "bull gun" variety, with extra heavy barrel and set triggers, but in any case should be capable of maximum precision. Ideally, the weapon should be able to group in one inch at one hundred yards, but 21/2" groups are adequate. The sight should be telescopic, not only for accuracy, but because such a sight is much better in dim light or near darkness. As long as the bare outline of the target is discernible, a telescope sight will work, even if the rifle and shooter are in total dar kness. <br><br>An expanding, hunting bullet of such calibers as described above will produce extravagant laceration and shock at short or mid-range. If a man is struck just once in the body cavity, his death is almost entirely certain. <br><br>Public figures or guarded officials may be killed with great reliability and some safety if a firing point can be established prior to an official occasion. The propaganda value of this system may be very high. <br><br>(b) The machine gun - Machine guns may be used in most cases where the precision rifle is applicable. Usually, this will require the subversion of a unit of an official guard at a ceremony, though a skillful and determined team might conceivably dispose o f a loyal gun crew without commotion and take over the gun at the critical time. <br><br>The area fire capacity of the machine gun should not be used to search out a concealed subject. This was tried with predictable lack of success on Trotsky. The automatic feature of the machine gun should rather be used to increase reliability by placing a 5 second burst on the subject. Even with full jacket ammunition, this will be absolute lethal is the burst pattern is no larger than a man. This can be accomplished at about 150 yards. In ideal circumstances, a properly padded and targeted ma chine gun c an do it at 850 yards. The major difficulty is placing the first burst exactly on the target, as most machine gunners are trained to spot their fire on target by observation of strike. This will not do in assassination as the subject will not wait. <br><br>(c)The Submachine Gun: This weapon, known as the "machine-pistol" by the Russians and Germans and "machine-carbine" by the British, is occasionally useful in assassination. Unlike the rifle and machine gun, this is a short range weapon and since it fires pistol ammunition, much less powerful. To be reliable, it should deliver at least 5 rounds into the subject's chest, though the .45 caliber U.S. weapons have a much larger margin of killing efficiency than the 9 mm European arms. <br><br>The assassination range of the sub-machine gun is point-blank. While accurate single rounds can be delivered by sub-machine gunners at 50 yards or more, this is not certain enough for assassination. Under ordinary circumstances, the 5MG should be used as a fully automatic weapon. In the hands of a capable gunner, a high cyclic rate is a distinct advantage, as speed of execution is most desirable, particularly in the case of multiple subjects. <br><br>The sub-machine gun is especially adapted to indoor work when more than one subject is to be assassinated. An effective technique has been devised for the use of a pair of sub-machine gunners, by which a room containing as many as a dozen subjects can be "purifico" in about twenty seconds with little or no risk to the gunners. It is illustrated below. <br><br>While the U.S. sub-machine guns fire the most lethal cartridges, the higher cyclic rate of some foreign weapons enable the gunner to cover a target quicker with acceptable pattern density. The Bergmann Model 1934 is particularly good in this way. The Dani sh Madman? SMG has a moderately good cyclic rate and is admirably compact and concealable. The Russian SHG's have a good cyclic rate, but are handicapped by a small, light protective which requires more kits for equivalent killing effect. <br><br>(d) The Shotgun: A large bore shotgun is a most effective killing instrument as long as the range is kept under ten yards. It should normally be used only on single targets as it cannot sustain fire successfully. The barrel may be "sawed" off for convenie nce, but this is not a significant factor in its killing performance. Its optimum range is just out of reach of the subject. 00 buckshot is considered the best shot size for a twelve gage gun, but anything from single balls to bird shot will do if the ran ge is right. The assassin should aim for the solar plexus as the shot pattern is small at close range and can easily [illeg] the head. <br><br>(e) The Pistol - While the handgun is quite inefficient as a weapon of assassination, it is often used, partly because it is readily available and can be concealed on the person, and partly because its limitations are not widely appreciated. While many we ll known assassinations have been carried out with pistols (Lincoln, Harding, Ghandi), such attempts fail as often as they succeed, (Truman, Roosevelt, Churchill). <br><br>If a pistol is used, it should be as powerful as possible and fired from just beyond reach. The pistol and the shotgun are used in similar tactical situations, except that the shotgun is much more lethal and the pistol is much more easily concealed. <br><br>In the hands of an expert, a powerful pistol is quite deadly, but such experts are rare and not usually available for assassination missions. <br><br>.45 Colt, .44 Special, .455 Kly, .45 A.S.[illeg] (U.S. Service) and .357 Magnum are all efficient calibers. Less powerful rounds can suffice but are less reliable. Sub-power cartridges such as the .32s and .25s should be avoided. <br><br>In all cases, the subject should be hit solidly at least three times for complete reliability. <br><br>(f)Silent Firearms - The sound of the explosion of the proponent in a firearm can be effectively silenced by appropriate attachments. However, the sound of the projective passing through the air cannot, since this sound is generated outside the weapon. In cases where the velocity of the bullet greatly exceeds that of sound, the noise so generated is much louder than that of the explosion. Since all powerful rifles have muzzle velocities of over 2000 feet per second, they cannot be silenced. <br><br>Pistol bullets, on the other hand, usually travel slower than sound and the sound of their flight is negligible. Therefore, pistols, submachine guns and any sort of improvised carbine or rifle which will take a low velocity cartridge can be silenced. The user should not forget that the sound of the operation of a repeating action is considerable, and that the sound of bullet strike, particularly in bone is quite loud. <br><br>Silent firearms are only occasionally useful to the assassin, though they have been widely publicized in this connection. Because permissible velocity is low, effective precision range is held to about 100 yards with rifle or carbine type weapons, while w ith pistols, silent or otherwise, are most efficient just beyond arms length. The silent feature attempts to provide a degree of safety to the assassin, but mere possession of a silent firearm is likely to create enough hazard to counter the advantage of its silence. The silent pistol combines the disadvantages of any pistol with the added one of its obviously clandestine purpose. <br><br>A telescopically sighted, closed-action carbine shooting a low velocity bullet of great weight, and built for accuracy, could be very useful to an assassin in certain situations. At the time of writing, no such weapon is known to exist. <br><br><br>Explosives: Bombs and demolition charges of various sorts have been used frequently in assassination. Such devices, in terroristic and open assassination, can provide safety and overcome guard barriers, but it is curious that bombs have often been the implement of lost assassinations. <br>The major factor which affects reliability is the use of explosives for assassination. the charge must be very large and the detonation must be controlled exactly as to time by the assassin who can observe the subject. A small or moderate explosive charge is highly unreliable as a cause of death, and time delay or booby-trap devices are extremely prone to kill the wrong man. In addition to the moral aspects of indiscriminate killing, the death of casual bystanders can often produce public reactions unfavo rable to the cause for which the assassination is carried out. <br><br>Bombs or grenades should never be thrown at a subject. While this will always cause a commotion and may even result in the subject's death, it is sloppy, unreliable, and bad propaganda. The charge must be too small and the assassin is never sure of: (1)re aching his attack position, (2) placing the charge close enough to the target and (3) firing the charge at the right time. <br><br>Placing the charge surreptitiously in advance permits a charge of proper size to be employed, but requires accurate prediction of the subject's movements. <br><br>Ten pounds of high explosive should normally be regarded as a minimum, and this is explosive of fragmentation material. The latter can consist of any hard, [illeg] material as long as the fragments are large enough. Metal or rock fragments should be walnu t-size rather than pen-size. If solid plates are used, to be ruptured by the explosion, cast iron, 1" thick, gives excellent fragmentation. Military or commercial high explosives are practical for use in assassination. Homemade or improvised explosives sh ould be avoided. While possibly powerful, they tend to be dangerous and unreliable. Anti-personnel explosive missiles are excellent, provided the assassin has sufficient technical knowledge to fuse them properly. 81 or 82 mm mortar shells, or the 120 mm m ortar shell, are particularly good. Anti-personnel shells for 85, 88, 90, 100 and 105 mm guns and howitzers are both large enough to be completely reliable and small enough to be carried by one man. <br><br>The charge should be so placed that the subject is not ever six feet from it at the moment of detonation. <br><br>A large, shaped charge with the [illeg] filled with iron fragments (such as 1" nuts and bolts) will fire a highly lethal shotgun-type [illeg] to 50 yards. This reaction has not been thoroughly tested, however, and an exact replica of the proposed device s hould be fired in advance to determine exact range, pattern-size, and penetration of fragments. Fragments should penetrate at least 1" of seasoned pine or equivalent for minimum reliability. <br><br>Any firing device may be used which permits exact control by the assassin. An ordinary commercial or military explorer is efficient, as long as it is rigged for instantaneous action with no time fuse in the system. <br><br>The wise [illeg] electric target can serve as the triggering device and provide exact timing from as far away as the assassin can reliably hit the target. This will avoid the disadvantages military or commercial high explosives are practical for use in as sassination. Homemade or improvised explosives should be avoided. While possibly powerful, they tend to be dangerous and unreliable. Anti-personnel explosive missiles are excellent, provided the assassin has sufficient technical knowledge to fuse them pro perly. 81 or 82 mm mortar shells, or the 120 mm mortar shell, are particularly good. Anti-personnel shells for 85, 88, 90, 100 and 105 mm guns and howitzers are both large enough to be completely reliable and small enough to be carried by one man. <br><br>The charge should be so placed that the subject is not ever six feet from it at the moment of detonation. A large, shaped charge with the [illeg] filled with iron fragments (such as 1" nuts and bolts) will fire a highly lethal shotgun-type [Illeg] to 50 yards. This reaction has not been thoroughly tested, however, and an exact replica of the proposed device should be fired in advance to determine exact range, pattern-size, and penetration of fragments. Fragments should penetrate at least 1" of seasoned p ine or equivalent for minimum reliability. <br><br>Any firing device may be used which permits exact control by the assassin. An ordinary commercial or military explorer is efficient, as long as it is rigged for instantaneous action with no time fuse in the system. <br><br>The wise [illeg] electric target can serve as the triggering device and provide exact timing from as far away as the assassin can reliably hit the target. This will avid the disadvantages of stringing wire between the proposed positions of the assassin an d the subject, and also permit the assassin to fire the charge from a variety of possible positions. <br><br>The radio switch can be [illeg] to fire [illeg], though its reliability is somewhat lower and its procurement may not be easy. <br><br><br>EXAMPLES:<br>([illeg] may be presented brief outlines, with critical evaluations of the following assassinations and attempts: <br><br>Marat<br> Hedrich<br> <br>Lincoln<br> Hitler<br> <br>Harding<br> Roosevelt<br> <br>Grand Duke Sergei<br> Truman<br> <br>Pirhivie<br> Mussolini<br> <br>Archduke Francis Ferdinand<br> Benes<br> <br>Rasputin<br> Aung Sang<br> <br>Madero<br> [illeg]<br> <br>Kirov<br> Abdullah<br> <br>Huey Long<br> Ghandi<br> <br>Alexander of Yugoslvia<br> <br>Trotsky<br> <br><br><br><br><br><br>CONFERENCE ROOM TECHNIQUE<br><br><br><br>1.<br><br><br><br>(1) Enters room quickly but quietly<br><br>(2) Stands in doorway<br> 2.<br><br><br><br>(2) Opens fire on first subject to react. Swings across group toward center of mass. Times burst to empty magazine at end of swing.<br><br>(1) Covers group to prevent individual dangerous reactions, if necessary, fires individual bursts of 3 rounds.<br> <br>3.<br><br><br><br>(2) Finishes burst. Commands"Shift." Drops back thru [sic] door. Replaces empty magazine. Covers corridor.<br><br>(1) On command "shift", opens fire on opposite side of target, swings one burst across group.<br> 4.<br><br><br><br>(1) Finishes burst. Commands "shift". Drops back thru [sic] door. Replaces magazine. Covers corridor.<br><br>(2) On command, "shift", re-enters room. Covers group: kills survivors with two-round bursts. Leaves propaganda.<br> <br>5.<br><br><br><br>(2) Leaves room. Commands "GO". Covers rear with nearly full magazine.<br><br>(1) On command "GO", leads withdrawl, covering front with full magazine.<br> 6.<br><br><br> <br><br><br><br>Related Webs:<br><br><!--EZCODE AUTOLINK START--><a href="http://www.anusha.com/ciastudy.htm">www.anusha.com/ciastudy.htm</a><!--EZCODE AUTOLINK END--> CIA Study of Assassination<br><br><!--EZCODE AUTOLINK START--><a href="http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB4/">www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB4/</a><!--EZCODE AUTOLINK END--> CIA and Assassinations: The Guatemala 1954 Documents<br><br> <p></p><i></i>
chiggerbit
 
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Re: Victory in Low-intensity Conflicts

Postby chiggerbit » Fri Aug 12, 2005 12:24 am

by MAJ Matthew Kee Yeow Chye<br><br><!--EZCODE AUTOLINK START--><a href="http://www.mindef.gov.sg/safti/pointer/back/journals/2000/Vol26_4/4.htm">www.mindef.gov.sg/safti/p...26_4/4.htm</a><!--EZCODE AUTOLINK END--><br><br>Despite the end of the Cold War, the historic warming of relations between the two Koreas and the initiatives for a peace process in the Middle East, low-intensity conflict (LIC) still remains a serious threat in many countries. This is largely due to the underlying causes of bitter ethnic and religious struggles, which to this day, has remained unresolved. <br><br>There are a combination of military and political elements which ensure that LIC will continue to be the most likely form of conflict in the future. Foremost of which are the capabilities of the major powers, both nuclear and non-nuclear, and the ability to project this around the world. This development has made high-intensity conflict too costly. The other main reason - the deep social, economic, and political problems of Third World nations and the recently formed states in the Balkans, create fertile ground for developing insurgencies and other conflicts. <br><br>This paper examines why governments have such difficulty in attaining success, particularly political success, for a lasting victory in LIC.<br><br>Low-intensity Conflict Defined<br><br>Despite the effort by nations to equip their conventional military forces in the defence of their homeland, most analysts agree that the major threat or type of conflicts of the future would be low-intensity in nature.1 Military theoreticians have categorised all conceivable conflicts with military involvement into three broad groups, ranging from the lowest conflicts to a strategic nuclear war. Confrontations like WW II, the Gulf War or a nuclear war are in the "high-intensity conflicts/wars" category. Confrontations in the scale of the Korean or Vietnam wars are regarded as "medium-intensity conflicts" while all other confrontations below these levels would be classified as LIC. <br><br>In the 1970s, the US conceptualised LIC as a broad range of conflicts less intense than full-scale conventional warfare.2 They were considered low-intensity in nature because the country combating such LIC usually committed relatively limited military resources. However, the same cannot be said for the party initiating the LIC as they may involve all that they have. <br><br>The US Joint Chiefs of Staff's more definitive explanation of LIC in 1986 is as follows: <br><br>"Low-intensity conflict is a limited politico-military struggle to achieve political, social, economic, or psychological objectives. It is often protracted and ranges from diplomatic, economic, and psychosocial pressures through terrorism and insurgency. Low-intensity conflict is generally confined to a geographic area and is often characterized by constraints on the weaponry, tactics, and level of violence. LIC involves the actual or contemplated use of military means up to just below the threshold of battle between regular armed forces".3<br><br>There are a few key elements in this definition. First, it states that the objective of LIC does not end at the military level alone but transcends to political, social, economic and even psychological levels. This is important as some observers may assume LIC as an exclusive military affair. Second, it makes clear the upper limits on the use of military force beyond which the concept no longer applies. <br><br>With so many possible types of conflicts under the LIC classification, it is not surprising that disagreements would abound when governments try to come up with measures to counter them as each conflict deserves unique treatment. To presume that a single general approach can counter such conflicts is a fallacy and the onset of defeat for governments. Although conflicts like counter-insurgency, anti-terrorism and guerrilla warfare are popularly associated to LIC, other conflicts like peacekeeping missions, drug interdiction, and contingency operations have been known to be classified as low-intensity operations as well. This paper will focus on the first three types of LIC.<br><br>It must be emphasised that LIC is not primarily a military matter. The aim is not military conquest, but social control, for whose attainment military means can be employed as a tool for resolving the conflict. Conceptually, LIC is primarily politically oriented and requires an integrated policy approach containing military elements. As such, the definition of LIC should not concentrate on the military level of conflict, but on its political character. <br><br>Winning in LIC, therefore requires an accurate understanding of what it really is.<br><br>Victory Defined<br><br>Many debates have gone into the definition of what victory in warfare means. The Collins Cobuild English Language Dictionary defines 'victory' as 'a situation in which you gain complete success, for example, in defeating an opponent in a war or in any other hard struggle'. By this definition, victory in LIC would mean being able to resolve the conflicts by completely eradicating groups that wage such LIC through their removal, surrender, or by winning them over.<br><br>From the many internal wars that have been waged, it is clear that it is not easy to completely remove such insurgency or guerrilla movements once they have established themselves, as in the case of the Irish Republican Army (IRA). But is victory in LIC merely the termination of such groups, or should governments concentrate on ending the causes fought by these groups? Often the coups, revolts and revolutions may be prevented and defeated, but the causes for which these are fought for are seldom completely defeated.4 In such situations, victory may end up having only a temporal effect and hence ineffective. <br><br>The experience of LICs fought since World War II shows that many governments were ill-prepared to handle them; even for major powers like the US. War, The US tried to turn the Vietnam War into a series of conventional military operations that were more suited for the plains of Europe than the jungles of Vietnam.5 Even if the opponents in such LICs were eventually defeated, the amount of damage, casualties, suffering and political objectives created by the opponents made such victories by the governing powers meaningless.6 Hence, true victory by the governing regime, if we are to follow the definition strictly, is often difficult to achieve; if not impossible. <br><br>Victory in any conflict can come in various forms: militarily, politically or economically.7 In Clausewitz's trinity on the nature of war, he concluded that there are three main pillars that determine the success or failure of a war - the people, the military forces and the government.8 Hence, attaining military success alone may not be enough to achieve an overall success in the war against LIC. Lasting victory in LIC comes more from achieving political success rather than military or economic success. Unlike conventional wars where defeating the opposing military forces would usually secure victory for the state, the mere capture or destruction of such LIC forces would not totally remove their influence on the populace due to the existence of sympathisers. New groups would simply spring up to continue the fight since the root cause of LIC has not been resolved. The political aspects in LIC therefore take paramount importance over the military and other aspects. <br><br>Why Victory is Difficult <br><br>Many countries have fallen into the trap of handling LIC as if it were any other conventional conflict. One of the main reasons why the US failed in the Vietnam War was its failure to realise that employing conventional military tactics in an unconventional operation would be totally ineffective. Unlike conventional warfare, LIC poses some unusual problems making victory difficult to achieve.<br><br>Conventional Military Forces Not Suited for LIC<br>Conventional military power is often irrelevant in LIC.9 In LIC, the concentration of military forces tend to be an exceptional occurrence. This is because the operations are mainly carried out by small groups or because they cannot be easily identified, especially in terrorism. In the case of insurgency war, the insurgents know that they are no match against the country's military force as they will be easily outnumbered and outgunned. They will instead avoid decisive battle and use their military forces to gain "maximum political effect at minimum military cost".10 Firepower is thus of secondary importance. <br><br>US Air Force Colonel Cardwell comments that generally it is a case of "unconventional, social-political, enduring and manpower-intensive warfare".11 For democracies that have configured their military forces to fight a conventional war, it is often difficult for them to adapt to unconventional warfare. A case in example is the US Armed Forces which despite its military might, failed to adapt itself adequately for the unconventional setting in Vietnam, and some may argue, even in Kosovo. The common mistake is assuming that the capability to handle conventional warfare automatically equips the military force for unconventional warfare. Although conventional warfare skills can be applied in peacekeeping and contingency missions, they are ill-suited for counter-terrorism or counter-insurgency operations. <br><br>The insurgents in Vietnam did not win by defeating the US on the ground; they eroded its political capability to wage war.12 Targeting the divisions within the American society for their support of the war, the North Vietnamese made it domestically impossible for the US to continue to fight. More recently, in the 1999 Kosovo conflict, President Milosevic avoided the strength of the US and NATO forces and fought instead on an asymmetrical plane to try to win the conflict. Although NATO has eventually succeeded in bringing the conflict to an end, it was not the bombing raids but other political and economic factors that led to the termination of the conflict.<br><br>In LIC, military strength is often not the decisive factor for victory. For counter-insurgency war, the skill in separating the population from the insurgents is more useful than military power.13 According to the Clausewitzian trinity, controlling the population is an important aspect for success. This can be achieved by building an effective program of incentives and disincentives to convince the population to stop supporting or accommodating the insurgents. Strong-arm tactics or employing harsh military measures may actually push the population to sympathise with the insurgents, thus nullifying any military effort taken.<br><br>Limited War Breeds Limited Success <br><br>LIC is a limited war. A full-scale war between states threatens survival, while LIC for a major power does not. An important difference between the two forms of conflicts is the acceptability of defeat. Once survival becomes an issue, defeat becomes unacceptable. In a limited war where survival of the nation is not at stake, governments have no compelling reasons to place high priority on the resolution of such conflicts over other national goals. Consequently, unlike an interstate full-scale war which becomes the pre-occupation of the entire country, nations caught up in LIC are willing to commit only limited resources to it. This frequently yields indecisive results. The problems of terrorism and insurgency have been likened to pest problems rather than a real sickness in need of permanent healing. Although the besieged country may be fighting a limited war, it may be a total war for the opponent fighting in a guerrilla or a revolutionary war. This mismatch in the level of commitment makes a clear-cut victory hard to achieve. Hence, if victory is not assured, then varying degrees of failure are possible, including outright defeat.<br><br>Military objectives must support the political objectives. Although this intention is easily seen in a full-scale war, the relationship between military success and political success in an LIC is not that straightforward. In full-scale war, as the enemy is steadily being destroyed and territories are being captured, it is easy to see the attacking country approaching closer to the political objective of causing the enemy's collapse. The ability to dictate the terms of peace becomes obvious. In LIC, this clear relationship does not exist. Tactical successes that facilitate the overall victory in a full-scale war do not necessarily produce the same results in LIC. There is no guarantee that military successes will stop the insurgents or guerrillas from attacking in the future. In fact, the guerrillas seeing themselves as fighting a full-scale war against an oppressive government, will resist more strongly and refuse to negotiate.14 Indeed, such military victories in LIC do not necessarily bring the opponents to the negotiation table to achieve the desired political outcome.<br><br>Need to Eliminate External Support<br><br>Another reason why insurgent and guerrilla groups have been able to withstand the onslaught of the more powerful military is due to the external aid it receives. Without cutting off this umbilical cord from external parties, these groups will be sustained indefinitely.15 Similarly, many terrorist groups get funds and training from foreign states. As long as the aid continues, it would be almost impossible to eliminate the subversive elements and a political compromise may be the only solution for a besieged government. <br><br>Dilemma of Governments<br><br>The types of LIC that are likely to appear in Third World countries are guerrilla, insurgency and revolutionary war. Such internal wars are a result of deep societal problems caused by maldistribution of wealth, poverty, corruption, repression, and collapse of social structure.16 Because of these deep-seated problems, the real solutions are impossible in the short-term and agonisingly difficult in the long-term. In such a condition, complete victory over the instigators may only come by implementing harsh and ruthless measures.17 However, this may be more achievable in autocratic societies where public opinion is not that important. <br><br>For democracies, such measures are unwelcomed by the public. Democratic governments, which depend on public support are unwilling to jeopardise their position in office by exacting such unpalatable measures against the insurgents or guerrillas. Often, counter-terrorism measures involve the assassination of known terrorists. Although this may be acceptable in countries like Israel where terrorist acts hit at their very existence, such acts are considered distasteful in Western democracies and would not be supported by the people. Furthermore, the insurgents or terrorists would be almost indistinguishable from the general public and any tough measures taken may result in many innocent people getting hurt. The victory that may be attained will be meaningless then. <br>Divisions also develop among the population as some people may support the government's efforts or call for firmer action while others may demand immediate cessation to the hostility. These divisions create a dilemma for the government trying to resolve the LIC. The government has to grapple with a need to maintain the balance between the views of the government, the people and the military force within the context of the Clausewitzian trinity of war.<br><br>As such, the need to appease the public with more acceptable yet effective measures makes it difficult, often impossible, for democracies to achieve complete success against the insurgents and guerrillas. <br><br>Lack of Stamina <br><br>One common characteristic of LIC is that it lasts a long time. Unlike conventional war where it can be terminated in a relatively short time, as in the Gulf War, it would take a long time to produce tangible results in LIC. The Huk rebellion in Philippines took up to 10 years to end. Although the IRA's ongoing fight against the British started in 1969, the Irish rebellion against the British dates back to late 18th century. The long duration reflects the complexity of the conflict, which is not merely a military confrontation but one that essentially contains a political and social dimension to the conflict. <br>One of the main reasons why modern democratic governments have difficulty in resolving LIC is their short term in office. With such a short term in office, politicians would be more inclined to invest their efforts in areas that bring more tangible results during their tenure. To ensure re-election and maintain public support, politicians tend to show that they have contributed positively to the community during their term of office. Unfortunately, efforts to resolve LIC does not show this as even the smallest success in LIC can take years to yield fruitful results.18 Without the determination and patience to tackle LIC, the problem is merely handed over from one administration to another, at times, without much progress. <br><br>Another significant effect of a protracted war is the risk of high casualties. As a consequence of the defeat in Vietnam, Americans began to show a low tolerance for casualties. The subsequent wars involving the US had to show a high certainty of success with low casualty rates. This was especially prevalent in the Kosovo conflict where the US was unwilling to send in ground forces for fear of sustaining casualties. Casualties have become a new centre of gravity for the US and other western democracies which can be exploited by the LIC forces.19 The LIC forces are willing to prolong the struggle and slowly bleed the government and military forces hoping that this will weaken the leaders eventually. Achieving victory in such a situation will be less meaningful if the country has lost many innocent civilians, military personnel and even political leaders in the process. <br><br>Mutual Hatred Affecting Objectivity <br>As LIC usually last a long time, inflicting high casualties on both sides, this gives ample reasons for both sides to hate each other. The devastation, the memory of friends and family killed in the conflict and the scepticism about living in peace with people seen as the enemy, pose insurmountable difficulties.20 The harsh treatment or torture experienced by the opponents often toughens their resolve to fight even more instead of surrendering or negotiating for peace. Such deep-rooted hatred make it difficult for the opponents to be objective when evaluating the offers of the government, no matter how accommodating they may be. <br><br>Adaptability <br><br>As the nature of warfare differs in LIC, there is a need to adapt and modify structures or methods to accommodate the variances. This may involve creating specialise forces schooled in the art of 'small wars' instead of relying on massive firepower or manoeuvre to win the war. <br><br>Although some aspects of conventional military operation can be adapted for LIC, there are many other aspects that require re-organising the forces, equipment and tactics. Some military leaders however, are resistant to effect the changes as they are unconvinced of the importance of LIC to justify the effort to train, organise, and equip for it.21 Military leaders also fear that too much effort on LIC will erode their preparedness for conventional war since their already limited resources have to be diverted for the cause. <br><br>This resistance to adapt and change for what would more likely involve the military in the future, results in the military forces being ill-prepared to handle LIC when it occurs. <br><br>Conclusion<br><br>The diverse range of LIC calls for different strategies to be deployed for an effective resolution. The government cannot go for quick fixes but must work out a robust plan to address the root cause of the problem. More importantly, the end state of what is to be achieved needs to be determined: Is complete victory desired? Is a compromise acceptable in the pursuit for peace? To resolve the issue, these fundamentals cannot be ignored. <br><br>Despite the advances in technology and progress in society, it is unclear if governments will ever be prepared to cope with LIC, since conventional military forces are inadequate, the opponents may not be rational people, and the governments themselves may be unable to stomach the realities of the nightmare. <br><br>Governments must realise that LIC is a very real threat. Proficiency in conventional warfare does not equate to the capability to handle LIC.<br><br>Endnotes <br><br>1. Grant, Thomas, 'Government, Politics and Low-intensity Conflict' in Corr and Sloan (eds) Old Threats In A New World, Colorado: Westview Press, 1992, pp. 258 - 260.<br><br>2. Thompson, Loren B, 'Low-Intensity Conflict: An Overview.' in Loren Thompson (ed.) Low-intensity Conflicts, Massachusetts, Lexington Books, 1989, p. 2. <br><br>3. Joint Low-Intensity Conflict Project Final Report, Executive Summary, Fort Moroe, Va, US Army Training and Doctrine Command, August 1986, p. 3. <br><br>4. Modelski, George, 'International Settlement of Internal War.' in James N. Rosenau (ed), International Aspects of Civil Strife, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1964.<br><br>5. Krepinevich, Andrew F, The Army and Vietnam, Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986, pp 258-75.<br><br>6. Wong Chee Wai, 'The Concept of Victory in Future Wars', Pointer, January - March 1997, p. 6.<br><br>7. Carroll, Bernice, 'Victory and Defeat: The Mystique of Dominance' in Edward Luck and Stuart Albert, ed., On the Endings of War, Port Washington, Kennikat Press, 1980, p. 53. <br><br>8. Clausewitz, Carl von, 'On War', (ed. and trans.) Howard, Michael and Paret,Peter, Princeton, NJ, Princeton University Press, 1984, p. 89. <br><br>9. Grant, Arthur V, 'Strategic Decisions: The Mire of Low-Intensity Conflict' in Comparative Strategy, 1991, p. 167.<br><br>10. Grant, Thomas, 'The Protraction of Internal Wars' in Small Wars and Insurgencies, Vol.3, No. 3, Winter 1992, p. 242. <br><br>11. Cardwell III, Thomas A, 'Strategy for Low-intensity Conflict', 9th Air University Airpower Symposium on the Role of Airpower in Low Intensity Conflict, Maxwell AFB, Alabama, March 11-13, 1985, Appendix 2, p. 13.<br><br>12. Mack, Andrew, 'Why Big Nations Lose Small Wars: The Politics of Asymmetric Conflict,' World Politics, Jan 1975, p. 195. <br><br>13. Grant, Thomas, 'Government, Politics and Low-intensity Conflict', p. 264. <br><br>14. Grant, Arthur, op. cit., p. 170. <br><br>15. Manwaring, Max, 'Towards An Understanding of Insurgency Wars: The Paradigm' in Max Manwaring, ed., Uncomfortable Wars, Colorodo, Westview Press, 1991, p. 24. <br><br>16. Metz, Steven, 'Insurgency After the Cold War', in Small Wars and Insurgencies, Vol. 5., No. 1, Spring 1994, p. 64. <br><br>17. Curtis, Ian, 'Not Keeping the Peace: Mis-preceptions of LIC' in Defense & Foreign Affairs Strategic Policy, January 31, 1997, p. 10. <br><br>18. Grant, Thomas, 'Government, Politics and Low-intensity Conflict', p. 262. <br><br>19. Stephens, Alan, 'The Transformation of 'Low Intensity' Conflict' in Small Wars and Insurgencies, Vol. 5, No. 1, Spring 1994, p. 147. <br><br>20. Grant, Thomas, 'The Protraction of Internal Wars', p. 248. <br><br>21. Ibid., p. 267.<br><br>Bibliography <br><br>1. Adams, Thomas, Small Wars and Insurgencies, Vol. 1, No. 3, Dec 1990. <br><br>2. Cardwell, A Thomas III, Strategy for Low-intensity Conflict, 1985.<br><br>3. Caroll, A Bernice, On the Endings of War, Port Washington, Kennikat Press, 1980.<br><br>4. Curtis, Ian, Defense & Foreign Affairs Strategic Policy, Jan 31, 1997. <br><br>5. Duiker, J William, Vietnam: Revolution in Transition, Boulder, Westview Press, 1995.<br><br>6. Grant, V Arthur, Comparative Strategy, 1991. <br><br>7. Grant, Thomas, Old Threats In A New World, Colorado, Westview Press, 1992. <br><br>8. Grant, Thomas, Small Wars and Insurgencies, Vol. 1, Dec 1990, No. 3. <br><br>9. Grant, Thomas, Small Wars and Insurgencies, Vol. 3, Winter 1992, No. 3. <br><br>10. Krepinevich, F Andrew, The Army and Vietnam, Baltimore, MD, Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986. <br><br>11. Mack, Andrew, Why Big Nations Lose Small Wars, Jan 1975. <br><br>12. Manwaring G Max, Uncomfortable Wars, 1991. <br><br>13. Metz, Steven, Small Wars and Insurgencies, Vol. 5., No. 1, Spring 1994. <br><br>14. Howard, Michael and Paret, Peter, Carl von Clausewitz, On War, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1984. <br><br>15. Modelski, George, International Aspects of Civil Strife, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1964.<br><br>16. Stephens, Alan, Small Wars and Insurgencies, Vol. 5, No. 1, Spring 1994. <br><br>17. Thompson, B Loren, Low-intensity Conflicts, Massachusetts, Lexington Books, 1989. <br><br>18. US Army Training and Doctrine Command, August 1986. <br><br>19. Van Creveld, Martin, The Transformation of War, New York, The Free Press, 1991. <br><br>20. Wong Chee Wai, Pointer, January - March 1997.<br><br><br><br>MAJ Matthew Kee Yeow Chye holds a BSc(Hons) in IT from the University of Ireland. He attended the 31st Command and Staff Course at SCSC in 2000.<br> <p></p><i></i>
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Re: Victory in Low-intensity Conflicts

Postby chiggerbit » Wed Dec 14, 2005 6:43 pm

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