Here's how so-called 'mainstream media' became state-controlled in 20th century America.
Over 2000 WWII-era Office of Special Services documents were recently de-classified and posted on Paul Wolf's homepage where he also has a COINTELPRO database.
Included are pages outlining the beginning of the US's psychological warfare programs which were called at the time Morale Operations.
Total War doctrines turned these plans into CIA control of the media during the Cold War called Operation Mockingbird which I've outlined in another DataDump thread called 'The CIA and the Media.'
-HMW
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OSS - The Psychology of War
Outline of Document Database
The Office of Strategic Services was America's first "central" intelligence and covert action agency. Pioneered by a maverick Wall Street lawyer named William "Wild Bill" Donovan, the OSS seemed to take on his personality. Donovan was interested in results, had no patience for bureaucracy, and was willing to try any new idea. As a result, the work of the OSS ranged from the enlightened to the absurd.
While the OSS' mission may have been laudable, its hard-hitting methods set unfortunate precedents for future conflicts. Civilians were organized into partisan militias, and psychological terror was considered a weapon just like any other in the military's arsenal. These files offer a rare and uncensored view of the Second World War that you won't find in any history books.
MORALE OPERATIONS BRANCH
Morale Operations (MO) were intended to generate panic, intimidate, demoralize, and spread confusion and distrust among enemy civilians and military forces; and to stimulate feelings of resentment and rebellion among occupied populations. Morale Operations used "black" propaganda, in which the source of the information was disguised. Black propaganda could be either true or false. For morale operations purposes, the truth or falisity was irrelevant. It was the effect on the target's mind that mattered.
MO propaganda was spread by a variety of creative and devious means. Subversive rumors were spread by agents or planted in news stories. Leaflets were scattered from airplanes, suddenly appearing on the streets of cities as if they had been casually discarded. Some urged resistance or gave sabotage instructions. Others were intented to "generate panic." For example, forged air raid instructions dropped on Japan urged people to flee when they heard the air raid sirens, adding to the confusion and panic generated by the raids. Other forgeries included currencies, train tickets, postage stamps, and military orders and manuals. Other Morale Operations were designed to encourage resistance movements, by creating the appearance of an organized resistance where there was none. Newspapers and flyers were produced. "Black radio" stations purported to be broadcasting from within enemy territory. Leaflets urged industrial sabotage and explained "simple sabotage" of railways, automobiles, etc. Graffitti was also used to create the impression of an organized resistance.
Morale Operations by Country
Modus Operandi
SPECIAL OPERATIONS BRANCH
The Special Operations Branch worked with resistance organizations, organized sabotage operations and implemented many of the Morale Operations designed by the MO Branch. I have not focussed on this much since it has been well-researched by others. The SO Branch was led by Carl Hoffman and then William Davis, Jr.
Sabotage
X Plan
RESEARCH AND ANALYSIS BRANCH
The Research and Analysis Branch of the OSS was the first concerted effort on the part of any world power to enlist members of the academic community as foreign affairs analysts. I began my study of the OSS here, in the files of R&A's Psychologic Warfare Division. These theoretical studies are among the most interesting, if somewhat kooky government documents I have ever seen. The R&A Branch was led by Dr. James Baxter and Dr. William Langer.
Academics
Psychological Surveys
Morale and the Subconscious
SECRET INTELLIGENCE BRANCH
The Secret Intelligence Branch of the OSS, modeled after the British Secret Intelligence Service (SIS), collected information, primarily from underground organizations. SI agents were tasked to collect information about the vulnerabilities of enemy groups, both civil and military, and about neutral populations, to be exploited by psychological warfare. A study of SI and X-2, it's counterintelligence component, would be a massive undertaking in itself, and I have barely touched on it, limiting my work to collecting espionage instruction materials. The SI Branch was led by Paul Helliwell and then William Casey.
FOREIGN NATIONALITIES BRANCH
The Foreign Nationalities Branch, headed by Dewitt Poole, engaged in political warfare abroad using anti-Axis and immigrant groups based in the United States. This again would make a fascinating study of a subject that as far as I know has not been described in any books. I intend to develop this area further in the future.
OSS ORGANIZATION AND INTERAGENCY RELATIONS
This is really just a lot of odds and ends, organizational charts, and so on, that seem to have value, but may not be too interesting to read.
ARMY COMBAT PROPAGANDA
A cousin of Morale Operations, the Army's idea of psywar was to use it in combination with military operations. Dropping surrender leaflets, projecting loud noises, and so on, to affect the enemy's performance in battle. Whether this technique was more effective, I don't know, but this material is less bizarre and less interesting than the Morale Operations.
COLD WAR FOUNDATIONS
After the war, the OSS was disbanded. Many OSS psywar veterans went on to work for the Central Intelligence Agency, or for the Ford Foundation. Since CIA records are not yet available to the public, the study of psychological warfare in the cold war must be based on secondary sources, such as those used in this webpage. Whether there is any contemporary equivalent of the "ideological offensive" of the cold war, I don't know, and I do not mean to promote any theories about how public diplomacy is used today or what media channels might be used. That is for future historians to decide.
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Copyright Paul Wolf, 2004-2005. For educational use only. No copyright to original government works.
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OSS - The Psychology of War
MORALE OPERATIONS BRANCH
Morale Operations used "black" or false propaganda spread by a variety of creative and devious means. Subversive rumors were spread by agents or planted in news stories. Leaflets were scattered from airplanes, suddenly appearing on the streets of cities as if they had been casually discarded. Some urged resistance or gave sabotage instructions. Others were intented to "generate panic." For example, forged air raid instructions dropped on Japan urged people to flee when they heard the air raid sirens, adding to the confusion and panic generated by the raids. Other forgeries included currencies, train tickets, postage stamps, and military orders and manuals.
Other Morale Operations were designed to encourage resistance movements, by creating the appearance of an organized resistance where there was none. Newspapers and flyers were produced. "Black radio" stations purported to be broadcasting from within enemy territory. Leaflets urged industrial sabotage and explained "simple sabotage" of railways, automobiles, etc. Graffitti was also used to create the impression of an organized resistance.
In its brief history, the Morale Operations Branch was led a succession of individuals including Frederick Oechsner, Kenneth D. Mann, Charles P. Healy, Patrick Dolan, Morton Bodfish, and Herbert S. Little.
Note below that it's not always clear whether a proposed morale operation was ever approved or implemented.
MORALE OPERATIONS BY COUNTRY
Germany
Italy
Europe and the Balkans
North Africa and the Middle East
Japan
China, Burma and India
Indonesia
Soviet Union
MODUS OPERANDI
Provisional Basic Field Manual
Use of Rumors
Bribery, Blackmail and Subsidy
Forged Documents
Airborne Leaflets
Poison Pen Letters
Coordination with OWI
Planting False Information in the News Media
Black Radio
Motion Pictures and the Arts
Other
During peace time there is ample reason for differences of opinion upon the philosophical question as to whether the end justifies the means. Under normal conditions many of those engaged in M.O. operations would question the religious or ethical propriety of committing acts which in themselves are considered unmoral merely because they serve what is considered a useful or desireable end. In a war, however, which threatens the very existence of our way of life, our civilization, our religious, ethical, educational and other institutions, the end becomes all important. Unless the end is achieved, nothing results but the extinction of our way of living and consequent slavery. It is for this reason that there is virtual universal agreement among all people in our country, both clerical and lay, that the bombing of civilians, though to be avoided whenever possible, is a necessary and inevitable result of all-out-war in order to achieve the earliest possible termination of hostilities and the rebuilding of a peaceful world. Likewise, the general principle underlying M.O. operations is that however unorthodox and distasteful to us during peace time, any means should be employed if it will contribute appreciably to the collapse of enemy resistance. Viewed in the broad perspective of human progress, the greatest good will result from the early and utter defeat of the enemy by whatever means it may be necessary to employ. Chapter 3: General Principles (context unknown -- all I know is what is apparent from document markings, found in RG 226 Entry 92 mixed in with Italy MO)
MORALE OPERATIONS BY COUNTRY (separate webpages)
Germany [77 documents]
Italy [32 documents]
Europe and the Balkans [30 documents]
North Africa and the Middle East [5 documents]
Japan [61 documents]
China, Burma and India [44 documents]
Indonesia [17 documents]
Soviet Union [4 documents]
MODUS OPERANDI
Psychological warfare, as the term is used by the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff ... comprises all moral and physical means other than orthodox military operations which tend to destroy the will and ability of the enemy to resist, to deprive him of support of allies or neutrals and to increase in our own troops and allies the will to victory. The implements of psychological warfare are: open propaganda, subversion, special operations (sabotage, guerrilla warfare, espionage), political and cultural pressures, economic pressures. The principal effects sought are persuasion, sympathy, terrorization, confusion, division and physical interference. These operations, ancient in origin, are modernly employed, notably by Italy, Germany, the Soviet Union and other principal powers. The programs are planned more or less centrally in all nations, but executed by a variety of agencies. Memorandum on Intelligence for Psychological Warfare, by General John Magruder, Feb. 1943
Contact with underground movements through Foreign Nationalities Branch, through Labor Desk, SI, through independent emigres in this country (Mrs. Rado), through eventual MO Representatives in London, Stockholm, etc. Bribery and subsidies, maintain contact names index file, and work through MO Foreign Representatives and their agents. Blackmail -- maintain contact names index file and work through MO Foreign Representatives and their agents. Counterfeiting. Currency reference for Mr. Healy's James Hecksher and Mr. Shubart, Bank of the Manhattan Company, regarding foreign currencies, ration cards, passports, personal papers of the enemy prisoners or dead. Rumor and whispering campaigns -- see special memo on these. Abduction -- see Sedgwick proposals. Chain letters with cupidity, superstition and fear as main employed motives. Poisoning (tricks and toy gadget) instructions as to how to make or use these things in enemy occupied or enemy countries, actual distribution. Assassination by suggestion or agents. Illness and epidemics by suggestion or contagion. Diver's manipulations: black market in neutral countries, discrediting by cartoons (Artsybasheff and Szyk). Possibility for MO Activity, by Frederick Oechsner, April 21, 1943
Instrumentality and media: open propaganda (radio, press, films); subversive: black propaganda, rumor spreading, "poison pen", bribery, etc., physical destruction, guerrilla operations, etc., aimed to induce confusion, uncertainty, and fear; combat psychological warfare: activities carried on within the military ranks (radio, prisoner indoctrination, panic-production, etc.); economic pressure; diplomatic pressure; social contacts. Psychological warfare tactics: fraternization or neutralization, conversion (appeals to belief), soporifics (alleviation of anxieties), appeasement (appeals to expediency); disruption or attack, terror (aims to frighten), vilification (aims to undermine self-respect), confusion (aims to stir up conflicts between groups, over ideologies) Factors to be Considered in Planning Psychological Warfare Strategy, Nov. 3, 1942
The Operational Use of MO Material, circa 1944
The Morale Operations Branch should function largely as a planning unit and must rely upon SO and SI in the field for the activation of its plans. PW Operations - Future Operations as Affected by Current Military and Political Events, August 9, 1943
Provisional Basic Field Manual
Provisional Basic Field Manual -- Morale Operations, Dec. 21, 1943 (first 36 pages)
I have but one suggestion to make, which I believe will be an improvement by way of eliminating the present ambiguity in the text in the use of the word "Subversion". The word is used in three places ... without other qualifying or modifying language. In each such instance it is immediately followed by a description of activities which are instantly recognized as those of the SO Branch. However, at two places in the text ... the word "Subversion" is followed by the expression "other than physical", and here too immediately follows a description of the duties and activities of SO. Memorandum from Charles Pratt Healy on Provisional Basic Field Manual, Psychological Warfare, May 24, 1943
Subversion operations, other than physical, will be conducted within enemy countries, within enemy-occupied or controlled countries and within other areas where action or counter-action may be effective against the enemy. Such operations have for their purpose: inciting or spreading dissension, creating confusion and disorder, encouraging and supporting resistance and revolt against the enemy and the enemy government. The means (other than open propaganda) for carrying out the above operations are: by rumors and black propaganda; by contact with and manipulation of individuals and underground groups. Excerpts from "Provisional Basic Field Manual -- Psychological Warfare" with regard to MO, May 1943
The OSS Planning Group in its meeting Monday, May 31, discussed the desirability of the preparation by the MO Branch of basic doctrine for MO operations. ... The Planning Group also suggested that the preparation of such doctrine by the MO staff should be done in close liaison with the Psychological Warfare Staff, which it is believed has already done some work on such a project. MO Doctrine, June 1, 1943
Use of Rumors
There are tens of thousands of rumors in the OSS files. Those listed in the country-specific webpages are either from sustained campaigns, or are novel in some way. Rumors were designed to achieve long-range MO objectives, but were normally related to current events. Rumor themes were orchestrated by the "MOPO Committee" and coordinated with rumor campaigns of the British Political Warfare Executive (PWE). The British referred to rumors as "sibs".
The following are the more important strategic uses of rumor for subversive purposes: Dividing the enemy by means of fostering distrust and suspicion between enemy allies, the enemy and collaborationists or within the enemy population itself. Terrorization by means of circulating rumors of a terrifing character. Certain rumors of this type when properly timed may be employed to precipitate panic. Arouse unwarranted optimism. This strategy is most effective in order to pave the way for the greateest psychological impact of impending defeat upon the enemy. Thus hopes are raised only to be precipitiously dashed. Deception. Here rumors are circulated primarily with the aim of deceiving enemy intelligence. Rumor Lecture for MO Course, circa 1943
The Criteria of a Successful Rumor, June 12, 1943 (12 pages)
Pre-releases through sib agents, Feb. 26, 1944
Pre-releases through sib agents, Feb. 24, 1944
Open Channels for Rumor Dissemination, et. al., Oct. 1, 1943
Planned Rumors, July 30, 1943
Planned Rumors, Aug. 11, 1943
Rumors for Dissemination, Dec. 7, 1943
Sib Committee, Oct. 11, 1943
For your information, I am sending you a duplicated copy of the minutes of the first "Sib" Committee meeting. ("Sib" is British term for "rumor.") This new committee is composed of the several Area of Operations Officers of the M.O. Branch, or their designated representatives. They meet twice a week and concern themselves soley at these meetings with framing of rumors to be sent to our field offices for dissemination. Memorandum from Lt. Patrick Dolan to Lt. Col. Edward W. Gamble, Sept. 3, 1943
5th Meeting of "SIB" Committee, Sept. 15, 1943
Sibs, Dec. 6, 1943
Rumors
Airborne Leaflets
At present the R.A.F. will have nothing to do with the dropping of black printed matter the reasons being (a) that any of the crews captured in possession of such material woukd probably be shot and (b) S.O.E. is afraid that if such stuff were dropped it would lodge in trees, on roofs, etc., and give away the show. Memorandum from Rae Smith to Patrick Dolan, July 31, 1943
MO Progress Report 16 - 28 March 1945
Please send us by the truck that is returning to Rome, one bomb fully packed, less explosives, of CORNFLAKES, one bomb, fully packed, less explosives of PIG IRON. Memorandum of Robert M. Allen, April 27, 1945
Coordination with the Office of War Information
Recommendation: That permission be requested from S.I. and R&A to release to O.W.I recent reports on anti-Fascist activities in Italy. O.W.I does not have an intelligence set-up comparable to O.S.S. and we can further M.O.'s aims by giving them some of our intelligence. The reports might be given them for background information or for quotation -- in the latter case, the source must not be given. Furthermore, a great number of the latest reports on Italy bear directly on O.W.I's field. Secret Memorandum from V. Taylor to MOPO Committee, June 23, 1943
To hasten dissemination of this propaganda, it is now proposed to fake a leaflet, supposedly spread by the Italian Underground, and to hand the text of the fake leaflet to OWI for broadcasting. In this way, we'll reach our target quicker. Secret Memorandum from Eugene P. Warner to MOPO Committee, June 23, 1943
You will be interested to know that we have struck a deal with Doob of O.W.I. whereby he now is able to plant selected rumor items in O.W.I. for newscasts. ... We are continuing to supply Doob with a considerable amount of material and are greatly encouraged over the use of it. Incidentally, the programs are rebroadcast by B.B.C. Naturally this arrangement with Doob is on a purely informal and unofficial level and should be kept within the family. OWI Aid in Dissemination of Rumors, Oct. 4, 1943
NAME
NAME
OWI Leaflets, circa 1943
NAME
Messages Home From Italian Soldiers Campaign, circa 1943
Rumor Policy - Russia-Japan, April 10, 1945
Planting False Information in the News Media
Dr. Embree has just passed me a note informing me that he has accidentally learned that OFF is in the process of preparing a report in which they intend to make suggestions regarding what the American public should be told about Japan. He expresses the feeling that the suggestions may be quite naive and may show a rather shallow understanding of the complexity of the Japanese-U.S. relations. Is there any instrumentality by which information on foreign countries coordinated by COI may be communicated to OFF for domestic consumption? Memorandum from Robert C. Tryon, Chief, Psychology Division, to Mr. Baxter, Jan. 29, 1942
The British say that they do not like plants in British open channels and seldom use them. Occasionally the rumor will make a circuit and come home to roost in the form of a story in the newspapers, but there is very little direct implantation. Memorandum from Frederick Oechsner to Robert H. Knapp, Oct. 18, 1943
Confirming our conversation of this date I suggest that an inquiry be made relative to the foreign circulation of such periodicals as the New York Times, Life and Time Magazine, Army and Navy Journal, Inventors Journal, etc. It is obvious that if these periodicals are dispatched by airmail to Lisbon, for example, the German authorities there will immediately relay the periodicals to the proper authorities in Berlin. If it is possible; if it has not already been done; and if it is within our province I suggest that we could utilize this situation to our advantate by "planting" articles in such foreign edition for the benefit of enemy consumption. Interoffice Memo From Maj. Gen. George H. White, Jan. 18, 1944
Motion Pictures and the Arts
Communication Channels (1), June 8, 1943
The motion picture is one of the most powerful propaganda weapons at the disposal of the United States. Motion pictures are an unparalleled instructional medium - they can present new facts concerning important problems on which peopke are ignorant and on which they ought to be informed; they can clarify complicated problems on which people are confused. Motion pictures are a potent force in attitude formation, and attitudes are the basis of action and morale. Motion pictures can stimulate or inhibit action. Motion pictures can contribute to the building and maintenance of morale by: (1) Dispelling doubt and uncertainty, and allaying anxiety. (2) Providing a unique and valuable form of recreation. Motion pictures can orient the individual to affairs beyond his personal experience by providing opportunities for vicarious participation. Newsreels, for example, are the best medium for giving the remote civilian the "feel" of front line combat. The Motion Picture as a Weapon of Psychological Warfare, circa 1943
Herewith is a report outlining the Musac Project for recording songs in German to be played to German troops over a black radio station in ETO. This work is being done at the request of our London office. Musac Project, July 13, 1944
Your increasing awareness of the relative importance of the artist in your program is encouraging. How much else you've learned of their problems - I don't know. Setting an artist down in a strange country with adequate art supplies is not in itself going to produce art for you. OWI combat team in Assam - with all their efficiency learned that the hard way. And the need for accuracy is greater with us than OWI. Memorandum from Sam Berman, June 22, 1945
Bribery, Blackmail and Subsidy
Bribery, Blackmail and Subsidy, July 16, 1943
Comments on Implementary Course, July 17, 1943
The Bazooka - Secret Weapon of Psychological Warfare
Ordinance Materiel for Psychological Warfare Purposes, March 31, 1943
Plan for a Subversive Campaign Involving U.S. Weapons, March 24, 1943
One Man "Tank-Busting" Gun is Newest U.S. Secret Weapon, March 28, 1943
Other
Poison Scissors, Aug. 20, 1943
Psychological Use of Occupational Money, Feb. 23, 1943
Atabrine as a Weapon of Psychological Warfare, May 10, 1943
Unsorted
Proposed plan for classifion of MO Matierial at Co. C Packing Station, April 2, 1945
Mr. Rae Smith has suggested that to avoid any confusion with the British, who are also using the code "Etna" for one of their campaigns, the M.O. Branch adopt American slang tags for its campaigns. Accordingly, listed below are the new code names for all M.O. Campaigns:
Etna Campaign "Beans"
Italian Crisis Campaign "Cripes"
Evil Eye Campaign "Jinx"
Save Train Campaign "Scram"
W For Why Campaign "Whiz"
Hitler Campaign "Heel"
Scorched Earth Campaign "Heat"
(Note: these were apparently the first major M.O. campaigns. As the war progressed there would be many more.) Code Names, Aug. 10, 1943
The Functions and Organization of the Morale Operations Branch of the Office of Strategic Services European Theater, July 31, 1943
The copies of your manuscript on the above subject have been received and distributed to the several members of the M.O. staff. Planning Unorthodox Military Tasks for M.O., June 7, 1943 [manuscript not found]
Minutes of 199th Meeting of Planning Group for Psychological Warfare, Sept. 6, 1943
Suggestions for Weekly Black Cable, March 15, 1945
Project for a Secret Printing Press, July 13, 1942
OSS/MO Cable to be sent 12 September, 7 September 1944
Intelligence Material, Jan. 13, 1945
Ideas for an Outline on Psychological Warfare
Morale Operations, May 8, 1944
NAME, Nov. 15, 1943
NAME, Jan. 18, 1943
Memorandum Covering Conversation between Mr. James MacPherson, Mr. DeVecchi and Mr. Hughes, Aug. 1, 1944
Observations on Possible MO Operations, Dec. 29, 1943
MO Recording Project, Sept. 14, 1944
Proposals for Joint MO, PWE, SOE Planning and Operations in the Field of Psychological Warfare in Southeast Asia
Sonics, June 30, 1944
NAME, Jan. 8, 1944
British deception devices, 1943
Letter from Alfred A. Gross, Dec. 18, 1941
NAME, Jan 15, 1942
NAME, Oct. 5, 1943
Copyright Paul Wolf, 2004. For educational use only. No copyright to original government works.
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OSS - The Psychology of War
SPECIAL OPERATIONS BRANCH
The Special Operations Branch, modelled after the British Special Operations Executive (SOE) worked with resistance organizations, organized sabotage operations and implemented many of the Morale Operations designed by the MO Branch. The SO Branch was led at different times by Carl Hoffman and William Davis, Jr.
Sabotage
Sabotage Instructions, May 7, 1943
Simple Sabotage, circa 1945
The first thing to consider in simple sabotage is to have the minimum injury, detection and reprisal. Materials: should be simple and appear to be innocent, such as salt, pebbles, thread, nails, candles. Techniques: select acts for which large numbers of people could be responsible. Simple Sabotage (2), circa 1945
Area A is primarily an S.O. training school for organizers of long-term sabotage activities in enemy occupied territory. The object of the training is long term direct action. Emphasis is placed on organization, recruiting and handling of agents, and selection of sabotage activites. Letter from J.R. Brown, July 7, 1942
Pursuant to your request, a list of subjects for the above-named school is included herewith: sabotage of power plants, including dynamos, transformers, turbines, steam generators, etc; communications including telephones and telegraph radio stations; transportation including railriads, steam and electric locomotives, cars, railbeds; miscellaneous engines including trucks, passenger automobiles and buses; hydroelectric plants including dams sluice ways, canals etc.; industrial sabotage including airplane factories, tank factories, automotive plants, ammunition factories etc.; oil wells and oil refineries; docks, loading piers, ships, tankers and cargo vessels; agricultural resources including rubber plantations, wheat stores etc. Proposed Sabotage Specialist Course, Aug. 19, 1942
NAME
X Plan
The plan thus involves no functions that could be subject to serious exposure or penetration, since it would exclude: all knowledge of prospective action; all forms of secret intelligence or informant paraphenalia (list of names, places, targets, etc.); any knowledge of leaders, organizations, fellow cells, etc. In other words, the military objective and the means of carrying out this objective, as well as dates, etc., would remain hidden from the participating groups. Penetration of a cell or a number of cells would not expose or seriously impair operations. Cells: from 5 to 8 men - small enought to insure that the organizer of the proposed cell would be intimately acquainted with each prospective member of the cell. The organizer should be a local person, belonging to the group or nationality from which the cell is to be made up. Such organizers could be drawn from among priests, educators, merchants, salesmen, etc. The cell would have no immediate function to perform. The organizer would keep in contact with the other members through normal intercourse of community life. The organizer would know only that as some future date the cell might be called upon to receive a visitor and follow his orders. He would be told that this event would be in connection with Allied operations, and for the cause of liberation, etc. His main task, prior to specific instructions putting the cell on the alert, would be to keep his cell unit conscious of its unity in connection with the cause of liberation. There would be no connection with other cells. The members of the cell would not be told of other cells, except perhaps in a vague way that such existed. No list of names of the members of the cell would be kept, and no other records of any sort. To start with, in areas where no friendly organized movement exists, recourse should be taken to outside business or professional persons whose work or business normally brings them into the given area. ... The function of the contact men would be to persuade reliable persons from within a group to organize small units (cells) among their personal acquaintances for the purpose of holding themselves prepared to give aid to the Allies at some future date. X Plan (Cell Variety), December 30, 1943
Economic
[I]t was decided to prepare a plan under the code name of "Barrel" for the exploitation of any and all strains that the Japanese economy may be going through at the present moment. ... It is hereby requested that you send Cpl. Caughlin to Comdr. Huntsberger at room 500 Annex to obtain information on the following topics: Japanese controls over the financial structure; Japanese controls regulating industry; Japanese controls over distribution and rationing of commodities; general standard of living; information on how Japanese propaganda is treating such problems as inflation, food shortages, transportation and etc. The Barrel Plan, July 27, 1945
By reducing the effectiveness of the Japanese transport system, the Japanese military effort can be materially weakened. There is evidence that transport workers in China have preserved some independence of action, and are receptive to approaches to handicap the Japanese military effort. The work of these transport workers against the Japanese military effectiveness can be encouraged. The following themes are to be employed to induce the Chinese railroad workers to sabotage trains: sabotage of transport facilities brings nearer the end of the war and the freeing of the transport workers from Japanese oppression; transport facilities sent to shops for repair will escape destruction and thus be available to provide jobs after the defeat of Japan; transport workers are safest whose trains do not reach forward marshalling yards; let us always remember that a demolished train does la patria no good. We must make the trains unfit for Japanese use by merely crippling them, NOT WRECKING them. Save our trains for the days of peace! Campaign Against Railroad Workers in North China, circa 1945
Copyright Paul Wolf, 2004. For educational use only. No copyright to original government works.
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OSS - The Psychology of War
RESEARCH AND ANALYSIS BRANCH (R&A)
The Research and Analysis Branch of the OSS was the first concerted effort on the part of any world power to enlist members of the academic community as foreign affairs analysts. [Smith, 1972, p. 13] The R&A Branch was led by Dr. James Baxter and Dr. William Langer. After the war, most of the OSS Research Branch analysts in Germany participated in interrogating Nazi defendants; Franz Neumann became the first Chief of Research at Nuremberg, succeeded by his OSS colleague Henry Kellermann. [Smith, p. 239]
Recruiting Academics
Group one is composed of men who might be called national figures. I understand them to be tops professionally and are well known. Some are working in Washington and may not be available. The second group is made up mostly of younger men. I would regard them as equal to the first group professionally but a shade beneath them in terms of experience and reputation. Excerpts from Letter to Dr. Baxter from Elmo Roper, Aug. 25, 1941
You may recall your meeting with Professor Mark May several weeks ago. I had a long talk with him about the materials in the Cross-Cultural Survey, and about his staff. They have collected a great amount of information on the social and psychological characteristics of many societies throughout the world. As they may probably have information of value to us, and as they expressed a desire to assist us on any problem on which we wish information, it seems wise to send Mr. Junker, who knows Professor Murdock, head of the Survey, to Yale University for a brief investigation. The Yale Cross-Cultural Survey, Jan. 21, 1942
[T]he Psychology Division feels that psychoanalytic deliberation on special questions from time to time would be helpful. It would, therefore, welcome the privilege of submitting to your committee appropriate questions for discussion and of receiving a report on your deliberations. Furthermore, the Division would appreciate copies of memoranda from your Committee originating quite independently of any questions submitted by the Division. Relation of Psychology Division [of the Coordinator of Information] with Morale Committee of the American Psychoanalytic Association, Jan, 29, 1942
Surveys and Morale Metrics
Our division is interested in the morale and attitudes of the populace of strategic countries. In order to understand the psychological condition of the people we need a systematic description of their social structure and dynamics and of the ideologies of different classes and social groups. It is this description that our outline of topics organizes. Our interest in military and economic potentials and in formal political organization is peripheral. ... Our division plans to make recurrent morale situation reports not only to the end of revealing the current psychological condition of a people but also for the purpose of recommending, on the basis of such situation reports, current propaganda directives. The Conference with the Social Anthropologists and Resulting Operations, Jan. 10, 1942
After talking with our staff, and with Dr. Guthrie and Dr. Edwards, the advisors proceeded to formulate a working outline for the analysis of any social system having a territorial extent (a tribe, a village, a city, a nation, etc.) They conceived their job in this respect to be one of devising a guide for analysis based upon the experience of social anthropologists which would help us answer three major questions about a given country: (1) How do the people act? (2) How are these actions continued? (3) If we want to maintain (or change) these conditions, how can we do it? Report on Conference of Social Anthropologists held December 20-21, 1941.
The essential social and psychological facts about any country can be subsumed under six broad categories: I. Adaptation to the natural environment. (the forms of economic enterprise and the groupings of people in them). II. The social organization. III. Ideologies (the symbolic system of each social aggregate; ultimate beliefs and sanctions for behavior). IV. Recent social change (general trends and important dislocations within the last generation). V. Leaders and leadership (leadership in the organizational sense; particular individual leaders and aspirants). VI. The individual in his society (personality development in key groups, important national characteristics; etc.). Social and Psychological Analysis of a Nation: A Working Outline, Jan. 2, 1942
On the accompanying orientation chart the populace with its complex social structure and psychology is indicated by a center circle. The conditions that affect the morale of a group are indicated on the left. The appraisal of the military, economic, social and political conditions is not the central interest of the social psychologist except insofar as they affect individuals directly. The effect of these conditions on the populace results in certain expressions of the people as indicated by the 17 types of items at the right of the chart. These expressions define the national morale of a people and it is the main job of the social psychologist to collect and evaluate facts about them on strategic foreign countries. ...
Special psychological problems. We are conducting and plan to do further work on a number of special psychological problems dealing with certain characteristics of foreign peoples. These questions are as follows: 1. The social situations that produce panic in different peoples and the form that panic takes. One such study is under way. 2. The appeals to which persons in important social groups respond as revealed by a systematic study of contemporary popular literature, speeches, leaders' characteristics, music, aesthetic content, etc. 3. The social sensitivies and modes of releasing them as revealed by characteristics of humor, fads, etc. 4. Common modes of solving conflicts and frustrations as revealed by neurotic and psychopathic patterns. 5. Unique social sentiments in strong emotional situations, such as birth, marriage, death. 6. The characteristics of rumor-spreading. One study in collaboration with Mr. Potter, the OFF, and the Office of Education is now being planned. Summary of the Activities of the Psychology Division, Jan. 24, 1942
As our analysis proceeded it became increasingly evident that civilian panic as a weapon can only be effectively used when integrated with specific military operations against specific military objectives that include civilian groups. Such operations would require the participation of social analysts working directly with the military strategists. These analysts, employing the principles herein presented, would make a preliminary psychological study of the people of the specific communities involved in the campaign, and the procedures for the stimulation of panic would have to be carefully time and integrated with the actual operations. Like any other weapon, panic would not be effective if it were shot off at the enemy in general. Its use requires a high degree of control; skillful integration with other operations, and above all, planned and careful study preliminary to an actual campaign. Generating Panic, April 7, 1942 [report not found]
All confidential government materials come in as well as material from P.W.E.'s own agents. Sifters go over this material first and decide what of the material is usable for propaganda purposes and who is to use it, e.g., whether it should be carried by BBC or the black operations. This material goes to the quite separate research staff, also housed in the country offices. This staff files the material and prepares summaries. Here, also, the propaganda analysis and the morale indexes are made. ... Mr. Crossman is going to have his research staff give us a report on their methods of preparing the Morale Graphs. He thought that it would be possible to make the graphs available to us too. The Political Warfare Executive as Described by Mr. H.R.S. Crossman, Oct. 9, 1942
Morale and the Subconscious
We must recognize that what is important in propaganda is the effect upon the listener, whether his morale has been improved or not, rather than the manifest line which the propaganda takes. It is obvious that a given broadcast or movie can leave an audience violently disagreeing with the material presented. Such effects may be controlled. Likewise, the broadcast which is full of highest patriotism, but at the same time makes the patriot's cause appear hopeless, may have a negative morale effect upon the listener. ... Cues for disguised propaganda may be taken from the list of possible techniques above. The most usual one is whether or not there is a predominance of "bad news" or "good news." Suggested Report on The Psychology of Disguised Propaganda, August 7, 1942
We should make our most aggressive psychological warfare of informative kind in battle lulls; at other times the news speaks for itself -- (as relayed by white). During lulls, rumor, black radio, pamphlets should carry out aggressive divertive pseudo-news campaigns dealing with personalities, etc. The cream of such materials should be reserved to lull periods. On the other hand, major military news events should be immediately followed by black psychological warfare campaigns designed to exploit them, e.g., when Axis out of Tunis, spread local rumors of landings at neighboring points in Italy -- rumors that Mussolini asked for peace but was immediately placed under custody, etc. Random Notes for a Manual on Subversive Psychological Warfare Techniques, circa 1943
It is my impression that attention is focussed almost wholly on the purely conscious, rational level. This phase is certainly important and warrants extensive consideration. It is, however, only a part of the picture. Behind this facade lies a psychological domain which is not conscious and does not follow the laws of reason. For the purposes of Psychological Warfare the latter may be of even greater value than the former inasmuch as effects produced in this regious are beyond conscious control and tend to go over into action more promptly and efficiently. Psychoanalysis is the only branch of science which has studied this region [of] the mind extensively and it is for that reason that I believe it is in a position to make some worthwhile contributions. Psychoanalytical Contributions to Psychological Warfare, by Walter Langer, Jan. 1, 1943
I think the psychographs of the enemy leaders and enemy nations would be immensely valuable. I am somewhat less convinced of the possibility of analyzing current propaganda, although for obvious reasons it is worth trying. Memorandum about Langer Report, circa 1943
German Vulnerabilities
Summary of Suggestions by Mr. Theodore Roscoe, of New York City, For Psychological Warfare Campaigns Against Germany, Oct. 6, 1942
Factors which may decrease confidence in victory. Operative vulnerabilities: 1918 parallel -- American participation, etc.; reverses on Russian Front and diminishing air power; recent changes in propaganda line to Strength through Fear theme; rumors of persons in high circles. Contingent vulnerabilities: Hitler's assumption of personal responsibility for the conduct of the war; doubts of German technological superiority.
Conditions contributing to war-weariness. Operative vulnerabilities: prospect, officially admitted, of long hard war. End not yet in sight; execssive casualties on Russian Front; dread of air raids on cumulative scale; disruption of order and efficiency in German civilian life, especially in bombed areas; boredom and frustration with existing living conditions; soldier morale on Russian Front and in occupied areas.
Grievances against Party. Operative vulnerabilities: destruction of German labor's traditional freedom, organization, and power; Gestapo and SS surveillance; attack upon churches; violation of German cultural traditions; misconduct of party leaders; corruption of justice; estrangement of parents from children; distrust of news sources, surfeit of propaganda; proletarianization of small business and professional groups. Contingent vulnerabilities: bungling of foreign policy; assumption of responsibility for war.
Other conditions contributing to internal dissention. Operative: sectionalism; dissention and conflict amony Party leaders.
Bases for possible appeals. Operative vulnerabilities: unpopularity of party; United Nations' policy opposing indiscriminate reprisals; war-weariness in Germany; appeal to German cultural values - craving for law and order, identification with England and U.S., tradition of workmanship, refinement, and ethics in conduct, German nationalism.
Groups and conditions which may be exploited. Inflation, black market, currency; foreign nationality workers; rumor channels; radio listening habits; remnants of German labor organizations; soldiers in occupied areas and Russia; the Churches; physical installations capable of being sabotaged.
Exploitable anxieties. Civilian anxiety about conditions on the Russian Front; inflation; reprisals from conquered peoples; two-front war; stab in back; Bolshevization of Europe and Russian occupation; American participation; uneasiness about choice of allies; fear of agrarianization and destruction of industry; guilt feelings over violation of traditional stand. Preliminary List of Major German Vulnerabilities, Jan. 23, 1943
Kurt Wiener's Outline of a Program of Psychological Warfare, March 8, 1943
Analysis of the Personality of Adolph Hitler, Oct. 1943 (first 53 pages of longer report)
The Psychological Foundations of the Wehrmacht, Feb. 1944 (excerpts from long report)
Vulnerabilities Within Components of the Wehrmacht, May 6, 1944
Unsorted
R and A Research Program on Behalf of MO in European Theater, April 4, 1944
Source Materials, circa Oct. 1943
Outposts of the Research and Analysis Branch, March 12, 1943
Notes on Organization of Topographic Intelligence, Dec. 13, 1944
Branch Morale, June 9, 1943
Considerations in respect to the basis and procedures of Psychological Warfare, Dec. 14, 1942
Plan for the More Specific Functions of the Psychology Division, Oct. 9, 1941
Observations on the Bill of Rights Day, Dec. 10, 1941
Panic in War Situations, Feb. 13, 1942 (27 pages)
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OSS - The Psychology of War
SECRET INTELLIGENCE BRANCH
The Secret Intelligence Branch of the OSS, patterned after the British Secret Intelligence Service (SIS), collected information from underground organizations. The SI Branch was led by Paul Helliwell and then William Casey. After the war, another SI officer named Frank Wisner was put in charge of handling the Gehlen organization, a network of former Nazi spies. Wisner went on to become the CIA?s chief of the Office of Policy Coordination, the arm of the CIA engaged in political warfare, and committed suicide later in life.
Psychological warfare is the employment of all moral and physical means other than orthodox military operations which tend to: destroy the will and ability of the enemy to resist; deprive him of the support of his allies and neutrals; increase in our own troops and allies the will to victory. This must be consonant with national policy and coordinated with orthodox military operations. The implements of psychological warfare include open propaganda, black propaganda, subversion, and sabotage, special phases of economic and political pressure, and cultural contacts. Since psychological warfare can be waged successfully only when supplemented by adequate intelligence, it becomes necessary that a flow of information regarding the psychological state of mind of groups and populations in both enemy and neutral countries, and their reaction to psychological warfare conducted by our agencies and those of our allies, be available to this office. Therefore, supplementary to your present activities, it is desired by the Director that you secure and send reports regarding the vulnerabilities of enemy groups, both civil and military, and neutral populations which can be exploited for psychological warfare. Instructions to SI agents, Jan. 26, 1943
Relatively accurate facts can be secured as to the activities of the civil government, and the parties or political groups exercising power at the moment, and these reports should be in considerable detail. The more difficult task of securing accurate information as to minority political groups and subversive political organizations constitutes a very real challenge to the Director. He must develop contacts within such groups, or place loyal agents in such groups as members. Such opposition forces should be assisted in every possible way in their aim to interfere with the functioning of the government in power. Financial support should be offered and, if accepted, should be given in such a way that that future actions of the group can be controlled. This can best be accomplished by requiring that one of our agents be given a high position in the organization and that he exercise control over the finances. ... Efforts should be made to foment social unrest in the hostile nationa by agitating the current social problems and pitting one class against the other. A sub-Director who is thoroughly acquainted with the history of the hostile naiton and its peoples should be assigned to study this problem and direct a planned campaign. ... In studying his territory the Director will know the key points in the enemy installations but generally such points will be carefully protected and sabotage of such point must be the act of "desperate" men who have been especially selected and especially trained. ... Propaganda should be divided into two categories, one being the Propaganda Reconnaissance Agent and the other the Propaganda Distributing Agent. ...
The country should be divided into geographical areas and an Area Leader placed in charge of the activities in such areas. This Area Leader should be responsible only to the Director. Each Area Leader should be given no information additional to that which is necessary to carry on the work in his own area and he would not be acquainted with the personnel or activities of the other areas in the country. Conferences or meetings at which the various heads of areas, districts, zones or groups are assembled should never be held. Coordination must be secured through the control exercised by the next higher leader and not by a dangerous assemblage of subordinates. Within each area districts should be created and a District Leader made responsible to the Area Leader. These District Leaders should not be known to each other and as a general rule it should be unnecessary for such District Leaders to be known to the Director of the country. With the proper election of subordinates it should never be necessary for a superior to know anyone other than his immediate subordinate leaders, and those individuals are held responsible for results only and not required to subject their subordinates to contact with higher or adjacent echelons. Within each district zones should be organized and Zone Leaders appointed. These Zone Leaders will be particularly charged with the duty of organizing passive resistance and simple sabotage in their zones. They will also be specifically charged with the duty of acquiring detailed information on all phases of intelligence activities and submitting routine periodic reports on all of the various classes of intelligence referred to above in this memorandum. In the final analysis it is quite likely that the most important results achieved by an intelligence organization will come as a direct result of the routine operations of these Zone Leaders and the participating individuals in their organizations. These Zone Leaders must be carefully selected from among residents of the zone involved. They must have an intimate knowledge of the people in the zone, the industrial organizations in the vicinity and, in general, must KNOW their zone. Care should be taken that a zone is not too large for a single individual to exercise a close personal control of every activity therein. A zone might consist of only a single division of a large plant, a small factory, a single large apartment house, two or three residential blocks of houses, a small village or a sparely populated country or township. ... In addition to the geographical organization of the country, intelligence work must be organized along functional lines. The Director of the country should have on his staff Sub-Directors who are specialists in various lines of activity. ... The Director of the country should have a personal staff composed of special types of agents who will act as his personal "spies" on both of the above mentioned divisions of the organization. This should not be merely a few individuals sent out occasionally by the Director, but must be a definite organization within itself and must be designed to accomplish the mission of policing the organization. It should be highly secret from everyone in the two main operating divisions and should operate in the most ruthless manner. ...
The mobile Agents are utilized by the Leader to travel throughout the geographical subdivisions and may be charged with various types of duties and the accomplishment of various missions. These mobile Agents should have a cover that permits their movement throughout the geographical subdivision. The fixed Agent may be charged with such dutues as constantly observing an installation, or activity and rendering periodic reports thereon, as, for instance, the following types of work: working or residing near a railroad and reporting on the number of troops and supply trains passing, their direction of movement, the identification of the passing units and descriptions of the equipment; working or residing near highway junctions an submitting reports of a similar type; working in a factory and reporting output; working in a hotel and reporting on activities of hostile travelers. A fixed Agent may also be a small merchant or shopkeeper or a householder who will serve as a letter-box or as an addressee for mail communications. ...
Orders to employeees must always be verbal, definite and understandable. It is best to repeat orders, and to have the employee repeat the order, until it is positive that it is clearly understood. Orders should never be given in writing. ... The disposition to be made of an employee who proves to be unsatisfactory or disloyal should be a part of the Director's plan. If the employee proves to be disloyal and is in possession of dangerous information, he should probably be killed. ...
Informers should be made available to known hostile agents and false or misleading information furnished. These informers may be either unwitting individuals or agents engaged [in a] deliberately planned campaign. The activities of known enemy organizations or agents might be embarrassed by rendering anonymous reports to police authorities and thus subjecting them to embarrassing inquiries. When possible their activities might be made the subject of reports to newspapers and thuse secure them unfavorable publicity. The wives and relatives of known hostile agents should be given scandalous information, and embarrassing information of this type should be disseminated so that it reaches the ears of the superiors of a hostile agent. Instructional Memorandum on Intelligence Operations, circa 1943 (39 pages)
Espionage is by its very nature not to be considered as 'honorable' or 'clean' or 'fair' or 'decent.' It consists in obtaining information by stealth, in encouraging and executing sabotage, in wrecking the civilian and military morale, and in combatting equally subversive activities directed against itself. The objectives are accomplished in large part by two appeals: to patriotism and to the lowest nature of individuals -- greed, lust for power, revenge, etc. By far the largest number of AGENTS or EMPLOYEES are taken from the petty criminal class, mal-contents, revolutionaries, refugees or psychopaths. Subject: Special Intelligence Section [of ONI], March 11, 1942
I gave the opinion that the Government of India would probably not agree to any other Government setting up a covert organization within India employing Indian nationals. ... As an alternative we would suggest that the American authorities should indicate on a map the airports and any other areas in which they think cover is necesary. We shall then arrange for them to be put in direct touch with the Service and Police Security authorities on the spot. It would be essential for the Americans to have an officer in each major area with Security experience to effect and maintain liaison. We would also welcome any measures which could be taken to strengthen the American C.I.C. representation in India, and would gladly assist by offering training facilities either for officers or men at out Karachi schools. Most Secret British Document of Maj. Gen. DMI, Feb. 7, 1944
Near East Agents
Secret Near East Project No. 10
Secret Near East Project No. 16
Secret Near East Project No. 14(a)
Secret Near East Project No. 21, Nov. 10, 1942
Near East Project No. 23, Jan. 13, 1943
Secret Near East Project No. 23, Jan. 14, 1943
Secret Near East Project No. 25
Secret Near East Project No. 29
Counterfeiting
Memorandum of June 22, 1943
NAME, Oct. 28, 1943
NAME, Oct. 5, 1943
NAME
NAME, May 13, 1943
NAME, May 11, 1943
NAME, June 8, 1944
NAME, Dec. 14, 1943
NAME, Nov. 30, 1943
NAME, Nov. 20, 1943
Merchandise, Sept. 10, 1943
NAME, Sept. 10, 1943
NAME, Aug. 13, 1943
NAME, May 13, 1943
unsorted
SEAC X-2 Org. Chart, March 11, 1944
Exploitation of White Russians in the Far East for Espionage Activities, Jan. 1, 1944
Use of White Russians in the Far East, Jan. 6, 1944
Document Flow Chart, Africa Division, SI, circa 1943
Medusa Activities, June 2, 1944
Criteria for Categorical Division of SI Field Personnel, Feb. 14, 1946
Special Plan for Future SI Activities in Albania, Sept. 18, 1944
Capt. Andrews -- SI Possibilities, Nov. 23, 1943
SCE Field Units, Jov. 30, 1943
The Informer, circa 1943
Notes for the History of SI, Istanbul, Jan. 5, 1945
Memorandum of Chas W. Edwards, June 27, 1944
Monograph on Lock-Picking, March 4, 1944
Copyright Paul Wolf, 2004. For educational use only. No copyright to original government works.
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OSS - The Psychology of War
FOREIGN NATIONALITIES BRANCH
Foreign Nationalities Field Manual, Sept. 21, 1945
The Use of Native People in the Pacific and Far Eastern Theaters, circa 1944
Jews
World Jewry in Relation to a Program of Psychological Warfare, July 11, 1942
Okinawans
You will shortly receive, from the distribution center of R [and] A, Dr. Tozzer's very excellent Okinawan Studies #3 under date of 10 June 1944. The earlier studies, No. 1 of March 16th and No. 2 of March 27th, undoubtedly have suggested the desirability of planning to make use of the opportunity to do a little MO work on this subject. Okinawas, June 19, 1944 [Okinawan studies not found]
There were a number of miscellaneous matters raised, among others, the use of Okinawas, natives of the islands south of Japan, who are unfriendly to Japan; the excellent intelligence received from the Allied Interpreters and Intelligence Branch G-2, of the Southwest Pacific Area (SWPA); the possible use by MO of what they called counter-intelligence, i.e., finding out what the enemy propaganda is and turning it to our benefit. OSS Activities in the Pacific Ocean Area, July 19, 1944
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OSS - The Psychology of War
OSS ORGANIZATION AND INTERAGENCY RELATIONS
Planning Group for Psychological Warfare, circa 1943
Pschological Warfare Agency Org Chart
What you should know about OSS, July 7, 1944
Activities of the Office of Strategic Services in Theaters of Operation, July 5, 1944
Opinion on position of the Office of Strategic Services if the Joint Chiefs of Staff were dissolved, Feb. 8, 1944
Information to be Furnished the Administrative Secretary, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Feb. 3, 1944
Memorandum from Brig. General John Magruder, Feb. 8, 1944
Memorandum from John S. Davenport III on State Department Relations, Dec. 2, 1944
OSS Representation on State Department Missions, Nov. 15, 1944
State Department Briefing of OSS Field Representatives, March 7, 1944
Liquidation of OSS, Sept 14, 1945
Memorandum of President Truman, Jan. 22, 1946
siafricadocumentflowchartcirca1943.jpg
intelflowchart1feb1944a.jpg
ossorgchart1.jpg
ossorgchart2a.jpg
ossorgchart3a.jpg
Undercover Intelligence Service, Sept. 5, 1941
Committees on coordination of intelligence, Aug. 25, 1944
Meeting on OSS Operations Reporting, Aug. 16, 1944
Joint Intelligence Committee, Aug. 15, 1944
M.O. Directives, Sept. 21, 1943
Relations Between Washington Planning and Field Operations, Dec. 27, 1943
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OSS - The Psychology of War
ARMY COMBAT PROPAGANDA COMPANIES
[A] transfer of certain combat propaganda units, formerly a part of the Military Intelligence Service, to the Office of Strategic Services has been accomplished. These units represent partial activation of the Combat Propaganda Companies, which when completely activated and trained, will be available to Task Force Commanders as fully mobile combat units to: demoralize, deceive, and otherwise hamper the tactical activity of enemy troops opposite our lines; break the will to win or to resist of enemy inhabitants of enemy territory; inform, assure, inspire, and guide friendly inhabitants of occupied territory in their cooperation with our objectives and forces. Specially staffed and equipped, these organizations will provide Task Force Commanders, for immediate front line use, with all media of combat propaganda including the spoken work by radio transmission to points deep behind the enemy line, and combat loud speaker adjacent to the line, and the written word and the picture by printed leaflet, pictorial propaganda dropped from the air or shot across the lines. In addition to providing the above media of combat propaganda, the companies will perform the following functions: intercept enemy broadcasts for evaluation as to the enemy's tactical propaganda intent, receive United States or United Nations broadcasts and rebroadcast them when and where desired or record them for evaluation or later rebroadcasts, interfere with and jam enemy communications and broadcasts. Activation of Combat Propaganda Companies, Feb. 3, 1943
PWB - ETO Training School, Jan. 10, 1944
Master Outline of Two Weeks M.O. Course at Area F, circa Nov. 1944
Sample Campaign that may be Used by a Combat Propaganda Company, circa 1943
The combat units will be trained as radio and printing teams of 30 men each. Each unit will be equipped with a mobile printing press, and at leaste two units will be equipped with mobile radio broadcasting transmitters. The personnel of each team will include trained script writers with the proper language qualifications (English, French, German), radio announcers and broadcasters, and the necessary technical personnel. The mnission of these units will be to prepare prin ted material and devices in
