barracuda wrote:Are you seriously telling me that you think tee vee viewing is more influential than the beauty of the world? That's moronic to even suggest.
In the United States of Black Water? Hell, yes.
barracuda wrote:hmw wrote:Do try waxing poetic to the 44% of 2004 Americans who once upon a time thought that Muslims should have their civil liberties restricted, as if it was time to put the Japanese back in concentration camps-
Oh yeah,
how'd that pan out for the ol' Mockingbird?
Really well. We lost the Bill of Rights and the Federal treasury.
barracuda wrote:hmw wrote:Art, meet television psyops.
No contest. And the torture never stops.
What a sad, petty world you are living in. Turn off the tee vee, put away the magazines, and go ride your bike. Talk to some chicks. Have a beer. Make a painting. Sing a song. Wax poetic.
That's hedonism, not activism. And nothing to do with opposing fascism's delivery of white phosphorus to children around the world.
You never know, it might make you smile in a way that discovering some new, pathetic mind-trick hidden in a movie poster could never do. Not that that stuff is unimportant. It's just a thought. I guess we all have our hobbies, though.
Nothing makes me smile like finding evidence of psyops culture designed to abet atrocity...so it can be exposed as a System.
Art, real art, can fight oppression like nothing else.
That's what anti-fascist Mexicans like David Sequiros espoused and why the no-message art of Jackson Pollock was promoted by the CIA.
But NEUROSCIENCE, social science, game theory, and military doctrine are what define psyops culture with widespread subliminal nudges towards power-friendly attitudes and away from 'subversive' viewpoints using science like this-
http://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/abs ... lCode=jocn
Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience
Summer 1992, Vol. 4, No. 3, Pages 244-256
Posted Online December 13, 2007.
(doi:10.1162/jocn.1992.4.3.244)
© 1992 by the Massachusetts Institute of Technology
Priming and Multiple Memory Systems: Perceptual Mechanisms of Implicit Memory
Daniel L. Schacter
Department of Psychology, Harvard University
PDF (1,659.125 KB) PDF Plus (608.373 KB)
Abstract
Research examining the relation between explicit and implicit forms of memory has generated a great deal of evidence concerning the issue of multiple memory systems. This article focuses on an extensively studied implicit memory phenomenon, known as direct or repetition priming, and examines the hypothesis that priming effects on various tasks reflect the operation of a perceptual representation system (PRS)—a class of cortically based subsystems that operate at a presemantic level and support non conscious expressions of memory. Three PRS subsystems are examined: visual word form, structural description, and auditory word form. Pertinent cognitive, neuropsychological, and neurobiological evidence is reviewed, alternative classificatory schemes are discussed, and important conceptual and terminological issues are considered.
Cited by
N. E. A. Kroll, A. P. Yonelinas, M. M. Kishiyama, K. Baynes, R. T. Knight, M. S. Gazzaniga. (2003) The Neural Substrates of Visual Implicit Memory: Do the Two Hemispheres Play Different Roles?. Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience 15:6, 833-842
Online publication date: 1-Aug-2003.
Abstract | PDF (672 KB) | PDF Plus (202 KB)
Karine Lebreton, Béatrice Desgranges, Brigitte Landeau, Jean-Claude Baron, Francis Eustache. (2001) Visual Priming Within and Across Symbolic Format Using a Tachistoscopic Picture Identification Task: A PET Study. Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience 13:5, 670-686
Online publication date: 1-Jul-2001.
Abstract | PDF (3375 KB) | PDF Plus (216 KB)
**And this article tells you enough about the mental tricks of the trade to see how widespread yet barely detectable it can be-
http://goliath.ecnext.com/coms2/gi_0199 ... ition.html
Understanding the relationship between repetition priming and mere exposure.
Publication: British Journal of Psychology
Publication Date: 01-NOV-04 Format: Online - approximately 10677 words
Delivery: Immediate Online Access
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Article Excerpt
Over the last 35 years a research tradition has developed within psychology dedicated to studying the mere exposure effect. In a classic monograph, Zajonc (1968) described the mere exposure effect as the observation that the mere repeated exposure of the individual to a stimulus is a sufficient condition for the enhancement of his attitude toward it' (p. 1). Following Zajonc's initial observations, numerous demonstrations of the mere exposure effect have been reported (see e.g. Bornstein, 1989; Harrison, 1977 for reviews), with most using one of two procedures for measuring such effects, namely Likert-type ratings (e.g. Bornstein & D'Agostino, 1994; Zajonc, Marcus, & Wilson, 1974) and forced choice preference judgments (e.g. Kunst-Wilson & Zajonc, 1980; Seamon et al., 1995). Surprisingly though, as Seamon, McKenna, and Binder (1998) observe, a widely accepted theoretical interpretation remains elusive. Of the various theories that have been proposed over the years (e.g. Berlyne, 1974; Harrison, 1977) the primacy of affect (Zajonc, 1980, 2000, 2001) and perceptual fluency/attribution (Bornstein & D'Agostino, 1994; Seamon, Brody, & Kauff, 1983) approaches have been most influential.
More recently, a major development in cognitive psychology has been the growth in interest in implicit memory. Implicit memory is defined as the non-intentional, non-conscious retrieval of previously acquired information, and is demonstrated on tasks that do not require conscious, intentional recollection of past experiences (Graf & Schacter, 1985). Although Roediger and McDermott (1993) outline a number of phenomena that could be described as implicit memory, the most widely studied form is repetition priming; that is the facilitation or bias in the processing of a stimulus as a function of a recent encounter with that stimulus. Numerous procedures now exist for studying such priming (see Fleischman & Gabrieli, 1998; Roediger & McDermott, 1993), with commonly used tasks including word identification and word-stem completion. Part of the interest in repetition priming tasks stems from the variety of ways in which they have been shown to dissociate from explicit measures of memory such as standard recall and recognition which require the conscious and intentional recollection of past experiences. Such findings have typically been used in support of either processing (e.g. Roediger, 1990) or system-based (Tulving & Schacter, 1990) accounts of repetition priming.
Historically, the fields of mere exposure and implicit memory have developed largely independently. However, in a number of reviews (e.g. Schacter, 1987; Squire, 1992) and articles (e.g. Bornstein & D'Agostino, 1992; Butler & Berry, 2001b; Jacoby & Kelley, 1987; Seamon et al., 1995) the mere exposure effect has been described as an example of implicit memory. For example, Schacter (1987) and Squire (1992) cite studies in which mere exposure effects have been obtained in the absence of explicit recognition (e.g. Kunst-Wilson & Zajonc, 1980; Mandler, Nakamura, & Van Zandt, 1987). By definition, the fact that mere exposure can be obtained in situations wherein no direct reference is made to the learning episode means that such demonstrations would qualify as examples of implicit memory in its broadest sense (as would implicit learning, classical conditioning, etc). However, tacit in this classification is the assumption that the mere exposure effect belongs to a particular implicit memory subgroup, namely repetition priming (e.g. as measured by word-stem completion or perceptual identification; see Butler & Berry, 2001a, b; Fleischman & Gabrieli, 1998; Seamon et al., 1995). Although intuitively appealing, this assumption has received relatively little attention. This is surprising, as even a cursory analysis is sufficient to reveal significant differences, as well as similarities, between the two phenomena. These are expanded upon in the first part of this paper. Undoubtedly, there is some utility to be gained from integrating the mere exposure effect within a repetition priming account, not least in terms of theoretical clarity. However, having established that the relationship is not as straightforward as might be thought, the second part of the paper examines whether existing mere exposure frameworks can accommodate any of the differences identified between the two phenomena. First, consideration is given to the perceptual fluency/attribution framework which embodies the 'cognitive' approach to mere exposure (e.g. Bornstein & D'Agostino, 1994; Seamon et al., 1983), and can be thought of as an extension to the repetition priming account. Second, attention turns to the primacy of affect framework (Zajonc, 1980, 2000), which draws on neurological and evolutionary concepts and ideas. In short, appealing to the notion of an attributional component appears to offer some success in accounting for the differences between the two phenomena. Notwithstanding this, there is still a series of findings that are problematic even for an extended repetition priming/attributional account. This indicates that further theoretical specification is needed. The final part of the paper provides some initial thoughts as to the direction that such a specification might take, as well as identifying key areas for future research.
Terminology
As mentioned above, while the term implicit memory encompasses a range of phenomena including implicit learning and classical conditioning, the most widely studied form is repetition priming. For this reason, a popular convention in cognitive psychology has been to refer to the procedures for measuring priming as 'implicit memory tasks' (e.g. word-stem completion and word identification). To avoid any unnecessary confusion in the current paper, these procedures are simply described as repetition priming tasks. To reiterate, although the classification of many mere exposure effects (e.g. Bornstein & D'Agostino, 1994; Kunst-Wilson & Zajonc, 1980) as implicit memory phenomenon per se is not in question, it is important to query the assumption that such effects are necessarily demonstrations of repetition priming.
Differences between mere exposure and repetition priming tasks
One of the most striking aspects of the repetition priming literature is the sheer diversity of paradigms, materials, populations and experimental variables that have been explored (for reviews see, e.g. Roediger & McDermott, 1993; Schacter, 1987). Although studies of mere exposure have been more limited in terms of the paradigms employed, here too, the range of materials and variables examined has been impressive (see Bornstein, 1989). Notwithstanding this, it is possible to identify a number of general features of mere exposure paradigms that distinguish them from repetition priming ones (see Table 1). The crucial distinction is that mere exposure tasks involve some form of affective judgment (e.g. liking ratings, preference judgments, pleasantness/attractiveness ratings), whereas repetition priming tasks require participants to make non-affective judgments (e.g. word-stem completion, picture clarification, word identification). It should be noted that a small number of mere exposure studies has also employed tasks involving non-affective judgments (e.g. Mandler et al., 1987). However, as described later, the evidence for non-affective mere exposure effects is mixed (e.g. Seamon et al., 1998).
In addition to the differing processing demands of the two tasks (affective vs. non-affective judgments), a number of further task-based distinctions can be drawn. Thus, whereas mere exposure paradigms involve the presentation of fully intact test stimuli, most common repetition priming tasks comprise partial (word-stem and fragment completion) or data-limited (perceptual identification, picture clarification) test cues. Also, whereas most repetition priming studies employ familiar materials, especially words, the mere exposure effect has been traditionally studied using unfamiliar materials (e.g. Chinese ideographs, Turkish 'words', irregular polygons). In some mere exposure studies, stimuli are also presented very briefly, sometimes for only a few milliseconds during encoding (e.g. Bornstein & D'Agostino, 1992; Kunst-Wilson & Zajonc, 1980). In contrast, presentation times in repetition priming studies tend to be much longer (e.g. Rajaram & Roediger, 1993). Finally, whereas stimuli tend to be presented on a single occasion during encoding in repetition priming studies, repeated study presentations are common in mere exposure paradigms.
So at a task level it is possible to identify a number of broad differences between mere exposure and repetition priming. The crucial question, however, is whether any form of distinction is required at a system level. Specifically, does the mere exposure effect reflect the operation of the same underlying systems and/or processes as are responsible for producing repetition priming? In the next section evidence is presented which directly informs on this question. However, in comparing the two phenomena it is important to note that comparatively few studies have explored mere exposure and repetition tasks directly within the context of a single study (for exceptions see, e.g. Butler, Berry, & Helman, in press; Stone, Ladd, & Gabrieli, 2000). As such, some of the cross-study comparisons of mere exposure and repetition priming reported below differ, not only in terms of the type of judgment performed at test (affective vs. non-affective), but also in other ways (e.g. familiar vs. unfamiliar materials). Such differences, where they occur, are highlighted in the next section. In assessing their likely impact however, it is important to stress that associations between mere exposure and repetition priming have been reported where such material differences exist (e.g. Stone et al., 2000). Equally, dissociations in performance can be obtained when only the type of test performed (perceptual identification vs. liking judgments) is varied (e.g. Butler et al., in press).
Mere exposure and repetition priming
The evidence reviewed in this section takes the form of parallels and differences between mere exposure and repetition priming as a function of various mutually studied variables. The assumption is that if similar processes and/or systems are in operation, parallels in performance should be observed. Although logical, some caution is warranted as differences are occasionally reported even between repetition priming tasks (Gabrieli et al., 1999; Witherspoon & Moscovitch, 1989). However, such findings are substantially outweighed by reports of parallels (e.g. Rajaram & Roediger, 1993; see, e.g. Roediger & McDermott, 1993 for review) across different repetition priming measures.
In making comparisons, one important point to note is that mere exposure and repetition priming have enjoyed largely independent research traditions...
