Live: Al Jazeera coverage of Egypt’s growing revolution

[AlicetheKurious]

Prosecutor investigates foreign funding charges against activists
On Sat, 07/09/2013 - 19:37

http://www.egyptindependent.com/news/pr ... -activists

Top prosecutor Hisham Barakat ordered an investigation into claims against a number of Egyptian activists over charges of receiving foreign funds, a judicial source said.

Many claims were filed against activists saying they received foreign funding from the United States specifically.

The activists include Wael Abbas, Wael Ghonim, Amr Hamzawy, Esraa Abdel Fattah, Wael Qandil, Asmaa Mahfouz, Ayman Nour, Ahmed Douma, Alaa Abdel Fattah, Nawara Negm, Abderrahman Ezz, Essan Sultan, Moataz Abdel Fattah, Ahmed Maher, Gehad al-Haddad, Hesham al-Bastawisy, Ghada Shahbandar, Hafez Abu Se'da, Nasser Amin, Amr al-Shobaky, Ahmed Samih, Mazen Hassan, Hamdy Qenawy, Doaa Qassem, Marwa Mokhtar, Gamila Ismail, Maikel Mounir, Barbara Ibrahim and others.

A claim about secret meetings between former US Ambassador to Egypt Anne Patterson with activists, in order to divulge details about the internal situation in Egypt will also be investigated, the source said.

Edited translation from Al-Masry Al-Youm

Most of us may readily recognize only Wael Ghonim among the names on the above list.

Would love to hear from Alice who in her estimation the people being investigated tend to be: real or fake revolutionaries, really pushing a foreign agenda or not?

Most of these names are very well-known here in Egypt, though with a few notable exceptions, they were completely unknown before the January 25th revolution. Under Mubarak, virtually all organized political opposition was eradicated. This was done either by co-opting them, infiltrating them or, if they refused to play ball, persecuting and harassing their cadres. Among other things, the 30-year "state of emergency" under Mubarak made it illegal for more than five people to gather; and the Mubarak regime used this, and other provisions that prevented fund-raising activities, specifically to stifle the opposition. In its tunnel vision, the Mubarak regime only really feared Leftists and secular Arab nationalists, and that's whom they targeted with special ferocity.

On the other hand, the Mubarak regime secretly encouraged the activities of four other sectors, which it considered either as allies or tools against the genuine opposition: one was run and financed by the US (the well-heeled network of 'democracy activists' and 'youth groups' and 'civil society' mostly associated with Freedom House, George Soros' "Open Society Institute" and the National Endowment for Democracy, etc.), the other was run and financed by Saudi Arabia, especially through extremely well-funded 'charities' such as various Salafist and other right-wing religious organizations. A third group was the transnational Muslim Brotherhood, which under Mubarak was allowed and even encouraged to amass a vast money-laundering business and financial empire that included retail chains, construction firms, real estate developers, importers, and so-called "Islamic" banks, among others. The fourth group was a network of right-wing, neo-liberal professionals employed by international US-controlled elite organizations such as the IMF, the World Bank and a number of international law and investment firms (such as the global law firm Baker and Mackenzie and investment firms such as Goldman Sachs), many of whom were appointed to high-level positions in the government.

There was some overlap among the four sectors, but one thing they all had in common was their dependence on outside support and their almost total lack of indigenous or popular support among the Egyptian masses. The Mubarak regime controlled them (or thought it did) by maintaining good relations with those on the outside who controlled the purse-strings of these sectors.

As for the overwhelming majority of the Egyptian people, they were disenfranchised; locked out of the game. They were dismissed as a factor by all analysts, and considered irrelevant in any negotiations or predictions. They had no outlet for political expression, no leadership, no unified ideological framework, no money, and no way to organize. That's why the January 25th revolution took everybody by surprise; it defied logic and violated every principle and historical precedent. The people simply rose up, unified by the simple slogan: "Bread, Freedom, Economic Justice and Human Dignity". January 25th began as a protest against police brutality on National Police Day, which commemorates the massacre of 50 police officers by the British occupation forces in 1952. It was organized by a few thousand young people who had organized mainly on Facebook, and aimed to remind the police of its nationalist history, and call for the resignation of the Minister of the Interior.

Nobody, including any of the organizers, could have predicted that this small spark would, in the space of a few hours, galvanize millions of Egyptians, the vast majority of whom had never heard of Facebook, into rising up against the regime itself. It was not so long ago that Egyptians were considered the vanguard of popular anti-imperialist movements around the world, and the January 25th revolution proved that they never forgot, despite all the combined efforts of the world's most powerful nations to force them to forget, or to reject their past. The songs, posters and slogans of the supposedly long-buried and/or discredited 1960s were suddenly everywhere across Egypt, given fresh meaning, not only by the generations that had experienced those heady days, but by young people in their teens. The kind of passionate national pride that everyone had assumed was dead, emerged with a vengeance. Perhaps most frightening of all, echoes of Arab nationalism and a longing for Arab unity began to be heard across the Arab world, and similar echoes resonated in African countries that Egypt had helped to liberate from colonialism half a century ago.

Though it was too late to save Mubarak and his regime, the US began frantically to scramble its resources to harness and control the revolution -- to transform it from a genuine expression of the Egyptian people's will, into a fake 'color' revolution. First they tried to brand it the "Lotus Revolution", which never caught on; then, through SCAF, and the then-controlled SCAF media, as well as the Western media and Al-Jazeera, the Egyptian people were introduced to the supposed leaders of their revolution, most of whom nobody had heard of before. They became its spokesmen, its stars; they were glorified and romanticized and publicized in Egypt and around the world.

Very early on, we all heard rumors and even facts about the ties between most of these individuals and the Muslim Brotherhood and/or CIA-linked organizations, but we'd lived through the revolution and knew it was real. In the euphoria immediately following the fall of the Mubarak regime, most of us (including me) dismissed these discordant warnings. The positive energy and unity were so overwhelming, we felt they could overcome any nefarious plots or attempts to hijack our revolution.

Two-and-a half very painful and even traumatic years later, we are battered but much wiser and better informed.

Sorry to be so long-winded, but here's what we know about the people you listed (most of them are pretty much pariahs here):

Wael Abbas: Revolutionary Socialist, didn't have two crumbs to rub together, suddenly lots of money and access to Western Leftist publications, where he uses Leftist buzzwords to basically re-package Western imperialist talking points;

Wael Ghonim: "former" Salafist, later a secret member of the Muslim Brotherhood; Google executive, married to an American.

Amr Hamzawy: Carnegie Endowment for Peace, and pretty much any CIA front that pays;

Esraa Abdel Fattah: another of those who had no money, and is now living luxuriously on fellowships, grants, etc., from CIA fronts;

Wael Qandil: journalist, Muslim Brotherhood;

Asmaa Mahfouz: Muslim Brotherhood, another rags to riches story. Now exiled in Kuwait, I believe;

Ayman Nour: a forger and failed journalist and a former presidential candidate against Mubarak with formerly secret close family ties to Salafist terrorists, now living comfortably in Beirut, where he is advising Al-Jazeera and directing their propaganda against Egypt;

Ahmed Douma: I've heard some stuff about him, but nothing I find convincing and I like him a lot;

Alaa Abdel Fattah: he was great during and immediately after the January 25th revolution, but then suddenly turned into a foul-mouthed, lying Mr. Hyde. Totally discredited, no visible means of support, but seems to be quite well-off;

Nawara Negm: not a word against her, she's amazing;

Abderrahman Ezz: he's a former member of April 6. Later turned out to be Muslim Brotherhood. He's the star of the video I posted earlier, of the guy calling in to Al-Jazeera from a balcony and falsely describing the horrible massacre going on around him.

Essan Sultan: It's actually Essam Sultan. Sultan supposedly defected from the Muslim Brotherhood and portrayed himself as a liberal democrat, but when the Muslim Brotherhood took over, he was one of their worst rabid attack-dogs;

Moataz Abdel Fattah: an academic and talk-show host, long suspected to be Muslim Brotherhood, but this was only confirmed after they took power. His most recent contribution to Western wisdom is his claim, during an interview with the BBC, that "the Copts" were responsible for the massive explosion that targeted the Minister of Interior, but which killed and maimed several innocent bystanders instead, including children;

Ahmed Maher: a total whore and serial liar (which is the hallmark of the MB, but there is no other evidence I know of, that he is one). Once again, has no visible means of support, but has a lot of money.

Gehad al-Haddad: US-educated son of Muslim Brotherhood elite member Essam El-Haddad, who took over Egypt's foreign policy and ran the foreign ministry when the Brotherhood took power; Gehad al-Haddad is one of the main media spokesmen for the international Muslim Brotherhood;

Hesham al-Bastawisy: a principled judge, a good guy, but he was fooled into joining the Brotherhood-controlled "Judges for Egypt". When the Brotherhood took over, he left the country and has been working as a judge in a Gulf state;

Ghada Shahbandar: founder of the NGO "We See You" (Shayfenkom) during Mubarak's time, she seems good;

Hafez Abu Se'da, Nasser Amin: human rights activists; I have nothing against either one, especially Nasser Amin, who is a tireless and principled activist for human rights;

Amr al-Shobaky: academic, former member of parliament after the January 25th revolution, seems like a good guy but a bit of a wuss; hedges his bets.

Ahmed Samih, Mazen Hassan, Hamdy Qenawy, Doaa Qassem, Marwa Mokhtar: I know nothing about them.

Gamila Ismail: the ex-wife of Ayman Nour, mentioned above. A real hero, an activist, journalist and parliamentary candidate, we all wondered why she suddenly divorced Nour a few years ago, after decades of marriage. Now we know.

Maikel Mounir: a US-based Copt who seems awful close to Republican and Zionist groups in the US, but who has parachuted into Egypt and re-branded himself as a grassroots activist. Lots of money.

Barbara Ibrahim: the American wife of Professor Saad Eddin Ibrahim; her husband is the go-to pimp for any Egyptian for sale, seeking a US buyer. He's the one who brokered the secret contacts between the US government and the Muslim Brotherhood under the Mubarak regime, and he has recently arranged White House visits for the Salafist Nour Party, who want badly to replace the Brotherhood in the US' affections.

And others: unfortunately, there are all too many others.

[JackRiddler]

Wow.

That was a lot. I could never complain about an answer that complete! Thank you.

This thread is a compilation but it feels like half the material for a history. (Missing documents & more testifying by all involved.) Egypt's is a revolution as complicated and difficult and perhaps will be as momentous as the French. It certainly hasn't lacked for constant shifts.

I would be curious about your general gist on the Wallerstein piece. He's great at speaking with authority and giving big-picture views that actually seem nuanced and fair. This is the original "world systems theorist" of course. That makes him talented and knowledgeable but it doesn't make him right about any given thing. Without considering whose "side" he may be on, how do you see his idea of the constellation and balance of the forces in play?

[AlicetheKurious]

Well, to make it even more complete, Jack, I should probably add that Ahmed Douma is the son of a prominent Muslim Brother and was himself one, though he has been one of their most vocal and articulate opponents. A lot of people strenuously disagree with me when I defend him, though I do so on the basis of what he's said and done so far, and the lack of credible evidence against him; I could change my mind any time, depending on what he does. Also, I should have mentioned that Ahmed Maher is a founding member of April 6, rather than assume it's general knowledge.

I would be curious about your general gist on the Wallerstein piece. He's great at speaking with authority and giving big-picture views that actually seem nuanced and fair. This is the original "world systems theorist" of course. That makes him talented and knowledgeable but it doesn't make him right about any given thing. Without considering whose "side" he may be on, how do you see his idea of the constellation and balance of the forces in play?

After your suggestion I read the whole tiresome article, which only confirmed my initial negative impression. I refuse to waste time I don't have to take it apart piece by piece, but I'll just summarize my objections.

1) He blithely drops gross over-simplifications designed either to hide his own ignorance or to convey a false image, like this one:

In Egypt, the army has been the deciding force since 1952.

No, it hasn't.

Then he concludes:

When [the army] began to feel that the actions of the Morsi government might lead to a significant increase in Muslim Brotherhood power at the expense of the Egyptian army, General Abdel Fattah el-Sisi decided that enough was enough, and acted ruthlessly to increase the day-to-day power of the army.

As a matter of fact, one of the reasons that General Abdel-Fattah el-Sisi is such a popular hero today is that he risked his career, his life, and also the incredible privileges that the Muslim Brotherhood awarded the army in their constitution (which is now being totally re-written in response to the popular will), in order to stand with the people and the Egyptian nation against the tyranny of the Brotherhood and of their Western imperialist patrons. He and the army have done nothing, nothing, but obey the people's express demands, even at great cost to themselves. When Tantawy and Anan ran the army, the Muslim Brotherhood were their greatest supporters and the most violent opponents of anyone who dared to criticize SCAF's handling of the country. (The story of how El-Sisi replaced Tantawy as Defense Minister is a fascinating story that I'll tell elsewhere.) All the churches, mosques, government buildings, homes and businesses and roads that have been destroyed or damaged by the Muslim Brotherhood terrorists are being re-built and repaired at the army's expense, under the supervision of the army's engineers, at the same time that the army is fighting an all-out war against battle-hardened fanatic terrorists in Sinai, who are armed with advanced weaponry smuggled into Egypt from NATO-occupied Libya. Also at the same time, the army is providing logistical support to the police in its fight against terrorism in Egypt's cities, towns and villages. Every single day, there are army officers and soldiers being murdered by terrorists; in several instances, even retired officers were dragged from their cars and beaten and stabbed to death, and that's not counting the road-side and truck bombs in northern Sinai, which are almost a daily occurrence and have taken the lives of dozens of officers and conscripts.

There are towns in Egypt that have been taken over by terrorists and declared "Islamic Emirates". Notably, in the large but geographically isolated village of Delga, in Egypt's south, a group of terrorists had taken control of the village and its 150,000 residents. They burned down its churches (including one that dated from 400 AD), and marked the homes of Christian families with large red crosses, then looted and burned them as well. They attacked the police station and murdered its personnel. Most Christians fled outside the village, but those who remained were taken in by their Muslim neighbors, who clothed and fed them because everything they owned had been destroyed. They also had to hide them, because any Christian caught by the terrorists was either forced to pay for his survival or was killed. This went on for a month. In response to the public outcry, the police cited the difficulty of invading the village because of its isolated location surrounded by desert and mountains, because of its large population and the village's 27 entrances. Finally, yesterday morning, at the crack of dawn, the army surrounded the village, securing all the entrances and providing air and ground cover for the police forces. The police entered the village, arrested a few dozen armed terrorists, and freed the inhabitants. Nevertheless, the majority of the terrorists had already fled, fueling speculation that someone from within the police had alerted them. It wouldn't be the first time. Anyway, once again the army has committed itself to rebuilding the more than 65 homes that were destroyed, as well as the churches and the businesses that were burned down.

Mr. Wallerstein thinks the army is running Egypt for its own profit, when it is on the contrary, serving the Egyptian people at its own expense, because they love us and we love them. They are us, and we are them.

For Israel, Morsi represented a threat whereas the Egyptian army will preserve the relative detente.

I'm not even going to bother to refute this, I'm just putting it here because it makes me smile.

The political situation is straightforward. Both the Muslim Brotherhood and the Egyptian right (the forces that had long supported Mubarak) command enough voters so that any reasonably honest election will allow one or the other to be victorious.

That would be a neat trick, given the fact that the Muslim Brotherhood's pitiful weakly marches have been reduced to vandalizing public and private property, attacking ordinary citizens and issuing threats (like next Friday's march, which the Brotherhood have dubbed "The Friday of Egypt's Ruin"), while their sheikhs, like that clown Youssef el-Qaradawy in Qatar, shrilly demand that the US bomb Egypt and that Muslims around the world take up arms and go wage 'jihad' in Egypt. Hardly a winning electoral strategy, but maybe Mr. Wallerstein knows something I don't know.

As for the Right, the only way to garner any kind of popular support (even among the middle and upper classes) these days is to give at least lip-service to the revolutions' goals, which are very much Leftist and nationalist in nature. Given the current climate in Egypt, those who promise but don't deliver will certainly live to regret it. Which brings me to my final objection to Wallerstein's article:

The secular forces – the multiple socialist parties and the middle-class centrists whose leading figure at the moment is Mohamed el-Baradei, are too few in number. In the end, they have to join forces with one or the other, while they really want neither the right nor the Muslim Brotherhood. And the Egyptian Salafists joined the anti-Morsi coalition, hoping thereby to strengthen their own hand among Muslim activists.

I had to check the date on the article, because Mohamed El-Baradei left Egypt over a month ago for Austria, and is unlikely to return soon. He's burned himself and his political career and the only question now is whether he is simply a craven coward whose decades abroad have placed him out of touch with reality in Egypt, or whether he was a foreign agent all along.

Finally, Mr. Wallerstein has the same blind spot as the Americans, the Muslim Brotherhood, the SCAF, Mubarak, etc., etc., who all made their calculations without factoring in the Egyptian people, whom he portrays as passive, helpless, easily manipulated and dismissed. I'd like to remind him that it was the Egyptians who united and against all odds, got rid of not one, not two, but three foreign-backed tyrannies in less than three years, certainly a world historical record. Simply put, those who insist on ignoring or thwarting the people's will are idiots, blinded by their own arrogance and wishful thinking and prejudices. If Egyptians support their army today, it is because the army supports them, and sacrifices for them, and because it has acted with honor and courage to serve and protect the people, and Egyptians more than anyone appreciate those who are loyal and faithful to them. Analysts like Mr. Wallerstein seem totally incapable of understanding this, which is why reading such articles is a silly waste of time.

[American Dream]

http://www.jadaliyya.com/pages/index/14 ... revolution

The Egyptian Military and the 2011 Revolution

Sep 06 2013

by Sara Salem


The Egyptian military has emerged as one of the most powerful and influential actors since the inception of the modern Egyptian state. Despite this, since the late 1970s, there has been relatively little work that contextualizes and historicizes the military, even though it has continued to play a role in Egyptian political and economic life, as an institution and a community of elites.[1] The importance of such a line of inquiry cannot be overstated in our current moment. Specifically, it could shed a great deal of light on the conditions that deepened the military’s engagement in politics in recent years, most notably during the 2011 eighteen-day uprising and its aftermath.

For example, one way of understanding the position the military took vis-à-vis the 2011 revolution is to analyze the ties between the military and other members of the ruling class in Egypt, particularly in light of realignments among political actors over time. The question of interest is: What power shifts have occurred within the ruling class and how have they generated constraints on its cohesion and ability to govern Egypt? More specifically, how did these shifts within the ruling class relate to the societal tensions that contributed to the 2011 uprising and the military’s intervention? It is useful to conceptualize the military and the security forces as forming part of the ruling class, alongside other elites. When an imbalance or major shift occurs within this power dynamic, changes within the ruling class may lead to policies exerting economic and social pressure on the population. This in turn can lead to unrest, weakening the ability of the ruling class to govern—a shift that has serious ramifications for the entire ruling class.

This article puts the military’s decision to break ways with Egypt’s civilian ruling elite in 2011 in historical context, and analyzes the position of the military vis-à-vis new, emergent groups within the ruling class in the 1990s. It argues that shifts in the power dynamics within the ruling class can help us understand both why the 2011 revolution occurred when it did, and why the military had an incentive to intervene in 2011. Leading up to 2011, the growing influence of a new group of elites not only challenged the military’s position within the ruling class, but also set the stage for the 2011 uprising and the subsequent intervention of the military.

The Egyptian Military

The 1952 coup, often popularly understood as a revolution, marks the beginning of official Egyptian independence. On 23 July 1952, a movement within the military known as the Free Officers seized power and ousted King Farouk, a process that would soon end the British occupation of Egypt. The Free Officers formed the Revolution Command Council and declared a transitional period. In 1956 a new constitution was announced, giving the new president—Gamal Abdel Nasser—vast powers, including the right to appoint ministers. On the economic front, industrialization and nationalization became top priorities. The coup transformed Egypt into a country in which the military-dominated state controlled the goals and orientation of the economy. Coinciding with these developments was a shift within the ruling class such that the influence of land-owning bourgeoisie declined to the benefit of a new class of industrialists.[i] Nasser’s rule institutionalized a prominent political role for the military within the ruling class, and paved the way for its control over the means of production.

The Egyptian military continues to draw upon a history of revolutionary legitimacy, and many view it as a patriotic institution. The 1881 ‘Urabi revolution against the British, the Free Officer’s movement, and Egypt’s wars with Israel reinforce the military’s important historical role within the popular imagination. Moreover, after 1952, the military portrayed itself as an anticolonial force, and military leaders such as Nasser explained that the 1952 coup had been motivated primarily by the British presence in Egypt as well as the perceived corruption of the monarchy. These anticolonial credentials, and the accompanying nationalist rhetoric focused on industrial development, afforded the military an enormous amount of legitimacy among the population.[ii] The nationalization of the Suez Canal in 1956 served as a clear representation of the anticolonial position of the new regime and was a widely popular development among Egyptians. For the military, this popular legacy endures until today. Finally, not only did Nasser’s two successors also emerge from the military, mandatory conscription ensures that there are ties between the institution and the broader population.

The military’s international alliances aimed to fortify its powerful position further. Following the 1952 coup that brought Nasser and the military into power, Egypt adopted a policy of non-alignment. Nevertheless, there was often a critical amount of tension, if not outright conflict, between the Western powers and Egypt over key issues such as the Suez Canal and Israel’s colonial occupation of Palestine. Sadat’s presidency signaled a change in Egyptian foreign policy, both at the economic and political levels. Economically, Sadat’s policy of infitah opened up Egyptian markets, leading to an influx of foreign direct investment. Politically, Egypt signed a peace treaty with Israel in 1979, which led to tension not only between Egypt and other Arab countries, but also between Sadat and key military and political figures who were against the peace treaty. After the signing of the peace treaty, Foreign Minister Mohammed Ibrahim Kamel was quoted saying: “I almost died of disgrace, disgust, and grief as I witnessed this tragedy unfold.” Since the peace treaty with Israel was signed in 1979 the Egyptian military has been the recipient of the second largest amount of American military aid, totaling over two billion dollars per year.

The Depoliticization of the Military?

The role of the military in Egyptian politics after the Nasser era has been the subject of extensive debate in the literature. Hazem Kandil argues that although the military was behind the 1952 coup that launched the post-independence Egyptian state, the process of marginalizing the institution began soon after. Nasser, Sadat, and Mubarak all favored the state security apparatus over the military as a tool of repression, and under Mubarak a new group of elites emerged that represented a challenge to the military. This new economic elite became the core of the ruling class, thus marginalizing the position of the military. Others, however, such as Yezid Sayigh, argue that Egypt continued to be a military state until 2011 (and afterwards), and that what changed was the visibility of the military within the Egyptian political and economic spheres. This assertion is highly pertinent in light of claims after 30 June 2013 that the Egyptian military has “returned to power,” which assume that the military was not part of the ruling class before then.

On the one hand, it is difficult to argue that the military was completely depoliticized. The military continued to have widespread popular support in the public imagination, and continued its influence in the economic sphere. Importantly, top military figures were part of the corrupt system that existed under Mubarak, although it can be argued that they were drawn in as part of a broader attempt to co-opt them. Moreover, the military has been part of the ruling class since the inception of the Egyptian state. While their position within the ruling class has changed vis-à-vis other elites, their presence within the class is difficult to dispute.

On the other hand, successive governments did attempt to curb the power of military figures they saw as threatening. By Mubarak’s presidency, attempts to draw the military into the system through patronage and economic incentives were frequent, and popular military figures such as former Defense Minister Abd al-Halim Abu Ghazala were prevented from accessing powerful positions.[iii] Moreover, a notable shift under Nasser (which continued with Sadat and Mubarak) was a focus on expanding the domestic security establishment. This meant that the Ministry of Interior began to accumulate unparalleled powers. Following the 1977 “bread riots” in which Sadat called upon the military to restore calm, he deepened the power of the police in anticipation of further unrest. Under Mubarak, the Ministry of Interior reigned supreme, and police brutality gradually became one of Egypt’s biggest problems. This can be understood in light of the economic policies, the effects of which could only be suppressed coercively. These changes set the scene for the emergence of new elite figures that would marginalize the military’s position even further.

Ruling Class Realignments

Shifts in power within the elite, particularly with respect to control over the Egyptian economy, served to weaken the position of the military vis-à-vis other actors within the ruling class. Under Nasser, nationalization and industrialization programs ensured that the military controlled vast sectors of the economy. This shifted slightly under Sadat following notable privatization of the state sector. By the 1980s, however, the military began to again expand its economic reach into areas that had traditionally been civilian-controlled. Throughout Sadat’s presidency, the military expanded its powers in the economic sphere, investing and running major projects in tourism, industry and real estate, all of which were exempt from oversight. This expansion was especially notable in three areas: agriculture and land reclamation, arms manufacturing, and construction and services.

The economic empire for which the military is famous today (despite the lack of reliable data estimating its size) can be dated back to this period. Profits from some of this economic activity—most notably weapons production and export—are not only kept secret but are also produced at a subsidized rate, as the army enjoys subsidized prices for electricity and other manufacturing inputs. Agriculture and food production is another economic sector in which the military began to invest in. Land reclamation—turning desert land into land for urban development—which had been privatized under Sadat until the 1980s, saw a resurgence in army activity. The military also took on massive developmental projects under Mubarak. The 1980s thus saw the military begin to branch out into numerous industries at the expense of both state and civilian control over these industries. This created a new alliance between the military and the bourgeoisie who controlled these industries. By the late 1990s, however, Gamal Mubarak’s circle of businessmen, their excessive privatization, and monopolization began to threaten the military’s stake in the economy once again.

Under Mubarak, a new economic elite had emerged, of which his son Gamal was a key figure. This group constituted a powerful challenge to others within the ruling class, and can be characterized by their adherence to neoliberalism as a method of capitalist accumulation. The presence of this neoliberal group signaled a shift within the ruling class, as they soon began to vie for increasing control, particularly within the ruling National Democratic Party (NDP).[iv] Their brand of monopoly capitalism challenged the military’s monopolies in certain sectors, in particular their focus on privatizing segments of the economy that were previously controlled by the state and the military, including national banks and land reclamation projects.[v] These changes were largely the result of policies propagated by Gamal Mubarak and the new neoliberal elite within the NDP. The increasing influence of Gamal and other businessmen was especially visible within the party’s Policies Committee, one of the most powerful committees within the ruling party.

Mubarak’s Egypt became one of the leading neoliberal states in the Middle East. As Timothy Mitchell noted, both the ability of markets to work freely as well as the rampant privatization were applied unevenly and thus benefited a small elite, while the majority of Egyptians experienced a decline in quality of life.[vi] This is not to say that other members of the ruling class did not partake in the neoliberal project that created the vast gulfs between Egypt’s social classes, but rather to argue that this new group of elites was challenging other members of the ruling class—including the military—through their monopoly capitalism.

By the third decade of Mubarak’s presidency, the economic elites that now monopolized much of the Egyptian economy relied extensively on the police and security forces.[vii] This was especially clear in the way security forces dealt with the increasing number of labor strikes. Class tensions were growing and threatening to explode, rendering state coercion even more necessary. In order to maintain the stability necessary for economic exploitation, it was essential that social unrest over rising prices and inequality was kept to a minimum, and this was done through an increase in policing and police brutality. These tensions resulted primarily from the increased embeddedness of neoliberalism, visible in the widening gaps between social classes, the effects of structural adjustment programs at the micro level, and the influx of foreign capital and spread of privatization (which also threatened the military’s economic interests). [viii]

Moreover at the political level the systematic rigging of elections and increased brutality of the security forces added to the unrest in Egyptian society. The transformation that had begun in the 1970s was now complete: the ruling party, comprised largely of neoliberal elites, and supported by the Ministry of the Interior and security forces, exerted significant control over Egypt. The class tension from rising inequality, growing prices of basic goods, and increasing numbers of labor strikes suggest that important segments of the Egyptian public were finding it increasingly difficult to survive.[ix] This combination of the challenge from a new neoliberal elite as well as the sharp rise in social inequality resulting from the policies of this new elite sheds light on the military’s intervention in 2011.[x]

2011 and 2013: Attempts to Recenter the Military within the Ruling Class

Several factors shaped the choices facing the military during the 2011 uprising. There is little doubt that the grassroots pressure from protesters, as well as the threats by various segments of the public and private sector to go on strike, played a major role in compelling the authorities to address their demands. These demands centered around social justice and freedom, with police brutality and reform of the Ministry of Interior also playing a central role. The impossibility of salvaging the legitimacy of the Mubarak regime soon became clear, and undoubtedly affected the military’s decision to intervene. Additionally, the military’s concern about its declining position in the Egyptian ruling class was critical, as was the need to protect corrupt figures within the military ranks from the trials that were bound to take place. Following the forced resignation of Hosni Mubarak in February 2011, Egypt duly entered a military-led transitional period under the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF). The military was once again at the forefront of Egyptian politics.

It appears that the revolutionary protests succeeded in toppling Mubarak because the military decided to “side with the revolution.” This was not necessarily out of sympathy for the demands of the protesters, however, but because the military made a strategic calculation. With apparent plans to groom Gamal for the presidency underway, the military was now facing the prospect of a civilian president for Egypt for the first time in over half a century. Moreover, the new group of elites headed by Gamal Mubarak had played an important role in exacerbating the societal tensions behind the revolution that was now threatening to topple the entire ruling class, which would inevitably affect the military’s privileged position. Finally, the economic policies that resulted from the shift in the ruling class, primarily the extensive privatization of key industries, changed the balance that had existed since Nasser. This opportunity to re-center themselves within the ruling class acted as an incentive for the military to intervene in 2011. This intervention led to a military-led transitional period, followed by presidential elections in 2012, which senior Muslim Brotherhood figure Mohamed Morsi won. Notably, the constitution that was written under Morsi protected the military’s privileges, further shedding doubt on the narrative that Morsi sent the military back to the barracks.

Following the widespread protests on 30 June 2013 against Morsi, the military has once again entered center stage, this time with much public support. On 3 July General Abd al-Fattah al-Sisi announced that Morsi was no longer president of Egypt and that the constitution was suspended. The Chief Justice of the Supreme Constitutional Court, Adly Mansour, took over as interim president. The 30 June protests signaled a continuation of many of the demands of 2011, as well as deep discontent with Morsi’s first year in power. The constitutional process was perceived as exclusionary to non-Islamist forces, and the violent clashes at the presidential palace in December (in response to the constitutional crisis) raised questions about the role of police violence in Morsi’s Egypt. This, together with the possibility of a new loan from the International Monetary Fund, further cementing neoliberalism in Egypt, had all managed to raise concern among different segments of Egyptian society.

While the debate about whether this intervention constitutes a military coup or not has been extensive, a more important question is whether this intervention can shed light on the position of the military within the ruling class pre-2011 as well as after the 2012 presidential elections. It is clear that events in Egypt after 30 June cannot be explained primarily by asking whether what occurred was a coup or a popular revolution—it was a combination. It is more useful to focus on the different actors involved: an important aspect of the events since 30 June is the military elite’s effort to prevent the protests from reaching a point where the army itself and its privileged position become targets. This is the second time the military has stepped in since 2011, and both times it has done so in an effort to determine the course of events following massive mobilization at the grassroots level, and an immense revolutionary energy that seemed capable of demanding—and achieving—critical socio-economic and political demands.

It is crucial to highlight the role that both the military and Morsi’s government have played in continuing and consolidating neoliberal governance in Egypt, a project that continues to undermine widespread demands for redistribution. It is this project that continues to obstruct key revolutionary demands, and it is thus in the interest of the entire ruling class to prevent continued mass mobilizations that threaten the project. This, alongside the challenge posed to their economic interests prior to 2011, can help explain why the military intervened in 2011. As has been pointed out, the military has worked to control and contain the energy on the street. The military’s interest is primarily to maintain the status quo that allows the ruling class to stay in power and pursue its economic and political project, which is precisely what many protesters have been trying dismantle since 2011. The demands that were central to 25 January 2011, in particular the demand for social justice, require an overthrow of the ruling class and their policies. In other words, while the fulfillment of key revolutionary demands would entail the overthrow of the ruling class, the military is simply trying to re-shape the ruling class in order to protect its interests.

Theorizing the military interventions of 2011 and 2013 demands a close examination of the shifts within the ruling class and how these manifest in society. These diverse elites share a collective interest in maintaining a hegemonic system, and when one group within the ruling class threatens to disrupt this project conflict and defections are likely to arise, as was the case in both 2011 and 2013. The army’s interventions in 2011 and 2013 can be viewed as an attempt to restore its centrality within the ruling class (especially after 2011), and to protect its privileges from the protests themselves.



[1] Some recent exceptions include Hazem Kandil, Soldiers, Spies and Statesmen: Egypt's Road to Revolt. (Verso Books, 2012). Steven A. Cook, Ruling but not governing: The military and political development in Egypt, Algeria, and Turkey. (Johns Hopkins University Press, 2007); Imad Harb, "The Egyptian military in politics: Disengagement or accommodation?." The Middle East Journal (2003): 269-290.

[i] Anouar Abdel-Malek,, Egypt: Military Society: The Army Regime, the Left, and Social Change under Nasser (New York: Random House, 1968), 87.

[ii] Much of this nationalist rhetoric focused on industrialization and, later, socialism. Early redistribution policies served to classify Egypt’s new regime as socialist, though arguably Egypt during the Nasser period can be better classified as capitalist, whereby the ruling class combined the public and private sectors.

[iii] In 1989 Mubarak replaced Abu Ghazala following allegations that he was part of a scheme to import banned missile technology into Egypt. Abu Ghazala was widely popular, both in the army and in the country, and was rumoured to have been a possible rival to Mubarak.

[iv] One example was their attempts to extend their power through the ruling party. They took control of the cabinet, followed by control of the NDP and parliament. Key businessmen were appointed to important positions within the NDP. Ahmed Ezz, a steel tycoon, became the majority leader in parliament and Gamal Mubarak became the Assistant Secretary-General of the NDP.

[v] McMahon in Dan Tschirgi,, Walid Kazziha, and Sean F. McMahon, eds., Egypt's Tahrir Revolution (Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2013), 166.

[vi] Timothy Mitchell, Rule of Experts: Egypt, Techno-politics, Modernity (University of California Press, 2002), 228.

[vii] McMahon, 2013.

[viii] Selim H Shahine, “Youth and the Revolution in Egypt,” Anthropology Today 27, no. 2 (2011), 1-3.

[ix] See: Galal A. Amin, Egypt in the Era of Hosni Mubarak 1981-2011 (Cairo: American University in Cairo Press, 2011), 100; Saad Z. Nagi and Omar Nagi, “Stratification and Mobility in Contemporary Egypt,” Population Review 50, no. 1 (2011), 6.

[x] See: Shahine, 3-4; Amin, Whatever Happened to the Egyptians?: Changes in Egyptian Society from 1950 to the Present (Cairo: American University in Cairo Press, 2000), 4-5.

[bluenoseclaret]

A D ...Don't you have anything to say about Alice's postings. Just curious.

Are you a supporter of the Open Society Foundation/George Soros.

I find Alice's postings fascinating and so informative. Without them, I would be flailing in the dark.

[vanlose kid]

*

Egypt: Frenchman dies in police custody amid rising tide of xenophobia

Jailed Canadian pair on hunger strike while Syrian refugees bear brunt of anger towards foreigners in wake of Morsi ousting

Patrick Kingsley in Cairo
theguardian.com, Wednesday 18 September 2013 19.35 BST


Eric Lang, a French national living in Egypt, was beaten to death by inmates in a Cairo police station. Photograph: Alain Blotti Re/AP

A French national has died in police custody in Cairo and two Canadians have begun a hunger strike to protest at their month-long detention amid a rising tide of xenophobia and nationalist fervour in Egypt.

Elsewhere, two Syrian refugees were killed by Egyptian coastguards while trying to flee the country by boat, while a Swiss national has been arrested on suspicion of espionage after being caught in possession of a toy plane.

Frenchman Eric Lang, 49, a teacher, was beaten to death by fellow inmates in a Cairo police station last Friday. A longterm Cairo resident, Lang had been held by the police since 6 September after failing to produce valid residency papers. Initial reports suggested Lang was arrested for flouting Cairo's curfew, which has been in place since the brutal killing of up to a thousand supporters of the ousted president Mohamed Morsi on 14 August sparked a wave of unrest across Egypt, but his family's lawyer said that he was arrested during the day.

News of Lang's murder came as two Canadians announced a hunger strike to protest against their continued incarceration without charge in an Egyptian prison. John Greyson, a renowned Canadian documentary film-maker, and his companion Tarek Loubani, a doctor, were arrested during the unrest in Cairo on 15 August after asking at a police station for directions, according to friends.

Shortly afterwards, they called a colleague in Canada. "They said: we're being arrested," Greyson's sister Cecilia said. "And then the line went dead."

The pair were on their way to Gaza, where Loubani planned to teach local doctors in a training programme that Greyson had wanted to document on camera. Instead, they have spent 33 days in jail without charge, much of it in a cramped cell containing 36 other inmates, Cecilia Greyson said.

The pair's situation has become a cause célèbre overseas, and Alec Baldwin, Arundhati Roy, Ben Affleck, Charlize Theron and Michael Ondaatje are among 135,000 to have signed a petition calling for their release.

While the precise circumstances surrounding their and Lang's arrests are unknown, their treatment follows a spike in xenophobia and nationalism in Egypt that was provoked by the overthrow of Morsi in early July.

Suspicion of foreigners is by no means unprecedented in Egypt, but it has heightened this summer as Egypt's new government and its backers across state and private media began to demonise Morsi and his allies as anti-Egyptian terrorists backed by an unlikely range of foreigners, from Hamas to Barack Obama.

Prosecutors accuse Morsi of colluding with Hamas during Egypt's 2011 uprising, in charges that paint Morsi and his Muslim Brotherhood as foreign interlopers who act without Egypt's national interests at heart. In a similar vein, Egypt's flagship state newspaper, al-Ahram, has run front-page stories claiming that Morsi's Brotherhood were plotting with the US to divide up Egypt. One private newspaper even claimed that Obama was himself a member of the Brotherhood.

Some television chatshow hosts have fanned the flames on a nightly basis, vilifying western governments and journalists for failing to give wholesale approval to the army's removal of Morsi, which had widespread public approval within Egypt's borders.

"America and Britain have a plan to pay the Muslim Brotherhood so that the country will be divided – one piece to Palestine, another to Libya and another to the Christians, so that we'll have a war for 50 years," Salah Zeyada, a governor of a province in central Egypt, said last week, expressing a commonly held sentiment.

A British resident in Cairo for nearly three decades, Cathy Costain said she had never personally experienced xenophobia since arriving in 1986, now or in the past. But she said that anger towards foreigners from some television hosts is now "way beyond anything I've seen before", and added that the treatment of Lang, Greyson and Loubani was unusual.

"The teacher who's died, and the journalists who are in prison – it used to be that the authorities would try to make the problem go away as quickly as possible," said Costain, a charity worker. "But it seems like they are trying to make an example of them – which is quite scary."

There are also concerns about the effect such events will have on foreign investment and tourism, which has already fallen drastically since the 2011 uprising.

Angus Blair, an economic and political analyst at Cairo's Signet Institute, said that while Egypt remained an attractive investment opportunity for overseas businesses, such security incidents would prove off-putting to investors.

"It's one extra piece of information that makes Egypt less likely to be seen as a good investment – part of the drip-drip-drip of bad news," said Blair.

Syrian refugees have borne the brunt of the xenophobia. Tawfik Okasha, a reactionary television chatshow host, has called on Egyptians to arrest any Syrians they find in the street – mostly because Syrians have become unfairly associated with the now widely hated Brotherhood during the dying days of Morsi's presidency.

Warmly received before Morsi's ousting, some Syrians report an increase in xenophobic street harassment, others greater job insecurity. One man claimed his children were not allowed to register at a state-run school because of their Syrian nationality. Another was taken to a police station by a taxi driver after getting in his cab to go home. Many are now fleeing their second country in as many years.

http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/s ... yria-morsi

*

[AlicetheKurious]

Elsewhere, two Syrian refugees were killed by Egyptian coastguards while trying to flee the country by boat, while a Swiss national has been arrested on suspicion of espionage after being caught in possession of a toy plane.

Frenchman Eric Lang, 49, a teacher, was beaten to death by fellow inmates in a Cairo police station last Friday. A longterm Cairo resident, Lang had been held by the police since 6 September after failing to produce valid residency papers. Initial reports suggested Lang was arrested for flouting Cairo's curfew, which has been in place since the brutal killing of up to a thousand supporters of the ousted president Mohamed Morsi on 14 August sparked a wave of unrest across Egypt, but his family's lawyer said that he was arrested during the day.

News of Lang's murder came as two Canadians announced a hunger strike to protest against their continued incarceration without charge in an Egyptian prison. John Greyson, a renowned Canadian documentary film-maker, and his companion Tarek Loubani, a doctor, were arrested during the unrest in Cairo on 15 August after asking at a police station for directions, according to friends.

Shortly afterwards, they called a colleague in Canada. "They said: we're being arrested," Greyson's sister Cecilia said. "And then the line went dead."

The pair were on their way to Gaza, where Loubani planned to teach local doctors in a training programme that Greyson had wanted to document on camera. Instead, they have spent 33 days in jail without charge, much of it in a cramped cell containing 36 other inmates, Cecilia Greyson said.

According to this Guardian article, a Swiss guy was arrested for having a toy plane, a teacher who didn't happen to have residency papers was arrested and then beaten to death in jail, up to a thousand supporters of Morsi were brutally killed (by police), there is a "wave of unrest across Egypt", and a couple of Canadians "on their way to Gaza" were arrested during the unrest in Cairo "after asking at a police station for directions".

Does it matter that the Guardian is partly owned by Qatar, and along with much of the Western media, has been one of the biggest purveyors of lies and pro-Muslim Brotherhood propaganda? Let's see.

First: where did the Guardian obtain the figure of "up to 1000" Morsy supporters killed? According to the coroner's office, the total number of people killed during the entire week from August 14 to 21 was 667, including 146 police officers, 52 unidentified and unclaimed bodies (many of which were found inside the MB camps in various stages of decomposition) and several hundred shot or stabbed or beaten to death by the Muslim Brotherhood during their murderous rampage through Cairo and Giza following the dispersal of their terrorist camps, which has been amply documented in videos and photos and by many, many eyewitnesses. These also include those who shot at police or who refused to evacuate the camps after the police had offered safe passage to the Morsy supporters, and who surrounded the shooters as 'human shields', behind whom the snipers shot at police. Does the Guardian have another source for information about the number of Morsi supporters killed? The coroner's report identifies their cause of death and names where possible, and the photographs and location of each body. No bodies can be buried in Egypt without an official death certificate from the coroner's office. Where did the Guardian get its own figures?

Second: a Swiss man is arrested on suspicion of espionage because he had a toy plane. Was that all it was? When the Muslim Brotherhood had their camps, they used toy planes equipped with miniature cameras to fly over and monitor police and military bases. Several of them were shot down, and the cameras taken as evidence. Was the Swiss guy's toy plane equipped with a similar camera? We'd need more information, which the article does not provide.

Third: what happened in the US on September 11, 2001 was unrest; hurricane Sandy was a storm, and Katrina was a large wave. What happened in Egypt on August 14-21 was a nation-wide terrorist rampage in which hundreds of police stations, dozens of churches, at least two mosques, dozens of office buildings and stores were looted and burned by armed fanatics seeking revenge against the Egyptian people and the state for having rejected their tyrannical rule. They planted bombs in metro stations and on major bridges; they marched through the streets shooting randomly at the windows of residential buildings, killing dozens of people (including the young brother of someone I know). Several of the armed fanatics are foreign terrorists from various countries, imported by the Muslim Brotherhood to terrorize Egyptians. These include Syrians, Palestinians, Pakistanis, Afghanis, Turks, Chechnyans, and assorted Europeans, including Germans and British and others, none of whom have residential or entry permits. Needless to say, a strict curfew was imposed by the authorities. People stayed home, to let the police do their job. But a drunken Frenchman without residential papers stumbles around in the deserted streets. He gets picked up by the police and thrown in the crowded lock-up, where he gets into a fight with other inmates (something about trying to keep the light on when they wanted to sleep) and gets beaten to death. Given these circumstances, it's hard to imagine a different outcome in any country on earth.

Finally, you gotta love this:

News of Lang's murder came as two Canadians announced a hunger strike to protest against their continued incarceration without charge in an Egyptian prison. John Greyson, a renowned Canadian documentary film-maker, and his companion Tarek Loubani, a doctor, were arrested during the unrest in Cairo on 15 August after asking at a police station for directions, according to friends.

The pair were on their way to Gaza, where Loubani planned to teach local doctors in a training programme that Greyson had wanted to document on camera

They couldn't have been "on their way to Gaza", because the Egyptian border with Gaza has been sealed, and hundreds of tunnels destroyed, to prevent any more armed Palestinians affiliated with the Muslim Brotherhood from entering to join with thousands of terrorists imported by the Brotherhood from all over the world to fight the Egyptian army in Sinai. Northern Sinai is a war zone where every day soldiers and police are ambushed and shot, or killed by roadside and truck bombs. Needless to say, it is closed to visitors.

Finally, according to Western news reports, Greyson and Loubani were arrested on August 15 at the Ezbekeya police station near Ramses Square, where they were "asking for directions". Sounds innocuous, right? Only if you don't know that the Ezbekeya police station, which is not just a station but one of the country's major police headquarters, was surrounded and besieged on the morning of August 15 by around 3,000 armed terrorists, including snipers on the rooftops of neighboring buildings and by pro-Morsy fanatics on the surrounding streets and bridges, where they had set up barricades and were wielding rocks, molotov cocktails and shotguns. Here is a video filmed from inside police headquarters (sorry it's in Arabic, but the images speak for themselves) of what was happening there in the early morning of August 15, where the pair stopped "to ask for directions":



Now, why on earth would the Guardian, and all other Western news media, neglect to mention any of this? Why would they suggest that the pair merely stopped to ask for directions at a police station la-la-dee-da, when in fact at the time, the police headquarters were besieged and surrounded by armed terrorists? Anybody have an answer?

[AlicetheKurious]

Following the fatal shooting of three of his colleagues by Muslim Brotherhood supporters, the Chairman of the Cairo Foreign Press Association, veteran correspondent for Der Spiegel in Egypt, issued a statement on August 18:

ALERT From FPA Chairman


Dear colleagues, members of the Cairo Foreign Press Association,

Without taking sides in the internal conflict, I consider it our duty to make our members aware of a seriously increasing danger for our journalistic performance and even lives. Unfortunately, some of our colleagues succumbed to fatal attacks.

They were not just victims of chaos or normal fire exchange, they had been fired at on purpose. Not by police or army officers, but by the self-proclaimed 'peaceful demonstrators'. Today I myself happily escaped a mean sniper attack on the 15 Mayo bridge at Zamalek. The criminal was not a policeman either, I have witnesses for that fact - normal Egyptian citizen passers-by.

I was not there for press coverage, but just heading for a coffee shop to meet friends. It is outrageous what these aggressive "protesters" commit. They attack people at random, attack their own state, attack public buildings and an ever increasing number of churches and houses and shops of Christians. It is not my job as FPA chairman to bother you with political analyses, but I feel forced by my conscience and professional moral to express my strong disappointment that the war which the "protesters" fight against the state of our host country only scarcely finds an adequate due coverage. But it is never too late. Take care.

Volkhard Windfuhr
Chairman Link

He is not alone. Many long-time correspondents stationed in Cairo for foreign media have expressed their objections to the extreme bias in the way their organizations are covering events in Egypt. Several of them were subsequently reassigned to other countries, and replaced with uninformed correspondents who relied on their organizations' briefings for understanding of current events. Another problem is the Western media correspondents' reliance on information provided by Egyptian journalists who are affiliated with the Muslim Brotherhood, but whose affiliation they either don't know or simply don't report. Reporters from some publications, such as the Muslim Brotherhood's Freedom & Justice newspaper, have participated, not only in fabricating 'news', but in actual violence against civilians and security forces. Others, such as reporters for the Muslim Brotherhood-owned newspaper Shorouk, have been very active in supplying Western reporters with false information, which the latter then report without further investigation or corroboration. The American University in Cairo employs a number of Muslim Brothers as professors; their fluency in English makes them attractive commentators and analysts. Once again, their affiliation is not mentioned. Then there is the Al-Jazeera network, including its Arabic and English channels as well as its websites, which is the single most effective propaganda machine for the Muslim Brotherhood's lies, despite the irrefutable evidence that it regularly engages in disinformation and fabrications.

[AlicetheKurious]

This is what is left from our Faculty of Engineering Cairo University. The MB "Peaceful" protesters in Nahda turn it into ashes. Link

They're trying to destroy Egypt in the same way that the US destroyed Iraq and Libya and their proxies are destroying Syria. Sorry, they will not succeed. Egypt is in a life-or-death fight for her survival, and believe me, we will win.

[AlicetheKurious]

Remember the police station in Kerdasa (a rural town in Giza), where the policemen and officers were sadistically tortured, massacred and their bodies mutilated by the pro-Morsy "demonstrators"? Well, Kerdasa had been occupied for the past month by the terrorists (most of whom are members of the Gama'a Islameya, the group that assassinated Sadat), and had been declared another of their "Islamic emirates". Yesterday before dawn, the police finally went in and liberated the town. Hundreds of terrorists were arrested and their weapons confiscated; there were no casualties among the terrorists or the civilians.




However, several policemen were shot and wounded, and one officer was killed by a sniper: Deputy Chief of Security for Giza, 52 year-old Nabil Farrag, father of three children, the youngest one only 5 years old. He was wearing a bullet-proof vest, but the sniper shot through his upper arm and the 9mm bullet tore right through his chest from right to left, tearing up both his lungs and heart. Today was a national day of mourning; thousands of Egyptians attended his funeral, and the nation's churches rang their bells with the mosque's announcement of noon prayers.

This is he, at the moment he was shot; a reporter for Mehwar TV, an independent television channel, is calling for help. A policeman is staring in shock.

[beeline]

link

Sep 23, 8:55 AM EDT

Egypt bans Muslim Brotherhood group

By MAGGIE MICHAEL
Associated Press

CAIRO (AP) -- An Egyptian court on Monday ordered the Muslim Brotherhood to be banned and its assets confiscated in a dramatic escalation of a crackdown by the military-backed government against supporters of the ousted Islamist president Mohammed Morsi.

The ruling opens the door for a wider crackdown on the vast network of the Brotherhood, which includes social organizations that have been key for building the group's grassroots support and helping its election victories. The verdict banned the group itself - including the official association it registered under earlier this year - as well as "any institution branching out of it or ... receiving financial support from it," according to the court ruling, made public on Egypt's state official news agency MENA.

The judge at the Cairo Court for Urgent Matters also ordered the "confiscation of all the group's money, assets, and buildings" and said that an independent committee should be formed by the Cabinet to manage the money until final court orders are issued. The verdict can be appealed.

The Brotherhood was outlawed for most of its 85 years in existence. But after the 2011 ouster of autocrat Hosni Mubarak, it was allowed to work openly, formed a political party and rose to power in a string of post-Mubarak elections. In March, it registered as a recognized non-governmental organization.

"This is totalitarian decision," leading group member Ibrahim Moneir said in an interview with Qatari-based Al-Jazeera Mubashir Misr TV. "You are losers and it (the Brotherhood) will remain with God's help, not by the orders by the judiciary of el-Sissi," he added, referring to military chief Gen. Abdel-Fattah el-Sissi, who led the overthrow of Morsi on July 3.

The court did not immediately make public the grounds for its ruling. The verdict came in a suit raised by lawyers from the leftist party Tagammu party, accusing the Brotherhood of being a "terrorist" and "exploiting religion in political slogans." Several other courts are looking into similar suits.

[bluenoseclaret]

Egypt bans Muslim Brotherhood again

AP reports:

An Egyptian court on Monday ordered the Muslim Brotherhood to be banned and its assets confiscated in a dramatic escalation of a crackdown by the military-backed government against supporters of the ousted Islamist president Mohammed Morsi.

Of course this has been tried before.

In 1954, a Brotherhood member tried to assassinate [President Gamal Abdel] Nasser during a speech. In the aftermath of the attempt, the Brotherhood was dissolved, with many of its members subsequently arrested or fleeing overseas.

Here’s a fascinating clip of Gamal Abdel Nasser in 1966 ridiculing the Muslim Brotherhood to an appreciative audience:

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=wIbZMH5Zu8s

"This short video is funny, Nasser speaks of having had a meeting with the head of the Muslim Brotherhood, and his first and foremost request of Nasser was that all the Egyptian women must be compelled to walk around wrapped around in the Abaya and also wearing the headscarf."

I liked Nasser.

[AlicetheKurious]

I liked Nasser

I LOVE Nasser. Present tense.

An Egyptian court on Monday ordered the Muslim Brotherhood to be banned and its assets confiscated in a dramatic escalation of a crackdown by the military-backed government against supporters of the ousted Islamist president Mohammed Morsi.

Of course this has been tried before.

Actually, this is not strictly accurate. Legally, the Muslim Brotherhood does not exist, any more than the Mafia exists in the US. It has no members, no bank accounts, no property, no assets; it engages in no activity. The Muslim Brotherhood was established as a religious missionary organization in 1928, and was legally banned under the monarchy in 1949 after a series of terrorist attacks carried out by its members, including assassinations of Cabinet ministers, judges and others during the 1930s and 1940s.

After the Free Officers' Revolution in 1952, the Nasserist government tried to start a new page, inviting them to join the new government and integrate into the nation's political life. However, they were not willing to participate, but insisted on dominating the new government; they were offered three Cabinet Ministries, but this was not enough. After they were found to be conducting secret (treasonous) negotiations with the British occupation forces, and then after they attempted to assassinate Nasser in 1954, once again, the new government cracked down on its members, arresting those it could, while the rest escaped to Saudi Arabia and Europe. This was based on a political/administrative decision by the Revolutionary Council, not a legal decision. As I mentioned earlier, legally, the Muslim Brotherhood did and does not exist.

Nasser had succeeded in virtually eliminating the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt. During the 18 years he was in power, there were no terrorist attacks, no sectarian conflicts, no religious fanaticism. Not surprisingly, the Muslim Brotherhood continue to nurture a corrosive hatred for Nasser and socialism and Arab nationalism, the Egyptian military and indeed any national institution until this day.

When Sadat took over after Nasser's death, and especially after the 1973 War, when he decided to turn Egypt over to the Americans and reverse all the socialist and Arab nationalist policies of his predecessor, he faced strenuous opposition from the Leftist/Nasserist/Arab nationalist intellectuals, journalists, academics, student and labor and peasant activists, etc. Rather than attacking them directly, he declared himself to be "the Pious President"; then he released the Muslim Brotherhood members who were still in prison, invited all its exiles back to Egypt, and unleashed them upon his opposition. He allowed them to receive enormous funds from Saudi Arabia and other Gulf patrons of the Brotherhood, which they used to establish a nation-wide network of religious schools, especially in poor rural areas, which indoctrinated children into their fanatic cult. They built mosques in which their preachers did the same. As the state starved government health facilities of funds, they set up free clinics in the poorest areas to recruit new members. In universities and major newspapers, editors and journalists were fired, and replaced with those loyal to Sadat and his pro-American policies. Those who tried to protest or organize were attacked by the Brotherhood's militias, wielding steel chains or knives. Others were assassinated.

By the late 1970s, the Muslim Brotherhood and its armed offshoots were openly declaring their intention to establish a Taliban-like state in Egypt, on their way to taking over the region and eventually the world. Seriously. They declared Sadat and his government, and indeed the Egyptian people to be "infidels" needing to be conquered and converted to their version of Islam. They launched attacks against Christian-owned businesses, especially jewelry shops, to finance their operations. They also attacked night-clubs, video rental shops and liquor stores. Sadat had created a Frankenstein that he could not control, and lived to regret it. In his last speech before he was assassinated by them, he admitted that he'd made a mistake. He ordered a police crack-down on the leadership of the Muslim Brotherhood (which still did not exist legally), but said: "As for the youths who have been misled and fooled by them, I will give them a chance to come to their senses." Even after he was assassinated, the courts only punished those who were directly involved in the assassination and the subsequent attacks against police stations in Upper Egypt, in which hundreds of policemen were murdered.

When Mubarak took over after Sadat in 1981, the US-Saudi alliance to indoctrinate, recruit, train and send Reagan's so-called "Freedom Fighters" to Afghanistan to fight Soviet troops was in full swing. Egypt was one of the biggest recruitment centers for these fighters. Mubarak had been in charge of this file since his days as Sadat's vice-president, working with Hussein Tantawy (who later became the head of SCAF and took over Egypt after the January 25th Revolution); Tantawy was Egypt's Military Attache in Pakistan, a major transit center for the 'freedom fighters' on their way to Afghanistan. Once again, the Muslim Brotherhood and its fanatic offshoots were allowed to operate freely, recruiting young men to go fight on America's behalf under the banner of Islam.

Like Sadat before him, Mubarak thought he could control and use them for his own ends. While Mubarak allowed them to recruit and train armed fighters to wage "jihad" against the US' opponents in Afghanistan and Bosnia and Chechnya and elsewhere, he drew the line at allowing them to commit their terrorist acts inside Egypt itself. When Wahhabist fanatics committed a series of assassinations and terrorist bombings in Egypt, especially in the 1990s, his government cracked down hard. At the same time, he allowed and even encouraged the Brotherhood itself to engage in 'non-violent' activities: recruiting through schools, universities, mosques and labor unions, establishing large financial and trade operations, and even occasionally uniting with them politically to defeat Leftist candidates. Proving that he was as stupid as Sadat, Mubarak also sponsored a more extreme form of Wahhabism which came to be called "salafism" and was run directly by the state security apparatus, financed by Saudi Arabia and other Gulf states. Using the principle of fighting fire with fire, it was the salafists' role to oppose on religious grounds any political activity, especially against the state authorities. As with the Brotherhood, they were encouraged to propagate their cult through mosques, satellite tv stations and charities, all of which were lavishly funded from abroad. Salafists were supposed to be a non-political competitor to the Brotherhood, obsessed with the minutiae of religious observance and obeying the cardinal rule never to rebel against government authority.

Until after the January 25th Revolution, the Muslim Brotherhood had succeeded in convincing most Egyptians that they had renounced violence long ago, and that there was a big difference between the Muslim Brotherhood (a political/charitable/missionary organization) and armed terrorist groups like the Jama'a Islameya, Takfeer wa Hijra and Jihad, among others, including Al-Qaeda. I confess that I was one of those who was fooled by them. Their political spokesmen always sounded so reasonable. They were always on the right side of any issue concerning civil liberties, human rights and political freedoms. They seemed to be particularly sensitive to the plight of the poor and issues of social/economic justice.

After Mubarak was deposed, they vowed that they would not seek the presidency, nor would they even compete for more than 30% of the parliamentary seats. They declared that their objective was to "participate, not dominate" in Egypt's political life.

It didn't take long for the warning signs to appear: within weeks of Mubarak's removal, a special committee was set up by the SCAF to issue a constitutional decree that would remain effective until a new constitution could be written and approved by referendum. The members of this committee comprised several virtual unknowns, but included two prominent persons associated with the Muslim Brotherhood, including the Committee Chairman. Even more alarming, was the fact that in the referendum campaign, all the differences between the so-called "political" groups and the "religious" groups and even the "terrorist" groups which advocate violence, simply vanished. All Islamists' resources were mobilized to get a "Yes" vote: mosques, preachers, money, media, violence; everything. Illiterate voters were told to vote for "God" and for "Islam"; they were told that a "yes" vote would get them into heaven. Educated voters were told to vote "yes" to achieve stability and economic recovery. Revolutionary youth groups were told that a "yes" vote would speed up the process whereby the army would withdraw from political life and return to its barracks. Furthermore, as some of us suspected at the time (including me), the vote was rigged by the SCAF itself, using voter lists that include millions of fraudulent names of non-existent voters, and other means for which the evidence gradually emerged, especially as the same methods were used in all the votes we've had over the past two and a half years.

Since then, it has become glaringly obvious that all the distinctions between Islamists were illusory: they are one, wearing different hats and masks depending on the circumstances. When they feel weak, they show a more politicized, conciliatory, reasonable, tolerant face. When they feel strong, they reveal their bullying, contemptuous, violent and triumphalist face. This was striking when they won the first referendum, back in March of 2011, but too many people refused to admit what was happening. Over the past two and a half years, this tendency on the part of the Muslim Brotherhood and its offshoots and partners, to 'drop the act' whenever they feel empowered, made it impossible for even the most willfully blind to ignore. When Morsy became president, they thought they were untouchable (he was overheard saying, "We will rule for 500 years.") The presidency and all the state were run by the Muslim Brotherhood. Foreign policy was run by the Muslim Brotherhood's Essam el-Haddad, while the Minister of Foreign Affairs and Egypt's ambassadors were ignored and left out of the loop. The same with all the ministries. The American ambassador and visitors from the European Union held secret meetings for hours with the MB's number-two man in Egypt, Khairat el-Shater, who had no official status, but who was widely perceived as the true decision-maker. Morsy's presidential advisers resigned one by one, all saying that they had no functions and were not informed or consulted about anything. There were constant resignations from the Islamist-dominated constituent assembly that was writing Egypt's new constitution; many members said that the committees were not actually writing the clauses. They were being written elsewhere, then put to a vote, which would always pass because of the Islamists' majority.

As it became clear that it was the Muslim Brotherhood, not Morsy or any other elected official, who was running the country, a number of individuals launched lawsuits against the government, citing the fact that the Muslim Brotherhood is operating illegally, and to request that the entity be dissolved and its assets confiscated. In response, the Muslim Brotherhood hastily set up something called the Muslim Brotherhood Society. Since Egyptian law does not permit political organizations to engage in religious or social activities, and does not permit social/religious organizations to engage in political activities, the Muslim Brotherhood Society was set up as a social/religious organization, but this was a straw entity merely set up to deflect these lawsuits. At the same time, reflecting the Muslim Brotherhood's extremely cavalier attitude towards the law and even the provisions of its own constitution, the Muslim Brotherhood Society was set up in a way that violated the applicable laws.

They didn't worry too much about such things: at the time, the Muslim Brotherhood was busily filling government posts with its own people, and was preparing to summarily force into retirement more than 3200 senior judges, who were to be replaced with lawyers from the Muslim Brotherhood.

All that we had witnessed and experienced during the previous 18 months under SCAF were nothing compared to the devastating year under Morsy and the Brotherhood's rule. All bets were off. The savagery and arrogance and corruption and open treason, the deliberate chaos, the virulent hatred against Egypt and Egyptians that were unleashed against us during that time, were unlike anything Egyptians had ever seen. Morsy and the Islamists' unprecedented obsequiousness towards Israel, their cringing subservience to the US, their cold brutality against Egyptians, their looting of the country's resources and lavish spending on themselves that made even Mubarak's regime seem thrifty, and especially their glaring, outrageous incompetence and stupidity, left most Egyptians torn between laughter, tears, fury and depression.

June 30th came as a huge shock to the entire Islamist network, and to their foreign sponsors. The Egyptian people rose up as one and kicked them out. You see, in all the previous times, the conflict had been mainly between succeeding governments and the Muslim Brotherhood. That's how they're used to operating, dealing with governments and their intelligence services. This time, they're facing the entire Egyptian people. When Morsy was arrested, he cried out, "The Americans won't let you get away with this!" The Americans tried, and their European allies tried, but when a whole country is united, there's nothing they can do. The MB's American patrons threatened to cut off economic and military aid, and were told to shove it. They intensified the terrorist attacks in Sinai and across the country, but this only unified Egyptians even more. Obama repeatedly tried to phone the Defense Minister, but he was told that Egypt has a president, named Adly Mansour, and he should talk to the latter. The major Gulf states (Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, United Arab Emirates) and also Jordan shocked the MB and its US bosses even more when they stood up to the US and aligned themselves with Egypt.* Qatar's formidable Al-Jazeera network and all the Western media was mobilized to portray the June 30th popular revolution as a military coup, but we ignored that and proceeded to write our new, beautiful constitution, and finally begin to implement the revolutionary changes that we've been demanding since January 25th. The US' latest tactic is to apply intense pressure Egyptians to "include" the Muslim Brotherhood in planning our country's future, and to allow them to run for office in the upcoming parliamentary and presidential elections.

Which brings us to the current decision by the Egyptian court, which does not make the Muslim Brotherhood an illegal organization, which it has been since 1949. No, it declares the Muslim Brotherhood to be an organized crime network, which includes all its offshoots and any individual or organization that knowingly collaborates with it or promotes it. As I mentioned earlier, the Muslim Brotherhood does not have assets in its name, nor, legally speaking, does it have official members. It is a criminal network, like the Mafia: its members are those who knowingly engage in activities that contribute to the criminal entity as a whole. These include money-laundering, political corruption, recruitment and financing of terrorists, trading in weapons, conspiracy to commit terrorist acts, treason and/or spying on behalf of foreign states, harboring terrorists, robbery, and a long list of other activities which contribute to the criminal entity. All assets that are or have been used for purposes related to the criminal network are to be confiscated.

I think this legal decision is long overdue, and it has been greeted with great relief by the vast majority of Egyptians. If I'm not mistaken, there will be future measures to present evidence at the United Nations and officially request that the Muslim Brotherhood be placed on the UN's list of terrorist organizations. Since the MB is a transnational organization with headquarters all over Europe, North America and elsewhere, this will make it easier for the Egyptian government to pursue its members and assets abroad. Incidentally, Saudi Arabia and especially Kuwait have already implemented a similar crack-down against Muslim Brotherhood activities, personnel and assets, as has the United Arab Emirates. The Muslim Brotherhood is already listed as a terrorist organization in Russia.

* We can only speculate about these Arab monarchies' unexpected and unprecedented rebellion against US orders. Egypt's Defense Minister, General Al-Sisi, used to head Military Intelligence. He is known to have lived in Saudi Arabia for many years, and to have very close, very high-level relations there. I'm only guessing, but I suspect that sometime in the run-up to June 30th, General Al-Sisi presented to the Saudi authorities irrefutable evidence that if the Muslim Brotherhood succeed in taking over Egypt and entrenching themselves here, that there was a plan in place to take over their countries next.

[JackRiddler]

This is amazing material, no matter what you think. It's also seems impossible to find in English with such acute detail. Thank you Alice.

[AlicetheKurious]

You're very welcome. I also appreciate the chance to shout over the wall. I really do.