Telephones Cut Off, Mousavi Arrested, Rafsanjani Resigns

[Sweejak]

Joe Cannon

Previously, I've voiced my suspicion that America's hysterical reaction against Iran's election was ginned up. Mir-Hossein Mousavi, the man supposedly robbed of the presidency, is an old Ghorbanifar pal and a familiar figure from the bad old days of Iran-contra. He also killed 30,000 political prisoners in one year. Compare that figure to Saddam Hussein's estimated lifetime total of 200,000.

The American media's reportage on Iran depended on Twitter "tweets" of unverifiable origin and dubious veracity. (See also here.) Many media organs -- including AP, the NYT and National Public Radio -- cited a website called Tehran Bureau. This was a blogspot site -- like Cannonfire -- which became a repository for those aforementioned dubious tweets.

NPR labeled Tehran Bureau "one of the most reliable sites" for news on Iran, as if such were the assessment of journalists who had spent time in that nation and who were well-versed in Iranian affairs.

Tehran Bureau now looks rather mysterious. Such, at least, is the purport of this expose by Foreign Policy Journal.
Tehran Bureau was announced in a press release on February 26 – little more four months prior to the election.
The site was (is?) run by one Kelly Golnoush Niknejad, a lawyer/journalist with an interesting background:
Niknejad, who was born in Iran and lived there until age 17, is a lawyer-turned-journalist. As an M.S. student at the Journalism School, she specialized in newspaper reporting. The following year, Niknejad earned an M.A. in journalism with a focus on politics.

She has reported for the Los Angeles Times, TIME Magazine, California Lawyer and PBS/Frontline. Most recently, she was a staff reporter for the new English-language newspaper The National in Abu Dhabi, United Arab Emirates. Niknejad is a syndicated columnist with Agence Global and a freelance producer and consultant on Iran to ABC News.
This Boston Globe profile offers more:
This past September, she returned to Boston from nearly a year of reporting for an English-language newspaper in Dubai - a major Persian Gulf listening post for events in Iran - and resolved to launch a blog.
This lady does get around. Her stint at a "listening post" should raise an eyebrow or two.

For what it is worth, the Iranians say that the CIA has been running an anti-Iran destabilization effort out of Dubai. See, for example, here.

As noted above, Kelly wrote for The National, which is run by Martin Newland, previously of the highly conservative Telegraph Group. This site finds some amusement in the fact that Newland receives a very handsome salary for editing a paper that has only 2000 paid subscribers. That's a clue -- a really obvious clue -- as to what's actually going on.

Kelly herself has written:
If Iranians are suspicious of journalists, it’s partly because our reporting jobs can seem like the perfect cover to gather intelligence.
Gee. Where would anyone get that idea?

Here's an interesting factoid from the Foreign Policy Journal investigation:
Curiously, the domain TehranBureau.com is owned not by Niknejad, but by Jason Rezaian. Even more curiously, that domain name was created on June 12, 2008 – exactly one year to the day before Iran’s presidential election, and months before Niknejad says she set up Tehran Bureau in 2008, which was several months before she actually announced the launch of Tehran Bureau on Blogspot, which was prior to its actual move to TehranBureau.com.

And yet, despite having had the name registered for a year before the election, there’s no indication the domain was actually in use before Niknejad’s Tehran Bureau came along.
Remember, the site was set up four months before the election, yet the URL was registered a year in advance. I believe that she was still in United Arab Emirates in June of 2008. (A May, 2008 story in The National carries her byline.)

In a very strange interview, Kelly says that her columns for Tehran Bureau were carried by Agence Global, and that she has been a consultant on Iran for ABC News. That last item on her CV reminds me of this bit of skullduggery involving ABC.

In the same interview, she denies receiving any backing whatsoever for her blog. Nevertheless, she had big plans for it:
I would like Tehran Bureau to become the news source of record on Iran.
As soon as it’s feasible, Tehran Bureau will also feature video and audio programs. Further the down the road, I hope Tehran Bureau will air television programs, documentaries and even venture into book publishing.
She said those words mere weeks ago. Yet at this time, the site displays...nothing. Or almost nothing. Only one post remains from Tehran Bureau's brief time in the sun.

As noted earlier, much of the reportage on that site consisted of dubious Twitterings. Now, researchers will not be able to judge just how dubious those reports were. The evidence has been hidden. Scrubbed.

We often saw this kind of "news" operation spring up during the Cold War era. For old spook-watchers like yours truly, publications like Tehran Bureau have always conveyed a Certain Intriguing Aroma.

(As always, nothing in this post should be construed as an endorsement of Iranian theocracy.)

http://cannonfire.blogspot.com/2009/07/ ... story.html

[American Dream]

http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Middle_East/KG25Ak03.html

Iran and Russia, scorpions in a bottle
By Pepe Escobar

HONG KONG - Things get curiouser and curiouser in the Iranian wonderland. Imagine what happened last week during Friday prayers in Tehran, personally conducted by former president Ayatollah Hashemi Rafsanjani, aka "The Shark", Iran's wealthiest man, who made his fortune partly because of Irangate - the 1980s' secret weapons contracts with Israel and the US.

As is well known, Rafsanjani is behind the Mir-Hossein Mousavi-Mohammad Khatami pragmatic conservative faction that lost the most recent battle at the top - rather than a presidential election - to the ultra-hardline faction of Ayatollah Ali Khamenei-Mahmud Ahmadinejad-Iran Revolutionary Guard Corps. During prayers, partisans of the hegemonic faction yelled the usual "Death to America!" - while the pragmatic conservatives came up, for the first time, with "Death to Russia!" and "Death to China!"

Oops. Unlike the United States and Western Europe, both Russia and China almost instantly accepted the contested presidential re-election of Ahmadinejad. Could they then be portrayed as enemies of Iran? Or have pragmatic conservatives not been informed that obsessed-by-Eurasia Zbig Brzezinksi - who has US President Barack Obama's undivided attention - has been preaching since the 1990s that it is essential to break up the Tehran-Moscow-Beijing axis and torpedo the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO)?

On top of it, don't they know that both Russia and China - as well as Iran - are firm proponents of the end of the dollar as global reserve currency to the benefit of a (multipolar) basket of currencies, a common currency of which Russian President Dmitry Medvedev had the gall this month to present a prototype at the Group of Eight (G-8 ) meeting in Aquila, Italy? By the way, it's a rather neat coin. Minted in Belgium, it sports the faces of the G-8 leaders and also a motto - "Unity in diversity".

"Unity in diversity" is not exactly what the Obama administration has in mind as far as Iran and Russia are concerned - no matter the zillion bytes of lofty rhetoric. Let's start with the energy picture.

Iran is world number two both in terms of proven oil reserves (11.2%) and gas reserves (15.7%), according to the BP Statistical Review of World Energy 2008.

If Iran ever opted towards a more unclenched-fist relationship with Washington, US Big Oil would feast on Iran's Caspian energy wealth. This means that whatever the rhetoric, no US administration will ever want to deal with a hyper-nationalist Iranian regime, such as the current military dictatorship of the mullahtariat.

What really scares Washington - from George W Bush to Obama - is the perspective of a Russia-Iran-Venezuela axis. Together, Iran and Russia hold 17.6% of the world's proven oil reserves. The Persian Gulf petro-monarchies - de facto controlled by Washington - hold 45%. The Moscow-Tehran-Caracas axis controls 25%. If we add Kazakhstan's 3% and Africa's 9.5%, this new axis is more than an effective counter-power to American hegemony over the Arab Middle East. The same thing applies to gas. Adding the "axis" to the Central Asian "stans", we reach 30% of world gas production. As a comparison, the whole Middle East - including Iran - currently produces only 12.1% of the world's needs.

All about Pipelineistan

A nuclear Iran would inevitably turbo-charge the new, emerging multipolar world. Iran and Russia are de facto showing to both China and India that it is not wise to rely on US might subjugating the bulk of oil in the Arab Middle East. All these players are very much aware that Iraq remains occupied, and that Washington's obsession remains the privatization of Iraq's enormous oil wealth.

As Chinese intellectuals are fond of emphasizing, four emerging or re-emerging powers - Russia, China, Iran and India - are strategic and civilizational poles, three of them sanctuaries because they are nuclear powers. A more confident and assertive Iran - mastering the full cycle of nuclear technology - may translate into Iran and Russia increasing their relative weight in Europe and Asia to the distress of Washington, not only in the energy sphere but also as proponents of a multipolar monetary system.

The entente is already on. Since 2008, Iranian officials have stressed that sooner or later Iran and Russia will start trading in rubles. Gazprom is willing to be paid for oil and gas in roubles - and not dollars. And the secretariat of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) has already seen the writing on the wall - admitting for over a year now that OPEC will be trading in euros before 2020.

Not only the "axis" Moscow-Tehran-Caracas, but also Qatar and Norway, for instance, and sooner or later the Gulf Emirates, are ready to break up with the petrodollar. It goes without saying that the end of the petrodollar - which won't happen tomorrow, of course - means the end of the dollar as the world's reserve currency; the end of the world paying for America's massive budget deficits; and the end of an Anglo-American finance stranglehold over the world that has lasted since the second part of the 19th century.

The energy equation between Iran and Russia is much more complex: it configures them as two scorpions in a bottle. Tehran, isolated from the West, lacks foreign investment to upgrade its 1970s-era energy installations. That's why Iran cannot fully profit from exploiting its Caspian energy wealth.

Here it's a matter of Pipelineistan at its peak - since the US, still during the 1990s, decided to hit the Caspian in full force by supporting the Baku-Tblisi-Ceyhan (BTC) oil pipeline and the Baku-Tblisi-Supsa (BTS) gas pipeline.

For Gazprom, Iran is literally a goldmine. In September 2008, the Russian energy giant announced it would explore the huge Azadegan-North oilfield, as well as three others. Russia's Lukoil has increased its prospecting and Tatneft said it would be involved in the north. The George W Bush administration thought it was weakening Russia and isolating Iran in Central Asia. Wrong: it only accelerated their strategic energy cooperation.

Putin power play

In February 1995, Moscow committed to finishing construction of a nuclear reactor at Bushehr. This was a project started by that erstwhile, self-proclaimed "gendarme of the Gulf" for the US - the shah of Iran. The shah engaged KWU from Germany in 1974, but the project was halted by the Islamic Revolution in 1979 and hit hard between 1984 and 1988 by Saddam Hussein's bombs. The Russians finally entered the picture proposing to finish the project for $800 million. By December 2001, Moscow also started to sell missiles to Tehran - a surefire way of making extra money offering protection for strategic assets such as Bushehr.

Bushehr is a source of immense controversy in Iran. It should have been finished by 2000. As Iranian officials see it, the Russians seem never to be interested in wrapping it up. There are technical reasons - such as the Russian reactor being too big to fit inside what KWU had already built - as well as a technology deficit on the part of Iranian nuclear engineers.

But most of all there are geopolitical reasons. Former president Vladimir Putin used Bushehr as a key diplomatic peon in his double chessboard match with the West and the Iranians. It was Putin who launched the idea of enriching uranium for Iran in Russia; talk about a strategic asset in terms of managing a global nuclear crisis. Ahmadinejad - and most of all the Supreme Leader - gave him a flat refusal. The Russian response was even more foot-dragging, and even mild support for more US-sponsored sanctions against Tehran.

Tehran got the message - that Putin was not an unconditional ally. Thus, in August 2006, the Russians landed a new deal for the construction and supervision of two new nuclear plants. This all means that the Iranian nuclear dossier simply cannot be solved without Russia. Simultaneously, by Putin's own framework, it's very clear in Moscow that a possible Israeli strike would make it lose a profitable nuclear client on top of a diplomatic debacle. Medvedev for his part is pursuing the same two-pronged strategy; stressing to Americans and Europeans that Russia does not want nuclear proliferation in the Middle East while stressing to Tehran that it needs Russia more than ever.

Another feature of Moscow's chessboard strategy - never spelled out in public - is to keep the cooperation with Tehran to prevent China from taking over the whole project, but without driving the Americans ballistic at the same time. As long as the Iranian nuclear program is not finished, Russia can always play the wise moderating role between Iran and the West.

Building up a civilian nuclear program in Iran is good business for both Iran and Russia for a number of reasons.

First of all, both are military encircled. Iran is strategically encircled by the US in Turkey, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Pakistan and Afghanistan, and by US naval power in the Persian Gulf and the Indian Ocean. Russia has seen the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) gobbling up the Baltic countries and threatening to "annex" Georgia and Ukraine; NATO is at war in Afghanistan; and the US is still present, one way or another, across Central Asia.

Iran and Russia share the same strategy as far as the Caspian Sea is concerned. They are in fact opposed to the new Caspian states - Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan and Azerbaijan.

Iran and Russia also face the threat of hardcore Sunni Islam. They have a tacit agreement; for instance, Tehran has never done anything to help the Chechens. Then there's the Armenian issue. A de facto Moscow-Tehran-Erevan axis profoundly irks the Americans.

Finally, in this decade, Iran has become the third-largest importer of Russian weapons, after China and India. This includes the anti-missile system Tor M-1, which defends Iran's nuclear installations.

What's your axis?

So thanks to Putin, the Iran-Russia alliance is carefully deployed in three fronts - nuclear, energy and weapons.

Are there cracks in this armor? Certainly.

First, Moscow by all means does not want a weaponized Iranian nuclear program. This spells out "regional destabilization". Then, Central Asia is considered by Moscow as its backyard, so for Iran to be ascendant in the region is quite problematic. As far as the Caspian goes, Iran needs Russia for a satisfactory juridical solution (Is it a sea or a lake? How much of it belongs to each border country?)

On other hand, Iran's new military dictatorship of the mullahtariat will react savagely if it ever had Russia fully against it in the UN Security Council. That would spell a rupture in economic relations - very bad for both sides - but also the possibility of Tehran supporting radical Islam everywhere from the southern Caucasus to Central Asia.

Under these complex circumstances, it's not so far-fetched to imagine a sort of polite Cold War going on between Tehran and Moscow.

From Russia's point of view, it all comes back to the "axis" - which would be in fact Moscow-Tehran-Erevan-New Delhi, a counter-power to the US-supported Ankara-Tblisi-Telaviv-Baku axis. But there's ample debate about it even inside the Russian elite. The old guard, like former prime minister Yevgeny Primakov, thinks that Russia is back as a great power by cultivating its former Arab clients as well as Iran; but then the so-called "Westernizers" are convinced that Iran is more of a liability.

They may have a point. The key of this Moscow-Tehran axis is opportunism - opposition to US hegemonic designs. Is Obama - via his "unclenched fist" policy - wily enough to try to turn this all upside down; or will he be forced by the Israel lobby and the industrial-military complex to finally strike a regime now universally despised all over the West?

Russia - and Iran - are fully committed to a multipolar world. The new military dictatorship of the mullahtariat in Tehran knows it cannot afford to be isolated; its road to the limelight may have to go through Moscow. That explains why Iran is making all sorts of diplomatic efforts to join the SCO.

As much as progressives in the West may support Iranian pragmatic conservatives - who are far from reformists - the crucial fact remains that Iran is a key peon for Russia to manage its relationship with the US and Europe. No matter how nasty the overtones, all evidence points to "stability" at this vital artery in the heart of the New Great Game.

[Sweejak]

Going back to weaponized non-violence, American Conservative Mag has an article up on Samantha Power.

...Surely Samantha Power was the paladin, the conscience, the senior director for multilateral affairs to bring human rights back into U.S. foreign policy.

Don’t count on it. “Human rights,” a term once coterminous with freeing prisoners of conscience and documenting crimes against humanity, has taken on a broader, more conflicted definition. It can now mean helping the Marine Corps formulate counterinsurgency techniques; pounding the drums for air strikes (of a strictly surgical nature, of course); lobbying for troop escalations in various conquered nations—all for noble humanitarian ends.

The intellectual career of Samantha Power is a richly instructive example of the weaponization of human rights.

http://amconmag.com/article/2009/sep/01/00028/

[Ben D]

http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/8216533.stm

Rafsanjani in 'conciliatory' move

Saturday, 22 August 2009 22:52 UK

The influential former leader has defied calls to back the disputed election.

Former President Ali Akbar Rafsanjani has urged Iran's political factions to follow orders from the supreme leader, in an apparent conciliatory move.
Ayatollah Ali Khamenei has endorsed the disputed re-election of President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad in June, but Mr Rafsanjani has backed the opposition.

Correspondents say his statement seems to contradict a speech last month when he said the country was in crisis.

Official news agency Irna said he has also called for action to foster unity.
At least 4,000 people were arrested in protests following last month's election, alleging the result was rigged. Hundreds still remain in jail.

'Creating unity'
"[Mr Rafsanjani] referred to the observance of the guidelines set by the supreme leader and confronting lawbreakers as a necessity under the present conditions," Irna reported after a meeting of Iran's Expediency Council, the country's top political arbitration body, which he chairs.

Irna said he also called for "sympathy between officials and the public as a necessity for the country's passage from the current domestic problems and for confronting the problems created by foreigners".

He also reportedly reiterated a call to politicians and the media to "avoid stirring schisms... and take steps toward the creation of unity".

The comments appeared to be in contrast with a hard-hitting sermon he delivered on 17 July, when he declared the Islamic Republic to be in crisis and demanded an end to the arrests of moderates following the election.

Shortly after that sermon, clerics had called on Mr Rafsanjani to show more support for Ayatollah Khamenei.

[JackRiddler]

.

When another thread asked people to list their all-time favorites, I thought simply to revive this one - which grew from a gloriously wrong title into a hell of an informative compilation, at least in English, plus some great tangential tussles.

Anyone have a clue what's been going on with this the last few weeks? I was away & generally off-line/without media, all wonderful states.

.

[Sweejak]

It has fallen off the feeds hasn't it. Even the twitter feeds have slowed down and everybody's avatar is no longer tinged green.

Last I heard after some pretty significant power struggles is that the revolution has pretty much failed as far as an overthrow goes, but it appears that it has had a deep effect on the ptb.

Ahmadinejad has selected or is trying to nominate women to some key positions, some of his 'reform' picks have not been approved.

These are mostly just my impressions.

[smallprint]

Iranians Favor Diplomatic Relations With US But Have Little Trust in Obama

September 18, 2009


A new WorldPublicOpinion.org poll of Iranians finds that six in 10 favor restoration of diplomatic relations between their country and the United States, a stance that is directly at odds with the position the Iranian government has held for three decades. A similar number favor direct talks.

However, Iranians do not appear to share the international infatuation with Barack Obama. Only 16 percent say that have confidence in him to do the right thing in world affairs. This is lower than any of the 20 countries polled by WPO on this question in the spring. Despite his recent speech in Cairo, where Obama stressed that he respects Islam, only a quarter of Iranians are convinced he does. And three in four (77%) continue to have an unfavorable view of the United States government.

"While the majority of Iranian people are ready to do business with Obama, they show little trust in him," says Steven Kull, director of WPO.

At the same time, there are some signs of softening. Trust in Obama is three times higher than the 6 percent of Iranians who expressed confidence in George W. Bush in a 2008 WPO poll. Unfavorable views of the United States government are down 8 points from the 85 percent unfavorable views in 2008 (WPO).

On Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, the survey finds that eight in 10 Iranians say they consider him to be the country's legitimate president. Ahmedinejad, who will visit the United States on Tuesday and address the UN General Assembly, was the focus of large-scale protests in Tehran after opposition supporters disputed the validity of his reelection in June.

WorldPublicOpinion.org (WPO) conducted the poll of 1,003 Iranians across Iran between Aug. 27 and Sept. 10, 2009. Interviewing was conducted by a professional survey organization located outside Iran which used native Farsi speakers who telephoned into Iran (8 in 10 Iranian households have a telephone line). The margin of error is 3.1 percent. WPO, a collaborative project involving research centers from around the world, is managed by the Program on International Policy Attitudes at the University of Maryland.


rest of article here:
http://www.worldpublicopinion.org/pipa/ ... nt=639&lb=

[Sweejak]

Pretty interesting.

It seems that no one took the Obama Kool Aid outside of US and Europe.

The Green Revolution seems to be on the skids. I wish them better timing next time.

Medvedev still says to Isra/Usa they better not bomb Iran, and Zbig Brother wants to shoot down Israeli jets if they try.

[John Schröder]

On Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, the survey finds that eight in 10 Iranians say they consider him to be the country's legitimate president.

80 percent think that Ahmadinejad really won the election? But... but... haven't they read Juan Cole's articles?! Don't they know that Professor Cole has already conclusively proven that it was Mousavi who won in a landslide? Why wouldn't they listen to someone who demonstrably knows their country better than they do? Silly people.

[John Schröder]

http://www.iranaffairs.com/iran_affairs ... lyzed.html

Iran elections: fraud claims and counter-claims analyzed

(THis post has been updated here)

Out of boredom, I thought it would be fun to keep track of the various claims about how the elections in Iran were supposedly stolen or fraudulent, versus their counter-arguments - please add to the list if you can, since I haven't been keeping track of all the claims and counter-claims.

[As a side note: Before you automatically and unthinkingly assume that there was election fraud in Iran, ask yourself: WHY? was Mousavi, the opposition leader -- and a former Prime Minister and very much a supporter of the revolution -- such a threat to the system that they had to resort to election fraud? No, sorry, he isn't.]

CLAIM 1: MOUSAVI LOST IN HIS HOME DISTRICT - SUSPICIOUSLY.

"It is claimed that Ahmadinejad won the city of Tabriz with 57%. His main opponent, Mir Hossein Mousavi, is an Azeri from Azerbaijan province, of which Tabriz is the capital. Mousavi, according to such polls as exist in Iran and widespread anecdotal evidence, did better in cities and is popular in Azerbaijan. Certainly, his rallies there were very well attended. So for an Azeri urban center to go so heavily for Ahmadinejad just makes no sense." (Juan Cole)

COUNTER-CLAIM:

"But Ahmadinejad himself speaks Azeri quite fluently as a consequence of his eight years serving as a popular and successful official in two Azeri-majority provinces; during the campaign, he artfully quoted Azeri and Turkish poetry — in the original — in messages designed to appeal to Iran’s Azeri community. (And we should not forget that the supreme leader is Azeri.) The notion that Mousavi was somehow assured of victory in Azeri-majority provinces is simply not grounded in reality." (Leveretts)

CLAIM 2: AHMADINEJAD WON IN TEHRAN - SUSPICIOUSLY.

"Ahmadinejad is claimed to have taken Tehran by over 50%. Again, he is not popular in the cities, even, as he claims, in the poor neighborhoods, in part because his policies have produced high inflation and high unemployment." (Juan Cole)

COUNTER-CLAIM:

Ahmadinejad won the province of Tehran, not the city of Tehran. Anyway, he was the mayor of Tehran and won there in 2005 too.

CLAIM 3: THE STRAIGHT-LINE GRAPH



"Ahmadinejad's numbers were fairly standard across Iran's provinces. In past elections there have been substantial ethnic and provincial variations." (Juan Cole)

"Statistically and mathematically, it is impossible to maintain such perfect linear relations between the votes of any two candidates in any election — and at all stages of vote counting. This is particularly true about Iran, a large country with a variety of ethnic groups who usually vote for a candidate who is ethnically one of their own." (Tehran Bureau)

"They didn't even attempt to disguise the fraud. Which, to me, tells me they panicked. This graph is a red flag to Iran and the world." (Andrew SUllivan)

COUNTER-CLAIM

The apparently extremely strong relationship is mostly an artifact of the exceptionally simple fact that as you count more votes, both candidates' totals will tend to increase. (Fivethirtyeight.com)

[T]hese figures, though they may seem eerily consistent at first glance, are actually just what we would expect. That's the nature of large batches of data, governed by what's called the Law of Large Numbers: Averages of widely varying quantities can, and usually do, yield results that look almost perfectly uniform. Given enough data, the outliers tend to cancel one another out. (Jordan Ellenberg)

CLAIM 4: SECURITY CRACK-DOWN

"If Ahmadinejad had really won, then why the crack down on dissidents, cutting off international communications and filtering Facebook? "

COUNTER-CLAIM:

This is more of a rhetorical question than an argument. Perfectly valid reasons exist for security measures following a hotly-disputed election especially when you add in the tense international situation, what with talk of "regime change" and all. Add rioting to the mix too.

CLAIM 5: AHMADINEJAD's BAD ECONOMIC POLICIES

Ahmadinejad is responsible for bad economic policies that have driven up inflation, increased unemployment, increased poverty, and so people could not have possibly voted for him.

COUNTER-CLAIM:

"The belief that Iran suffers from dire economic conditions is one of four myths circulating about Iran's macroeconomic performance. Iran's economy has actually performed well in aggregate terms, with a moderate rate of growth in the last ten to fifteen years, including healthy GDP and per capita growth in investment. In the last three years, Iran's actual growth rate has averaged 5.8 percent." (Kelly Campbell, U.S. Institute of Peace)

"Lucky for Mr. Ahmadinejad, there are good reasons to doubt that poverty has been on the rise...Another comparison, based on the absolute poverty lines defined on the basis of the $2 per day standard, shows the opposite: that poverty rates have declined slightly during 2005-06." (Djavad Salehi-Isfahani, Brookings Institute)

"There is no shortages of complaints one can have about Iran’s economy (high youth unemployment, high inflation, and stagnant productivity, to name a few) , but a low standard of living is not one of them. "(Djavad Salehi-Isfahani, Brookings Institute)

"The International Monetary Fund projects that Iran’s economy will actually grow modestly this year (when the economies of most Gulf Arab states are in recession). A significant number of Iranians — including the religiously pious, lower-income groups, civil servants and pensioners — appear to believe that Ahmadinejad’s policies have benefited them. And, while many Iranians complain about inflation, the TFT poll found that most Iranian voters do not hold Ahmadinejad responsible." (Leveretts)

(I would add to this: I'm no economist but I think inflation rates go up because of increased government spending under Ahmadinejad in part as a result of benefits and subsidies that went mostly to the poor -- something for which he was widely criticized by economists in Iran.)

CLAIM 6: COUNTING VOTES IMPOSSIBLE IN SHORT TIME

It is impossible to have counted all the votes in the short time between the closing of the polls and the announcement of Ahmadinejad's victory.

COUNTER-CLAIM:

"During the election, there were about 47,000 polling stations for voting. For each station, every candidate was allowed to have a representative present to oversee the process... When the voting ended at 11 pm, they immediately started counting. Once they had the final tallies at each station, the representatives were made to sign off on them, and the numbers were fed into a centrally computerized system where the tallies were collected.

Now, if you divide 39 million votes by 47,000 stations, it comes to 893 votes per station on average. This is a very small number of ballots that can easily be counted in a short period of time." (Huffington Post interview with Iranian cleric)

"The counting mechanism is simple: Iran has 47,000 voting stations, plus 14,000 roaming stations that travel from tiny village to tiny village, staying there for a short time before moving on. That creates 61,000 ballot boxes designed to receive roughly the same number of votes. That would mean that each station would have been counting about 500 ballots, or about 70 votes per hour. With counting beginning at 10 p.m., concluding seven hours later does not necessarily indicate fraud or anything else." (Stratfor)

CLAIM 7: EXCESS VOTERS

A spokesman for Iran's authoritative Guardian Council has admitted that voter turnout in the country's July 12 presidential election exceed 100 percent in as many as 50 cities

COUNTER-CLAIM:

"Voter turnout of above 100% in some cities is a normal phenomenon because there is no legal limitation for people to vote for the presidential elections in another city or province to which people often travel or commute." (Press TV)

"In an interview with the special news section of the Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting's [state broadcaster] Channel II on Thursday night, [Iranian Interior Minister] Sadeq Mahsuli said that the increase in the votes in some of the country's cities against the limit of the eligible voters is quite natural and it has also happened in the past. He added: In 48 cities, the number of voters was higher than the number of those eligible to vote and this was due to employment or education related emigration and holiday trips.

He pointed out that in some of these cities where there were surplus votes, the votes for the rival candidate was higher than the elected candidate and added: The number of voters in Shemiranat [area in north Tehran] were thirteen times higher than the eligible voters in this region and one of the candidates achieved votes twice of the elected candidate and the figure of thirteen times higher participation by the people on holiday in this region appears quite normal. The interior minister stated that the number of eligible voters was announced based on the places in the country where birth certificates were issued and added: This is in spite of the fact that a great percentage of people have left their place of residence because of employment, education and holidays and even in the previous elections, we had up to 800 times the number of eligible voters in some cities. Mahsuli explained that on the whole, 184,734 people out of 100 per cent of the eligible voters have voted over the limit in 48 cities and specified: In a province such as Yazd, at least 30 per cent of the population, meaning more than 37,000 students and military garrison personnel, consists of non-native individuals whereas the surplus voters in this region only totalled 515." (Resalat, Tehran, in Persian, 27 Jun 09, p. 2, BBC Monitoring Service Jun 30 2009)

CLAIM 8: STATISTICAL EVIDENCE

A statistical analysis of province-by-province voting in Iran’s June 12 presidential election makes a compelling case for wide-spread fraud in the vote that returned conservative President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad to power and touched off days of bloody protests in Iran. (Christian Science Monitor)

COUNTER-CLAIM:

"Recently, spot analyses by scholars from the University of Michigan and the Royal Institute of International Affairs suggested that this year’s election results are out of line with previous presidential elections. These analyses compare this year’s results with the first round of the 2005 presidential election, when Ahmadinejad and former President Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani outpolled other candidates to move into a runoff. Viewed through that prism, Ahmadinejad’s 2009 tally seems inflated.

But the comparison is structurally flawed. It is tantamount to arguing that, because Barack Obama won 38 percent of the vote in a competitive, multicandidate caucus in Iowa in January 2008, it is implausible that he could have won 54 percent of that state’s vote in the two-person general election in November. A more appropriate comparison for this year’s results in Iran would be the second round of the 2005 presidential election, when Ahmadinejad trounced Rafsanjani." (Leveretts)

The University of Michigan study relies on Benford's Law but according to the Carter Center which has monitored more than 70 elections around the world:

In short, Benford's Law does not generally apply to electoral data and even in cases where we suspect that it might apply, we find that it does not. All in all, Benford's Law seems like a very weak instrument for detecting voting fraud. There are many reasons to believe that it does not apply to electoral data, and empirical tests suggest that deviations from the law are not necessarily indicative of fraud.

CLAIM 9: KARROUBI's LOW VOTES

Karroubi, one of the candidates, scored very low in the polls -- lower than expected.

COUNTER-CLAIM:

He also admitted on TV during his debates with Ahmadinejad to accepting $300,000 payment from Shahram Jazayeri, a shadowy figure involved in a number of recent financial scandals in Iran. (PressTV)

CLAIM 9: BALLOT BOXES WERE CLOSED, NOT ENOUGH BALLOT PAPERS PRINTED, ETC.

"In his letter released on Saturday [20 June], Musavi had cited seven accounts of abnormalities in the election process and asked the Guardian Council, the body tasked with overseeing the election, to "cancel the election nationwide."

Musavi said the "sealing of ballot boxes before the voting in most polling stations, shortage of ballot papers and limited voting time" were among the reasons he objected to the results of the election." (Press TV website, Tehran, in English 1807 23 Jun 09)

COUNTER-CLAIM:

"The Interior Ministry however rejected the claims, saying that his letter 'contains apparent contradictions' and includes general cases which 'lack concrete and legal evidence.'

The ministry added that according to the election law, the ballot boxes have to be sealed in the presence of the representatives of the supervisory board before the voting officially starts.

It added that the ministry, however, invited Mr Musavi's representatives to be present and almost all of them were present when the ballot boxes were sealed.

On the shortage of the ballot papers, the ministry argued that it was 'impossible to estimate the exact and correct number of voters in a town or a polling station.' " (Press TV website, Tehran, in English 1807 23 Jun 09)

[John Schröder]

http://blog.foreignpolicyjournal.com/20 ... -election/

The Case of the Mystery Voters in Iran's Election

by Jeremy R. Hammond

One claim made by the opposition in Iran to the re-election of President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad in an attempt to paint the election as fraudulent is that there was an unusually high turnout, in some cases more than 100 percent, in many places across the country.

Citing just one example, the Guardian reported on June 17 that:

Turnouts of more than 100% were recorded in at least 30 Iranian towns in last week’s disputed presidential election, opposition sources have claimed.

In the most specific allegations of rigging yet to emerge, the centrist Ayandeh website — which stayed neutral during the campaign — reported that 26 provinces across the country showed participation figures so high they were either hitherto unheard of in democratic elections or in excess of the number of registered electors.

There are a couple of key points to emphasize here. First, this is considered “the most specific allegations of rigging yet to emerge”. In other words, at the time of this report, this was the best evidence to date. Second, the Guardian’s source for this is being portrayed as an objective and credible one.

The Guardian provides a link to the website–in Persian. This is notable since the Guardian’s audience is an English-speaking one, and the site has an English version. There is, however, no obvious link to the English version from the Persian one, so anybody following the link from the Guardian to view the source would be at a loss to garner any useful information from it.

From the English version, on the other hand, one is learn a bit more. At the time, for instance, one could see a prominent link to a statement from the Association of Iranian Futurists, the group behind the site, asserting that the election was a “massive fraud” that was “tantamount to a coup d’etat” and demanding that “the elections results be declared null and void”.

The day after the election of June 12, the group issued an open letter to U.S. President Barack Obama describing “the ruinous foreign and domestic policies” during President Ahmadinejad’s tenure and asserting that the certification of the election by Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khamenei was “in effect a coup d’etat”.

Such official statements of policy by the website hardly serve to lend credence to the Guardian’s claims of the sites neutrality on the question of Iran’s election.

The website’s director and owner is Hossein Mola. He began the Iran Futurist Foundation with Sam Chandchi, who runs his own site, Iran Scope, which has a mirror site. The Ayandeh website’s name apparently comes from “Ayandehnegar”, which “futurist” or the equivalent in Persian. The platform of the Iranian Futurist party states among its goals that of a secular Iran and calls for the abolition of the current regime.

Again, whatever one may think of their platform, the claim that the group was “neutral” during the election is fairly dubious. The party and the website clearly have an agenda, for better or for worse.

Interestingly, Mola founded Radio Azadi in Sweden, according to Ghandchi’s profile on his own website. Ghandchi himself also worked for an “Azadi” (“freedom” or “liberty” in Persian) radio station that was shut down following the Islamic Revolution that overthrew the U.S.-backed Shah.

There remains an “Azadi Radio” today. While it may or may not be associated with the “Azadi” radio stations Mola or Ghandchi worked for, the chances of this being mere coincidence seem lessened by the fact that Azadi Radio and related broadcasters, like Radio Farda, are Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty (RFE/RL) stations.

RFE/RL, like the Voice of America (VOA), are under the umbrella of the Broadcasting Board of Governors, an agency of the U.S. government.

Under U.S. law designed to protect the public from propaganda issued by its own government, RFE/RL and the VOA are forbidden from broadcasting into the U.S.

Issuing propaganda in foreign countries, of course, is perfectly “legal”.

Returning to the Guardian article, it said:

Ayandeh’s source said at least 200 polling stations across Iran recorded participation rates of 95% or above. “This is generally considered scientifically impossible because out of every given cohort of 20 voters, there will be at least one who is either ill, out of the country, has recently died or is unable to participate for some other reasons,” the source said.

What neither Ayandeh nor the Guardian — which, to be fair, stated that “The claims are impossible to verify” — saw fit to inform their readers of is that in Iran, this is not considered “scientifically impossible” because of the simple fact that voters need not have voted in their home town or district, but could vote from anywhere in Iran.

To vote, Iranians presented their national identification book, which afterward is stamped to ensure voters cannot cast more than one ballot.

Iran’s Guardian Council made no secret of the fact that voting figures in some places exceeded the number of people registered to vote in that area. As reported by state-run Press TV, a spokesman for the council, Abbas-Ali Kadkhodaei, announced, “Statistics provided by the candidates, who claim more than 100% of those eligible have cast their ballot in 80-170 cities are not accurate — the incident has happened in only 50 cities.”

Reported Press TV,

Kadkhodaei further explained that the voter turnout of above 100% in some cities is a normal phenomenon because there is no legal limitation for people to vote for the presidential elections in another city or province to which people often travel or commute.

The June 12 election was held on a Friday. This “irregularity” might be further explained by the fact that, just as Saturday is for Jews, Friday is a day of prayer for Muslims. So the weekend, unlike in the West, is typically Friday and Saturday. Needless to say, people travel more on the weekend than during the work week. Many Iranians likely also travel to be with family for the Muslim Sabbath.

[John Schröder]

http://www.huffingtonpost.com/kaveh-l-a ... 64022.html

Obama Should Congratulate Ahmadinejad

Kaveh L. Afrasiabi, Ph.D.

There are several good reasons why president Barack Obama should join his White House guest this week, Egypt's president Hosni Mubarak, as well as the UN's Secretary General, Ban Ki-Moon, and dozens of other world leaders who have extended congratulations to Iran's duly re-elected president, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. Not to do so reflects a poor judgment on the White House's part, particularly since Obama has yet to fulfill his own post-election promise of responding to Ahmadinejad's letter that congratulated him for his victory.

First, with the dust of the post-election turmoil settling and the absence of any hard evidence of "rigged elections" becoming more and more transparent, time is actually on the side of Ahmadinejad, who has been much vilified in the western press, and maligned at home by his reformist challengers, as the grinch who "stole" the election.

Unfortunately, the sum of evidence presented by Mr. Mir Hossain Mousavi and Mehdi Karrubi to corroborate their allegations of widespread fraud in the June 12th elections simply doesn't add up. This author has examined in depth both the official complaints of losing candidates, as well as the various reports issued by their "truth committee", and has found them to be dreadfully lacking in substance, contradictory, and thick on irrelevant innunedo, such as passing off such pre-election "irregularities" seen in television debates as evidence of election fraud.

Second, lest we forget, Mousavi alone had more than forty thousand representatives at nearly ninety percent of the voting centers and, yet, his complaint to the oversight Guardian Council refers only to the few hundreds who were not allowed to monitor the balloting, without bothering to mention that nearly all his eyes and ears who monitored the process failed to report and document any major irregularities. According to the election officials, Mousavi had lodged complaints about merely 89 centers, indeed a minuscule number compared to more than forty-five thousand such centers throughout Iran.

Third, by all indications Mr. Mousavi, who improperly declared himself the "definite winner" exactly one hour after the voting had stopped, put the cart before the horse by first challenging the election results and then fishing for evidence, a hopeless cause as his own truth committee has undermined the argument that Ahmadinejad did not win the rural votes, by complaining that Ahmadinejad "purchased votes" by distributing cash and food to some 5.5 million villagers, as well as raising salaries, in the weeks ahead of election day.

Fourth, such complaints, including Mousavi's allegation of improper use of government resources, such as means of transportation, by the incumbent president, are not strictly speaking germane to allegations of "widespread fraud" at the ballot boxes, nor are unprecedented in Iran's young electoral system, in light of similar complaints in the past elections including against the reformist ex-president, Mohammad Khatami.

Fifth, compared to the past, the 2009 election was more transparent, as the government has published all the ballot box data pertaining to more than sixty thousand boxes receiving nearly forty million votes -- on average each box contained some 875 votes, making it easy to tally; hence the rapidity of the vote count, thanks in part to the system's electronic upgrade.

Sixth, the pitfall of pro-Mousavi demonstrators in Tehran who were carrying the sign "where is my vote?" was that they were not actually protesting that their own votes had been rigged; how could they since they won a solid majority in the country's capital, with Mousavi receiving 52 percent of the votes there, some 300,000 more than Ahmadinejad. The problem with those demonstrators and their leadership was that they somehow felt that they should have also won in the rest of the country -- an undue expectation, among other things, because of Mousavi's late entry to the race after a twenty-year absence from politics and his limited campaign compared to Ahmadinejad's extensive trips to every single province, particlularly the "deprived" areas such as Kerman, Chahar Mahal, South Khorasan, etc, where he won by a solid majority.

Seventh, in addition to Tehran, Mousavi also won in Yazd, Zahedan, Zanjan, Ardabil, and his hometown of Shabestar, a total of 46 voting districts mostly dominated by ethnic minorities, whereas the majority Persians voted solidly for Ahmadinejad, reflecting the race's ethnic undercurrent.

Eighth, with respect to the question of how Ahmadinejad's challengers could have done so poorly in their own home provinces, there is actually nothing unusual about this, and suffice it to say that in the 2005 elections, two candidates -- Mehr Alizad and Bagher Moin -- lost badly in their birth provinces.

Ninth, for sure the 2009 presidential elections was not problem-free and the government conceded the irregularity of excess votes in some 50 towns affecting 3 million votes. But, in some areas where this occurred such as Yazd or Shemiranat, Mousavi actually won, and mostly this phenomenon was attributable to summer travel affecting Caspian resort towns -- there are no registered voters in Iran, and Iranian voters can vote anywhere with proper identification.

Tenth, Iran's election system may not be fraud proof but it is for all practical purposes "rigged-proof" in light of the elaborate oversight by two sets of monitors, tens of thousands of monitoring representatives by the candidates, and the participation of some 60,000 election staff chosen at local levels primarly from among the ranks of teachers and the like, who are responsible for counting the votes. As of this date, not one of them has come forward corroborating the allegations of ballot box fraud.

Eleventh, even if all the three million above-mentioned votes had gone Mousavi's way, he would have still fallen short of beating Ahmadinejad, who defeated Mousavi with a margin of two-to-one, by receiving 11 million more votes -- or 63 percent compared to Mousavi's 33 percent -- just as predicted by the Washington-based pollsters of Terror Free Tomorrow, whose pre-election opinion survey led them to predict a first round victory by Ahmadinejad, a conclusion they stuck in their post-election piece in the Washington Post, where they conceded that the voting results "may reflect the will of Iranian voters." Their views have been endorsed by, among others, the US statistical guru, Nate Silver, who has stated that the Iranian elections results are "valid based on statistical analysis."

Indeed, much to the chagrin of reformist-friendly pundits in the West, close analysis of the election results gives absolutely no objective basis for levelling the charges of a rigged election. Ahamadinejad won fair and square by receiving some 24 million votes by an electorate that is enamored of his economic populism, fierce nationalism, austere life-style, promotion of Iran's nuclear rights, standing up to Uncle Sam, etc -- this despite a barrage of Western media propaganda prior to the elections that constantly vilified Ahmadinejad.

In conclusion, notwithsanding the above suggesting an election fraud hoax that does not withstand the weight of critical scrutiny, it does not bode well for Obama's policy of Iranian engagement to be disengaged from the world's growing recognition that Ahmadinejad was unfairly accused of stealing an election that he actually won fair and square. Even the British diplomat in Tehran attended Ahmadinejad's inaugural ceremony, as did several dozen other foreign diplomats, including from several European nations, in a sign of approval of the election results.

Sadly, the US has lagged behind, partly due to the negatie influence of pro-Mousavi Iranian pundits and academics, many of whom rushed to sign a petition to the UN Secretary General deploring the Iranian government's "disrespect" for the votes of Iranian electorate. Fortunately, the astute UN Secretary General excerisd independent judgment and righly reached the conclusion that despite their academic credentials, the signatories of that petition were fundamentally wrong in their unreflective sounding board for the losing candidates; hence his crucial decision to congratulate Ahmadinejad for his electoral success. Following Ban's footstep, Mr. Obama must now do the same, in the interest of fairness to Ahmadinejad and his mass of Iranian supporters throughout Iran, otherwise the risks to his ship of Iran diplomacy remain rather large.

[John Schröder]

http://www.iranaffairs.com/iran_affairs ... ution.html

Iran's "second revolution" - again

Regimes come and go as none can last, but hype and wishful-thinking has always been with us:

Is Iran nearing point where revolution is spent?
Geoffrey Godsell.
The Christian Science Monitor July 30, 1980

Political infighting in Iran casts doubt over future
of revolution. John Kifner.
The New York Times Feb 9, 1981

Renewed unrest in mullah-ruled Iran – is a second
revolution beginning? Ralph Joseph.
The Christian Science Monitor August 25, 1981

Iran regime’s staying power is debated by observers
after new bombing attack. David Ignatius.
The Wall Street Journal Sept 1, 1981

In revolutionary Iran: rising discontent: food and
freedom are in short supply as Muslim change and war
take a toll. Claude van England.
The Christian Science Monitor Oct 6, 1982

War could threaten long-term stability of Iran regime.
Claude van England.
The Christian Science Monitor Feb 27, 1985

Iran regime suffering its worst crisis; war, economy,
succession void plague nation. William Tuohy.
Los Angeles Times July 10, 1988

Discontent with revolution emerges in post-Khomeini
Iran. Patrick E. Tyler.
The Washington Post July 16, 1989

Painful rise in prices stirs discontent in Iran.
The New York Times August 3, 1991

Iran’s revolution grows old; after 14 years, Islamic
rules faces apathy, discontent, infighting. Caryle
Murphy.
The Washington Post Feb 12, 1993

Inflation fuels discontent against Iran’s government.
The New York Times Nov 20, 1994

In Iran, the revolution unravels. (economic conditions
in Iran) Robin Wright.
Los Angeles Times Dec 2, 1994

The revolution erodes in rural Iran. (growing
disenchantment with religious rulers) Kayaton Ghazi.
The New York Times Feb 18, 1995

Second revolution brews in Iran; the crucial support
of the poor and merchants is being undercut by
economic reforms. Lamis Andoni.
The Christian Science Monitor April 12, 1995

Youthful cravings are aging Iran’s revolution; As
ideology dies, voices of dissent grow louder. John
Daniszewski.
Los Angeles Times March 26, 1996

Iran discontent rises as oil-based economy falls.
(International Pages) Douglas Jehl.
The New York Times Dec 13, 1998

Time is running out for Tehran regime. (pro-democracy
movement in Iran is growing)(Column) Sandra Mackey.
Los Angeles Times July 23, 1999

Discontent Simmers in Iran. (Editorial)
Los Angeles Times June 12, 2001

Iran: Soccer or politics or both? (800 arrested during
rioting after Iran lost World Cup)(International
Pages)
The New York Times Oct 23, 2001

In Iran, an angry generation longs for jobs, more
freedom and power. (International Pages) Amy Waldman.
The New York Times Dec 7, 2001

Iran’s next revolution. (need for US support to help
Iranians fight government’s repressive
measures)(Column) Michael A. Ledeen.
The Wall Street Journal June 5, 2002

Iran’s third wave. (the third generation in Iran is
expected to begin another revolution)(Column) Thomas
L. Friedman.
The New York Times June 16, 2002

The coming revolution in Iran. (influence of the
Shiite theocracy and the mullahs will soon crumble
The Wall Street Journal July 29, 2002

In Iran, a ’second revolution’ gathers steam; Ten days
of pro-democracy protests spur militants to counter
with a show of conservative force in the streets.
(WORLD)
The Christian Science Monitor Nov 29, 2002

Iran’s failed revolution. (Ayatollah Ruhollah
Khomeini)(Editorial)
The New York Times Feb 10, 2003

Iran: Ripe for Revolution? (EDITORIAL)
The Christian Science Monitor June 16, 2003

Pending Regime Change in Iran. EDITORIAL
The Christian Science Monitor Jan 13, 2004

Iran’s revolution at 25: out of gas; Wednesday’s
silver anniversary marks a peak of political
disillusionment. (WORLD)
The Christian Science Monitor Feb 11, 2004

People ask me why I don't really cover the demonstations in Iran on this blog. As I have said before, this blog is not a news agency, and it is limited to my own interests which happen to be foreign affairs specifically the nuclear issue. However, if you're curious what I think about the events in Iran, the answer is... meh. I'm not overly excited. For one thing this is really an internal conflict between factions of the same regime, and secondly, the hyped reporting about a "second revolution" is hardly new as seen above. A regime is a creation of Man, and as such is never ever-lasting. Even if there is a "second revolution" in Iran, Iran's foreign policy won't chage, just as things didn't fundamentally change when the Shah was replaced by the IRI. No Iranian government can afford to give up their nuclear program, and no Iranian government can afford to be seen laying down for Israel.

[John Schröder]

http://pulsemedia.org/2010/02/05/yes-th ... -election/

Yes, This means Ahmadinejad Won the Election

by Max Ajl

Quick question: what do confused sectors of the Western radical left and the editorial board of the New York Times agree about? That last June’s Iranian presidential election, which almost certainly was not fraud­u­lent, was fraud­u­lent, that Ahmadine­jad is not the legit­i­mately elected president of Iran, that to analyze or criticize the tactics or ide­olo­gies of the green movement is tan­ta­mount to Stalinism, and that the correct political stance vis-a-vis the green movement is posting YouTube videos of pro­test­ers pummeling working-class basij.

For the NYT, this is a matter of massaging reality so as to prepare the symbolic ground for imperial warfare and desta­bi­liza­tion. For the Empire, an inde­pen­dent nuclear-capable Iran is haram (forbidden). A state of suicide bombers armed with fissile material? Oh hell no. Muslims can barely be relied upon to refrain from building minarets or misogynistically con­trol­ling their women, in stark contrast to the coura­geous feminism that permeates the West. The repressed men of The Muslim World would almost certainly manifest their frus­tra­tion in Armaged­don if they got remotely near a nuclear weapon, and the West–lily-white pure when it comes to visiting Armaged­don upon other people–could not possibly tolerate such a frightening prospect.

Anyway, put to the side the tactical question of where Western leftists should orient their efforts–unremittingly against sanctions, clearly, which are option one in the rejec­tion­is­tist imperial armory. (Putting this political question aside is slightly ridicu­lous since it’s actually the only relevant issue right now for leftists or liberals). And then move on to some poll analysis that should seal shut the debate about Ahmadinejad’s social support–a proxy for Iranian sentiment con­cern­ing populist economic policies. This is something I harp about with abrasive frequency. When American leftists have no movement–like right now–we look around for something dis­tract­ingly beguiling. In this case, something so inchoate and that pulls in so many direc­tions that it makes it easy to impose our rev­o­lu­tion­ary hopes upon a non-revolutionary situation.

Yes, millions mobilized as part of the Green Wave in June and more recently during Ashura. The green movement is real. But here’s the problem. The Iranian state is strong, deeply-embedded in civil society through a range of social welfare programs, many of them directed towards the rural poor, others benefiting the urban lower-classes. And the Iranian gov­ern­ment, extending well beyond Ahmadine­jad, is also repres­sive and anti-democratic. Repres­sive and anti-democratic gov­ern­ments frequently provoke back­lashes in favor of democracy. And sometimes, those back­lashes redound neg­a­tively upon the working-classes. Sometimes author­i­tar­i­an­ism brings pros­per­ity. This stuff is fairly obvious and banal, but debate on Iran tends to cliche, train-wrecked syllogism, and the crafting of straw-men, so sometimes it’s helpful to pedantically lay out the obvious, which I do by way of massively ellip­ti­cal intro­duc­tion to a poll from WorldPublicOpinion. Its gist? Iranians may not like their gov­ern­ment but they do think Ahmadine­jad is their legit­i­mately elected president. The reason a majority of Iranians voted for him? Probably because his gov­ern­ment is perceived, more-or-less rightly, as one in favor of economic populism within a global neo-liberal regime of accu­mu­la­tion. My thinking? So long as the Green Movement fails to braid together economic redistribution and political lib­er­al­ism, it will not gain the crucial societal mass that will enable it to become a force capable of restruc­tur­ing the Iranian state so as to enable it to defend the Iranian people from both the economic and military arms of the Empire. Tra­di­tion­ally, defense of economic redis­tri­b­u­tion and fighting the empire were the concerns of radicals, dis­si­dents, and social­ists. So were facts. In modern times, not so much.

Indications of fraud in the June 12 Iranian presidential election, together with large-scale street demonstrations, have led to claims that Mahmoud Ahmadinejad did not actually win the election, and that the majority of Iranians perceive their government as illegitimate and favor regime change.

An analysis of multiple polls of the Iranian public from three different sources finds little evidence to support such conclusions.

The analysis conducted by the Program on International Policy Attitudes at the University of Maryland (PIPA), was based on:

• a series of 10 recently-released polls conducted by the University of Tehran; eight conducted in the month before the June 12 election and two conducted in the month after the election, based on telephone interviews conducted within Iran
• a poll by GlobeScan conducted shortly after the election, based on telephone interviews conducted within Iran
• a poll by WorldPublicOpinion.org (managed by PIPA) conducted August 27--September 10, based on telephone interviews made by calling into Iran

The study sought to address the widely-discussed hypotheses that Ahmadinejad did not win the June 12 election and that the Iranian people perceive their government as illegitimate. It also sought to explore the assumption that the opposition represents a movement favoring a substantially different posture toward the United States. The analysis of the data found little evidence to support any of these hypotheses.

Steven Kull, director of PIPA, said, "Our analysis suggests that it would not be prudent to base US policy on the assumption that the Iranian public is in a pre-revolutionary state of mind."

On the question of whether Ahmadinejad won the June 12 election, in the week before the election and after the election, in all polls a majority said they planned to or did vote for Ahmadinejad. These numbers ranged from 52 to 57% immediately before the election and 55 to 66% after the election.

Steven Kull comments, "These findings do not prove that there were no irregularities in the election process. But they do not support the belief that a majority rejected Ahmadinejad."

The analysis did reveal factors that could have contributed to the impression that Ahmadinejad did not win. University of Tehran polls show that in the first few weeks of the campaign his support dropped precipitously and he did not enjoy majority support in the city of Tehran. But in the week before the election, his support recovered outside the capital.

Going into the election 57% said they expected Ahmadinejad to win. Thus it is not surprising that, in several post-election polls, more than seven in ten said they saw Ahmadinejad as the legitimate president. About eight in ten said the election was free and fair.

The polls did reveal some reservations about the government. Less than a majority expressed full confidence in the Guardian Council (42%) and the Ministry of the Interior (38%). While over eight in ten said they were satisfied with the current system of government, in June less than a majority (49%) said they were very satisfied and this number dropped to 41% in July.

However none of the polls found indications of support for regime change. Large majorities, including majorities of Mousavi supporters, endorse the Islamist character of the regime such as having a body of Islamic scholars with the power to veto laws they see as contrary to sharia.

To address the possibility that the data collected within Iran may have been fabricated, PIPA compared the patterns of responses, including within subgroups, in data collected inside Iran to those collected by calling into Iran from the outside. Steven Kull comments, "The patterns of responses at many levels are so similar, whether the data was collected inside Iran or by calling into Iran, that it is hard to conclude that these data were fabricated."

Another concern is that Iranian respondents were not answering candidly out of fear of some type of reprisal for making statements in support of the opposition or critical of the regime, particularly in the post-election environment. As noted above, on some questions majorities expressed views that were less than fully laudatory of the government.

Still there was the fact that after the election, the numbers expressing support for Mousavi diminished suggests that some self-censoring may have been occurring. Thus PIPA put special emphasis on analyzing the responses of those who felt bold enough to say that they voted for the opposition on the assumption that they would be frank on other issues as well. While Mousavi supporters are less affirmative of the legitimacy of the regime than the public as a whole, still a majority says that they believe that Ahmadinejad is the legitimate president and affirm the Islamist nature of the regime.

Some analysts have suggested that if the opposition were to gain power this would lead to fundamental changes in the Iranian posture toward the US. Focusing on those respondents who said they voted for Mousavi, as an approximation of the opposition, PIPA found that a majority were ready to negotiate with the US on a number of issues, while the Iranian public as a whole was more divided. However, Mousavi supporters, like the general public, were quite negative in their views of the US government and were strongly committed to Iran's nuclear program.

A majority of Mousavi supporters did favor diplomatic relations with the US, and were ready to make a deal whereby Iran would preclude developing nuclear weapons through intrusive international inspections in exchange for the removal of sanctions. However, this was equally true of the majority of all Iranians.

Full Report (PDF)
Questionnaire with Findings, Methodology for All Three Surveys (PDF)

WPO Dataset for Download (SPSS Format)
GlobeScan Dataset for Download (SPSS Format)

[John Schröder]

http://www.iranaffairs.com/iran_affairs ... topsy.html

Autopsy of Iran's Green Movement

People have asked me to elaborate further on why I think the "Green Movement" failed to make any impact during the anniversay celebrations in Iran last week. I think there are a number of reasons -- some blame the IRI, others the Green Movement itself, but the real reason is this: All the talk about toppling regimes and bombings and supporting ethnic separatists etc. has backfired on Washington by squelching the space for any real movement for change in Iran to develop. Washington's endless hostility and pressure on Iran for the last 30 years, especially but not limited to the nuclear issue which enjoys massive popularity across the political spectrum in Iran, has so polarized the atomosphere, narrowed willingess to explore options, and created a seige mentality in the public that there is no room for a "third movement" to arise in Iran that has the credibility and the popular trust to accomplish anything. The people prefer going with the regime, for all its faults, than to the alternatives (and in fact, as discussed below, there are no real credible alternatives presented either.)

Iranians see their country as being under seige and continued talk about sanctions that will supposedly cause so much harm to the people that they will rise up and do Washington's dirty work for of toppling the regime, or will force Iran to give up her massively poular nuclear program, only contributes to that perception.

Other lesser reasons which are mentioned by others:

First, as I said before, there is no real evidence that the elections were stolen in the first place, or that Ahmadinejad is so massively unpopular as some have claimed. If you don't want to believe the polling, just as yourself a logical question: Mousavi, the Green leader who supposedly actually won, is a regime-insider and who was specifically pre-cleared and vetted to run for office by the regime. So why would the same regime have to resort to massive election fraud to keep him out of office? It just makes no sense. Until you can come up with a colorable answer to that question, you've no business accusing anyone of stealing elections. (Most of the pro-Greens usually evade this question entirely, saying "it doesn't matter because this isn't about Mousavi" which is ridiculous, then they "appeal to emotion" by retelling about how awful the security crackdown has been and how many people were beaten etc. - as if atrocity makes up for their lack of a logical answer to a logical question.)

Second, the depth and breadth of support for the regime is consistently underestimated. This is partly due to the influence of wishful thinking by regime opponents, and their willingness to believe their own propaganda. I have already mentioned how the media in the US has been foretelling the imminent collapse of the regime practically eveyday for the last 30 years. Look folks, the bottom line is that since the revolutions, Iranians are better off than ever before. They live longer, healthier lives; they are far better educated, have better access to electricity, water, paved roads, etc. than ever before. This is simply an undeniable, statistically-proven fact (which leads the regime opponents to say "But those improvement are in line with the average improvements internationally" -- which may be true, but is irrelevant to the point. The regime has taken care of the people, and there is simply no doubt about it.)

Third, as much as some people want to deny it, the fact is that the "Greens" do not have a wide social base and represented a narrow class of people in Iran -- specifically, the more secular, educated, upper-class which explains their access to Twitter and Facebook etc. We've also heard about how the "youth" will topple the regime, but this is something I've heard for over a decade now. Even if there is a large youth contingent, that doesn't mean much. After all, would you trust your future to the hands of a petulant 20-something year old? Similarly, the analysts who reduced the conflict between "Mollahs" and everyone else were ridiculously shallow. The main backer of the Mousavi faction is Rafsanjani, a very prominent figure in the regime as well as a cleric (who incidentally is also often accused of massive corruption.) Ahmadinejad is not a cleric but is a technocrat.

Third, there is a general lack of leadership amongst the Greens, for a variety of reasons, but especially because...

Fourth, the Greens have no real agenda. All the petulance and empty sloganeering about "Freedom" etc make for great photo-ops, but not are just not a convincing substitute. (one of the problems in the West is that since they are so influenced by PR, they think that PR can be the solution to everything.) The demonstrators come across as just a confused bunch of repressed people who want to let off steam and break stuff, with some vague "Feel-good" chants. The only thing that barely unites them is some vague "opposition" to something -- not clear what. Some oppose the election results only, some oppose Ahmadinejad, some oppose the concept of the constitutional Supreme Jurisprudent, some simply want more social freedoms, some want to topple the regime entirely, etc. This was obvious in the number and variety of figures whom the Western media presented as ostensible "leaders" of the Green movement -- former crown prince, MEK spokesmen, movie directors, regime-insiders like Mousavi and Karroubi, reformists politicians like former President Khatami, etc. Clerics, secularists, Monarchists, the MEK, NeoCons etc. were all trying to climb onto the "Green Movements" wagon and take control of the steering by imposing their own agendas on the movement. Who's going to buy into that? None of these people have the necessary credibility or gravitas. Iranians have long-since become inured to calls for revolutions and regime-topplings by the Washington/Tel Aviv hawks and the Exile-TV crowd who rushed to lay claim to the green movement, and disregard them (or think them to be downright silly and immoral.)

Fifth, the people in Iran are once-bitten, twice-shy. They see all the posturing and rhetoric about regime change that has been coming from Washington and Tel Aviv for decades. They're not foolish enough to think that the denizens of the think tanks in DC really give a fig about human rights and democracy in Iran, and so they naturally wonder what's really behind the so-called Green movement. You can say this is "conspiracy thinking" but lets face it, there's more than enough justification for this sort of suspicion about the so-called Green movement.

Finally, I have to say that the conduct of some of the people identifying themselves as Greens was a major turnoff. The rioting, the burning of busses, the fighting in the street, the obvious appeals to foreign intervention by some who at least claimed to be members of the movement, the intolerance and "black v. white" mentality displayed towards people who may not agree 100% with them (read comments below for an example) all raise significant questions about what these people would be like once in power.