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Bhadrakumar wrote:"I am expecting you to resolve the situation in order to extinguish the fire, whose smoke can be seen in the atmosphere, and to take action to foil dangerous plots. Even if I were to tolerate this situation, there is no doubt that some people, parties and factions will not tolerate this situation," Rafsanjani angrily warned Khamenei.
Simultaneously, Rafsanjani also rallied his base in the clerical establishment. A clique of 14 senior clerics in Qom joined issue on his side. It was all an act of desperation by vested interests who have become desperate about the awesome rise of the IRGC in recent years. But, if Rafsanjani's calculation was that the "mutiny" within the clerical establishment would unnerve Khatami, he misread the calculus of power in Tehran. Khatami did the worst thing possible to Rafsanjani. He simply ignored the "Shark".
The IRGC and the Basij volunteers running into tens of millions swiftly mobilized. They coalesced with the millions of rural poor who adore Ahmadinejad as their leader. It has been a repeat of the 2005 election. The voter turnout has been an unprecedented 85%. Within hours of the announcement of Ahmadinejad's thumping victory, Khatami gave the seal of approval by applauding that the high voter turnout called for "real celebration".
He said, "I congratulate ... the people on this massive success and urge everyone to be grateful for this divine blessing." He cautioned the youth and the "supporters of the elected candidate and the supporters of other candidates" to be "fully alert and avoid any provocative and suspicions actions and speech".
Khatami's message to Rafsanjani is blunt: accept defeat gracefully and stay away from further mischief. Friday's election ensures that the house of Supreme Leader Khamenei will remain by far the focal point of power. It is the headquarters of the country's presidency, Iran's armed forces, especially the IRGC. It is the fountainhead of the three branches of government and the nodal point of foreign, security and economic policies.
Obama may contemplate a way to directly engage Khamenei. It is a difficult challenge.
-----------------
Ambassador M K Bhadrakumar was a career diplomat in the Indian Foreign Service. His assignments included the Soviet Union, South Korea, Sri Lanka, Germany, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Uzbekistan, Kuwait and Turkey.
"I am expecting you to resolve the situation in order to extinguish the fire, whose smoke can be seen in the atmosphere, and to take action to foil dangerous plots. Even if I were to tolerate this situation, there is no doubt that some people, parties and factions will not tolerate this situation," Rafsanjani angrily warned Khamenei.
Simultaneously, Rafsanjani also rallied his base in the clerical establishment. A clique of 14 senior clerics in Qom joined issue on his side. It was all an act of desperation by vested interests who have become desperate about the awesome rise of the IRGC in recent years. But, if Rafsanjani's calculation was that the "mutiny" within the clerical establishment would unnerve Khatami *(Khamenei?), he misread the calculus of power in Tehran. Khatami*(Khamenei?) did the worst thing possible to Rafsanjani. He simply ignored the "Shark".
The IRGC and the Basij volunteers running into tens of millions swiftly mobilized. They coalesced with the millions of rural poor who adore Ahmadinejad as their leader. It has been a repeat of the 2005 election. The voter turnout has been an unprecedented 85%. Within hours of the announcement of Ahmadinejad's thumping victory, Khatami* (Khamenei?) gave the seal of approval by applauding that the high voter turnout called for "real celebration".
He said, "I congratulate ... the people on this massive success and urge everyone to be grateful for this divine blessing." He cautioned the youth and the "supporters of the elected candidate and the supporters of other candidates" to be "fully alert and avoid any provocative and suspicions actions and speech".
Khatami's*(Khamenei?) message to Rafsanjani is blunt: accept defeat gracefully and stay away from further mischief. Friday's election ensures that the house of Supreme Leader Khamenei will remain by far the focal point of power. It is the headquarters of the country's presidency, Iran's armed forces, especially the IRGC. It is the fountainhead of the three branches of government and the nodal point of foreign, security and economic policies.
Obama may contemplate a way to directly engage Khamenei. It is a difficult challenge.
-----------------
Ambassador M K Bhadrakumar was a career diplomat in the Indian Foreign Service. His assignments included the Soviet Union, South Korea, Sri Lanka, Germany, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Uzbekistan, Kuwait and Turkey.
ON EDIT: * Please note that Bhadrakarumar appears to have confused the names of Khatami and Khamenei, but it should read Khamenei.
Ben D.
Detailed list of votes cast abroad in Iran election
Mon, 15 Jun 2009 20:38:19 GMT
Press TV has obtained the Interior Ministry's detailed list of the votes cast abroad in the country's 10th presidential election held on Friday, June 12.
A total of 234,812 votes were cast outside Iran, out of which Mahmoud Ahmadinejad won 78,300; Mehdi Karroubi won 4,647; Mohsen Rezaei won 3,635 and Mir-Hossein Moussavi won 111,792 votes.
Breakdown by cities,..... Link
Pakistan general: US interfering in Iran affairs
Mon, 15 Jun 2009 18:10:24 GMT
Former Pakistani Army General Mirza Aslam Beig claims the US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) has distributed 400 million dollars inside Iran to evoke a revolution.
In a phone interview with the Pashto Radio on Monday, General Beig said that there is undisputed intelligence proving the US interference in Iran.
"The documents prove that the CIA spent 400 million dollars inside Iran to prop up a colorful-hollow revolution following the election," he added.
Pakistan's former army chief of joint staff went on to say that the US wanted to disturb the situation in Iran and bring to power a pro-US government.
He congratulated President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad on his re-election for the second term in office, noting that Pakistan relationship with Iran has improved during his 4-year presidency.
"Ahmadinejad's re-election is a decisive point in regional policy and if Pakistan and Afghanistan unite with Iran, the US has to leave the area, especially the occupied Afghanistan," Beig added.
http://www.presstv.ir/detail.aspx?id=98 ... =351020401
In Tehran, anti-West protests erupt too
Mon, 15 Jun 2009 18:26:27 GMT
An Iranian protester holds a sign with the slogan "Down with the USA, UK and France" during a demonstration on June 15, 2009 outside the French embassy in Tehran against European interference in the Islamic Republic's latest election results.
As pro-Moussavi supporters staged a civil rally in Tehran, demonstrators from the opposite camp have gathered outside the British and French embassies in Tehran.
Waving Iranian flags and chanting anti-US and British slogans, the demonstrators gathered on Monday to protest what they called western involvement in Iran's internal affairs.
"We have gathered here to protest a hidden agenda (by Britain and the world), aimed at creating chaos in our country," said a protester in front of the UK embassy.
"We say to all oppressive governments not to intervene in the future of our country. We will stand in their way with all our strength," said another protestor in front of the French embassy.
The protests came on the day that Leader of the Islamic Revolution Ayatollah Seyyed Ali Khamenei ordered an investigation into allegations of election fraud.
The Leader also urged defeated presidential candidate Mir-Hossein Moussavi to pursue his appeal against Friday's vote result legally.
Meanwhile, British Foreign Secretary David Miliband said Monday the Tehran government which is dealing with post-election riots "seems to be state violence against its own people in Tehran and elsewhere".
http://www.presstv.ir/detail.aspx?id=98 ... =351020101
Those are who more experimental by nature could also download a shady software called "Low Orbit Ion Cannon" (that sounds like something dreamt up in computer labs of the Scientologists or, at least, to fight the Scientologists, no?), have it installed (disregard the alerts of your anti-virus, input a few targets, and, perhaps, also customize a message that you would like to "send" to Iranian servers, and hit "Launch Attack"! (it also displays some unknown call in a foreign language - I presume it is there to make it look more authentic; after all, you can't expect to be part of the Cyber-Jihad without some loud exclamations in Arabic or Farsi). There are calls to use an even more sophisticated tool called "BWraep", which seems to exhaust the target web-site out of bandwidth by creating bogus requests for serving images (many of these tools appear to be described and linked to from a shady web-site called the Insurgent Wiki).
There is a lot of Twitter hyperactivity surrounding these DDOS-attacks, including a dedicated Twitter handle "DDOSIran" and several frequent posters who share tips and links to new "tools" (some of these sites also carry some truly useful information, like the list of proxies that are currently working in Iran, so I assume there are quite indispensable at the moment, no matter what your take is on DDOS attacks). One interesting innovation that I've noticed is the use of Delicious to compile links to attack-sites; check http://delicious.com/freeiran for more - this strikes me as a very interesting use of social bookmarking, even though I am not sure that Delicious admins will let this stuff stay online if it gets really popular.
Evgeny Morozov, originally from Belarus, is a fellow at the Open Society Institute in New York (http://www.soros.org/)
Actually, what's shameful are the utterly spurious and entirely unjustified attack's against this Blog's gracious host, b, and various posters ...
Furthermore, the repeated attempted hijacking of these threads by individuals who appear incapable of courteous discourse based on mutual respect or basic civility. Assertions, allegations and emotive personal attacks abound ... debate and an exchange of views, opinions, analysis and supportive references, many of these posts, are Not
A couple of posters, upon review of thier contributions in total, are almost certainly, I humbly suggest, online agents provocateur ... though not very capable ones, at that ... greater internal and structural consistency matched with intellectual self-discipline is required in maintaining the fictional persona boys ... with practice they will, regretfully, invariably improve
Respect, civility, courtesy, diversity, tolerance are usually the hallmarks of MOA ... to wit,to agree tocivilly disagree ... lately uncouth ruffians just seem to wish to barge in and vomit on the bar ...
Events, immediate and of the moment, will move on, and so likely shall they ...
Heartfelt well wishes to all at the Bar.
Peace, Salaam, Shalom.
This list was being passed around among the resistance in Iran today:
1. Remove Khamenei from supreme leader because he doesn't qualify as a fair supreme leader
2. Remove Ahmadinejad from president because he took it forcefully and unlawfully
3. Put Ayatollah Montazeri as supreme leader until a review group for the ghanooneh asasi ( "constitution" ) is set up
4. Recognize Mousavi as the official president
5. A goverment by Mousavi and start a reform of the constitution
6. Free all political prisoners without any ifs ands or buts, right away
7. Call off any secret organization such as "gasht ershad"
JackRiddler wrote:.
Wow, I am so out of my depth on this one. Clueless.
...
3) There will or will not be an uprising in Tehran...
Two critically important questions need to be asked in the wake of Iran's disputed election.
What does this result mean in terms of the Iranian elite's relationship with the Iranian people?
And what does it mean in terms of the coherence of that elite, its ability to stick together and to maintain itself in power?
In a sense, it hardly matters now what does or does not emerge about the conduct, or misconduct, of the count.
If fraud is proved, the regime will face a huge crisis of legitimacy.
But, even if is not, and it has to be said that some evidence from independent polling suggests the results may have been legitimate, the crisis will hardly be less grave.
The supporters of Mir Hossein Mousavi have already made up their minds about what happened, as indeed have those of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad.
The already frayed bonds of trust that tie people to government will be, in either case, stretched to the limit, especially if Ahmadinejad continues to attack his opponents on the grounds that they are "against the nation".
A government in an adversarial relationship with a large number of its citizens, possibly even a majority of them, is not going to be a stable or effective government.
Equally, the polarisation of the society - between those who cling to the revolutionary tradition, whether out of interest or ideology, and those who have entirely lost faith in it - points to deep trouble ahead for the Islamic Republic.
And if the regime is forced to use its formidable coercive powers on the streets, if it kills people in any number, that will make it worse.
No wonder that even some conservative groupings in Iran say the country is in danger of losing its "republican dimension". In fact, it has been losing that dimension for years. Each succeeding political chapter has seen Iran's democratic arrangements further demoted, either in the elections themselves or in the hobbling of the relatively progressive governments that have sometimes been elected.
Yet Iranians over the years have either retained or regained the hope that the system could be made to respond to popular demands for change. And the more intelligent among the Iranian elite have always known that it is absolutely essential to keep that hope alive.
It was never, of course, in doubt which would trump the other if democracy and theocracy came into conflict, theocracy being in this case shorthand for a mixture of religious belief, loyalty to the revolution, and substantial material privileges.
But the shrewd men who run Iran knew that the trick was to avoid ever having to play that theocratic card.
The Iranian elite has always been split between competing groups.
Once Ayatollah Khomeini was gone, such divisions, part ideological, part personal, and part the product of competition for the spoils of office, became sharper.
Elections were shaped by these behind-the-scenes conflicts, and the recent campaign was no exception.
Mousavi was supported by former president Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, who must have calculated that, as Mousavi represented no real threat, the establishment would be ready to accept him, if he won, as just another figure who could be used to manage popular expectations.
The best guess must be that divisions within the elite overcame their common interest in keeping the system in balance.
In permitting Ahmadinejad all kinds of advantages during the campaign, and perhaps in a final act of fraud, they went too far.
Discussions about how to rescue the situation must be intense.
In the past it could be said that those who had ultimate power in Iran were ruthless but not stupid. Now they must decide between oppression and concession.
Ahmadinejad's threats, and the armed police on the streets, point in one direction, while the decision of Ali Khamenei, the Supreme Leader, to order an inquiry into the election results, points in the other.
Abbas Barzegar wrote:So the question occupying the international media, "How did Mousavi lose?" seems to be less a problem of the Iranian election commission and more a matter of bad perception rooted in the stubborn refusal to understand the role of religion in Iran.
...
In the future, observers would do us a favour by taking a deeper look into Iranian society, giving us a more accurate picture of the very organic religious structures of the country, and dispensing with the narrative of liberal inevitability. It is the religious aspects of enigmatic Persia that helped put an 80-year-old exiled ascetic at the head of state 30 years ago, then the charismatic cleric Khatami in office 12 years ago, the honest son of a blacksmith – Ahmedinejad – four years ago, and the same yesterday.
Robert Fisk wrote:Mr Ahmadinejad, the first non-clerical president in more than 25 years, basks in the support of Iran's Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, who called on Iranians to vote for an anti-Western candidate. The Ayatollah ultimately calls the shots in Iran, where the president can only influence policy, not decide it.
praeclarus wrote:JackRiddler wrote:.
Wow, I am so out of my depth on this one. Clueless.
...
3) There will or will not be an uprising in Tehran...
Yep. Couldn't agree with you more.
Ahmadinejad Won. Get Over It
By Flynt Leverett, New America Foundation
with Hillary Mann Leverett
Politico | June 15, 2009
Without any evidence, many U.S. politicians and “Iran experts” have dismissed Iranian President Ahmadinejad’s reelection Friday, with 62.6 percent of the vote, as fraud.
They ignore the fact that Ahmadinejad’s 62.6 percent of the vote in this year’s election is essentially the same as the 61.69 percent he received in the final count of the 2005 presidential election, when he trounced former President Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani. The “Iran experts’” shock at Friday’s results is entirely self-generated, based on their preferred assumptions and wishful thinking.
Although Iran’s elections are not free by Western standards, the Islamic Republic has a 30-year history of highly contested and competitive elections at the presidential, parliamentary, and local levels.
Manipulation has always been there, as it is in many other countries.
But upsets occur – as, most notably, with Mohammed Khatami’s surprise victory in the 1997 presidential election. Moreover, “blowouts” also occur – as in Khatami’s re-election in 2001, Ahmadinejad’s first victory in 2005, and, we would argue, this year.
Like much of the Western media, most American “Iran experts” overstated Mir Hossein Mousavi’s “surge” over the campaign’s final weeks. More importantly, they were oblivious – as in 2005 – to Ahmadinejad’s effectiveness as a populist politician and campaigner. American “Iran experts” missed how Ahmadinejad was perceived by most Iranians as having won the nationally televised debates with his three opponents – especially his debate with Mousavi.
Before the debates, both Mousavi and Ahmadinejad campaign aides indicated privately that they perceived a surge of support for Mousavi; after the debates, the same aides concluded that Ahmadinejad’s provocatively impressive performance and Mousavi’s desultory one had boosted the incumbent’s standing. Ahmadinejad’s charge that Mousavi was supported by Rafsanjani’s sons – widely perceived in Iranian society as corrupt figures – seemed to play well with voters.
Similarly, Ahmadinejad’s criticism that Mousavi’s reformist supporters, including former President Khatami, had been willing to suspend Iran’s uranium enrichment program and had won nothing from the West for doing so tapped into popular support for the program – and had the added advantage of being true.
More fundamentally, American “Iran experts” consistently underestimated Ahmadinejad’s base of support. Polling in Iran is notoriously difficult; most polls there are less than fully professional, and hence produce results of questionable validity. But the one poll conducted before Friday’s election by a Western organization that was transparent about its methodology – a telephone poll carried out by the Washington-based Terror-Free Tomorrow (TFT) during May 11-20 – found Ahmadinejad running 20 points ahead of Mousavi. This poll was conducted before the televised debates in which, as noted above, Ahmadinejad was perceived to have done well while Mousavi did poorly.
American “Iran experts” assumed that “disastrous” economic conditions in Iran would undermine Ahmadinejad’s reelection prospects. But the IMF projects that Iran’s economy will actually grow modestly this year (when the economies of most Gulf Arab states are in recession). A significant number of Iranians – including the religiously pious, lower income groups, civil servants, and pensioners – appear to believe that Ahmadinejad’s policies have benefited them.
And, while many Iranians complain about inflation, the TFT poll found that most Iranian voters do not hold Ahmadinejad responsible. The “Iran experts” further argue that the high turnout on June 12 – 82 percent of the electorate – had to favor Mousavi. But this line of analysis reflects nothing more than assumptions.
Some “Iran experts” argue that Mousavi’s Azeri background and “Azeri accent” mean that he was guaranteed to win Iran’s Azeri-majority provinces; since Ahmadinejad did better than Mousavi in these areas, fraud is the only possible explanation.
But Ahmadinejad himself speaks Azeri quite fluently as a consequence of his eight years serving as a popular and successful official in two Azeri-majority provinces; during the campaign, he artfully quoted Azeri and Turkish poetry – in the original – in messages designed to appeal to Iran’s Azeri community. (And, we should not forget that the Supreme Leader is Azeri.) The notion that Mousavi was somehow assured of victory in Azeri-majority provinces is simply not grounded in reality.
With regard to electoral irregularities, the specific criticisms made by Mousavi – such as running out of ballot paper in some precincts and not keeping polls open long enough (even though polls stayed open for at least three hours after the announced closing time) – could not, in themselves, have tipped the outcome so clearly in Ahmadinejad’s favor.
Moreover, these irregularities do not, in themselves, amount to electoral fraud even by American legal standards. And, compared to the U.S. presidential election in Florida in 2000, the flaws in Iran’s electoral process seem less significant.
In the wake of Friday’s election, some “Iran experts” – perhaps feeling burned by their misreading of contemporary political dynamics in the Islamic Republic – argue that we are witnessing a “conservative coup d’état”, aimed at a complete take over of the Iranian state.
But one could more plausibly suggest that, if a “coup” is being attempted, it has been mounted by the losers in Friday’s election. It was Mousavi, after all, who declared victory on Friday even before Iran’s polls closed. And, three days before the election, Mousavi supporter Rafsanjani published a letter criticizing the Leader’s failure to rein in Ahmadinejad’s resort to “such ugly and sin-infected phenomena as insults, lies, and false allegations”. Many Iranians took this letter as an indication that the Mousavi camp was concerned their candidate had fallen behind in the campaign’s closing days.
In light of these developments, many politicians and “Iran experts” argue that the Obama Administration cannot now engage the “illegitimate” Ahmadinejad regime. Certainly, the Administration should not appear to be trying to “play” in the current controversy in Iran about the election. In this regard, President Obama’s comments on Friday, a few hours before the polls closed in Iran, that “just as has been true in Lebanon, what can be true in Iran as well is that you’re seeing people looking at new possibilities” was extremely maladroit.
Among other things, from Tehran’s perspective this observation undercut the credibility of Obama’s acknowledgement, in his Cairo speech earlier this month, of U.S. complicity in overthrowing a democratically elected Iranian government and restoring the Shah in 1953.
The Obama Administration should vigorously rebut any argument against engaging Tehran following Friday’s vote. More broadly, Ahmadinejad’s victory may force President Obama and his senior advisers to come to terms with the deficiencies and internal contradictions in their approach to Iran. Before the Iranian election, the Obama Administration had fallen for the same illusion as many of its predecessors – the illusion that Iranian politics is primarily about personalities and finding the right personality to deal with. That is not how Iranian politics works.
The Islamic Republic is a system with multiple power centers; within that system, there is a strong and enduring consensus about core issues of national security and foreign policy, including Iran’s nuclear program and relations with the United States. Any of the four candidates in Friday’s election would have continued the nuclear program as Iran’s president; none would agree to its suspension.
Any of the four candidates would be interested in a diplomatic opening with the United States, but that opening would need to be comprehensive, respectful of Iran’s legitimate national security interests and regional importance, accepting of Iran’s right to develop and benefit from the full range of civil nuclear technology – including pursuit of the nuclear fuel cycle – and aimed at genuine rapprochement.
Such an approach would also, in our judgment, be manifestly in the interests of the United States and its allies throughout the Middle East. It is time for the Obama Administration to get serious about pursuing this approach – with an Iranian administration headed by the reelected President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad.
Copyright 2009, Politico
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