12 Warning Signs of U.S. Hyperinflation

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Re: 12 Warning Signs of U.S. Hyperinflation

Postby Canadian_watcher » Fri Apr 01, 2011 7:23 pm

I've been wanting to make a thoughtful reply based on all the data I've read about the US Fed printing money and Japan's holdings of US treasuries and China's holdings of both Japanese stocks and US treasuries coupled with the blatant currency market manipulations recently undertaken by the G7 in light of Japan's apocalypse.. the price of commodities rising like investors were sitting on the ace of spades, gold and silver prices through the roof, housing bubbles popping and reinflating, the spectre of a free-floating renminbi upsetting a delicate trade balance..

*sigh* there's more, of course. You all know that.

But let's get 'reality based' for a minute and just look at the bare fact that is now common knowledge: money means nothing. To me this whole thing hinges on a critical mass scenario. Exactly when is it going to reach the point where people figure out that if you can fix the Japanese crisis by manipulating currency markets in the short term that the same could be applied to household debt? The pure rage factor is a wild card. Money = shit. Worse than shit. It's all bullshit.

/crazy rant based on wishful thinking.
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Re: 12 Warning Signs of U.S. Hyperinflation

Postby JackRiddler » Fri Apr 01, 2011 7:25 pm

selective panic monger gonzalo lira wrote:Therefore, as Spock always sez, if you eliminate the impossible, whatever remains, however improbable, must be the truth.


Spock?!

With that he demonstrates at least to the geek faction that he's willing to pull anything out of his ass. Just in case any of them were going to fall for what follows...

gonzalo lira with my emphases added to highlight his reckless contempt for argument wrote:
So the Federal government might well turn to the private sector for cash. The Federal government might conceivably claim that ongoing funding needs require that every single 401(k) and IRA divest from its portfolio of stocks and bonds, and be fully invested in Treasuries.

This could be accomplished very easily, from a practical standpoint—just inform banks, and have them turn over to the Federal government all your mutual funds and stocks you agonized over, and get long-term Treasury bonds of nominal equal value in exchange.


If he was in some final death-spiral of crack abuse, he'd have an excuse for this bilge.

The US government as presently constituted (by which I mean: all power factions, Wall Street, the corporations, the MIC, the Democrats, the Republicans, and all of the money that runs both) is likelier to wage nuclear war for fun (chances: not quite zero) than to embark upon Lira's freely invented scenario (chances: in the negatives). They're likelier to give Manhattan back to the Indians, pay reparations for slavery, apologize for exaggerating Soviet power, or remove references to God from the laws and currency.

The revolution that would ever put such a measure on the table is not, at this time, conceivable.

Note I said he's selective panic monger. This is aimed entirely at conservative-minded aging folk who have private pensions and want those kids off their lawn (except the Mexican gardener). The only alternate universe in which such a measure would ever be "conceivable" to the US government is the Glenn Beck fantasy one where the NWO "socialists" out to seize cash and guns from the white people are already in power.

This is radical right-wing incitement.

401(k)’s and IRA’s would be the first ones the Federal government would go after—for the obvious reason that union pension funds have the union’s political muscle.


Fuck you. (Gonzalo Lira, that is.)

Do you see what kind of Nazi spirit this guy has? This is the kind who shoots you, puts his boot on your neck when you've fallen, and then, as he pushed down on your carotid, makes a speech about how dangerously powerful you are.

But individuals? They have no political machine. So they’re screwed.


Fuck you.

Anyway, the language used for this maneuver by the Treasury department would make it difficult for a lot of (unaffected) people to get upset over the situation:


And in a classic bit of sophistry, let's now continue as though his "conceivable" impossible scenario is already a done deal and paint some of the details.

The Treasury department wouldn’t call this process “retirement account confiscation”. They’d call it something innocuous, like “retirement asset swap”—or better yet, throw in some patriotic bullshit (indeed, the last refuge of the scoundrel) and call it “Americ-Aide Asset Swap”—or even better: Call it “Help America Retirement Treasury Bond Program”—otherwise known as HART-bonds. (Awww!!! Probably maudlin enough to get Geithner an appearance on fucking Oprah.)


Tell us about how Bill Ayers will be in charge of Obama Youth.

Plus, this guy pretends to be an opponent of the banksters. (Hm, would they have a problem with this idea of taking pension funds out of stock by government fiat? I wonder.) As he dishes it out typical banksterist propaganda about the evil government (the one that saved the banksters and is run by them).

Classic, pathological projection.

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Re: 12 Warning Signs of U.S. Hyperinflation

Postby Canadian_watcher » Fri Apr 01, 2011 7:33 pm

Jack, you're obviously in a better academic position to discuss economics than I, so don't take this as some sort of challenge to your knowledge of 'the system.'

But what's so inconceivable about the US demanding that pension funds convert their holdings into US treasuries? No one else is buying them, they absolutely need buyers to survive, and it's not like they've never told people what to do with their savings before. So..?
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Re: 12 Warning Signs of U.S. Hyperinflation

Postby compared2what? » Fri Apr 01, 2011 7:42 pm

justdrew wrote:any signs of our "trading partners" demanding payment for good in their own currency instead of dollars? Seems to me that would have to happen for the US to face "hyper" inflation?


I just learned that there was an international conspiracy to that effect, sent out a feeler for more details, and am waiting to hear back, fwiw.

Computerized transaction issues

Western Europe, North America and many parts of Asia and Australasia have economies that depend heavily on computerized transaction procession of money transfers. However, most nations that are subject to hyperinflation risk have not done assessments as to the ability of the electronic part of the finance system to remain intact under hyperinflation.

It is assumed (based upon IT practices for transnational processing that have evolved since the 1970s) that most money held by banks is not represented by 64 bit floating numbers. Under hyperinflation conditions most bank processing systems could fail due to overflow conditions


Any signs of hyperinflation in North America or other parts of the world that depend heavily on computerized transaction procession of money transfers?

Because if there aren't, I can't say that I really see what constructive purpose is served by augmenting the main purely speculative panic-and-paranoia-inducing narrative with a purely speculative panic-and-paranoia-inducing subplot. So I think I must be missing your point. Would you mind spelling it out in a little more detail?
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Re: 12 Warning Signs of U.S. Hyperinflation

Postby vanlose kid » Fri Apr 01, 2011 7:46 pm

JackRiddler wrote:... As he dishes it out typical banksterist propaganda about the evil government (the one that saved the banksters and is run by them).

Classic, pathological projection.

.


Jack, leaving questions of probability/conceivability aside, are you saying: it can't happen here?

what's more, Lira, whatever he may be, and he like most "financial bloggers/writers, Krugman included, does have a schtick, as far as i can recall doesn't make the distinction between banks and government that you attribute to him. as far as i can recall.

edit: which is not that far, i'll admit.

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Re: 12 Warning Signs of U.S. Hyperinflation

Postby justdrew » Fri Apr 01, 2011 7:56 pm

compared2what? wrote:
justdrew wrote:any signs of our "trading partners" demanding payment for good in their own currency instead of dollars? Seems to me that would have to happen for the US to face "hyper" inflation?


I just learned that there was an international conspiracy to that effect, sent out a feeler for more details, and am waiting to hear back, fwiw.

Computerized transaction issues

Western Europe, North America and many parts of Asia and Australasia have economies that depend heavily on computerized transaction procession of money transfers. However, most nations that are subject to hyperinflation risk have not done assessments as to the ability of the electronic part of the finance system to remain intact under hyperinflation.

It is assumed (based upon IT practices for transnational processing that have evolved since the 1970s) that most money held by banks is not represented by 64 bit floating numbers. Under hyperinflation conditions most bank processing systems could fail due to overflow conditions


Any signs of hyperinflation in North America or other parts of the world that depend heavily on computerized transaction procession of money transfers?

Because if there aren't, I can't say that I really see what constructive purpose is served by augmenting the main purely speculative panic-and-paranoia-inducing narrative with a purely speculative panic-and-paranoia-inducing subplot. So I think I must be missing your point. Would you mind spelling it out in a little more detail?


I raise the "Computerized transaction issues" purely as a data-point, FYI, kinda thing. In practice, such limitations would make actually accounting for and "doing" hyperinflation very problematic.

or would it? I don't see exactly how hyperinflation can happen. Are we to believe that at some point McDonald's workers (for example) would be getting checks for $100,000.00 ? It just doesn't seem like that could happen.
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Re: 12 Warning Signs of U.S. Hyperinflation

Postby vanlose kid » Fri Apr 01, 2011 8:13 pm

Hyperinflation
From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

In economics, hyperinflation is inflation that is very high or "out of control". While the real values of the specific economic items generally stay the same in terms of relatively stable foreign currencies, in hyperinflationary conditions the general price level within a specific economy increases rapidly as the functional or internal currency, as opposed to a foreign currency, loses its real value very quickly, normally at an accelerating rate.[1] Definitions used vary from one provided by the International Accounting Standards Board, which describes it as "a cumulative inflation rate over three years approaching 100% (26% per annum compounded for three years in a row)", to Cagan's (1956) "inflation exceeding 50% a month." [2] As a rule of thumb, normal monthly and annual low inflation and deflation are reported per month, while under hyperinflation the general price level could rise by 5 or 10% or even much more every day.

A vicious circle is created in which more and more inflation is created with each iteration of the ever increasing money printing cycle.

Hyperinflation becomes visible when there is an unchecked increase in the money supply (see hyperinflation in Zimbabwe) usually accompanied by a widespread unwillingness on the part of the local population to hold the hyperinflationary money for more than the time needed to trade it for something non-monetary to avoid further loss of real value. Hyperinflation is often associated with wars (or their aftermath), currency meltdowns, political or social upheavals, or aggressive bidding on currency exchanges...

Characteristics

In 1956, Phillip Cagan wrote The Monetary Dynamics of Hyperinflation,[3] generally regarded as the first serious study of hyperinflation and its effects. In it, he defined hyperinflation as a monthly inflation rate of at least 50%. International Accounting Standard 1[4] requires a presentation currency. IAS 21[5] provides for translations of foreign currencies into the presentation currency. IAS 29[6] establishes special accounting rules for use in hyperinflationary environments, and lists four factors which can trigger application of these rules:

1. The general population prefers to keep its wealth in non-monetary assets or in a relatively stable foreign currency. Amounts of local currency held are immediately invested to maintain purchasing power.
2. The general population regards monetary amounts not in terms of the local currency but in terms of a relatively stable foreign currency. Prices may be quoted in that foreign currency.
3. Sales and purchases on credit take place at prices that are increased by an amount that will compensate for the expected loss of purchasing power during the credit period, even if the period is short.
4. Interest rates, wages and prices are linked to a price index and the cumulative inflation rate over three years approaches, or exceeds, 100%.

In its its Exposure Draft: Severe Hyperinflation - Proposed Amendment to IFRS 1, the IASB has requested comment on a proposed categorization of an economy subject to severe hyperinflation as one in which the currency has both of the following characteristics: (a) a reliable general price index is not available to all entities with transactions and balances in the currency. (b) exchangeability between the currency and a relatively stable foreign currency does not exist.[7]

Root causes of hyperinflation

The main cause of hyperinflation is a massive and rapid increase in the amount of money (including bank credit, deposits, and currency) that is not supported by a corresponding growth in the output of goods and services. This results in an imbalance between the supply and demand for the money, accompanied by a complete loss of confidence in the money, similar to a bank run. This loss of confidence causes a rapid increase in velocity of spending which causes a corresponding rapid increase in prices. Once inflation has become established, sellers try to hedge against it by increasing prices. This leads to further waves of price increases.[8] Enactment of legal tender laws and price controls to prevent discounting the value of paper money relative to gold, silver, hard currency, or commodities, fail to force acceptance of the rapidly increasing money supply which lacks intrinsic value. If the entity responsible for increasing bank credit and/or printing currency promotes excessive money creation, with other factors contributing a reinforcing effect, hyperinflation usually continues. Often the body responsible for printing the currency cannot physically print paper currency faster than the rate at which it is devaluing, thus neutralizing their attempts to stimulate the economy.[9]

Hyperinflation is generally associated with paper money, which can easily be used to increase the money supply: add more zeros to the plates and print, or even stamp old notes with new numbers.[10] Historically, there have been numerous episodes of hyperinflation in various countries followed by a return to "hard money". Older economies would revert to hard currency and barter when the circulating medium became excessively devalued, generally following a "run" on the store of value.

Hyperinflation effectively wipes out the purchasing power of private and public savings, distorts the economy in favor of extreme consumption and hoarding of real assets, causes the monetary base, whether specie or hard currency, to flee the country, and makes the afflicted area anathema to investment. Hyperinflation is met with drastic remedies, such as imposing the shock therapy of slashing government expenditures or altering the currency basis. One form this may take is dollarization, the use of a foreign currency (not necessarily the U.S. dollar) as a national unit of currency. An example was dollarization in Ecuador, initiated in September 2000 in response to a 75% loss of value of the Ecuadorian sucre in early 2000.

The aftermath of hyperinflation is equally complex. As hyperinflation has always been a traumatic experience for the area which suffers it, the next policy regime almost always enacts policies to prevent its recurrence. Often this means making the central bank very aggressive about maintaining price stability, as was the case with the German Bundesbank or moving to some hard basis of currency such as a currency board. Many governments have enacted extremely stiff wage and price controls in the wake of hyperinflation but this does not prevent further inflating of the money supply by its central bank, and always leads to widespread shortages of consumer goods if the controls are rigidly enforced.

As it allows a government to devalue their spending and displace (or avoid) a tax increase, governments have sometimes resorted to excessively loose monetary policy to meet their expenses. Inflation is effectively a regressive consumption tax,[11] but less overt than levied taxes and therefore harder to understand by ordinary citizens. Inflation can obscure quantitative assessments of the true cost of living, as published price indices only look at data in retrospect, so may increase only months or years later. Monetary inflation can become hyperinflation if monetary authorities fail to fund increasing government expenses from taxes, government debt, cost cutting, or by other means, because either

* during the time between recording or levying taxable transactions and collecting the taxes due, the value of the taxes collected falls in real value to a small fraction of the original taxes receivable; or
* government debt issues fail to find buyers except at very deep discounts; or
* a combination of the above.


Theories of hyperinflation generally look for a relationship between seigniorage and the inflation tax. In both Cagan's model and the neo-classical models, a tipping point occurs when the increase in money supply or the drop in the monetary base makes it impossible for a government to improve its financial position. Thus when fiat money is printed, government obligations that are not denominated in money increase in cost by more than the value of the money created.

From this, it might be wondered why any rational government would engage in actions that cause or continue hyperinflation. One reason for such actions is that often the alternative to hyperinflation is either depression or military defeat. The root cause is a matter of more dispute. In both classical economics and monetarism, it is always the result of the monetary authority irresponsibly borrowing money to pay all its expenses. These models focus on the unrestrained seigniorage of the monetary authority, and the gains from the inflation tax. In Neoliberalism, hyperinflation is considered to be the result of a crisis of confidence. The monetary base of the country flees, producing widespread fear that individuals will not be able to convert local currency to some more transportable form, such as gold or an internationally recognized hard currency. This is a quantity theory of hyperinflation.[citation needed]

In neo-classical economic theory, hyperinflation is rooted in a deterioration of the monetary base, that is the confidence that there is a store of value which the currency will be able to command later. In this model, the perceived risk of holding currency rises dramatically, and sellers demand increasingly high premiums to accept the currency. This in turn leads to a greater fear that the currency will collapse, causing even higher premiums. One example of this is during periods of warfare, civil war, or intense internal conflict of other kinds: governments need to do whatever is necessary to continue fighting, since the alternative is defeat. Expenses cannot be cut significantly since the main outlay is armaments. Further, a civil war may make it difficult to raise taxes or to collect existing taxes. While in peacetime the deficit is financed by selling bonds, during a war it is typically difficult and expensive to borrow, especially if the war is going poorly for the government in question. The banking authorities, whether central or not, "monetize" the deficit, printing money to pay for the government's efforts to survive. The hyperinflation under the Chinese Nationalists from 1939-1945 is a classic example of a government printing money to pay civil war costs. By the end, currency was flown in over the Himalayas, and then old currency was flown out to be destroyed.

Hyperinflation is regarded as a complex phenomenon and one explanation may not be applicable to all cases. However, in both of these models, whether loss of confidence comes first, or central bank seigniorage, the other phase is ignited. In the case of rapid expansion of the money supply, prices rise rapidly in response to the increased supply of money relative to the supply of goods and services, and in the case of loss of confidence, the monetary authority responds to the risk premiums it has to pay by "running the printing presses."

Nevertheless the immense acceleration process that occurs during hyperinflation (such as during the German hyperinflation of 1922/23) still remains unclear and unpredictable. The transformation of an inflationary development into the hyperinflation has to be identified as a very complex phenomenon, which could be a further advanced research avenue of the complexity economics in conjunction with research areas like mass hysteria, bandwagon effect, social brain and mirror neurons.[12]

...

Much attention on hyperinflation naturally centres on the effect on savers whose investment become worthless. Academic economists seem not to have devoted much study on the (positive) effect on debtors. Interest rate changes often cannot keep up with hyperinflation or even high inflation, certainly with contractually fixed interest rates. (For example, in the 1970s in the United Kingdom inflation reached 25% per annum, yet interest rates did not rise above 15% - and then only briefly - and many fixed interest rate loans existed). Contractually there is often no bar to a debtor clearing his long term debt with "hyperinflated-cash" nor could a lender simply somehow suspend the loan. "Early redemption penalties" were (and still are) often based on a penalty of x months of interest/payment; again no real bar to paying off what had been a large loan. In interwar Germany, for example, much private and corporate debt was effectively wiped out; certainly for those holding fixed interest rate loans.


Hyperinflation
by Michael K. Salemi

Inflation is a sustained increase in the aggregate price level. Hyperinflation is very high inflation. Although the threshold is arbitrary, economists generally reserve the term “hyperinflation” to describe episodes when the monthly inflation rate is greater than 50 percent. At a monthly rate of 50 percent, an item that cost $1 on January 1 would cost $130 on January 1 of the following year.

Hyperinflation is largely a twentieth-century phenomenon. The most widely studied hyperinflation occurred in Germany after World War I. The ratio of the German price index in November 1923 to the price index in August 1922—just fifteen months earlier—was 1.02 × 1010. This huge number amounts to a monthly inflation rate of 322 percent. On average, prices quadrupled each month during the sixteen months of hyperinflation.

While the German hyperinflation is better known, a much larger hyperinflation occurred in Hungary after World War II. Between August 1945 and July 1946 the general level of prices rose at the astounding rate of more than 19,000 percent per month, or 19 percent per day.

Even these very large numbers understate the rates of inflation experienced during the worst days of the hyperinflations. In October 1923, German prices rose at the rate of 41 percent per day. And in July 1946, Hungarian prices more than tripled each day.

What causes hyperinflations? No single shock, no matter how severe, can explain sustained, continuously rapid growth in prices. The world wars themselves did not cause the hyperinflations in Germany and Hungary. The destruction of resources during the wars can explain why prices in Germany and Hungary would be higher after the wars than before. But the wars themselves cannot explain why prices would continuously rise at rapid rates during hyperinflation periods.

Hyperinflations are caused by extremely rapid growth in the supply of “paper” money. They occur when the monetary and fiscal authorities of a nation regularly issue large quantities of money to pay for a large stream of government expenditures. In effect, inflation is a form of taxation in which the government gains at the expense of those who hold money while its value is declining. Hyperinflations are very large taxation schemes.

During the German hyperinflation the number of German marks in circulation increased by a factor of 7.32 × 109. In Hungary, the comparable increase in the money supply was 1.19 × 1025. These numbers are smaller than those given earlier for the growth in prices. What does it mean when prices increase more rapidly than the supply of money?

Economists use a concept called the “real quantity of money” to discuss what happens to people’s money-holding behavior when prices grow rapidly. The real quantity of money, sometimes called the “purchasing power of money,” is the ratio of the amount of money held to the price level. Imagine that the typical household consumes a certain bundle of goods. The real quantity of money measures the number of bundles a household could buy with the money it holds. In low-inflation periods, a household will maintain a high real money balance because it is convenient to do so. In high-inflation periods, a household will maintain a lower real money balance to avoid the inflation “tax.” They avoid the inflation tax by holding more of their wealth in the form of physical commodities. As they buy these commodities, prices rise higher and inflation increases. Figure 1 shows real money balances and inflation for Germany from the beginning of 1919 until April 1923. The graph indicates that Germans lowered real balances as inflation increased. The last months of the German hyperinflation are not pictured in the figure because the inflation rate was too high to preserve the scale of the graph.

Hyperinflations tend to be self-perpetuating. Suppose a government is committed to financing its expenditures by issuing money and begins by raising the money stock by 10 percent per month. Soon the rate of inflation will increase, say, to 10 percent per month. The government will observe that it can no longer buy as much with the money it is issuing and is likely to respond by raising money growth even further. The hyperinflation cycle has begun. During the hyperinflation there will be a continuing tug-of-war between the public and the government. The public is trying to spend the money it receives quickly in order to avoid the inflation tax; the government responds to higher inflation with even higher rates of money issue.

Most economists agree that inflation lowers economic welfare even when allowing for revenue from the inflation tax and the distortion that would be created by alternative taxes that raise the same revenue.1

Figure 1 During the German Hyperinflation, the Real Quantity of Money Fell as Inflation Increased
Image

How do hyperinflations end? The standard answer is that governments have to make a credible commitment to halting the rapid growth in the stock of money. Proponents of this view consider the end of the German hyperinflation to be a case in point. In late 1923, Germany undertook a monetary reform, creating a new unit of currency called the rentenmark. The German government promised that the new currency could be converted on demand into a bond having a certain value in gold. Proponents of the standard answer argue that the guarantee of convertibility is properly viewed as a promise to cease the rapid issue of money.

An alternative view held by some economists is that not just monetary reform, but also fiscal reform, is needed to end a hyperinflation. According to this view, a successful reform entails two believable commitments on the part of government. The first is a commitment to halt the rapid growth of paper money. The second is a commitment to bring the government’s budget into balance. This second commitment is necessary for a successful reform because it removes, or at least lessens, the incentive for the government to resort to inflationary taxation. If the government commits to balancing its budget, people can reasonably believe that money growth will not rise again to high levels in the near future. Thomas Sargent, a proponent of the second view, argues that the German reform of 1923 was successful because it created an independent central bank that could refuse to monetize the government deficit and because it included provisions for higher taxes and lower government expenditures. Another way to look at Sargent’s view is that hyperinflations end when people reasonably believe that the rate of money growth will fall to normal levels both now and in the future.

What effects do hyperinflations have? One effect with serious consequences is the reallocation of wealth. Hyperinflations transfer wealth from the general public, which holds money, to the government, which issues money. Hyperinflations also cause borrowers to gain at the expense of lenders when loan contracts are signed prior to the worst inflation. Businesses that hold stores of raw materials and commodities gain at the expense of the general public. In Germany, renters gained at the expense of property owners because rent ceilings did not keep pace with the general level of prices. Costantino Bresciani-Turroni argues that the hyperinflation destroyed the wealth of the stable classes in Germany and made it easier for the National Socialists (Nazis) to gain power.

Hyperinflation reduces an economy’s efficiency by driving people away from monetary transactions and toward barter. In a normal economy, using money in exchange is highly efficient. During hyperinflations people prefer to be paid in commodities in order to avoid the inflation tax. If they are paid in money, they spend that money as quickly as possible. In Germany, workers were paid twice per day and would shop at midday to avoid further depreciation of their earnings. Hyperinflation is a wasteful game of “hot potato” in which people use up valuable resources trying to avoid holding on to paper money.

Hyperinflations can lead to behavior that would be thought bizarre under normal conditions. Gerald Feldman’s book The Great Disorder shows a photo of a small firm transporting wages in a wheelbarrow because the number of banknotes required to pay workers grew very large during the hyperinflation (Feldman 1993, p. 680). Corbis, an Internet source of photos (www.corbis.com), shows an image of a German woman burning banknotes in her stove because doing so provided more heat than using them to buy other fuel would have done. Another image shows German children playing with blocks of banknotes in the street.

More-recent examples of very high inflation have occurred mostly in Latin America and former Eastern bloc nations. Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Peru, and Uruguay together experienced an average annual inflation rate of 121 percent between 1970 and 1987. In Bolivia, prices increased by 12,000 percent in 1985. In Peru, a near hyperinflation occurred in 1988 as prices rose by about 2,000 percent for the year, or by 30 percent per month. However, Thayer Watkins documents that the record hyperinflation of all time occurred in Yugoslavia between 1993 and 1994.2

The Latin American countries with high inflation also experienced a phenomenon called “dollarization,” the use of U.S. dollars in place of the domestic currency. As inflation rises, people come to believe that their own currency is not a good way to store value and they attempt to exchange their domestic money for dollars. In 1973, 90 percent of time deposits in Bolivia were denominated in Bolivian pesos. By 1985, the year of the Bolivian hyperinflation, more than 60 percent of time deposit balances were denominated in dollars.

What caused high inflation in Latin America? Many Latin American countries borrowed heavily during the 1970s and agreed to repay their debts in dollars. As interest rates rose, all of these countries found it increasingly difficult to meet their debt service obligations. The high-inflation countries were those that responded to these higher costs by printing money.

The Bolivian hyperinflation is a case in point. Eliana Cardoso explains that in 1982 Hernán Siles Suazo took power as head of a leftist coalition that wanted to satisfy demands for more government spending on domestic programs but faced growing debt service obligations and falling prices for its tin exports. The Bolivian government responded to this situation by printing money. Faced with a shortage of funds, it chose to raise revenue through the inflation tax instead of raising income taxes or reducing other government spending.

http://www.econlib.org/library/Enc/Hyperinflation.html


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Re: 12 Warning Signs of U.S. Hyperinflation

Postby Canadian_watcher » Fri Apr 01, 2011 8:15 pm

justdrew wrote:I don't see exactly how hyperinflation can happen. Are we to believe that at some point McDonald's workers (for example) would be getting checks for $100,000.00 ? It just doesn't seem like that could happen.


I'm sure that those in Weimar felt the same way.

“It was horrible. Horrible! Like lightning it struck. No one was prepared. The shelves in the grocery stores were empty. You could buy nothing with your paper money.” – Ralph Foster, "Fiat Paper Currency: The Hstory and Evolution of Our Money"
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Re: 12 Warning Signs of U.S. Hyperinflation

Postby justdrew » Fri Apr 01, 2011 8:20 pm

well, regarding the "how could it happens" factor. the wiki definition, etc, "large increase in the money supply" but the money supply is disconnected. The fed can make all the funny money they want, and so long as it never 'trickles down' into the real economy, and remains within the bullshit FIRE economy, it wouldn't have any 'real' effect. I suspect much of the truth about the "vast corporate profits and pay checks and bonus payments etc" is that the money/economy has been broken for over a decade, and it generates these huge sums of fake profit utterly unrelated to actual cash flows, so they have to keep that money segregated from reality, only occasionally able to cash out small amounts of it.

anyway, it's a theory :shrug:
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Re: 12 Warning Signs of U.S. Hyperinflation

Postby Canadian_watcher » Fri Apr 01, 2011 8:27 pm

yeah, exactly.. that's what I was getting at earlier:

Canadian_watcher wrote:But let's get 'reality based' for a minute and just look at the bare fact that is now common knowledge: money means nothing. To me this whole thing hinges on a critical mass scenario. Exactly when is it going to reach the point where people figure out that if you can fix the Japanese crisis by manipulating currency markets in the short term that the same could be applied to household debt? The pure rage factor is a wild card. Money = shit. Worse than shit.


it's all a complete and obvious sleight of hand now. The only question for me is: when will the bluff be called? Surely either Russia or China is sitting there drooling waiting for the order to sell.
Satire is a sort of glass, wherein beholders do generally discover everybody's face but their own.-- Jonathan Swift

When a true genius appears, you can know him by this sign: that all the dunces are in a confederacy against him. -- Jonathan Swift
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Re: 12 Warning Signs of U.S. Hyperinflation

Postby vanlose kid » Fri Apr 01, 2011 8:28 pm

justdrew wrote:well, regarding the "how could it happens" factor. the wiki definition, etc, "large increase in the money supply" but the money supply is disconnected. The fed can make all the funny money they want, and so long as it never 'trickles down' into the real economy, and remains within the bullshit FIRE economy, it wouldn't have any 'real' effect. I suspect much of the truth about the "vast corporate profits and pay checks and bonus payments etc" is that the money/economy has been broken for over a decade, and it generates these huge sums of fake profit utterly unrelated to actual cash flows, so they have to keep that money segregated from reality, only occasionally able to cash out small amounts of it.

anyway, it's a theory :shrug:


and a way to actually hide inflation. double-entry economy.

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Re: 12 Warning Signs of U.S. Hyperinflation

Postby vanlose kid » Fri Apr 01, 2011 8:37 pm

Canadian_watcher wrote:yeah, exactly.. that's what I was getting at earlier:

Canadian_watcher wrote:But let's get 'reality based' for a minute and just look at the bare fact that is now common knowledge: money means nothing. To me this whole thing hinges on a critical mass scenario. Exactly when is it going to reach the point where people figure out that if you can fix the Japanese crisis by manipulating currency markets in the short term that the same could be applied to household debt? The pure rage factor is a wild card. Money = shit. Worse than shit.


it's all a complete and obvious sleight of hand now. The only question for me is: when will the bluff be called? Surely either Russia or China is sitting there drooling waiting for the order to sell.


When Sigmund Freud was first attempting to chart the geography of the human psyche, he kept encountering an outrageous association — money and excrement. ...

link


Freud: "My mood also depends very strongly on my earnings. Money is laughing gas for me. I know from my youth that once the wild horses of the pampas have been lassoed, they retain a certain anxiousness for life. Thus I came to know the helplessness of poverty and continually fear it. You will see that my style will improve and my ideas will be more correct if this city provides me with an ample livelihood." (Masson, 1985, p. 374; italics added)

http://www.pep-web.org/document.php?id=jaa.017.0609a


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Re: 12 Warning Signs of U.S. Hyperinflation

Postby vanlose kid » Fri Apr 01, 2011 8:40 pm

Image


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Re: 12 Warning Signs of U.S. Hyperinflation

Postby anothershamus » Fri Apr 01, 2011 8:43 pm

vanlose kid wrote:
JackRiddler wrote:... As he dishes it out typical banksterist propaganda about the evil government (the one that saved the banksters and is run by them).

Classic, pathological projection.

.


Jack, leaving questions of probability/conceivability aside, are you saying: it can't happen here?

what's more, Lira, whatever he may be, and he like most "financial bloggers/writers, Krugman included, does have a schtick, as far as i can recall doesn't make the distinction between banks and government that you attribute to him. as far as i can recall.

edit: which is not that far, i'll admit.

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Gonzalo Lira seems to have sparked a flame or two eh?

Be advised that he LIVED THROUGH THE ARGENTINE HYPERINFLATION! This means something, he sees the same signs and denials that were around in Argentina at the time. He even gives you investment tips for the coming financial apocalypse, (for a 35$ fee). I look to him as an alert system, the alert may be just a drill, or it could be a weak tsunami, or it could be a huge tsunami that takes out the nuclear reactors and destroys Tokyo!
But it's worth being prepared. And if I decide to give him $35 I will let you know his investment strategies, (for a $40 dollar fee) Hahahahhahaah!
)'(
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Re: 12 Warning Signs of U.S. Hyperinflation

Postby vanlose kid » Fri Apr 01, 2011 8:56 pm

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FED contingency planning (just thinking out loud, folks):

Kocherlakota Suggests It May Be Time For Fed To Consider "Bailing Out", Or At Least LBOing, America

Submitted by Tyler Durden on 04/01/2011 12:15 -0400

We can only assume this is some evil April Fool's joke: in a speech, titled appropriately: "Central Bank Independence and Sovereign Default" given at Wharton, Minneapolis Fed's Kocherlakota who now it can be put to rest was well aware of what today's NFP number will be, says the following: "I’ve argued that even if the fiscal authority borrows exclusively in its country’s own currency, the central bank can have a large amount of control over the price level. But the central bank can only achieve that control if it is willing to commit to letting the fiscal authority default. Such a commitment may expose the country to risks of short-term and medium-term output losses. How this trade-off should best be resolved awaits future research. But I suspect that it may be optimal for central banks to guarantee fiscal authority debts in some situations." In other words, if this is really a prevailing mode of thought within the Fed, very soon we may witness the first ever Leveraged Buyout by a central bank of a sovereign, leading to advent of the concept known as the Full Faith and Credit Of The Chairsatan. It will also certainly cement the perception of the Fed as an "independent" organization. And one wonders why gold is well on its way to recouping today's losses.

From: Central Bank Independence and Sovereign Default

Narayana Kocherlakota - President
Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis

Wharton Conference
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania

Sargent and Wallace published their classic “Some Unpleasant Monetarist Arithmetic” in the Minneapolis Fed’s Quarterly Review in 1981. Since that date, there has been a growing appreciation of the role of fiscal policy in the determination of the price level. The idea is a simple one. Consider a government that borrows only using non-indexed debt denominated in its own currency. There is an intertemporal government budget constraint that implies that the current real value of government liabilities — including the monetary base — must equal the present value of future real surpluses. Because the liabilities are nominal and non-indexed, the government budget constraint provides a linkage between the public’s assessment of future real tax collections and government spending and the current price level.

I like John Cochrane’s analogy here.2 He thinks of money and government bonds as being like stock in a company. Just like a firm’s stock, money and bonds implicitly represent claims to the ownership of the government’s stream of surpluses. And just like with financial assets, the variations in their prices are fundamentally linked to variations in the present discounted value of government profits — that is, surpluses.3

This simple insight has rather profound consequences for how we think about inflation. Inflation is no longer “always and everywhere a monetary phenomenon”. Instead, even apparently independent central banks may not have control of the price level. Thus, if the public begins to think that the fiscal authority is behaving irresponsibly, that belief will push upward on the price level.

However, in the existing literature, the analysis of fiscal effects on the price level is typically based on the presumption that a fiscal authority will never default on liabilities denominated in its own currency. In my remarks today, I will relax this assumption. Once I do so, it will become clear that a sufficiently tough central bank does have the ability to control the price level, regardless of the behavior of the fiscal authority. 4 I will argue that its ability to do so hinges on the nature of its response to the possibility of default on the part of the fiscal authority. I will talk about some of the short-run versus long-run tensions involved in that response. Throughout, I will refer to the central bank as CB and the fiscal authority as FA. I will refer to the currency as being dollars, but that should not be viewed as suggesting that I am talking about the United States — or Australia.

Let me start by describing a simple CB policy: a commodity price peg. Suppose the central bank holds X ounces of gold. It commits to being willing to buy and sell p dollars for each ounce of gold, and has a monetary base of $pX. This policy successfully ties the price level to variations in the price of gold, regardless of the behavior of the FA.

What impact does this policy have on the FA? Now, when the FA borrows in dollars, it is essentially borrowing in a real commodity: gold. All of the FA’s debt is essentially indexed to the price of gold, and it is certainly conceivable that various shocks could lead the FA to default on those obligations.5

Of course, as I have argued elsewhere, this simple policy is generally viewed as suboptimal by macroeconomists. 6 In contrast, suppose that the CB follows an aggressive Taylor rule when determining the path of the short-term interest rate. 7 That policy pins down an inflation path in the usual way, regardless of the FA’s fiscal plans.8 However, given that inflation path, the FA’s nominal debt is now actually real. This means that if the FA is faced with an unexpected decline in its current and expected future real surpluses, it will be forced to default.9

Thus, once we allow for the possibility of default by the FA, a sufficiently tough CB can have considerable control over the price level. Of course, I’ve been arguing through examples. It would be more interesting to deliver a fuller characterization of the term “sufficiently tough” — but I’m not going to attempt to do so. Instead, in what follows, I’ll discuss some aspects of the CB’s response to a particularly critical situation.

Suppose the FA owes $10 billion on a given Friday. It plans to repay that loan by auctioning new debt on the preceding Monday. However, when it auctions off the new debt, it finds that it can only raise $5 billion. The FA is now in danger of defaulting on its Friday obligation of $10 billion.

It is at this stage that the level of commitment of the CB to its chosen inflation path will be severely tested. The FA will ask the CB to take some action that will allow the FA to raise an additional $5 billion on Wednesday. There are many possible actions. The FA might ask the CB to intervene by setting a floor on the price of debt in the Wednesday auction. But there are less overt approaches. For example, the CB can commit to a price peg for the FA’s debt in the secondary market for that debt.

In any event, if the CB does intervene in some way to ensure the FA’s solvency, the CB no longer can be said to have independent control over the price level. If the CB’s intervention was largely unanticipated by markets, expected inflation will rise after the CB’s intervention. Then, incipient fiscal insolvency has triggered inflationary pressures. Of course, markets may well have already assigned a positive probability to the possibility that the CB might intervene in this kind of scenario. If so, then past inflation was already influenced by the markets’ expectations of this fiscal policy scenario.

Should the CB be required to never intervene in this sort of insolvency scenario? I’ve argued that a ban on these interventions will give the CB more independence in its control over the price level. For those who think of CB independence as being the foundational element of macroeconomic policy, that pretty much settles the question.

But I see a couple of reasons for caution here. It is certainly conceivable that FA insolvency can be triggered by shocks that are well outside of the control of the FA itself. And, empirically, FA insolvency is associated with large short-term and even medium-term declines in output. Should the CB be prepared to drive the FA into insolvency given the possible adverse economic impact on the country?

More subtly, regardless of the FA’s solvency, sovereign debt issues can fail simply through a co-ordination failure among investors. If I, as an investor, don’t anticipate that others will buy into the debt issue, I won’t either. In this sense, sovereign debt issues may be susceptible to suboptimal “runs”. The CB can eliminate this possibility by ensuring the nominal promises of the FA whenever the FA is threatened with default.

Thus, I see trade-offs. On the one hand, the CB is known to be willing to intervene to keep the FA solvent, then inflation is necessarily shaped by fiscal considerations and by the short-run incentives of elected officials. We know from many years of theoretical and empirical research that this effect is not a desirable one. On the other hand, if the CB is fully committed to allow the FA to default if necessary, then even optimal debt management by the FA may end up exposing the country to troubling risks.

Let me wrap up. I’ve argued that even if the fiscal authority borrows exclusively in its country’s own currency, the central bank can have a large amount of control over the price level. But the central bank can only achieve that control if it is willing to commit to letting the fiscal authority default. Such a commitment may expose the country to risks of short-term and medium-term output losses. How this trade-off should best be resolved awaits future research. But I suspect that it may be optimal for central banks to guarantee fiscal authority debts in some situations. If so, we again have to think of price level determination as something that is done jointly by the fiscal authority and the central bank — just as Sargent and Wallace taught us 30 years ago.


http://www.zerohedge.com/article/kocher ... ng-america


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