http://www.dailykos.com/storyonly/2009/ ... n-Honduras.
Whom the gods would destroy, part 3: The crisis in Honduras.
Introduction: 3. Responses to the coup: This section of the multi-part series examines responses to the coup by the US government. The documentary record, as well as actions taken by the US government suggest that either the United States was complicit in the coup either before or after the fact. Alternatively, perhaps the State Department is so incompetent that it poses a clear and present danger to the United States.
This section also looks at the causes of violence in Honduras. While it's very difficult to get an exact read on what is going on, there is a serious concern about the presence of paramilitary troops, many of them from Colombia. There's an outside chance that they are being funded by USAID/Plan Colombia money. What is not at doubt is that US money flowing through NED is being used to influence the elections.
Whom the gods would destroy
By Charles Utwater II
3. Responses to the coup
a. Recap In the previous section, it was established that there is reason to suspect that the decision to overthrow Zelaya was arrived at, perhaps in consultation with the US military and State Department,
before Zelaya announced the Decree calling for a consulta. Also, certain documents, notably a letter purporting to represent Zelaya’s resignation but also perhaps some of the Supreme Court documents including the warrant for his arrest, may have been falsified. The international community intervened to reverse the coup not arbitrarily, but because the expulsion of Zelaya and other plain violations of
Honduran law thrust the matter into its collective face. It was further shown that the legal theory raised by the Law Library of the Library of Congress in the defense of the proposition that Zelaya’s removal could be legitimate was based on laughably bad research.
It seems clear that the courts overstepped their bounds on several matters. First, as Edmundo Orellana [14] said:
The court made an inexcusable error, to wit: to attempt that in the verdict would be included not only the Act that had been challenged, but also all future Acts of the defendant. With that, in practice, the clarification became a new verdict, which would rule on Acts which were not the object of the verdict and, additionally, which lacked physical reality, since it attempted to command regarding Acts which the judge imagined the Executive might order in the future.
But the court also overstepped in forbidding Zelaya’s dismissal of General Romeo Vásquez Velásquez. As HondurasCoup2009 dryly commented [54] in summarizing the Supreme Court’s ruling about the case, which directly flies in the face of Constitutional language giving the President absolute power to dismiss military commanders: "Zelaya apparently
could fire the general, but he did it the wrong way."
Granted, the dismissal of the General could be viewed as defiance of the order forbidding a consulta. This is what coup supporters argue and it’s the reason that Edmundo Orellana resigned. As he said in his resignation letter to the Congress [55], the poll had not been declared illegal, but the Court had ordered in an act of "juridical idiocy" that it not be conducted, so he advised the President to abstain from pressing against the envelope.
However, Zelaya
had shown respect for the Judiciary by modifying Decreto-05-2009 to remove the offending language and to make it clear that what he was attempting was a
nonbinding opinion poll. The Armed Forces are not constitutionally responsible for conducting polls. Therefore, removing the survey forms from the Army base fell outside the Court’s order. Whether one agrees with this argument or not, the Court should have heard arguments on the matter rather than pressing forward with a "juridical idiocy." The fact that in the language in their cover letter describing their actions they were forced to shuffle, like a naughty child sneaking a cookie, from consulta in points 1-3 to consulta o encuesta in point 4 and to encuesta in point 5 illustrates their own disrespect for the law. One need not agree with Zelaya’s relentless determination to press forward toward a Constituyente to conclude that the Supreme Court acted arbitrarily, in a manner inconsistent with the Honduran Constitution.
In weighing these matters and understanding what the consequences of the coup will be, it’s important to understand the true situation in the country, the true attitude of the United States government, and the present attitude of the world. The following sub-sections review the actions and statements of the US government, as well as the thin evidence regarding the sources of violence in Honduras.
b. The State Department. The US government is not monolithic. In Haiti, for example, the CIA all but publicly opposed the efforts of President Clinton to stabilize Haiti when he sent peacekeeping troops in 1993. The State Department and the Administration do enunciate policy publicly. They can be judged by whether their actions match their words, and they choose their words exceptionally carefully. But the actions of the covert branches of the government such as the CIA are not reported as such. They must usually be inferred from events.
A complication occurs because a proliferation of agencies—governmental, non-profit (NGO), and quasi-nongovernmental (quango)—serve as conduits for covert money flowing through what looks like non-covert pipelines. For example, Hillary Clinton not only heads the State Department, she is Chairman of the Board of Millenium Challenge Corp.[56] a heretofore ineffectual quango that drinks from the State Department trough (see S.1434 for the most recent status of 2010 Foreign Aid appropriations). Millenium Challenge Corporation (MDC) supplies large amounts of money to projects in Honduras, the continuation of which has the effect of sustaining the dictatorship [57], including direct payments to companies owned by Liberal Party candidate, Elvin Santos [58]. The continued flow of money, and the grudging reduction of the volume of its flow by Clinton, supports the idea that the State Department supports the coup. However, there is an alternative interpretation to the money situation, namely that Clinton needed projects to be completed to justify the continuation of MDC in the face of increasing congressional asperity and was willing to sacrifice democracy in Honduras to achieve that end.
Another indicator that the US government is not serious about preventing the precedent established by a successful coup is that the CIA-linked International Republican Institute (IRI), an NGO receiving money from the (State Department-funded quango) National Endowment for Democracy (NED) [59, 60, 61], is going to Honduras as an "observer" of the elections, along with its faux-left counterpart, the National Democratic Institute [62].
Whether such groups are directed by the CIA or whether their actions are inspired by pure stupidity is unclear. What is clear is that their meddling generally backfires, sometimes as catastrophically as the intervention in Venezuela. Even their great success, Viktor Yuschenko of the Ukraine, is now under 10% approval in the polls, [63], regarded as incompetent and quarrelsome. Sending observers, widely believed to be tutored by the CIA but certainly not tutored in the complex politics of Honduras, to meddle in elections that most outsiders regard as a sham reinforces the notion that the State Department supports the coup. If a foreign government did this to us, we might well declare war.
The most unambiguous signal that the US was never serious about negotiating Zelaya’s return was its choice of Lewis Amselem, Deputy U.S. Permanent Representative to the Organization of American States, as representative to the OAS. There is no doubt that Amselem is a veteran, having joined the foreign service in 1978. Nor is there any question that he has relevant experience. One problem is his abrasive personality. After suffering the gratuitously rude remarks of Lewis Amselem for many months, Rodolfo Pastor Fasquelle said the following. As a post by a member of the government on the official website, it carries special force [64]:
"Someone has to say it to the American people. The people of Honduras feel betrayed by the United States government and resent the bad joke played by American diplomats at its expense. We were led to believe first that the US government sympathized with our plight, only to discover gradually that it is willing to back and whitewash the dictatorship imposed on us."...
"...there has never once been a sign of solidarity, much less of condemnation, from the US. We would not have US military intervention. And we are not asking for particular reprisals (those are sovereign decisions) but only that the US be consistent with the position to which it had committed itself, of working within regional multilateral organization"
...
With no small insolence, insinuating that U.S. recognition will be enough in the end, U.S. Ambassador Amselem asked the OAS Assembly last week: "What does not recognizing the coming elections mean, not in the the world of magic realism, but in the real world?" Since diplomats won’t, let me explain to such a well-read man that it means that Honduras is headed toward a Revolution, with the backing of the peoples and governments of the continent and, that being the circumstance, perhaps it is not in the interest of the country he represents and which purports to back multilateralism, to stand in our way.
If only bad manners were the worst of Amselem’s problems. His real problem is that he is closely associated, at least in the minds of Central Americans, with the Guatemalan death squads. The following, presented here thanks to Al Giordano’s [65] good memory, is from Sister Dianna Ortiz’s account of her kidnapping, gang-rape. and torture by those death squads:
"...after a U.S. doctor had counted 111 cigarette burns on my back alone, the story changed. In January 1990, the Guatemalan defense minister publicly announced that I was a lesbian and had staged my abduction to cover up a tryst. The minister of the interior echoed this statement and then said he had heard it first from the U.S. embassy. According to a congressional aide, the political affairs officer at the U.S. embassy, Lew Amselem, was indeed spreading the same rumor.
"In the presence of Ambassador Thomas Stroock, this same human rights officer told a delegation of religious men and women concerned about my case that he was ‘tired of these lesbian nuns coming down to Guatemala.’ The story would undergo other permutations. According to the Guatemalan press, the ambassador came up with another version: he told the Guatemalan defense minister that I was not abducted and tortured but simply ‘had problems with [my] nerves.’" [66]
Lewis Amselem is the man that Hillary Clinton had at the table representing the United States of America in negotiations regarding a dictatorship that included at least one member of the Honduran death squads of the 1980s, Billy Joya Améndola [67, 68] and that showed every sign of going down the road of repression and murder that Central America had experienced then. Incredibly, Clinton had met with Sister Dianna in the 1990s and presumably knew of Amselem’s role in covering up American complicity in her ordeal. If, by some fluke she didn’t know about Amselem's past before the Honduran crisis, she has been reminded.
In addition to suspending some MDC funds, the US did, after a long delay, lift the visas of a few members of the coup membership. Among other actions that the US might have taken and did not were the following:
• Declare the event a military coup
• Withdraw the US Ambassador
• Withdraw the US military
• Refuse to include Honduras in scheduled Panamax military exercises
• Enact a trade embargo
• Freeze bank accounts of members of the dictatorship
• Suspend all travel
While most of these are serious sanctions, not to be undertaken lightly, the failure to have any serious sanctions that would puncture the confidence of the dictatorship is, at best, incompetence. The coup media openly discussed the matter as evidence of US lack of seriousness or even of support.
As was noted by Arnold August [69], the very first statement of Hillary Clinton [70] failed even to call the coup a coup, calling it an "action." While one does not wish to over-interpret her choice of words, diplomatic language is very carefully chosen. Doubtless the Secretary discussed this phrase with her career advisors. Yet it’s a word that is unusual in diplomatic language, being used more usually in concert with an adjective, e.g., "military action" or "diplomatic action." "Actions" are things requiring a response, like a move in chess.
From that fog-beshrouded start, the State Department’s line only softened. Here are key excerpts from June and July, as well as a few additional excerpts from August-November.
6/29 (Monday) Press briefing [37]: Ian Kelly: "...we’re looking to do is make it clear to the various parties in Honduras that this is absolutely outside the bounds of democratic principles and constitutional norms, and it needs to be reversed."
...
QUESTION: "Is that the only way constitutional order can be restored? The only way democratic rule is restored is if he is brought back to power?"
MR. KELLY: "I think that’s the most important aspect of it that we are focused on now."
...
QUESTION: "Is it fair to say that the Secretary said, look, as a practical matter, this is a coup, but we’re not yet making that formal legal determination, which would, of course, then trigger the cutoff of most aid."
MR. KELLY: "Yeah."
6/30 (Tuesday) Press Briefing [71]: MR. KELLY: "Well, okay. You heard what the Secretary said yesterday. She said that there is a coup."
QUESTION: "Well –"
MR. KELLY: "The President said there’s a coup."
QUESTION: "Right."
MR. KELLY: "We do have some facts, of course, and the facts are that the constitutional order in Honduras has been overturned."
7/2 (Thursday) Press briefing [72]: MR. KELLY: "Well, of course, our goal is the restoration of constitutional – of the constitutional order in Tegucigalpa, which means the restoration of President Zelaya."
On July 5th, Zelaya attempted to return with President of the UN General Assembly Miguel d’Escoto to his homeland via Toncontin airport. The coup parked trucks on the runway to prevent the plane from landing.
7/6 (Monday) Press briefing [73]: QUESTION: "Have you figured out yet what – when you say you seek the restoration of democratic order, have you guys yet figured out exactly what that means?"
MR. KELLY: "Well, I think it means – in the most immediate instance, it means the return of the democratically elected president to Tegucigalpa –.."
7/7 (Tuesday Press briefing [74]: MR. KELLY: "Well, I know I owe you guys an answer on what exactly we have decided to pause, what aid we’re not pushing through. So we’re still working on this. Basically, what we’re looking at is aid that would directly benefit the de facto regime down there, so obviously, that means military assistance programs. But we’re still – I mean, we’ve taken a policy decision to stop aid that might be subject to this – the statute. And so I think that’s kind of a broad definition. I mean, it’s still a fairly small percentage of our overall aid because most of our aid would not come under this statute. And this would be humanitarian aid, which goes directly to the people – it doesn’t go to the government – and any aid that would be construed as democracy promotion."
...
QUESTION: "There is reports in Honduras that the money who is coming in from democracy and – you know, it’s getting in hands of the opposition guys who now are celebrating that Zelaya is out of power or out of government. Are you –"
MR. KELLY: "No, I’m not –"
QUESTION: "Will you review that situation? Is there at least any –"
MR. KELLY: "I’m not aware of those reports. But as I say, we’re conducting a very thorough review of all our assistance right now."
7/10 (Friday) Press briefing[75]: QUESTION: "And your end game is – or the end result that you want to see is Zelaya return?"
ASSISTANT SECRETARY CROWLEY: "We haven’t changed. That’s exactly right."
7/14 (Tuesday) Press briefing [76]: QUESTION: "And does that still entail his – Zelaya’s return?"
MR. KELLY: "That’s – that yes – because that is – the restoration of the democratic order would mean the restoration of the democratically elected president."
QUESTION: "Who is?"
MR. KELLY: "President Zelaya."
7/20 (Monday) Press briefing [77]: QUESTION: "P.J., just to clarify that. You said that you told Zelaya that mediation is the way. But have you told him specifically, ‘Do not go back because it’s dangerous and it could create tension and violence’."
MR. CROWLEY: "Yes."
QUESTION: "Directly, you’ve said that?"
MR. CROWLEY: "Yes."
...
QUESTION: "Coming back to Honduras, we’re getting some reports out of the region that there might be some sort of rift now between Zelaya and the Venezuelan Government. Is that Washington’s understanding? And if so, is that something that can be leveraged as these negotiations move on? To put it another way, is Chavez out of the way, and does that make Washington happy?"
MR. CROWLEY: "(Laughter.) We certainly think that if we were choosing a model government and a model leader for countries of the region to follow, that the current leadership in Venezuela would not be a particular model. If that is the lesson that President Zelaya has learned from this episode, that would be a good lesson."
...
MR. CROWLEY: "I mean, right now, our focus is on the mediation efforts and trying to help President Arias find a way to bring this to a successful conclusion. I mean, this isn’t – it – we shouldn’t personalize this. We are committed to a return to democratic and constitutional order. We want to see President Zelaya finish his term. We want to see Honduras move forward with new elections and to put in place a new government that the Honduran people can support, and we’ll see as legitimate. We reject the – rejected the extra-constitutional way in which President Zelaya was removed from power. But these are about the – this is about our support for the principles that are laid out in the Inter-American Democratic Charter."
"I think what you see here is that we have put in place a policy that reflects those principles. It’s why the Secretary went to the region last month and fought hard for those principles in the – when the issue came up over Cuba. It’s not about a particular leader. It’s about a trend that we’ve seen in the region, a very encouraging trend that we’ve seen in the region in recent decades. And we don’t want to see any backsliding from that trend."
"Yes."
QUESTION: "When you say that the Venezuelan Government is – should not be an example of government for any leader –"
MR. CROWLEY: "I’m a believer in understatement."
QUESTION: "Can you say that again? (Laughter.) It’s like – it’s justifying, sort of, the coup d’état, because if any government try to follow the socialist Government of Venezuela, then it’s fair, then, that somebody can try to make it – you know, defeat the government or something like that? Can you explain a little bit where we’re – what was your statement about Venezuela?"
On July 24th, Zelaya crossed briefly into Honduras from Nicaragua. Despite the dictatorship’s growls that he would be arrested for many crimes, again he was not.
July 27 (Monday) press briefing [78]: QUESTION: "Yeah. President Zelaya – not very happy with comments that Secretary Clinton made on Friday saying that his move was reckless, and he’s asking for the Administration to take – you know, put immediate sanctions on numerous people. What’s your reaction to that?"
MR. KELLY: "Well, we’re continuing to urge President Zelaya to allow this political process to play out, this – these negotiations that are being spearheaded by Costa Rican President Arias. We are urging all sides to refrain from actions that would not further this process. And we see this attempt to enter Honduras, absent any kind of political agreement between the two sides that would allow for his return, as not helpful."
"And what happened on Friday, as you heard, this going right up to the border point and even crossing over the border point, the Secretary termed, I think quite rightly, reckless. And I think that all sides have to focus on coming to a peaceful political resolution of this conflict."
...
QUESTION: "Do you still believe that the return of democratic rule requires the restoration of President Zelaya as president?"
MR. KELLY: "We – our policy remains the same, that we want the restoration of democratic order. And that includes the return by mutual agreement of the democratically elected president, and that’s President Zelaya."
7/28 (Tuesday) Press briefing [79]: MR. KELLY: "...The Department of State is currently reviewing the diplomatic visas or A visas of individuals who are members of the de facto regime in Honduras, as well as the derivative visas for family members of these individuals. We have already revoked diplomatic visas issued to four such individuals. These individuals received their diplomatic visas in connection with positions held prior to June 28th under the Zelaya Administration, but who now serve the de facto regime."
7/31 (Friday) Press briefing [80]: QUESTION: "But do you oppose Micheletti’s flat comments like these, that under no circumstances will Zelaya be allowed to return?"
MR. CROWLEY: "Well, at various times in the last few days, you have heard conflicting reports. Our message to Micheletti and to Zelaya are clear: President Arias has put forward an effective resolution to the crisis, and we encourage both sides to accept it."
The State Department partially cut aid to Honduras on September 3rd.
9/3 (Thursday) Press Briefing [81]: QUESTION: "And then secondly, why not go the whole distance and make the determination that this is a coup, a legal determination?"
MR. CROWLEY: "Well – "
QUESTION: "A military coup."
MR. CROWLEY: "Well, but the Secretary, in terminating the aid, did not have to reach that conclusion."
QUESTION: "But why didn’t she reach that conclusion? Why, when the democratically elected president of a sovereign country gets bundled onto an airplane in his pajamas by the military and flown into exile, is that not a military coup?"
MR. CROWLEY: "Well, let’s focus on what we are trying to do here. We are trying to see democratic, constitutional rule restored in Honduras. ..."
...
QUESTION: "But why isn’t it a military coup?"
MR. CROWLEY: "I’m not going to parse complex facts and judgments here. The Secretary did not have to make that determination to take the action that she has taken."
...
QUESTION: "-- you’re sending a mixed message, because on one hand, yes, you’re suspending aid. You’re not definitively calling it a military coup. And this – and he charges that this Micheletti government is not taking you seriously, is not kind of respecting your will that if you were to be declarative about what you think this is, that you would – he would have a better leg to stand on."
MR. CROWLEY: "Well, I think we’ve actually sent, Elise, a very clear message. The United States is sending a very clear and compelling message to the de facto regime: The status quo isn’t acceptable. They have, in fact, failed to sign on to the San Jose Accords. They have, in fact, failed to assure the international community they are willing to abide by the outlines of the Arias process – the international monitoring, the truth and reconciliation commission."
"The United States is sending a very clear message here: We want to see democratic, constitutional rule restored to Honduras through peaceful means."
11/18/09 (Wednesday) Press briefing [82]: QUESTION: "Ian, on Honduras, the parliament seems to have put off until after the election a decision on whether Zelaya will be restored. What does that do for the possible credibility of these elections?"
MR. KELLY: "Yeah. Well, let me give you kind of an update of where we are. Craig Kelly, of course, has been in Tegucigalpa. He’s been down there to help support the implementation of the accord. He held a series of meetings down there to support the OAS efforts to have it fully implemented. He’s met with President Zelaya and he met with the de facto leader Mr. Micheletti. He told us that these were very frank and open talks.
Regarding the reports on the Honduran lawmakers will not decide on whether or not to restore Zelaya until after the elections, according to the accord, the – it called for the national congress to issue a pronouncement on the restoration of a democratically elected authority, Mr. Zelaya. As you know, it never stipulated a timetable for the congressional action. All along, we’ve called on the congress to act expeditiously in the spirit of the accord. We believe that steady steps towards the implementation of the accord will enhance the prospects for transparent, free, and open elections that will ultimately resolve this crisis and allow Honduras to rejoin the international community of nations.
Another one of these important steps towards the implementation of the accord and resolving this crisis is the formation of the – of a government of national unity. So that’s also an important component to this.
But since the accord never actually gave any kind of deadline by – to have this vote by the national congress, scheduling the vote on December 2nd doesn’t necessarily – isn’t necessarily inconsistent with the accord."
QUESTION: "What – I’m sorry. That’s – you’ve just opened your – this is – they’re going to have a field day with this. So it’s okay with you if five years from now, they go and come back and say, all right, yeah, Zelaya can go – he’s restored, when you can’t – you can’t be restored after you’re voted out of office if you’re not – he’s not even running."
MR. KELLY: "That’s right. I mean, he – his term ends the end of January."
QUESTION: "Yeah. And so it’s okay – so it’s okay with you, and you’ll – it will be all right and you’ll accept the results of the election, if they – even if they don’t put him back in when you –"
MR. KELLY: "Well, he’s not running. He’s not running for the election."
QUESTION: "Yeah, but he’s going to be out – he’s effectively out of office. I mean, talk about – that’s the lamest of lame ducks. He’s not – he is – I’m confused. You no longer think that he has to be restored before he is voted out of office?"
MR. KELLY: "Well, it has been a very strong principle of ours that in order for the country to be reconciled, there has to be a restoration of the democratically elected president. That implies that he has to be restored before the end of his term, okay?"
QUESTION: "So basically –"
QUESTION: "All right. So 10 minutes – 10 minutes before the end of his term?"
QUESTION: "December – until the end of January it can be."
MR. KELLY: "Look, I mean, clearly, he has to be restored in a timely way. And I don’t think we’ve ever said anything but that."
State Dept. briefing (Thursday), 11/19/09 [83]: QUESTION: "I believe last week, or maybe a little bit before then, you were asked about human rights abuses in Honduras, and reports from the same organization that Dave just mentioned as well as Amnesty International and local human rights groups who have catalogued 4,234 violations since the coup, including 21 murders, or executions as they call them."
"There are growing calls from trade union movement here for the U.S. not to recognize the elections unless these things are corrected. Is this something of concern to you guys?"
MR. KELLY: "It is. It has been and remains a concern. There have been a number of human rights violations since the coup, and we have consistently called on the regime to respect the rights of individual citizens. And we’ve been particularly concerned about some of the moves against the media. And the U.S. Embassy in Tegucigalpa is closely monitoring the situation. It has reported back to us about a number of allegations of arbitrary arrests, disproportionate use of force, and, in particular, restrictions on freedom of expression. So yeah, we are concerned about it."
QUESTION: "Well, what are you doing about it?"
MR. KELLY: "Well, I just laid out to you that we’re monitoring very, very closely and we’re engaged with the government of Mr. Micheletti to express our concerns."
QUESTION: "Right, but do you think that this has any impact on whether the election can be free and fair?"
MR. KELLY: "I mean, an election being recognized as free and fair has many different aspects. The lack of freedom of media, of course, is an important – would be an important indicator of this. But as I’ve said before, I think we need to look at exactly how the elections are conducted. But it is fair to say that we are concerned about the human rights situation."
QUESTION: "All right. Well, I guess what I’m trying to get at is does this play any role in whether you will recognize the election, setting aside the whole Zelaya reinstitution? "
MR. KELLY: "Well –"
QUESTION: "Or is it a case where, "Well, there may be some abuses going on and it may – but it’s not going to – we’re still going to recognize the election?"
MR. KELLY: "We’ll have to see how it – how they’re actually conducted. Part of it, of course, is the run-up to the elections themselves. It’s not just the day of the election. A big part of whether or not elections are free and fair –"
QUESTION: "That’s exactly why I’m asking the question. In the run-up to the election, so it –"
MR. KELLY: "Yeah, yeah. Well, sure, I mean, we’ll look at restrictions on the media, particularly restrictions of access to candidates in the campaign before the elections themselves."
Most interesting of these are the briefings of 7/7 (in which the State Department is informed that US appropriations through the democracy programs like the IRI are being misapplied to fund the dictatorship), and 7/20, in which Colonel Crowley says he hopes that Zelaya has learned a lesson, which certainly sounds like a threat. One of the press calls him out, saying that is sounds as if he is justifying the coup d’etat.
In the 9/28 briefing, the reporter astutely notes that State is sending a mixed message by not calling the coup a
military coup, which has consequences in US law. The reporters sense the incoherence of the position that Crowley is defending and pummel him like a piñata. By 11/18, the State Department’s coherence has broken down so far that spokesman Ian Kelly is reduced to saying that Zelaya has to be restored in a timely way, even if that is 10 minutes before his term ends. On 11/19, the State Department finally recognizes that human rights violations have occurred, but only mentions freedom of the press specifically.
Another avenue into understanding the mindset at the State Department is found in a fascinating report from mid-November by anthropologist Adrienne Pine on a meeting with the Director of the Central American desk, Christopher Webster and his sidekick, Gabriela Zambrano [84]. What comes across is a bureaucrat, poorly-informed about the area he is in charge of, defensive, delusional about the prospects of restoring democracy, and yet aware that things are not really going to plan. Among the tidbits tucked into the report, Webster says that:
"the implementation of the San Jose Accords has admittedly not been ideal."
...
"...there have been problems with freedom of the press, but the two main radio stations are on the air, and we were happy to find out that last week's interruptions were just due to interference, not to the de facto government" [but, of course, the interference was due to the de facto government, at least in the case of Channel 36 [85]
...
"The charges of president Zelaya and his supporters of widespread repression are also exaggerated, of military shooting into crowds, etc...." [as Pine says, film of these shootings is widely available]
...
"We have seen some evidence of excessive force, arbitrary arrests" {in other words, he is unaware even of Elizabeth Malkin’s report in The New York Times [86]}
...
[Pine paraphrases his response to her confronting him with evidence that the State Department coup] "By this point the director was shaking visibly, and had begun to stutter. He resented the implication, and begged to differ again, claiming that they did not recognize the de facto government and had done everything in their power to restore democratic order"
...
"I'm not so sure the assassinations are well documented."
...
[Pine paraphrases] "So here I got into the magical realism of the accords, saying that it was everyone's understanding that Zelaya would be reinstated before the elections, by November 5th in fact, and that the accords were worth nothing with that trust broken. At this point, Ms. Zambrano became more active than at any other point in the interview, vigorously and angrily shaking her head ‘no.’ Webster became a lawyer, smugly and aggressively pointing out that it was only the unity government that had to be agreed upon by that time. [which, of course, it wasn’t, because Zelaya as was his right reserved his support for a unity government until the coup demonstrated an inkling of good faith]."
...
"...certainly we don't plan to support repression or repressive elections. We have taken measures against the repression and will take more."
To summarize, then, the State Department shifted its position gradually, shuffling from "[the coup] needs to be reversed" to "the return
by mutual agreement of the democratically elected president" (emphasis added) on 7/27 to "We want to see democratic, constitutional rule restored to Honduras through peaceful means" on 9/3 to the last whimper: "...we’ll look at restrictions on the media..."
The major shift occurred in about mid-July. Colonel Crowley implicitly threatened Zelaya on July 20th by saying that he hoped that he’d learned a lesson regarding Chavez. On July 24th, Zelaya crossed into Nicaragua. Hillary Clinton accused him of being "reckless," though it was never clear why she did so. After that, the Administration never called unilaterally for Zelaya’s restoration even in the weak terms that it had been using in mid-July. Instead, they shifted to a formula saying was only by mutual agreement through the "San Jose Accords" that Zelaya could return. On July 28th, State imposed the very first real sanctions by suspending some visas, so perhaps Zelaya’s bit of theater at the Nicaraguan border had some effects. But State did not really sanction Honduras until September 3rd, when it cut aid. By that time, any chance of significantly affecting the course of events had fled.
c. The Administration. According to a search of the White House archives, there are only 22 documents in which Barack Obama has mentioned Honduras since the coup. Most of those are duplications, such as a press release followed by a press conference, or incidental, such as the nomination of a person to a post. On a few occasions, Obama has spoken clearly, but not boldly, and the limited force of the statements has abated with time. On 6/29, he did not declare the coup "illegal," calling it only "not legal," a far weaker designation. On 7/7, he spoke of the "restoration" of Zelaya. By 8/10, he stated that Zelaya "remains" the president of Honduras. And on 9/16, a joint press release said merely that the US and Canada sought a "peaceful restoration of democratic and constitutional order" without mentioning Zelaya at all. Since then, he has not mentioned the coup in any White House document. His spokesman, Robert Gibbs, was even less forthright. Here are Obama’s key statements:
"President Zelaya was democratically elected. He had not yet completed his term. We believe that the coup was not legal and that President Zelaya remains the President of Honduras, the democratically elected President there. In that we have joined all the countries in the region, including Colombia and the Organization of American States." --Barack Obama, 6/29 [87]
"Now let me be clear: America cannot and should not seek to impose any system of government on any other country, nor would we presume to choose which party or individual should run a country. And we haven't always done what we should have on that front. Even as we meet here today, America supports now the restoration of the democratically-elected President of Honduras, even though he has strongly opposed American policies. We do so not because we agree with him. We do so because we respect the universal principle that people should choose their own leaders, whether they are leaders we agree with or not." --Barack Obama, 7/7/09 [88]
"And in particular, we discussed the coup in Honduras. As has been mentioned, our three nations stand united on this issue. President Zelaya remains the democratically elected president. For the sake of the Honduran people, democratic and constitutional order must be restored." --Barack Obama, 8/10/09 [89]
"In particular, they reiterated their shared commitment to helping the Afghan government prevent Afghanistan from again becoming a base for terrorism and they restated U.S. and Canadian support for the peaceful restoration of democratic and constitutional order in Honduras and called on all parties to accept the San José Accord." --Joint Statement by Stephen Harper and Barack Obama, 9/16 [90]
d. Covert action, the paramilitaries, and allegations against the resistance It’s impossible to know with any certainty what covert branches of the US government or other governments are doing in Honduras.This section covers issues that have been raised related to unlawful violence either by the resistance or by coup government.
As to violence by the resistance, there’s an awkward point. According to Article 3 of the Honduran Constitution, people have a right to insurrection against an illegitimate government [18]. It’s not a matter of settled law how far that goes. While many crimes that have been committed after the coup could not be characterized as crimes of insurrection, certainly graffiti, blocking highways, occupying buildings, and other non-violent crimes or even acts of violence committed in self-defense represent lawful actions. Most of the resistance members in prison would be released if that standard were used.
Still, it’s hard to extend insurrection to the case of arson against a Popeye’s restaurant on August 11th. The resistance claims that this was the work of police infiltrators [91]. Judge Maritza Arita Herrera judge apparently believed that those who had been arrested had some mitigating circumstance, because the young men were given suspended sentences by [92]. Judge Herrera was suspended for not having delivered the verdict that higher-ups wanted [93]. That suspension further deprived subsequent convictions of members of the resistance of legitimacy. Indeed, human rights organizations say that there have been 4,000 politically-motivated cases of imprisonment [94, 95].
Three other cases deserve brief mention. One is the destruction of electrical transmission towers. To the best of my knowledge, the motives and perpetrators are unknown. It certainly could be the work of the resistance, but they’re far from the only suspects. Those who are hurt worst by electrical outages are the less affluent, and the resistance has complained that one means by which the dictatorship controls the media is by electrical outages. The two other cases are murders that occurred at about the same time, Enzo Micheletti (a nephew of the Roberto Micheletti) and the other of Colonel Concepción Jiménez [96]. Authorities have discounted a political motive in both cases. The allegations by the pro-coup press of involvement by Cuba, Nicaragua or Venezuela in violence have never been substantiated.
Violence against the resistance is too extensive to review. About 20 assassinations have been documented, but most human rights observers think that the true numbers run into the hundreds. Especially recently, assassinations of resistance leaders have skyrocketed. Many hundreds have been severely beaten or shot. And, as indicated about, many thousands have been jailed, probably unjustly. One representative murder is that of Marco Antonio Vallecillos, who was a congressional candidate of the minor PINU party, who was murdered by gunmen on a motorcycle. He was the nephew of the owner of Radio Globo [97; see note by reference below].
One report of potential covert activity was of a Dutch Minister to the European Parliament, Hans van Baalen, who was said by Radio Netherlands to have been in Nicaragua to seek Army officers to overthrow President Daniel Ortega. After being invited to troll elsewhere, van Baalen then went to Honduras to consult with Roberto Micheletti Bain [98].
Another report that could represent covert activity was a report on August 2nd by René Andrés Pavón, President of the Honduran Human Rights Commission (CODEH), who told journalist Dick Emanuelsson that Israeli commandos were training Honduran forces, as they had trained Colombian paramilitaries previously [99]. To the best of my knowledge, no independent proof of this exists, but the allegation is specific enough that if there were any investigative reporters left in the US press, they could certainly prove or disprove it. And there’s this very odd point that the Honduran dictatorship keeps claiming that Israel supports it, even as Israel denies the same [100]. According to the coup press, they even provided what the pro-coup press described as very sophisticated technology, the "ultimate secret weapon," a LRAD sonic cannon, to the dictatorship [101].
Israeli mercenaries could, of course, be freelance operators. US mercenaries are found all over the world, often acting independently of or even against US interests. But for some reason, elements of the American couch potato press, notably Frances Robles of the Miami Herald [102], jumped on Zelaya’s mention of this story, presumably to tag Zelaya and therefore the resistance as nutty anti-Semites.
Now, there is anti-Semitism in Latin America. Indeed, the Catholic Church preached it from the pulpit until relatively recently [103]. Honduras is especially complicated, because the oligarchy is ethnically Middle Eastern—mostly of Palestinian Christian descent, but there are also some Jews. Anti-Semitism in Honduras or anywhere else is not to be taken lightly, although the more prevalent form of ethnic hatred is against the "turcos"—those of Arab descent. A shocking case of anti-Semitism was exhibited by David Romero of Radio Globo, himself of Jewish ancestry, who said that he wished that Hitler had succeeded, because (counterfactually) then the Honduran oligarchy would never have existed [104].
Al Giordano, aided by a reader put together a fairly convincing case that Robles may have been so energized by the thought of tagging the resistance as anti-Semitic as to sensationalize or perhaps even fabricate quotes [104]:
In a September 24 story, headlined "They’re Torturing Me, Zelaya Claims," Robles typed the following lead paragraph:
"It's been 89 days since Manuel Zelaya was booted from power. He's sleeping on chairs, and he claims his throat is sore from toxic gases and ‘Israeli mercenaries’ are torturing him with high-frequency radiation [102]."
Normal journalistic procedure when lifting a sensationalist quotation like that reference to "Israeli mercenaries" in a first paragraph is to then, in a later paragraph, provide the full quote in its full context so that readers can judge for themselves what really was said.
Robles did not do that, which raised the first red flag about her intentions.
Asked six times by a reader, via email, to provide the full quote in its context, Robles kept replying via email to that reader with lengthy self-important defenses while still refusing to provide the exact quote from which she extracted the words "Israeli mercenaries" and put other words, not quoted, around them.
Other media reported this story and managed not to sensationalize it. And the readership of the Miami Herald, like that of the rest of the United States, still has no idea whether Israeli mercenaries are training Honduran troops, or not.
One reason why the question of Israeli mercenaries is so interesting is because of a story about which there is no question, namely the introduction of Colombian United Self-Defense Forces (AUC) paramilitaries into Honduras [105]:
The AUC, essentially an umbrella organization of various right-wing death squads, many of which also collaborate with Colombian drug traffickers, is one of the region's most notorious paramilitary organizations and is classified as a terrorist group by the U.S. State Department. Supposedly "demobilized" in 2006, the AUC has largely continued to carry out its drug-dealing activities and campaign of violence and intimidation against campesinos, indigenous peoples, stigmatized social groups such as homosexuals and prostitutes, labor organizers, critical journalists, and human rights advocates.
Interestingly [106],
Earlier this month [March, 2007], Chiquita, the international fruit corporation, admitted to funding a Colombian terrorist group and agreed to pay a $25 million fine. The Justice Department indictment, filed March 13 in D.C. Federal Court, states that Chiquita gave more than $1.7 million to the United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia (Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia - AUC), an illegal right-wing anti-guerrilla group tied to many of the country's most notorious civilian massacres.
That would be the Chiquita that is so influential in Honduras. Another interesting point is that USAID and Plan Colombia money is known to have leaked into the hands of Colombian paramilitaries, but not necessarily the same ones as those who went to Honduras [107].
e. Summary of responses to the coupBy its actions and its words, the US government looks as if it is supporting the coup in a number of ways:
• By failing to impose serious sanctions on the dictatorship,
• By signaling to the dictatorship that it will recognize elections and that elections will serve to wash away the stigma of dictatorship,
• By using Lewis Amselem as a representative, signaling a support for death squads
• By refusing to press the dictatorship on human rights issues,
• By failing to genuinely cut ties to the Honduran military,
• By continuing to inject money through normal channels such as MDC,
• By injecting money and resources through quasi-covert channels such as NED/IRI/NDI and perhaps even through covert channels such as Colombian USAID or Plan Columbia money.
In addition, much of the technology used for repression probably originates in the United States.
The first statements by Barack Obama and by State Department spokesmen are moderately strong rejections of the coup, a position from which they slowly shifted away. That suggests that if there was complicity by the Administration with the coup, it probably began after the expulsion of Zelaya.
It’s of course certainly possible that the State Department is just incredibly incompetent. But the consequences of the coup are serious and lasting. They will be discussed in detail in the final section. The next section will look at the situation in the country at present, and how the elections are likely to play out.
To be continued in part 4
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Blogs you probably aren't reading and should be:
http://www.hondurascoup2009.blogspot.com
http://www.quotha.net
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References
14. Edmundo Orellana, Coup D’état in Honduras. A Juridical Analysis,
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18. Honduran Political Constitution of 1982 through 2005 reforms,
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37. State Department briefing, 6/29/09,
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54. RAJ, The Honduran Supreme Court: In its own words, 7/29,
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55. Edmundo Orellana, resignation letter to Congress, 6/29/09
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56. Millenium Challenge Corp. website
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58. Al Giordano and Bill Conroy , Pro-Coup Honduras Presidential Candidate Elvin Santos Is a Key Beneficiary of Continued US Government Funding, 8/14/09,
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59. Mukoma Wa Ngugi , John McCain and the International Republican Institute, 6/27/08,
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97. This article, from about 9/26/09, has vanished from the Tiempo archives. The original link was
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103. John Thavis, Jewish leaders fear anti-Semitism among Hispanic immigrants, 7/1/04, Catholic News Service,
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105. Reed M. Kurtz, 10/21/09, The Plot Thickens: Honduran Coup Regime and Landowning Elites Enlist the Support of Foreign Paramilitaries, NACLA,
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106. Michael Evans, Documents Implicate Colombian Government in Chiquita Terror Scandal, 3/27/09, National Security Archive,
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107. Unsigned, Verdad Abierta.com, Accessed 11/28/09, Platas de Usaid y Plan Colombia llegaron a manos de los paras,
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