Weird that you would try to rewrite the historical record to liven up an otherwise fruitless wiki-binge.
But it sounds like you're having fun, so carry on.
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kenoma wrote:
Weird that you would try to rewrite the historical record to liven up an otherwise fruitless wiki-binge.
But it sounds like you're having fun, so carry on.
Joe Hillshoist wrote:lupercal wrote:The first police patrols began crossing Lake Tyrifjorden at 6.03pm, arriving on the island at 6.25pm.
Let's see, 22 min. to travel 1,600 feet = 0.303030303 miles / 22 min / 60 min per hour = 0.82644628 miles per hour.
0.83 mph. I guess in the fog of war they forgot to bring the inflatable raft paddle?
Maybe they were swimming.
waugs wrote:Joe Hillshoist wrote:stickdog99 wrote:Dradin Kastell wrote:Coming from a similar-sized Northern European country as Norway, with only one dedicated national "heavy weapons"/"anti-terror" police unit, I see the events and the timetable of the Norwegian police response more or less plausible.
Sorry, but I don't buy that you decide not to send the closest cops when you have multiple reports of a single gunman slaughtering a bunch of kids. That is simply not plausible in any way, shape or form.
Wait a minute - where did the reports of two gunmen come from then? Did they start before the guy was busted/stopped?
as of Saturday, the Norwegian police said they weren't ruling out the possibility of multiple shooters. I believe it was a Guardian article I had read.
7/7 Phone network performance examined and explained
Submitted by Webmaster01 on Wed, 03/04/2009 - 08:23
www.continuityforum.org
Following the explosions on the morning of 7th July hundreds of thousands of people used their mobile phones to contact their families and work colleagues. Mobile networks are designed to cope with significant peaks in volumes of calls, and a safety margin is also built in so that even major events do not overload the system. Call volumes on 7th July far exceeded normal levels, and the O2 network alone carried 67% more voice traffic in central London than normal, while text message volumes increased by 20% on the day across the whole country.
The O2 network was not damaged by the attacks and we took steps to manage the demand. The large number of calls did mean that there was network congestion in parts of London, but most customers were able to make calls after several attempts.
Actions taken
Let us consider the equivalent situation on a motorway. Normally the traffic flows freely, and vehicles are able to move at will. Occasionally however, an accident, a breakdown or bad weather cause the traffic to slow down and congestion inevitably follows. Mostly this is short-lived and the situation recovers quickly, but sometimes the incident is more serious and the congestion lasts much longer.
When this happens, the Police have a number of options open to them in order not only to reduce congestion at the point of the incident but also to keep further traffic from entering the motorway and exacerbating the problem.
In much the same way, mobile network operators have a number of call traffic management options open to them. For example we can make network changes in the immediate area of the incident which will normally remove localised congestion quite quickly, and we can restrict additional call traffic from entering the system which reduces the load on the network, especially the gateways between the fixed and mobile networks.
These controls were used on the 7th July by all network operators, with the intention of preserving the integrity of the networks while still allowing as much traffic to flow as possible, but the situation was complicated by having four major incidents confined in a fairly small geographical area. This inevitably resulted in some customers experiencing the busy signal when attempting to make a call.
Those people who were unable to make voice calls turned to text messaging and again, inevitably, the text messaging systems became congested, delaying the time it took for a message to be delivered.
Industry working together
Co-operation among the fixed and mobile networks is the key to an effective response to a major incident. The telecoms industry runs a tripartite forum consisting of fixed and mobile network operators, the industry regulator Ofcom and various areas of central government – which comes together on a conference bridge on such occasions, with the objective of maintaining the integrity of the Critical National Infrastructure.
This forum was convened several times during 7th July, and the spirit of co-operation which it encouraged ensured that all operators worked together to minimise the impact on emergency responders as well as the public at large.
Emergency restrictions
Just before noon, the Police requested that O2 should apply a set of network access restrictions known as Access Overload Control or ACCOLC in a 1 kilometre area around Aldgate. This facility makes the network in the immediate area unavailable to the public at large, but permits a pre-agreed list of emergency responders to use the network in order to
save lives and protect the infrastructure.
The facility was removed later in the afternoon, but during that time, the O2 network would have been unavailable for all normal calls (with the exception of emergency calls to 112 and 999) within a kilometre or so of Aldgate station.
Recommendations
Should events be repeated, there are a number of steps which individuals and businesses can take in order to improve the situation.
• Encourage staff and individuals who might be in the affected area to call from their mobiles to a fixed line number rather than calling from fixed lines to mobiles – this is less onerous on the networks and relieves congestion.
• Keep calls as short as possible – once you have established that an individual is safe, clear the call so that others can do the same.
• Arrange a central 0800 number to which members of staff can call which will provide information regarding the incident and advice or instructions to staff.
We would like to thank David Sutton, Network Continuity & Restoration Manager for O2 (UK) Limited for this piece.
END
barracuda wrote:Survivors who heard the shots reported that they had thought a shooting contest was being held as part of the activities, and thought nothing of it til they saw the gunman.
barracuda wrote:I'd have run my ass off and tried to hide as quietly as possible before that fucker blew my head off, that's what I'd have done.
Nordic wrote:The Unthinkable is difficult to prepare for.
Because nobody's thought of it.
When someone commits Unthinkable acts, they usually get pretty damn far before anyone stops them.
Kind of just how it is.
stickdog99 wrote:Nordic wrote:The Unthinkable is difficult to prepare for.
Because nobody's thought of it.
When someone commits Unthinkable acts, they usually get pretty damn far before anyone stops them.
Kind of just how it is.
Yep. Nobody ever thinks of calling 911 in an emergency.
kenoma wrote:stickdog99 wrote:According to the current official timeline, it took 97 minutes for the killer to go from placing a bomb in Oslo to killing kids on the island and he took the ferry!
Nobody's suggesting he lit a fuse under the car.
Nordic wrote:Now you're just being a dick.
Do you remember when the Tahir Square thing was going on? Remember how we'd read one thing in the American and English press, then Alice would get on here and tell us what was REALLY going on?
Why are you believing every little detail of what the English speaking press is telling you about this stuff? The details could be wildly wrong. It's translated, who knows how many people it has gone through, it's like playing Operator.
Just relax, Jesus Christ.
While it's good to study this stuff as it comes out, so many people are jumping to idiotic conclusions about things they actually don't know JACK SHIT about.
stickdog99 wrote:kenoma wrote:stickdog99 wrote:According to the current official timeline, it took 97 minutes for the killer to go from placing a bomb in Oslo to killing kids on the island and he took the ferry!
Nobody's suggesting he lit a fuse under the car.
The timeline is:
15:20: A witness observes what he describes as a suspicious-looking man leaving Regjeringskvartalet (the Government quarter), in downtown Oslo.[8]
15:22: A bomb placed in a Volkswagen Crafter goes off in Grubbegata, near the offices of the Prime Minister, and several other governmental buildings.[9]
Again WTF is up with all the apologists for the cops taking 78 minutes to get the damn island with little kids getting shot all the while?
Joe Hillshoist wrote:One issue I have with people expecting the timeline to be quicker. If they don't know know how many shooters there are do you expect them to go rushing in like the guy in the Shining who got an axe in the gut?
Nordic wrote:stickdog99 wrote:kenoma wrote:stickdog99 wrote:According to the current official timeline, it took 97 minutes for the killer to go from placing a bomb in Oslo to killing kids on the island and he took the ferry!
Nobody's suggesting he lit a fuse under the car.
The timeline is:
15:20: A witness observes what he describes as a suspicious-looking man leaving Regjeringskvartalet (the Government quarter), in downtown Oslo.[8]
15:22: A bomb placed in a Volkswagen Crafter goes off in Grubbegata, near the offices of the Prime Minister, and several other governmental buildings.[9]
Again WTF is up with all the apologists for the cops taking 78 minutes to get the damn island with little kids getting shot all the while?
Dude, this is what you do ALL THE TIME. You think that people who might think that things are getting lost in translation, or that the media might not have all the details down pat, are "APOLOGISTS FOR THE COPS".
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