Debt: The first five thousand years

Moderators: Elvis, DrVolin, Jeff

Debt: The first five thousand years

Postby seemslikeadream » Sun Aug 14, 2011 1:35 pm

Debt: The first five thousand years

April 22nd, 02010 by Alexander Rose - Twitter: @zander

Anthropologist David Graeber recently sent in his essay on the 5000 year history of debt (orignally published in Mute and Eurozine). Aside from being an interesting read in general, this effort (which he is just now finishing as a book) is an interesting resource for the Eternal Coin and the Long Finance project.

Debt: The first five thousand years by David Graeber

Throughout its 5000 year history, debt has always involved institutions – whether Mesopotamian sacred kingship, Mosaic jubilees, Sharia or Canon Law – that place controls on debt’s potentially catastrophic social consequences. It is only in the current era, writes anthropologist David Graeber, that we have begun to see the creation of the first effective planetary administrative system largely in order to protect the interests of creditors.

What follows is a fragment of a much larger project of research on debt and debt money in human history. The first and overwhelming conclusion of this project is that in studying economic history, we tend to systematically ignore the role of violence, the absolutely central role of war and slavery in creating and shaping the basic institutions of what we now call “the economy”. What’s more, origins matter. The violence may be invisible, but it remains inscribed in the very logic of our economic common sense, in the apparently self-evident nature of institutions that simply would never and could never exist outside of the monopoly of violence – but also, the systematic threat of violence – maintained by the contemporary state.

Let me start with the institution of slavery, whose role, I think, is key. In most times and places, slavery is seen as a consequence of war. Sometimes most slaves actually are war captives, sometimes they are not, but almost invariably, war is seen as the foundation and justification of the institution. If you surrender in war, what you surrender is your life; your conqueror has the right to kill you, and often will. If he chooses not to, you literally owe your life to him; a debt conceived as absolute, infinite, irredeemable. He can in principle extract anything he wants, and all debts – obligations – you may owe to others (your friends, family, former political allegiances), or that others owe you, are seen as being absolutely negated. Your debt to your owner is all that now exists.

This sort of logic has at least two very interesting consequences, though they might be said to pull in rather contrary directions. First of all, as we all know, it is another typical – perhaps defining – feature of slavery that slaves can be bought or sold. In this case, absolute debt becomes (in another context, that of the market) no longer absolute. In fact, it can be precisely quantified. There is good reason to believe that it was just this operation that made it possible to create something like our contemporary form of money to begin with, since what anthropologists used to refer to as “primitive money”, the kind that one finds in stateless societies (Solomon Island feather money, Iroquois wampum), was mostly used to arrange marriages, resolve blood feuds, and fiddle with other sorts of relations between people, rather than to buy and sell commodities. For instance, if slavery is debt, then debt can lead to slavery. A Babylonian peasant might have paid a handy sum in silver to his wife’s parents to officialise the marriage, but he in no sense owned her. He certainly couldn’t buy or sell the mother of his children. But all that would change if he took out a loan. Were he to default, his creditors could first remove his sheep and furniture, then his house, fields and orchards, and finally take his wife, children, and even himself as debt peons until the matter was settled (which, as his resources vanished, of course became increasingly difficult to do). Debt was the hinge that made it possible to imagine money in anything like the modern sense, and therefore, also, to produce what we like to call the market: an arena where anything can be bought and sold, because all objects are (like slaves) disembedded from their former social relations and exist only in relation to money.

But at the same time the logic of debt as conquest can, as I mentioned, pull another way. Kings, throughout history, tend to be profoundly ambivalent towards allowing the logic of debt to get completely out of hand. This is not because they are hostile to markets. On the contrary, they normally encourage them, for the simple reason that governments find it inconvenient to levy everything they need (silks, chariot wheels, flamingo tongues, lapis lazuli) directly from their subject population; it’s much easier to encourage markets and then buy them. Early markets often followed armies or royal entourages, or formed near palaces or at the fringes of military posts. This actually helps explain the rather puzzling behaviour on the part of royal courts: after all, since kings usually controlled the gold and silver mines, what exactly was the point of stamping bits of the stuff with your face on it, dumping it on the civilian population, and then demanding they give it back to you again as taxes? It only makes sense if levying taxes was really a way to force everyone to acquire coins, so as to facilitate the rise of markets, since markets were convenient to have around. However, for our present purposes, the critical question is: how were these taxes justified? Why did subjects owe them, what debt were they discharging when they were paid? Here we return again to right of conquest. (Actually, in the ancient world, free citizens – whether in Mesopotamia, Greece, or Rome – often did not have to pay direct taxes for this very reason, but obviously I’m simplifying here.) If kings claimed to hold the power of life and death over their subjects by right of conquest, then their subjects’ debts were, also, ultimately infinite; and also, at least in that context, their relations to one another, what they owed to one another, was unimportant. All that really existed was their relation to the king. This in turn explains why kings and emperors invariably tried to regulate the powers that masters had over slaves, and creditors over debtors. At the very least they would always insist, if they had the power, that those prisoners who had already had their lives spared could no longer be killed by their masters. In fact, only rulers could have arbitrary power over life and death. One’s ultimate debt was to the state; it was the only one that was truly unlimited, that could make absolute, cosmic, claims.

The reason I stress this is because this logic is still with us. When we speak of a “society” (French society, Jamaican society) we are really speaking of people organised by a single nation state. That is the tacit model, anyway. “Societies” are really states, the logic of states is that of conquest, the logic of conquest is ultimately identical to that of slavery. True, in the hands of state apologists, this becomes transformed into a notion of a more benevolent “social debt”. Here there is a little story told, a kind of myth. We are all born with an infinite debt to the society that raised, nurtured, fed and clothed us, to those long dead who invented our language and traditions, to all those who made it possible for us to exist. In ancient times we thought we owed this to the gods (it was repaid in sacrifice, or, sacrifice was really just the payment of interest – ultimately, it was repaid by death). Later the debt was adopted by the state, itself a divine institution, with taxes substituted for sacrifice, and military service for one’s debt of life. Money is simply the concrete form of this social debt, the way that it is managed. Keynesians like this sort of logic. So do various strains of socialist, social democrats, even crypto-fascists like Auguste Comte (the first, as far as I am aware, to actually coin the phrase “social debt”). But the logic also runs through much of our common sense: consider for instance, the phrase, “to pay one’s debt to society”, or, “I felt I owed something to my country”, or, “I wanted to give something back.” Always, in such cases, mutual rights and obligations, mutual commitments – the kind of relations that genuinely free people could make with one another – tend to be subsumed into a conception of “society” where we are all equal only as absolute debtors before the (now invisible) figure of the king, who stands in for your mother, and by extension, humanity.

What I am suggesting, then, is that while the claims of the impersonal market and the claims of “society” are often juxtaposed – and certainly have had a tendency to jockey back and forth in all sorts of practical ways – they are both ultimately founded on a very similar logic of violence. Neither is this a mere matter of historical origins that can be brushed away as inconsequential: neither states nor markets can exist without the constant threat of force.

One might ask, then, what is the alternative?
Towards a history of virtual money

Here I can return to my original point: that money did not originally appear in this cold, metal, impersonal form. It originally appears in the form of a measure, an abstraction, but also as a relation (of debt and obligation) between human beings. It is important to note that historically it is commodity money that has always been most directly linked to violence. As one historian put it, “bullion is the accessory of war, and not of peaceful trade.”[1]

The reason is simple. Commodity money, particularly in the form of gold and silver, is distinguished from credit money most of all by one spectacular feature: it can be stolen. Since an ingot of gold or silver is an object without a pedigree, throughout much of history bullion has served the same role as the contemporary drug dealer’s suitcase full of dollar bills, as an object without a history that will be accepted in exchange for other valuables just about anywhere, with no questions asked. As a result, one can see the last 5 000 years of human history as the history of a kind of alternation. Credit systems seem to arise, and to become dominant, in periods of relative social peace, across networks of trust, whether created by states or, in most periods, transnational institutions, whilst precious metals replace them in periods characterised by widespread plunder. Predatory lending systems certainly exist at every period, but they seem to have had the most damaging effects in periods when money was most easily convertible into cash.

So as a starting point to any attempt to discern the great rhythms that define the current historical moment, let me propose the following breakdown of Eurasian history according to the alternation between periods of virtual and metal money:
I. Age of the First Agrarian Empires (3500-800 BCE). Dominant money form: Virtual credit money

Our best information on the origins of money goes back to ancient Mesopotamia, but there seems no particular reason to believe matters were radically different in Pharaonic Egypt, Bronze Age China, or the Indus Valley. The Mesopotamian economy was dominated by large public institutions (Temples and Palaces) whose bureaucratic administrators effectively created money of account by establishing a fixed equivalent between silver and the staple crop, barley. Debts were calculated in silver, but silver was rarely used in transactions. Instead, payments were made in barley or in anything else that happened to be handy and acceptable. Major debts were recorded on cuneiform tablets kept as sureties by both parties to the transaction.

Certainly, markets did exist. Prices of certain commodities that were not produced within Temple or Palace holdings, and thus not subject to administered price schedules, would tend to fluctuate according to the vagaries of supply and demand. But most actual acts of everyday buying and selling, particularly those that were not carried out between absolute strangers, appear to have been made on credit. “Ale women”, or local innkeepers, served beer, for example, and often rented rooms; customers ran up a tab; normally, the full sum was dispatched at harvest time. Market vendors presumably acted as they do in small-scale markets in Africa, or Central Asia, today, building up lists of trustworthy clients to whom they could extend credit. The habit of money at interest also originates in Sumer – it remained unknown, for example, in Egypt. Interest rates, fixed at 20 percent, remained stable for 2,000 years. (This was not a sign of government control of the market: at this stage, institutions like this were what made markets possible.) This, however, led to some serious social problems. In years with bad harvests especially, peasants would start becoming hopelessly indebted to the rich, and would have to surrender their farms and, ultimately, family members, in debt bondage. Gradually, this condition seems to have come to a social crisis – not so much leading to popular uprisings, but to common people abandoning the cities and settled territory entirely and becoming semi-nomadic “bandits” and raiders. It soon became traditional for each new ruler to wipe the slate clean, cancel all debts, and declare a general amnesty or “freedom”, so that all bonded labourers could return to their families. (It is significant here that the first word for “freedom” known in any human language, the Sumerian amarga, literally means “return to mother”.) Biblical prophets instituted a similar custom, the Jubilee, whereby after seven years all debts were similarly cancelled. This is the direct ancestor of the New Testament notion of “redemption”. As economist Michael Hudson has pointed out, it seems one of the misfortunes of world history that the institution of lending money at interest disseminated out of Mesopotamia without, for the most part, being accompanied by its original checks and balances.
II. Axial Age (800 BCE – 600 CE). Dominant money form: Coinage and metal bullion

This was the age that saw the emergence of coinage, as well as the birth, in China, India and the Middle East, of all major world religions.[2] From the Warring States period in China, to fragmentation in India, and to the carnage and mass enslavement that accompanied the expansion (and later, dissolution) of the Roman Empire, it was a period of spectacular creativity throughout most of the world, but of almost equally spectacular violence. Coinage, which allowed for the actual use of gold and silver as a medium of exchange, also made possible the creation of markets in the now more familiar, impersonal sense of the term. Precious metals were also far more appropriate for an age of generalised warfare, for the obvious reason that they could be stolen. Coinage, certainly, was not invented to facilitate trade (the Phoenicians, consummate traders of the ancient world, were among the last to adopt it). It appears to have been first invented to pay soldiers, probably first of all by rulers of Lydia in Asia Minor to pay their Greek mercenaries. Carthage, another great trading nation, only started minting coins very late, and then explicitly to pay its foreign soldiers.

Throughout antiquity one can continue to speak of what Geoffrey Ingham has dubbed the “military-coinage complex”. He may have been better to call it a “military-coinage-slavery complex”, since the diffusion of new military technologies (Greek hoplites, Roman legions) was always closely tied to the capture and marketing of slaves. The other major source of slaves was debt: now that states no longer periodically wiped the slates clean, those not lucky enough to be citizens of the major military city-states – who were generally protected from predatory lenders – were fair game. The credit systems of the Near East did not crumble under commercial competition; they were destroyed by Alexander’s armies – armies that required half a ton of silver bullion per day in wages. The mines where the bullion was produced were generally worked by slaves. Military campaigns in turn ensured an endless flow of new slaves. Imperial tax systems, as noted, were largely designed to force their subjects to create markets, so that soldiers (and also, of course, government officials) would be able to use that bullion to buy anything they wanted. The kind of impersonal markets that once tended to spring up between societies, or at the fringes of military operations, now began to permeate society as a whole.

However tawdry their origins, the creation of new media of exchange – coinage appeared almost simultaneously in Greece, India, and China – appears to have had profound intellectual effects. Some have even gone so far as to argue that Greek philosophy was itself made possible by conceptual innovations introduced by coinage. The most remarkable pattern, though, is the emergence, in almost the exact times and places where one also sees the early spread of coinage, of what were to become modern world religions: prophetic Judaism, Christianity, Buddhism, Jainism, Confucianism, Taoism, and eventually, Islam. While the precise links are yet to be fully explored, in certain ways, these religions appear to have arisen in direct reaction to the logic of the market. To put the matter somewhat crudely: if one relegates a certain social space simply to the selfish acquisition of material things, it is almost inevitable that soon someone else will come to set aside another domain in which to preach that, from the perspective of ultimate values, material things are unimportant, and selfishness – or even the self – illusory.
III. The Middle Ages (600 CE – 1500 CE). The return to virtual credit money

If the Axial Age saw the emergence of complementary ideals of commodity markets and universal world religions, the Middle Ages[3] were the period in which those two institutions began to merge. Religions began to take over the market systems. Everything from international trade to the organisation of local fairs increasingly came to be carried out through social networks defined and regulated by religious authorities. This enabled, in turn, the return throughout Eurasia of various forms of virtual credit money.

In Europe, where all this took place under the aegis of Christendom, coinage was only sporadically, and unevenly, available. Prices after 800 AD were calculated largely in terms of an old Carolingian currency that no longer existed (it was actually referred to at the time as “imaginary money”), but ordinary day-to-day buying and selling was carried out mainly through other means. One common expedient, for example, was the use of tally-sticks, notched pieces of wood that were broken in two as records of debt, with half being kept by the creditor, half by the debtor. Such tally-sticks were still in common use in much of England well into the 16th century. Larger transactions were handled through bills of exchange, with the great commercial fairs serving as their clearing houses. The Church, meanwhile, provided a legal framework, enforcing strict controls on the lending of money at interest and prohibitions on debt bondage.

The real nerve centre of the Medieval world economy, though, was the Indian Ocean, which along with the Central Asia caravan routes connected the great civilisations of India, China, and the Middle East. Here, trade was conducted through the framework of Islam, which not only provided a legal structure highly conducive to mercantile activities (while absolutely forbidding the lending of money at interest), but allowed for peaceful relations between merchants over a remarkably large part of the globe, allowing the creation of a variety of sophisticated credit instruments. Actually, Western Europe was, as in so many things, a relative late-comer in this regard: most of the financial innovations that reached Italy and France in the 11th and 12th centuries had been in common use in Egypt or Iraq since the 8th or 9th centuries. The word “cheque”, for example, derives from the Arab sakk, and appeared in English only around 1220 AD.

The case of China is even more complicated: the Middle Ages there began with the rapid spread of Buddhism, which, while it was in no position to enact laws or regulate commerce, did quickly move against local usurers by its invention of the pawn shop – the first pawn shops being based in Buddhist temples as a way of offering poor farmers an alternative to the local usurer. Before long, though, the state reasserted itself, as the state always tends to do in China. But as it did so, it not only regulated interest rates and attempted to abolish debt peonage, it moved away from bullion entirely by inventing paper money. All this was accompanied by the development, again, of a variety of complex financial instruments.

All this is not to say that this period did not see its share of carnage and plunder (particularly during the great nomadic invasions) or that coinage was not, in many times and places, an important medium of exchange. Still, what really characterises the period appears to be a movement in the other direction. Most of the Medieval period saw money largely delinked from coercive institutions. Money changers, one might say, were invited back into the temples, where they could be monitored. The result was a flowering of institutions premised on a much higher degree of social trust.”
IV. Age of European Empires (1500-1971). The return of precious metals

With the advent of the great European empires – Iberian, then North Atlantic – the world saw both a reversion to mass enslavement, plunder, and wars of destruction, and the consequent rapid return of gold and silver bullion as the main form of currency. Historical investigation will probably end up demonstrating that the origins of these transformations were more complicated than we ordinarily assume. Some of this was beginning to happen even before the conquest of the New World. One of the main factors of the movement back to bullion, for example, was the emergence of popular movements during the early Ming dynasty, in the 15th and 16th centuries, that ultimately forced the government to abandon not only paper money but any attempt to impose its own currency. This led to the reversion of the vast Chinese market to an uncoined silver standard. Since taxes were also gradually commuted into silver, it soon became the more or less official Chinese policy to try to bring as much silver into the country as possible, so as to keep taxes low and prevent new outbreaks of social unrest. The sudden enormous demand for silver had effects across the globe. Most of the precious metals looted by the conquistadors and later extracted by the Spanish from the mines of Mexico and Potosi (at almost unimaginable cost in human lives) ended up in China. These global scale connections that eventually developed across the Atlantic, Pacific, and Indian Oceans have of course been documented in great detail. The crucial point is that the delinking of money from religious institutions, and its relinking with coercive ones (especially the state), was here accompanied by an ideological reversion to “metallism”.[4]

Credit, in this context, was on the whole an affair of states that were themselves run largely by deficit financing, a form of credit which was, in turn, invented to finance increasingly expensive wars. Internationally the British Empire was steadfast in maintaining the gold standard through the 19th and early 20th centuries, and great political battles were fought in the United States over whether the gold or silver standard should prevail.

This was also, obviously, the period of the rise of capitalism, the industrial revolution, representative democracy, and so on. What I am trying to do here is not to deny their importance, but to provide a framework for seeing such familiar events in a less familiar context. It makes it easier, for instance, to detect the ties between war, capitalism, and slavery. The institution of wage labour, for instance, has historically emerged from within that of slavery (the earliest wage contracts we know of, from Greece to the Malay city states, were actually slave rentals), and it has also tended, historically, to be intimately tied to various forms of debt peonage – as indeed it remains today. The fact that we have cast such institutions in a language of freedom does not mean that what we now think of as economic freedom does not ultimately rest on a logic that has for most of human history been considered the very essence of slavery.
Current Era (1971 onwards). The empire of debt

The current era might be said to have been initiated on 15 August 1971, when US President Richard Nixon officially suspended the convertibility of the dollar into gold and effectively created the current floating currency regimes. We have returned, at any rate, to an age of virtual money, in which consumer purchases in wealthy countries rarely involve even paper money, and national economies are driven largely by consumer debt. It’s in this context that we can talk about the “financialisation” of capital, whereby speculation in currencies and financial instruments becomes a domain unto itself, detached from any immediate relation with production or even commerce. This is of course the sector that has entered into crisis today.

What can we say for certain about this new era? So far, very, very little. Thirty or forty years is nothing in terms of the scale we have been dealing with. Clearly, this period has only just begun. Still, the foregoing analysis, however crude, does allow us to begin to make some informed suggestions.

Historically, as we have seen, ages of virtual, credit money have also involved creating some sort of overarching institutions – Mesopotamian sacred kingship, Mosaic jubilees, Sharia or Canon Law – that place some sort of controls on the potentially catastrophic social consequences of debt. Almost invariably, they involve institutions (usually not strictly coincident to the state, usually larger) to protect debtors. So far the movement this time has been the other way around: starting with the ’80s we have begun to see the creation of the first effective planetary administrative system, operating through the IMF, World Bank, corporations and other financial institutions, largely in order to protect the interests of creditors. However, this apparatus was very quickly thrown into crisis, first by the very rapid development of global social movements (the alter-globalisation movement), which effectively destroyed the moral authority of institutions like the IMF and left many of them very close to bankrupt, and now by the current banking crisis and global economic collapse. While the new age of virtual money has only just begun and the long-term consequences are as yet entirely unclear, we can already say one or two things. The first is that a movement towards virtual money is not in itself, necessarily, an insidious effect of capitalism. In fact, it might well mean exactly the opposite. For much of human history, systems of virtual money were designed and regulated to ensure that nothing like capitalism could ever emerge to begin with – at least not as it appears in its present form, with most of the world’s population placed in a condition that would in many other periods of history be considered tantamount to slavery. The second point is to underline the absolutely crucial role of violence in defining the very terms by which we imagine both “society” and “markets” – in fact, many of our most elementary ideas of freedom. A world less entirely pervaded by violence would rapidly begin to develop other institutions. Finally, thinking about debt outside the twin intellectual straitjackets of state and market opens up exciting possibilities. For instance, we can ask: in a society in which that foundation of violence had finally been yanked away, what exactly would free men and women owe each other? What sort of promises and commitments should they make to each other?

Let us hope that everyone will someday be in a position to start asking such questions. At times like this, you never know.


David Graeber (Goldsmiths) The Human Economy II



Mazars and Deutsche Bank could have ended this nightmare before it started.
They could still get him out of office.
But instead, they want mass death.
Don’t forget that.
User avatar
seemslikeadream
 
Posts: 32090
Joined: Wed Apr 27, 2005 11:28 pm
Location: into the black
Blog: View Blog (83)

Re: Debt: The first five thousand years

Postby gnosticheresy_2 » Tue Aug 16, 2011 4:22 pm

Without doubt one of the best most thought provoking articles I've ever seen posted here (imo of course). Thank you for that :)
User avatar
gnosticheresy_2
 
Posts: 532
Joined: Mon Jan 01, 2007 7:07 pm
Blog: View Blog (0)

Re: Debt: The first five thousand years

Postby Elihu » Tue Aug 16, 2011 4:51 pm

Chris Sanders
Principal, SandersResearch.com
Buy others for news. Buy us for judgment.

Have Central Bankers Won the Fight Against Gold and Silver Bullion?

The question of whether or not the US Treasury and Federal Reserve can successfully suppress the price of gold on the open market is, by its nature, not susceptible to a yes or no answer. The reason for this conundrum lies at the intersection of politics and economics. The fact that the government and its quasi-governmental allies in banking, brokerage and mining have been "successful" in gold price manipulation at all has been largely a function of a long-term shift in the consensus of politically acceptable fiscal and monetary behaviour.

It should be immediately apparent from the preceding paragraph that I accept the idea that the gold price has been and is manipulated by a consortium of interested parties, to include the Federal Reserve, the US Treasury, assorted hedge funds, bullion banks, central banks, and mining companies. Absent the ability to subpoena records and the officials responsible, it is highly unlikely that it will ever be possible to prove the case that such a collusive manipulation has indeed been taking place on a systematic basis over a number of years. The reason for this is that the American courts have, since the government defaulted on the gold clause of its bond obligations in the 30s, consistently supported the government in cases of "national interest" as defined of course by the government. The legal issues notwithstanding, there is also a broad consensus in the economics profession that accepts gold price manipulation on the basis that it can be equated to intervention in the currency markets.

However widely accepted this equation is, it is nevertheless false. In the wake of the abrogation by the United States of the Bretton Woods Agreement, gold was demonetised and relegated to status as a commodity like any other. Now, government intervention in say, the coffee market, might be countenanced under certain conditions, but it is hard to imagine it being conducted under the conditions of strict secrecy and questionable accounting such as surrounds its gold operations. Moreover, central banks print fiat money; they do not print gold or even mine it. It is clear that what is desired by those who control them is a situation in which they are released from the burden of accountability, the last vestiges of which were shed with apparent impunity with the destruction of the Bretton Woods edifice of law and transparency.

Related to the desire for zero accountability is the holy grail of infinite leverage. Authoritarian regimes from remotest antiquity have attempted to debase the coinage they issued. It is only in our age that technology, in the form of dirt-cheap processing power, has made possible a high-tech form of coin clipping via the derivatives markets. Not only can a derivative not be touched, smelled or seen, but the banks that use them are not even required to report their derivatives books on balance sheet. Banks have many regulators, but these are all concerned with the on-balance sheet borrowing and lending businesses that are their "traditional" businesses. The ban king industry self-regulates derivatives with the enthusiastic support of the Federal Reserve, a private corporation that they, the banks, own.

This confers enormous power to manipulate quarterly earnings simply by altering the assumed discount rate used in calculating the net present value of expected future cash flows. In tandem with the regulatory edifice that has been built up over the past thirty years, this constitutes a formidable engine with which to drive the consolidation of the world banking industry. The model for this was the first Basel agreement on capital adequacy, which allowed the right of self-regulation to the handful of large financial institutions that operated interest rate swap warehouses and granted them higher credit ratings on the basis that they were able to hedge their balance sheets. At a stroke this gave them a strategic funding advantage, and forced anyone else who wished to compete to come to them for the tools with which to do it. Today something similar is happening thanks to Basel Two, which will confer similar advantages on the same cast of characters except this time with respect not to market related risk, but to credit itself. This can be confidently expected to drive yet another wave of international banking consolidation.

Yale economist Robert Shiller has drafted what must count as the manifesto of infinite leverage. This is his book, The New Financial Order: Risk in the 21st Century. In Shiller's New Order cash will be criminalized, the better to canalise all flows of money. Derivatives contracts on all manner of "risks" will be traded and indeed citizens will be required to use them to hedge their incomes, careers, and so on. It doesn't take a genius, much less an economist, to work out that such a system is workable only by compulsion and that with Shiller, Orwell's nightmare is set to become ours.

The technology to drive this world is already with us and the bureaucracy is not far behind. The regulatory edifice created to combat "money laundering" is no such thing. It will not catch the Enrons of the world because it is not meant to, but it is admirably suited to control individuals. Married to this are a handful of firms such as AMS, Dyncorp, Lockheed and IBM that manage the software development and financial control and accounting functions for most of the Federal government. AMS, as an example, took over HUD's internal financial control and accounting systems in 1996, and within two years had racked up $60 billion in "undocumentable transactions." It was then brought into the Treasury, where it presumably has worked the same sort of magic.

If this seems a little far afield of the gold market, it is not. Physical gold is flowing into the hands of those with the cash to buy it as is evidenced by more than a decade of a widening disparity between demand and mined supply of physical gold. That gap has been financed as it can only be financed, by the recycling of scrap and by the supply of physical gold from national reserves. This is the point. The Robert Shillers of the world can criminalize cash, I suppose, but they cannot suspend the workings of the international economy. The functions of audit and control can be subcontracted to "safe" hands, but this does nothing to alter the basic relations of value and risk. Indeed, what all this really represents is an invitation to racketeering, tax evasion, fraud, and ultimately a breakdown in the social compact. Gold is flowing out of national reserves and into the hands of individuals. Who are they, one wonders? Can it all be going to satisfy the desire for jewellery in China, India and the Middle East? I think not.

The question that really should be asked is not whether the gold "intervention" has worked, but how long will it work. The answer is presumably until citizens of the democracies restore the rule of law and accountability. Barring that, it will go on until all of those reserves are gone and all that is left is the question, cui bono.

� 2003 Chris Sanders
Principal, SandersResearch.com
Email
But take heart, because I have overcome the world.” John 16:33
Elihu
 
Posts: 1419
Joined: Wed Mar 16, 2011 11:44 pm
Blog: View Blog (0)

Re: Debt: The first five thousand years

Postby gnosticheresy_2 » Tue Aug 16, 2011 5:17 pm

seemslikeadream wrote:The real nerve centre of the Medieval world economy, though, was the Indian Ocean, which along with the Central Asia caravan routes connected the great civilisations of India, China, and the Middle East. Here, trade was conducted through the framework of Islam, which not only provided a legal structure highly conducive to mercantile activities (while absolutely forbidding the lending of money at interest), but allowed for peaceful relations between merchants over a remarkably large part of the globe, allowing the creation of a variety of sophisticated credit instruments. Actually, Western Europe was, as in so many things, a relative late-comer in this regard: most of the financial innovations that reached Italy and France in the 11th and 12th centuries had been in common use in Egypt or Iraq since the 8th or 9th centuries. The word “cheque”, for example, derives from the Arab sakk, and appeared in English only around 1220 AD.


A lightbulb moment when I read that. :shock:

Islamic Banking is growing at a rate of 10-15% per year and with signs of consistent future growth.[14] Islamic banks have more than 300 institutions spread over 51 countries, including the United States through companies such as the Michigan-based University Bank, as well as an additional 250 mutual funds that comply with Islamic principles. It is estimated that over US$822 billion worldwide sharia-compliant assets are managed according to The Economist.[15] This represents approximately 0.5% of total world estimated assets as of 2005.[16] According to CIMB Group Holdings, Islamic finance is the fastest-growing segment of the global financial system and sales of Islamic bonds may rise by 24 percent to $25 billion in 2010.[17]

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Islamic_banking


Puts things in a different light I think you'll agree.
User avatar
gnosticheresy_2
 
Posts: 532
Joined: Mon Jan 01, 2007 7:07 pm
Blog: View Blog (0)

Re: Debt: The first five thousand years

Postby seemslikeadream » Tue Aug 16, 2011 5:33 pm

^^^^^

St. Thomas asserted that usury was a violation of natural moral law. All things are created for their natural end (Aristotle). Money is not an end but a means of buying goods and services. Putting money out for the generation of more money is an evil unto itself. The formal value of money is the face value. Yet usury allows this face value to fluctuate, and hence the value of money can be diminished, thereby robbing the person who has purchased the money for use. Money stands alone as a non-vendible substance which is degraded from its natural end by selling.

Another argument used by Aquinas was that of the Roman distinction between consumable goods and non-consumable goods. Food and clothes are consumable in that once they are used, they are gone. A piece of land is non-consumable since it can produce crops for years, yet never lose its value. Money as defined by Aquinas is a consumable. To put it out for profit betrays its purpose in natural law. This is the view that prevailed for the next three centuries following St. Thomas' death.

Yet it was the one Realistic Scholastic interpretation of natural law that was completely disconnected from the economic reality of the day. The time of Aquinas was one where land feudalism was ceding prominence to money capitalism. Over the next several centuries it became clear that capitalism would provide a greater amount of goods and services than any other system.

Even in the time of Aquinas (and before), kings and popes engaged in usury. Some of the effects of Protestantism were a clarification of the views and acceptance of the practice of usury. Profit from lending became an acceptable goal. The Council of Trent (1545–1563) adopted Aquinas' view of usury, calling it a sin of equal gravity to that of homicide. This included putting money out for any return, no matter how minimal. It can be argued that this rigid stance may have encouraged the Protestant movement in larger money and trading centers.

Our views concerning capitalism, unfair labor practice, living wage, price gouging, monopolies, fair trade practices, and predatory pricing, inter alia, are remnants of the inculcation of Aquinas' interpretation of natural moral law. (See Colish p. 333–334).
Mazars and Deutsche Bank could have ended this nightmare before it started.
They could still get him out of office.
But instead, they want mass death.
Don’t forget that.
User avatar
seemslikeadream
 
Posts: 32090
Joined: Wed Apr 27, 2005 11:28 pm
Location: into the black
Blog: View Blog (83)

Re: Debt: The first five thousand years

Postby gnosticheresy_2 » Tue Aug 16, 2011 5:39 pm

More thoughts:

The west's fight against Islam is fundamentally about the ability to charge interest on debt because...

....charging interest on debt is the ultimate source of power in this world. Fiat currency is important to an extent, but it doesn't really matter what the debt is denominated in. Currency/ labour/ marks on a tally stick: it's all the same....

....so debates about precious metals, the dollar, exchange rates. Irrelevant. Who are the creditors?

<spewed out without much thought, feel free to pick apart, call me a wanker etc :clown >
User avatar
gnosticheresy_2
 
Posts: 532
Joined: Mon Jan 01, 2007 7:07 pm
Blog: View Blog (0)

Re: Debt: The first five thousand years

Postby Elihu » Tue Aug 16, 2011 6:27 pm

gnosticheresy_2 wrote:....charging interest on debt is the ultimate source of power...


so debt is the currency or medium of exchange?

gnosticheresy_2 wrote:Fiat currency is important to an extent, but it doesn't really matter what the debt is denominated in.


why is the force of law put behind the "legal tender" of an exclusive issuer then? and how would the debt be objectively quantified?

gnosticheresy_2 wrote:....so debates about precious metals, the dollar, exchange rates. Irrelevant. Who are the creditors?


so you're ready to toss the question of zero accountability and infinite leverage? privileges without responsibilities? free markets indeed. getting rid of interest. might as well howl at the moon. hucksters safe for another day...
But take heart, because I have overcome the world.” John 16:33
Elihu
 
Posts: 1419
Joined: Wed Mar 16, 2011 11:44 pm
Blog: View Blog (0)

Re: Debt: The first five thousand years

Postby Elihu » Sun Aug 28, 2011 7:06 pm

Chris Sanders
Principal, SandersResearch.com
Buy others for news. Buy us for judgment.

Does inflation have some serious positive benefits?

The view of many economists that inflation can be a good thing is, from an economic point of view, unobjectionable. Indeed, it is hard to see why, from a theoretical standpoint, that it should be at all controversial. Inflation in the sense that it is most commonly understood is just a way of looking at changes in the prices of traded goods and services. Clearly, from the standpoint of those selling those goods and services, higher prices are welcome. And that is precisely the point. Whether or not it is "good" depends really on who is receiving and who is paying those higher prices.

There are nevertheless problems associated with this way of looking at things because changes in goods and services prices do not actually represent inflation or deflation. These are correctly understood to be states of change in the value of money, and this is a very different thing than changes in the prices of goods and services. All the consumer price index tells you is how profits are shifting in the markets for goods and services. Of itself, it tells you nothing about the value of the unit of account.

This point is far from academic. It has been correctly pointed out over the years by a number of observers that by arbitrarily excluding changes in the prices of certain assets that conventional inflation measures only capture part of the change in monetary value. In the modern American economy this can be readily seen in action. Money in its modern format can be exchanged for bananas or stocks, which is to say that stocks and bananas are substitutes for one another. Over the last ten years or so it has been fashionable on Wall Street to talk about deflation, as in "China is exporting deflation because of its low wages." At the same time, the price we have had to pay for future earnings of the S&P 500 has soared. Do low or falling wages represent deflation? Not necessarily. They may be symptomatic of it, but they are not proof.

A more serious discussion of inflation requires that its legal, institutional, ethical and moral dimension be examined. It is not for nothing that in ancient times the priestly caste monopolized the business of money and the truth of the matter is that in some ways things have not changed much. Because money has varied functions as medium of exchange, unit of account, and store of value, it is important, indeed vital, that it be dependable. That is the reason, and in my opinion the only reason, why gold is attractive as money. Because of its unique characteristics, it is dependable.

That is why inflation is problematic, and why even those who argue that it can be positive base their conclusions conditionally on inflation being both moderate and predictable. This may well be so over the course of the ordinary business cycle, but it is far from obvious, at least to me, that it is so or even can be so over a longer credit cycle. The reason for this is that such cycles are long. To get a feel for this consider: the last time the US economy was in a similar position as it is in today was some thirty-five years ago. Does anyone seriously think that the Federal Reserve has a planning horizon that long? In the mid '80s Paul Volcker was asked why he had done such and so and he replied that in central banking one deals with yesterday's problems today, not with tomorrow's, or words to that effect. This was nothing more than an honest description of the realities of politics.

Indeed, the real problems with inflation do flow from politics, because there is no more political act that the granting of the right to issue money. Today we are living with the consequences of the Federal Reserve Act of 1912, which created the Federal Reserve System, a collection of private corporations owned by the very institutions that it supposedly regulates, and which profit from the money monopoly that Congress granted the Fed.

The creation of the Fed represented the triumph of expedience over principle and of partisan profit over national interest, so what else is new? The Trusts that the Fed's creation was nominally meant to control were granted ownership of the Fed. The demand of some reformers of the day that the trusts should not be allowed to control the nation's money but that the government should do so was met by Congress in the breech: Congress nominally accepted the responsibility and then delegated it back to the Trusts. And that is where matters still rest.

The significance of this to the question before us here is that this laid the groundwork for a changed attitude toward debt and inflation both amongst the captains of industry and in society generally, and the Fed's primary role during the 30s became that of debt accommodation. To be sure, this was at first exercised with circumspection but after America emerged unchallenged for all intents and purposes from the Second World War, circumspection crumbled. The result was Nixon's expedient abrogation of America's international treaty obligation, and expedience has governed national monetary and fiscal policy since, as it has for a century at least.

That expedience has led to the progressive consolidation of monopoly control over industry after industry, and the wholesale looting of public assets on a scale not seen since the land grabs in the early days of the Republic. Monopoly control over the monetary system has made easy the financing of all this with debt ultimately backed by the obligation of citizens to pay taxes, which is to say with other people's money. Another way of putting this is that in monetary terms this has been financed by inflationary debt accommodation by the Fed.

The Fed's ability to do this rests on the degree of prevailing popular belief in the legal fiction that it is independent of political control, and that it will perform its duties in a proper fiduciary manner. This is the most transparent fiction, and has resulted in laughable expedients over the years by both the Fed and the government to maintain its "credibility." So, for instance, in the early '80s when house price inflation was soaring, it was dropped from the inflation indices in favour of "imputed rents" that were not soaring. Hedonic pricing was another wheeze that has allowed the harnessing of Moore's Law in computer performance to the price indices. The Treasury together with the Fed seeks to control the prices of gold, exchange rates and so on, but piously intone that targeting asset prices (i.e. stocks) when they are going up is improper, but supporting them when they go down is responsible behaviour. The Fed has "granted" to its owners the right to self-regulate their market derivatives businesses, which is to say to value their own balance sheets, in flagrant disregard of its Congressional charter, and promoted the extension of this right to include credit derivatives under the terms of the new Basel II Accord.

I doubt that even JP Morgan, who reportedly once told a friend that he lost sleep at nights worrying about an antitrust suit being brought against him, would have in his wildest dreams imagined that he and his kind could, never mind would, get away with this. That the Bushes and the Rubins of our world are not only getting away with this but with much else besides says volumes.

It is no accident of course that as the Fed has pushed interest rates toward zero and the administration has opened the bond floodgates that corporate profits have soared. Workers have not participated in this, and wages are stagnant. Jobs are being created, but in other countries, such that the Fed's inflationary debt accommodation flows straight through to the bottom line. The Wall Street euphemism for this is that this is higher "productivity" but this is nonsense in any economically meaningful sense of the term. When one looks at personal debt statistics in the United States it is not "productivity" that comes to mind but "predatory lending." This is a straightforward inflationary siphoning of money from one end of the economic spectrum into the pockets of the other end.

So, gentlemen, in answer to the question at hand I can only answer: it depends on which end of that spectrum you are.


� 2004 Chris Sanders
Principal, SandersResearch.com
Email
Last edited by Elihu on Mon Aug 29, 2011 10:30 am, edited 1 time in total.
But take heart, because I have overcome the world.” John 16:33
Elihu
 
Posts: 1419
Joined: Wed Mar 16, 2011 11:44 pm
Blog: View Blog (0)

Re: Debt: The first five thousand years

Postby jingofever » Sun Aug 28, 2011 7:17 pm

What is Debt? – An Interview with Economic Anthropologist David Graeber:

Philip Pilkington: Let’s begin. Most economists claim that money was invented to replace the barter system. But you’ve found something quite different, am I correct?

David Graeber: Yes there’s a standard story we’re all taught, a ‘once upon a time’ — it’s a fairy tale.

It really deserves no other introduction: according to this theory all transactions were by barter. “Tell you what, I’ll give you twenty chickens for that cow.” Or three arrow-heads for that beaver pelt or what-have-you. This created inconveniences, because maybe your neighbor doesn’t need chickens right now, so you have to invent money.

The story goes back at least to Adam Smith and in its own way it’s the founding myth of economics. Now, I’m an anthropologist and we anthropologists have long known this is a myth simply because if there were places where everyday transactions took the form of: “I’ll give you twenty chickens for that cow,” we’d have found one or two by now. After all people have been looking since 1776, when the Wealth of Nations first came out. But if you think about it for just a second, it’s hardly surprising that we haven’t found anything.

Think about what they’re saying here – basically: that a bunch of Neolithic farmers in a village somewhere, or Native Americans or whatever, will be engaging in transactions only through the spot trade. So, if your neighbor doesn’t have what you want right now, no big deal. Obviously what would really happen, and this is what anthropologists observe when neighbors do engage in something like exchange with each other, if you want your neighbor’s cow, you’d say, “wow, nice cow” and he’d say “you like it? Take it!” – and now you owe him one. Quite often people don’t even engage in exchange at all – if they were real Iroquois or other Native Americans, for example, all such things would probably be allocated by women’s councils.

So the real question is not how does barter generate some sort of medium of exchange, that then becomes money, but rather, how does that broad sense of ‘I owe you one’ turn into a precise system of measurement – that is: money as a unit of account?

By the time the curtain goes up on the historical record in ancient Mesopotamia, around 3200 BC, it’s already happened. There’s an elaborate system of money of account and complex credit systems. (Money as medium of exchange or as a standardized circulating units of gold, silver, bronze or whatever, only comes much later.)

So really, rather than the standard story – first there’s barter, then money, then finally credit comes out of that – if anything its precisely the other way around. Credit and debt comes first, then coinage emerges thousands of years later and then, when you do find “I’ll give you twenty chickens for that cow” type of barter systems, it’s usually when there used to be cash markets, but for some reason – as in Russia, for example, in 1998 – the currency collapses or disappears.

PP: You say that by the time historical records start to be written in the Mesopotamia around 3200 BC a complex financial architecture is already in place. At the same time is society divided into classes of debtors and creditors? If not then when does this occur? And do you see this as the most fundamental class division in human history?

DG: Well historically, there seem to have been two possibilities.

One is what you found in Egypt: a strong centralized state and administration extracting taxes from everyone else. For most of Egyptian history they never developed the habit of lending money at interest. Presumably, they didn’t have to.

Mesopotamia was different because the state emerged unevenly and incompletely. At first there were giant bureaucratic temples, then also palace complexes, but they weren’t exactly governments and they didn’t extract direct taxes – these were considered appropriate only for conquered populations. Rather they were huge industrial complexes with their own land, flocks and factories. This is where money begins as a unit of account; it’s used for allocating resources within these complexes.

Interest-bearing loans, in turn, probably originated in deals between the administrators and merchants who carried, say, the woollen goods produced in temple factories (which in the very earliest period were at least partly charitable enterprises, homes for orphans, refugees or disabled people for instance) and traded them to faraway lands for metal, timber, or lapis lazuli. The first markets form on the fringes of these complexes and appear to operate largely on credit, using the temples’ units of account. But this gave the merchants and temple administrators and other well-off types the opportunity to make consumer loans to farmers, and then, if say the harvest was bad, everybody would start falling into debt-traps.

This was the great social evil of antiquity – families would have to start pawning off their flocks, fields and before long, their wives and children would be taken off into debt peonage. Often people would start abandoning the cities entirely, joining semi-nomadic bands, threatening to come back in force and overturn the existing order entirely. Rulers would regularly conclude the only way to prevent complete social breakdown was to declare a clean slate or ‘washing of the tablets,’ they’d cancel all consumer debt and just start over. In fact, the first recorded word for ‘freedom’ in any human language is the Sumerian amargi, a word for debt-freedom, and by extension freedom more generally, which literally means ‘return to mother,’ since when they declared a clean slate, all the debt peons would get to go home.

PP: You have noted in the book that debt is a moral concept long before it becomes an economic concept. You’ve also noted that it is a very ambivalent moral concept insofar as it can be both positive and negative. Could you please talk about this a little? Which aspect is more prominent?

DG: Well it tends to pivot radically back and forth.

One could tell the history like this: eventually the Egyptian approach (taxes) and Mesopotamian approach (usury) fuse together, people have to borrow to pay their taxes and debt becomes institutionalized.

Taxes are also key to creating the first markets that operate on cash, since coinage seems to be invented or at least widely popularized to pay soldiers – more or less simultaneously in China, India, and the Mediterranean, where governments find the easiest way to provision the troops is to issue them standard-issue bits of gold or silver and then demand everyone else in the kingdom give them one of those coins back again. Thus we find that the language of debt and the language of morality start to merge.

In Sanskrit, Hebrew, Aramaic, ‘debt,’ ‘guilt,’ and ‘sin’ are actually the same word. Much of the language of the great religious movements – reckoning, redemption, karmic accounting and the like – are drawn from the language of ancient finance. But that language is always found wanting and inadequate and twisted around into something completely different. It’s as if the great prophets and religious teachers had no choice but to start with that kind of language because it’s the language that existed at the time, but they only adopted it so as to turn it into its opposite: as a way of saying debts are not sacred, but forgiveness of debt, or the ability to wipe out debt, or to realize that debts aren’t real – these are the acts that are truly sacred.

How did this happen? Well, remember I said that the big question in the origins of money is how a sense of obligation – an ‘I owe you one’ – turns into something that can be precisely quantified? Well, the answer seems to be: when there is a potential for violence. If you give someone a pig and they give you a few chickens back you might think they’re a cheapskate, and mock them, but you’re unlikely to come up with a mathematical formula for exactly how cheap you think they are. If someone pokes out your eye in a fight, or kills your brother, that’s when you start saying, “traditional compensation is exactly twenty-seven heifers of the finest quality and if they’re not of the finest quality, this means war!”

Money, in the sense of exact equivalents, seems to emerge from situations like that, but also, war and plunder, the disposal of loot, slavery. In early Medieval Ireland, for example, slave-girls were the highest denomination of currency. And you could specify the exact value of everything in a typical house even though very few of those items were available for sale anywhere because they were used to pay fines or damages if someone broke them.

But once you understand that taxes and money largely begin with war it becomes easier to see what really happened. After all, every Mafiosi understands this. If you want to take a relation of violent extortion, sheer power, and turn it into something moral, and most of all, make it seem like the victims are to blame, you turn it into a relation of debt. “You owe me, but I’ll cut you a break for now…” Most human beings in history have probably been told this by their debtors. And the crucial thing is: what possible reply can you make but, “wait a minute, who owes what to who here?” And of course for thousands of years, that’s what the victims have said, but the moment you do, you are using the rulers’ language, you’re admitting that debt and morality really are the same thing. That’s the situation the religious thinkers were stuck with, so they started with the language of debt, and then they tried to turn it around and make it into something else.

PP: You’d be forgiven for thinking this was all very Nietzschean. In his ‘On the Genealogy of Morals’ the German philosopher Friedrich Nietzsche famously argued that all morality was founded upon the extraction of debt under the threat of violence. The sense of obligation instilled in the debtor was, for Nietzsche, the origin of civilisation itself. You’ve been studying how morality and debt intertwine in great detail. How does Nietzsche’s argument look after over 100 years? And which do you see as primal: morality or debt?

DG: Well, to be honest, I’ve never been sure if Nietzsche was really serious in that passage or whether the whole argument is a way of annoying his bourgeois audience; a way of pointing out that if you start from existing bourgeois premises about human nature you logically end up in just the place that would make most of that audience most uncomfortable.
In fact, Nietzsche begins his argument from exactly the same place as Adam Smith: human beings are rational. But rational here means calculation, exchange and hence, trucking and bartering; buying and selling is then the first expression of human thought and is prior to any sort of social relations.

But then he reveals exactly why Adam Smith had to pretend that Neolithic villagers would be making transactions through the spot trade. Because if we have no prior moral relations with each other, and morality just emerges from exchange, then ongoing social relations between two people will only exist if the exchange is incomplete – if someone hasn’t paid up.

But in that case, one of the parties is a criminal, a deadbeat and justice would have to begin with the vindictive punishment of such deadbeats. Thus he says all those law codes where it says ‘twenty heifers for a gouged-out eye’ – really, originally, it was the other way around. If you owe someone twenty heifers and don’t pay they gouge out your eye. Morality begins with Shylock’s pound of flesh.
Needless to say there’s zero evidence for any of this – Nietzsche just completely made it up. The question is whether even he believed it. Maybe I’m an optimist, but I prefer to think he didn’t.

Anyway it only makes sense if you assume those premises; that all human interaction is exchange, and therefore, all ongoing relations are debts. This flies in the face of everything we actually know or experience of human life. But once you start thinking that the market is the model for all human behavior, that’s where you end up with.

If however you ditch the whole myth of barter, and start with a community where people do have prior moral relations, and then ask, how do those moral relations come to be framed as ‘debts’ – that is, as something precisely quantified, impersonal, and therefore, transferrable – well, that’s an entirely different question. In that case, yes, you do have to start with the role of violence.

PP: Interesting. Perhaps this is a good place to ask you about how you conceive your work on debt in relation to the great French anthropologist Marcel Mauss’ classic work on gift exchange.

DG: Oh, in my own way I think of myself as working very much in the Maussian tradition. Mauss was one of the first anthropologists to ask: well, all right, if not barter, then what? What do people who don’t use money actually do when things change hands? Anthropologists had documented an endless variety of such economic systems, but hadn’t really worked out common principles. What Mauss noticed was that in almost all of them, everyone pretended as if they were just giving one another gifts and then they fervently denied they expected anything back. But in actual fact everyone understood there were implicit rules and recipients would feel compelled to make some sort of return.

What fascinated Mauss was that this seemed to be universally true, even today. If I take a free-market economist out to dinner he’ll feel like he should return the favor and take me out to dinner later. He might even think that he is something of chump if he doesn’t and this even if his theory tells him he just got something for nothing and should be happy about it. Why is that? What is this force that compels me to want to return a gift?

This is an important argument, and it shows there is always a certain morality underlying what we call economic life. But it strikes me that if you focus too much on just that one aspect of Mauss’ argument you end up reducing everything to exchange again, with the proviso that some people are pretending they aren’t doing that.

Mauss didn’t really think of everything in terms of exchange; this becomes clear if you read his other writings besides ‘The Gift’. Mauss insisted there were lots of different principles at play besides reciprocity in any society – including our own.

For example, take hierarchy. Gifts given to inferiors or superiors don’t have to be repaid at all. If another professor takes our economist out to dinner, sure, he’ll feel that he should reciprocate; but if an eager grad student does, he’ll probably figure just accepting the invitation is favor enough; and if George Soros buys him dinner, then great, he did get something for nothing after all. In explicitly unequal relations, if you give somebody something, far from doing you a favor back, they’re more likely to expect you to do it again.

Or take communistic relations – and I define this, following Mauss actually, as any ones where people interact on the basis of ‘from each according to their abilities to each according to their needs’. In these relations people do not rely on reciprocity, for example, when trying to solve a problem, even inside a capitalist firm. (As I always say, if somebody working for Exxon says, “hand me the screwdriver,” the other guy doesn’t say, “yeah and what do I get for it?”) Communism is in a way the basis of all social relations – in that if the need is great enough (I’m drowning) or the cost small enough (can I have a light?) everyone will be expected to act that way.

Anyway that’s one thing I got from Mauss. There are always going to be lots of different sorts of principles at play simultaneously in any social or economic system – which is why we can never really boil these things down to a science. Economics tries to, but it does it by ignoring everything except exchange.

PP: Let’s move onto economic theory then. Economics has some pretty specific theories about what money is. There’s the mainstream approach that we discussed briefly above; this is the commodity theory of money in which specific commodities come to serve as a medium of exchange to replace crude barter economies. But there’s also alternative theories that are becoming increasingly popular at the moment. One is the Circuitist theory of money in which all money is seen as a debt incurred by some economic agent. The other – which actually integrates the Circuitist approach – is the Chartalist theory of money in which all money is seen as a medium of exchange issued by the Sovereign and backed by the enforcement of tax claims. Maybe you could say something about these theories?

DG: One of my inspirations for ‘Debt: The First 5,000 Years’ was Keith Hart’s essay ‘Two Sides of the Coin’. In that essay Hart points out that not only do different schools of economics have different theories on the nature of money, but there is also reason to believe that both are right. Money has, for most of its history, been a strange hybrid entity that takes on aspects of both commodity (object) and credit (social relation.) What I think I’ve managed to add to that is the historical realization that while money has always been both, it swings back and forth – there are periods where credit is primary, and everyone adopts more or less Chartalist theories of money and others where cash tends to predominate and commodity theories of money instead come to the fore. We tend to forget that in, say, the Middle Ages, from France to China, Chartalism was just common sense: money was just a social convention; in practice, it was whatever the king was willing to accept in taxes.

PP: You say that history swings between periods of commodity money and periods of virtual money. Do you not think that we’ve reached a point in history where due to technological and cultural evolution we may have seen the end of commodity money forever?

DG: Well, the cycles are getting a bit tighter as time goes by. But I think we’ll still have to wait at least 400 years to really find out. It is possible that this era is coming to an end but what I’m more concerned with now is the period of transition.

The last time we saw a broad shift from commodity money to credit money it wasn’t a very pretty sight. To name a few we had the fall of the Roman Empire, the Kali Age in India and the breakdown of the Han dynasty… There was a lot of death, catastrophe and mayhem. The final outcome was in many ways profoundly libratory for the bulk of those who lived through it – chattel slavery, for example, was largely eliminated from the great civilizations. This was a remarkable historical achievement. The decline of cities actually meant most people worked far less. But still, one does rather hope the dislocation won’t be quite so epic in its scale this time around. Especially since the actual means of destruction are so much greater this time around.

PP: Which do you see as playing a more important role in human history: money or debt?

DG: Well, it depends on your definitions. If you define money in the broadest sense, as any unit of account whereby you can say 10 of these are worth 7 of those, then you can’t have debt without money. Debt is just a promise that can be quantified by means of money (and therefore, becomes impersonal, and therefore, transferable.) But if you are asking which has been the more important form of money, credit or coin, then probably I would have to say credit.

PP: Let’s move on to some of the real world problems facing the world today. We know that in many Western countries over the past few years households have been running up enormous debts, from credit card debts to mortgages (the latter of which were one of the root causes of the recent financial crisis). Some economists are saying that economic growth since the Clinton era was essentially run on an unsustainable inflating of household debt. From an historical perspective what do you make of this phenomenon?

DG: From an historical perspective, it’s pretty ominous. One could go further than the Clinton era, actually – a case could be made that we are seeing now is the same crisis we were facing in the 70s; it’s just that we managed to fend it off for 30 or 35 years through all these elaborate credit arrangements (and of course, the super-exploitation of the global South, through the ‘Third World Debt Crisis’.)

As I said Eurasian history, taken in its broadest contours, shifts back and forth between periods dominated by virtual credit money and those dominated by actual coin and bullion. The credit systems of the ancient Near East give way to the great slave-holding empires of the Classical world in Europe, India, and China, which used coinage to pay their troops. In the Middle Ages the empires go and so does the coinage – the gold and silver is mostly locked up in temples and monasteries – and the world reverts to credit. Then after 1492 or so you have the return world empires again; and gold and silver currency together with slavery, for that matter.

What’s been happening since Nixon went off the gold standard in 1971 has just been another turn of the wheel – though of course it never happens the same way twice. However, in one sense, I think we’ve been going about things backwards. In the past, periods dominated by virtual credit money have also been periods where there have been social protections for debtors. Once you recognize that money is just a social construct, a credit, an IOU, then first of all what is to stop people from generating it endlessly? And how do you prevent the poor from falling into debt traps and becoming effectively enslaved to the rich? That’s why you had Mesopotamian clean slates, Biblical Jubilees, Medieval laws against usury in both Christianity and Islam and so on and so forth.

Since antiquity the worst-case scenario that everyone felt would lead to total social breakdown was a major debt crisis; ordinary people would become so indebted to the top one or two percent of the population that they would start selling family members into slavery, or eventually, even themselves.

Well, what happened this time around? Instead of creating some sort of overarching institution to protect debtors, they create these grandiose, world-scale institutions like the IMF or S&P to protect creditors. They essentially declare (in defiance of all traditional economic logic) that no debtor should ever be allowed to default. Needless to say the result is catastrophic. We are experiencing something that to me, at least, looks exactly like what the ancients were most afraid of: a population of debtors skating at the edge of disaster.

And, I might add, if Aristotle were around today, I very much doubt he would think that the distinction between renting yourself or members of your family out to work and selling yourself or members of your family to work was more than a legal nicety. He’d probably conclude that most Americans were, for all intents and purposes, slaves.

PP: You mention that the IMF and S&P are institutions that are mainly geared toward extracting debts for creditors. This seems to have become the case in the European monetary union too. What do you make of the situation in Europe at the moment?

DG: Well, I think this is a prime example of why existing arrangements are clearly untenable. Obviously the ‘whole debt’ cannot be paid. But even when some French banks offered voluntary write-downs for Greece, the others insisted they would treat it as if it were a default anyway. The UK takes the even weirder position that this is true even of debts the government owes to banks that have been nationalized – that is, technically, that they owe to themselves! If that means that disabled pensioners are no longer able to use public transit or youth centers have to be closed down, well that’s simply the ‘reality of the situation,’ as they put it.

These ‘realities’ are being increasingly revealed to simply be ones of power. Clearly any pretence that markets maintain themselves, that debts always have to be honored, went by the boards in 2008. That’s one of the reasons I think you see the beginnings of a reaction in a remarkably similar form to what we saw during the heyday of the ‘Third World debt crisis’ – what got called, rather weirdly, the ‘anti-globalization movement’. This movement called for genuine democracy and actually tried to practice forms of direct, horizontal democracy. In the face of this there was the insidious alliance between financial elites and global bureaucrats (whether the IMF, World Bank, WTO, now EU, or what-have-you).

When thousands of people begin assembling in squares in Greece and Spain calling for real democracy what they are effectively saying is: “Look, in 2008 you let the cat out of the bag. If money really is just a social construct now, a promise, a set of IOUs and even trillions of debts can be made to vanish if sufficiently powerful players demand it then, if democracy is to mean anything, it means that everyone gets to weigh in on the process of how these promises are made and renegotiated.” I find this extraordinarily hopeful.

PP: Broadly speaking how do you see the present debt/financial crisis unravelling? Without asking you to peer into the proverbial crystal-ball – because that’s a silly thing to ask of anyone – how do you see the future unfolding; in the sense of how do you take your bearings right now?

DG: For the long-term future, I’m pretty optimistic. We might have been doing things backwards for the last 40 years, but in terms of 500-year cycles, well, 40 years is nothing. Eventually there will have to be recognition that in a phase of virtual money, safeguards have to be put in place – and not just ones to protect creditors. How many disasters it will take to get there? I can’t say.

But in the meantime there is another question to be asked: once we do these reforms, will the results be something that could even be called ‘capitalism’?
User avatar
jingofever
 
Posts: 2814
Joined: Sun Oct 16, 2005 6:24 pm
Blog: View Blog (0)

Re: Debt: The first five thousand years

Postby Elihu » Mon Aug 29, 2011 10:00 am

Chris Sanders
Principal, SandersResearch.com
Buy others for news. Buy us for judgment.

Is fiat currency really all that bad?
Is the real problem the monopoly that central banks have on the medium of exchange?

The world has lived with a purely fiat monetary system for thirty three years since the US abandoned its commitment to exchange gold for dollars at a fixed rate of exchange in 1971. That commitment, enshrined in the Bretton Woods Agreement of 1944, had the force of international law. The Bretton Woods system was something less than fully convertible, since the commitment to exchange gold only existed at the government-to-government level and at the level of the national economy did not exist at all. Indeed, holding gold was prohibited for private individuals, a point I shall return to momentarily.

The abandonment of Bretton Woods was, at the time, simply the latest in a long series of actions intended to create a workable unitary fiat monetary system. The creation of the Federal Reserve, the abandonment of gold in 1933 and the establishment of the Exchange Stabilization Fund in the same year, the creation on of the CIA in 1947 with the express authority to raise money outside the law, and the creation of government controlled oligopolies in housing and heavy industry via the GSEs and the Pentagon respectively were all designed expressly to create an institutional framework to accomplish that end.

What all these actions have in common--besides their purpose--is that they were all based on either illegal or deceptive foundations. The Federal Reserve is nominally a public company, but its equity was sold to the very men and institutions it was supposedly created to regulate and control. Roosevelt’s actions were tenuously based on the Trading with the Enemy Act of 1917 and the abrogation of the gold contract was accomplished over a bank holiday declared for that purpose so that no one could get their gold. The ESF was set up expressly to operate in secret; it is exempt from any reporting to Congress and is answerable only to the president and the secretary of the Treasury. The CIA’s charter amounts to an act of law authorizing the breaking of the law at will, as well as the ability to raise finance in the same manner. The creation of the GSEs was shrouded in ambiguity: are they or are they not guaranteed by the government? This may be less relevant today, but fifty years ago when private corporations could still go to the wall, it was extremely important. And the Pentagon has been since the early 60's a sink into which taxpayer dollars are poured to enrich contractors with guaranteed margins.

The surrender of the British Empire in 1944 at Bretton Woods, the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1989, and the adoption by the Chinese Communist Party of “liberal” capitalism have made the world economy a unitary dollar financial system--the significance of which is the absence of choice. Irrespective of how poorly managed or exploitative in nature the administration of that system is, there is no alternative. The only government with the chutzpah to attempt to do so was that of Saddam Hussein and the consequence was predictable. The adoption by a statistically significant segment of the world’s population of a gold backed unit of account and reserves supported by sufficient armed force to protect that area would bring about the end of the fiat currency system in a trice, historically speaking. The fact that the only organization talking about doing so is the World Islamic Conference may well inform the War on Terror. The combination of control of the world’s largest oil reserves and a hard currency and lower taxes would be hard to beat.

It is sometimes posited that a little bit of inflation is not a bad thing or that fiat currency is not so bad and it is the monopoly on money creation by the central bank that is the problem. This is to completely misunderstand the issue. Fiat currency can only exist under conditions of monopoly and an absence of freedom. The Roosevelt administration criminalized gold ownership by equating it with a threat to national security, in effect abrogating constitutional guarantees of personal political and economic freedom. In today’s system, you are free to own gold, but not free to know how much of the national gold reserve is even there any more, never mind what the Exchange Stabilization Fund is doing to suppress the price. The question is not so much whether or not fiat currency is bad, but is whether or not the political and institutional accoutrements that go with it are tolerable. That is a personal decision. I believe it was Ben Franklin who was asked after the adoption of the American Constitution what kind of government had been created. “A republic, if we can keep it” or words to that effect was his answer.

Have we kept it?

© 2004 Chris Sanders
Principal, http://www.sandersresearch.com
Email
Last edited by Elihu on Mon Aug 29, 2011 10:59 am, edited 4 times in total.
But take heart, because I have overcome the world.” John 16:33
Elihu
 
Posts: 1419
Joined: Wed Mar 16, 2011 11:44 pm
Blog: View Blog (0)

Re: Debt: The first five thousand years

Postby Elihu » Mon Aug 29, 2011 10:16 am

Antal E. Fekete
Professor Emeritus,
Memorial University of Newfoundland
St. John's, Canada, A1C 5S7

Red Herring

The Federal Reserve System (Fed), the guardian and advocate of the regime of the irredeemable dollar, is very different from the Fed as it was created by Congress in 1913 at a time when no sane man would have questioned the legitimacy or even the indispensability of the gold standard. The Fed was set up to provide an elastic currency for the United States that flowed and ebbed together with commerce, industry, and agriculture which, according to Adam Smith's "Real Bills Doctrine", was fully compatible with a gold standard. The Fed was conceived as a commercial paper system. Assets balancing the note and deposit liabilities of the Federal Reserve banks were supposed to be no less than 35 percent gold, with real bills (also known as self-liquidating bills of exchange) making up the rest. Treasury bonds could only be held in the asset portfolio if a penalty tax was paid, which provided a powerful incentive to replace them with real bills at the first opportunity. The alternative was, horribile dictu, the contraction of credit.

It is preposterous to suggest that the Fed, as it exists today, has come about through evolution rather than revolution. In fact, the change has involved nothing less than the overthrowing of the U.S. Constitution making it incumbent upon the federal government to establish the U.S. Mint and to keep it open for the free and unlimited coinage of gold and silver by the people. In this way the Constitution has delegated the power of creating money directly to the people. It is this power that, as a result of the revolution, is now usurped by the Fed. As all usurpers, the Fed is a law unto itself that tolerates no restriction on its power.

The question who really owns the Fed, no less than the question who really owns the gold confiscated from the people in 1933 and now held at Fort Knox, with gold certificates against it held by the Fed, is a red herring. The Fed is nominally owned by its member banks, but its modus operandi betrays the truth. After the gold standard was destroyed by the U.S. government, the Fed has been hijacked by a clique that runs it without any regard to ownership, the Constitution, the law or, for that matter, to the vital interests of the American people.

Who Gets the Loot?

I shall justify this outrageous claim by discussing the real question how the earnings of the Federal Reserve banks are disposed in violation of the law. The Federal Reserve Act, Section 7 (as amended, June 16, 1933) mandates that the net earnings of each Federal Reserve bank be paid into the surplus account of that bank. Note that this provision does not add to the profits of the member banks, which is limited by law to 6 percent per annum of the value of their paid up stock. It merely strengthens the capital structure of the Federal Reserve banks and, therefore, increases their capacity to serve commerce, industry, and agriculture. The law as it stands does not allow the U.S. Treasury to participate in the earnings of the Federal Reserve banks.

Yet in 1947 Fed Chairman Marriner Eccles set a precedent, establishing a practice that has continued year after year down to this day, to hand over 90 percent of net earnings to the U.S. Treasury. Instead of presenting to Congress a proposal for amendment of the Federal Reserve Act, as proper procedure required, Chairman Eccles decided to violate the law and to dissipate the earnings of the Federal Reserve banks.

An ethical issue makes this official violation of the law particularly significant. The bulk of the Federal Reserve banks' assets, contrary to the original intention to run the Fed as a commercial paper system, are Treasury bonds. The bulk of their earnings are interest income derived from Treasury bonds. Most of these interest payments are quietly and illegally refunded to the Treasury. Thus the assets backing Federal Reserve notes are, for the most part, non-interest-bearing Treasury bonds or "strips", the value of which is grossly overstated in the balance sheet. The interposition of the Fed between the U.S. Treasury and the public in the money-creating process is a sham. The "open market operations" of the Fed is a sham. The dollar is being created in violation of the law, by pure fiat, at the whim of appointed officials arrogating unlimited power to themselves; this in a republic where government is supposed to be based on limited and enumerated powers. The roundabout nature of the dollar-creating process serves the purpose of fooling people. The Fed could very well be abolished, and the U.S. Treasury could issue fiat dollars directly, reducing the budget deficit of the federal government in the process. If it doesn't, it is because it wants to pull the wool over the eyes of the public. It wants to maintain the pretense that a central bank independent of the government does the issuing as dictated by market forces. Hereby the true fiat nature of the dollar is revealed. Only simpletons believe that there are solid assets backing the dollar.

A Tale of Twelve Shills

The bond market has been turned into a casino. The gamblers are bond speculators, including all the major banks. The manager of the casino has hired twelve "shills" who play and win big at the gaming tables in order to perk up gambling spirit and to keep it high. At the end of the day the shills must return their winnings to the owner of the casino. These shills are none other than the twelve Federal Reserve banks.

The value of Treasury bonds is maintained through fraud. Today nobody in his right mind would hold his savings in bonds, as was the case before 1913 when the rate of interest and bond prices were stable and, hence, bond speculation was non-existent. Thus the logical basis of the value of bonds has been shattered. In the present environment the value of Treasury bonds is maintained by virtue of letting them serve as chips at the casino. People have to buy them if they want to play. As more and more chips are issued, the shills must become more and more active to prevent gambling spirit from sagging. The fraud of pretending that Treasury bonds have any real value at all, and that the destiny of the underlying debt is to be paid, is exposed. If it wasn't for the $100 trillion derivatives markets in bond futures and options, Treasury bonds would become worthless, and so would the dollar. These derivatives markets must spin ever faster in order to keep the value of Treasury bonds from collapsing. The shills can postpone the day of reckoning but cannot avoid it. Messrs. Greenspan and Bernanke could be reckless in using the printing press, as they have publicly said that they would do, but that should only make the d'nouement, whenever it came, even more horrible.

� 2004 Antal E. Fekete
FSO Expert Page
Email


fwiw, i think the nominal value of derivatives today in 2011 stands at one quadrillion....
But take heart, because I have overcome the world.” John 16:33
Elihu
 
Posts: 1419
Joined: Wed Mar 16, 2011 11:44 pm
Blog: View Blog (0)

Re: Debt: The first five thousand years

Postby Wombaticus Rex » Mon Aug 29, 2011 6:03 pm

MY BROWSER RESIZES THIS ONCE IT'S LOADED -- if this breaks frames for anyone, let me know and I'll edit up/host a smaller version.

Image

Source: http://www.spiegel.de/international/bus ... 90,00.html
User avatar
Wombaticus Rex
 
Posts: 10896
Joined: Wed Nov 08, 2006 6:33 pm
Location: Vermontistan
Blog: View Blog (0)

Re: Debt: The first five thousand years

Postby eyeno » Mon Aug 29, 2011 9:42 pm

Wombaticus Rex wrote:MY BROWSER RESIZES THIS ONCE IT'S LOADED -- if this breaks frames for anyone, let me know and I'll edit up/host a smaller version.

Image

Source: http://www.spiegel.de/international/bus ... 90,00.html



One of the scariest and most informative graphics I have seen lately. Thanx for that.
User avatar
eyeno
 
Posts: 1878
Joined: Wed Nov 24, 2010 5:22 pm
Blog: View Blog (0)

Re: Debt: The first five thousand years

Postby Wombaticus Rex » Mon Aug 29, 2011 9:53 pm

It's so transparently fucking insane, innit? A child could see this is doomed.

Critics of the financial system and Western Culture in general make a lot of noise about "infinite growth" but what's happening is far more insane than that. It's not just that Wall Street/CME/Lloyds/Nikkei believe there that the economy can continue to grow indefinitely -- they're also clearly betting that the rate of growth itself has infinite room to grow. Not only fractally wrong, exponentially wrong.
User avatar
Wombaticus Rex
 
Posts: 10896
Joined: Wed Nov 08, 2006 6:33 pm
Location: Vermontistan
Blog: View Blog (0)

Re: Debt: The first five thousand years

Postby Joe Hillshoist » Tue Aug 30, 2011 5:41 am

Wombaticus Rex wrote:It's so transparently fucking insane, innit? A child could see this is doomed.

Critics of the financial system and Western Culture in general make a lot of noise about "infinite growth" but what's happening is far more insane than that. It's not just that Wall Street/CME/Lloyds/Nikkei believe there that the economy can continue to grow indefinitely -- they're also clearly betting that the rate of growth itself has infinite room to grow. Not only fractally wrong, exponentially wrong.


Exponentially wrong is the perfect term.

Thanks for the graphic btw - mind blowing and clarity.
Joe Hillshoist
 
Posts: 10616
Joined: Mon Jun 12, 2006 10:45 pm
Blog: View Blog (0)

Next

Return to General Discussion

Who is online

Users browsing this forum: No registered users and 163 guests