The Criminal N.S.A.

Moderators: Elvis, DrVolin, Jeff

Re: The Criminal N.S.A.

Postby seemslikeadream » Tue Sep 02, 2014 5:20 pm

Challenge to NSA’s Mass Surveillance Inches Way Up Court System
09/02/2014

NSA
By Alex Abdo, Staff Attorney, ACLU Speech, Privacy, and Technology Project at 12:00am
This morning, we're heading back to court to challenge the NSA's phone-records program, this time in the Second Circuit Court of Appeals in New York.

Several district courts have already ruled on the program, with one calling it "almost Orwellian." And, of course, the secretive Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court has approved it many times. But one consequence of the excessive secrecy surrounding the program is that it has never been reviewed by the Supreme Court or even by a federal appeals court. Until now.

Our lawsuit and the several similar lawsuits that have been filed around the country are significant for many reasons. The phone-records program – under which the NSA collects a record of the calls made by millions of Americans every single day – is perhaps the most sweeping surveillance operation ever directed against the American public by our government. It raises profound questions about the role of government in a democracy and about the future of privacy in the digital era. And it threatens our constitutional rights in ways unimaginable by the founders of our country.

As we argued in a brief to the court:

Each time a resident of the United States makes a phone call, the NSA records whom she calls, when the call was placed, and how long the conversation lasted. The NSA keeps track of when she called the doctor, and which doctor she called; which family members she called, and which she did not; which pastor she called, and for how long she spoke to him. It keeps track of whether, how often, and precisely when she called the abortion clinic, the support group for alcoholics, the psychiatrist, the ex-girlfriend, the criminal-defense lawyer, the suicide hotline, and the child-services agency.

The legal challenges are also significant for the simple fact that they have forced the government to defend its program in public. For over a decade, the government has thwarted all attempts at public judicial review of the legality of the surveillance programs it inaugurated in the aftermath of 9/11. It erected procedural barriers and invoked the state-secrets doctrine to have those challenges thrown out of court.

But today, we're one step closer to having a definitive ruling on the legality of at least one of those programs. We are optimistic that the court will agree with us that the bulk collection of sensitive information on millions of innocent Americans is unlawful.

Stay tuned for our update after the hearing or watch it on C-SPAN here.
ACLU v. Clapper Oral Argument
The Second Circuit Court of Appeals in New York City heard oral argument in ACLU v. Clapper, which challenged the National Security Agency’s (NSA) phone records surveillance program.



Mazars and Deutsche Bank could have ended this nightmare before it started.
They could still get him out of office.
But instead, they want mass death.
Don’t forget that.
User avatar
seemslikeadream
 
Posts: 32090
Joined: Wed Apr 27, 2005 11:28 pm
Location: into the black
Blog: View Blog (83)

Re: The Criminal N.S.A.

Postby seemslikeadream » Sat Sep 06, 2014 10:17 am

THURSDAY, SEP 4, 2014 11:49 AM CDT
Patriot Act’s absurd new spawn: Just when you thought it couldn’t get any worse
Creative legal interpretations may now enable the government to sign off on things that will blow your mind
MARCY WHEELER

Patriot Act's absurd new spawn: Just when you thought it couldn't get any worse
James Clapper and CIA Director John Brennan at the Senate Intelligence Committee, Capitol Hill in Washington, Jan. 29, 2014 (Credit: AP/Pablo Martinez Monsivais)
Congress may be preparing to reinforce two horrible FISA Court decisions and an abusive government search with no debate in the coming weeks: a decision to give national security orders unlimited breadth, one making it legal for the government to investigate Americans for activities protected under the First Amendment, and the FBI’s “back door” searches of Americans’ communication content collected under the FISA Amendment Act Section 702 authority.

On Tuesday, the ACLU and the Department of Justice argued about the legality of the NSA’s phone dragnet program before the 2nd Circuit Court of Appeals in New York. Much of the discussion focused on the implications of the government’s theories that it can collect all phone records in the United States based on a claim they are “relevant” to standing terrorism investigations. “You can collect everything there is to know about everybody and have it all in one big government cloud,” said Judge Gerard Lynch, describing the implications of the government’s theories to Assistant Attorney General Stuart Delery.

But the ACLU and the government also engaged in an equally important debate — on whether the FISA Court’s interpretation of the word “relevant” overstepped Congress’ intent – focused on whether Congress had backed FISC’s definition of “relevant” by reauthorizing the Patriot Act twice.

The executive branch and the FISA Court have spent the last 15 months arguing that Congress “ratified” the expansive interpretations on which the phone dragnet program relies when it reauthorized the Patriot Act in 2010 and 2011 because, having been informed of the program, Congress extended the Patriot Act without changing that language. “When Congress reenacts a statute without change,” the administration said in a white paper on the phone dragnet in August 2013, ”it is presumed to have adopted the administrative or judicial interpretation of the statute if it is aware of the interpretation.” Three federal judges have bought that claim, relying on it to rule the program is legal.

The government’s claim with regards to past authorizations is terribly weak. There were at least six known instances where Congress did not get notice it should have; in several cases, those obligations were imposed by law. Perhaps the most important – in which House Intelligence Committee chairman Mike Rogers did not invite most congressmen to read notice of the dragnet provided to Congress in 2011 — means that 65 of the people who voted to reauthorize the Patriot Act in 2011 probably had had no way of learning about the phone dragnet. And, as the ACLU’s Alexander Abdo pointed out in Tuesday’s hearing, Congress couldn’t have been briefed on the legal analysis underlying the phone dragnet because the FISA Court never got around to writing an opinion on it until 2013, in response to the Snowden leaks.

The executive’s claim that Congress “ratified” the phone dragnet before the Snowden leaks — and therefore that the program currently complies with the intent of Congress — is farcical. And the judges on the panel — in addition to Lynch, fellow Democratic appointees Robert Sack and Vernon Broderick — seem skeptical of the government’s claim that secret briefings offered about an unannounced program can support a claim that Congress knowingly ratified the program.

So the government’s argument that the program is legal because Congress reauthorized the Patriot Act after the government started secretly using it to collect most phone records in the U.S. may fail to persuade the 2nd Circuit.

But that won’t be true going forward.

The government’s public release of numerous court opinions and other intelligence information over the last 15 months means no one in Congress can make a credible claim to be uninformed of the decisions underlying these parts of the government’s spying. In 2011, most members of Congress probably didn’t know the FISC had redefined the word “relevant” in a key Patriot Act definition to mean “everything,” but they should know that now. Yet none of the current proposals to reform the dragnet do anything about the definition of “relevant.” They limit collection of phone records in other ways, but would permit bulky collection under that “relevance” standard in a number of ways and by association using a number of statutes.

Thus, while the 2nd Circuit might rule the current dragnet illegal in part because the legal logic of it would permit the government to “collect everything there is to know about everybody,” if Congress passes the USA Freedom Act without changing that definition of “relevant,” it will be easier for the government to win this argument in the future.

Congressional passage of the USA Freedom Act with the existing language intact would also probably “ratify” two other intelligence community programs: first, a more recently released decision, a February 2013 opinion in which Judge John Bates ruled that prohibitions on using the Patriot Act to investigate Americans based solely on First Amendment-protected activities – such as political speech or religion — do not apply if associates of the targeted person are engaged in unprotected activities. Bates took language from Congress prohibiting the government from using Patriot authorities against Americans for nothing more than their speech and created a loophole allowing the government to do just that.

As Stanford law professor Jennifer Granick said in a post on this opinion, “Most people, when they cite [the] statutory language [from the Patriot Act], believe it means that Americans won’t be subjects of terrorism investigations for the First Amendment protected things they say or do.” But based on what we can see of Bates’ opinion, Granick continued, “They would be wrong.”

And while the language of the opinion pertains to a terrorism investigation, the novel interpretation of the phrase might now apply in other uses of Patriot authorities, such as counterintelligence investigations, which sometimes includes hacking or leak investigations. Behind a veil of secrecy, Bates and the government appear to have made it OK to investigate Americans for their free speech again.

In addition, the government has revealed the FBI conducts “back door” searches — warrantless searches on U.S. persons’ data collected under FISA Section 702 – even for “assessments” of counterterrorism investigations. The FBI keeps no records of such searches, presumably because it dictated for itself in 2011 it need not keep any records of assessments. As a result, it refuses to tell Congress how many Americans have been subjected to such warrantless searches.

In a letter released Wednesday, Director of National Intelligence James Clapper seemed to point to back door searches. He hailed Sen. Leahy’s version of the USA Freedom Act because it ”recognize[s] the technical limitations on our ability to report certain types of information.” The big topic the bill limited was FBI searches of 702 information. That suggests Clapper is pointing to Leahy’s exemption for FBI’s back door searches.

That would be particularly troubling given that back door searches are one area of particularly acute constitutional concern.

And if Congress doesn’t do anything about these issues, in the future the government will argue — more credibly, this time — that Congress signed off on these expansions of Executive authority.

Whether by passing USA Freedom Act this fall or by reauthorizing the Patriot Act next June, Congress is likely to extend the life of the Patriot Act. Given the absurd implications of some of the recently released FISC opinions, Congress would do well to redefine this language to reclaim the plain English meaning, contrary to FISC’s reinterpretations of it.

Thus far, however, they show no sign of doing so.
Mazars and Deutsche Bank could have ended this nightmare before it started.
They could still get him out of office.
But instead, they want mass death.
Don’t forget that.
User avatar
seemslikeadream
 
Posts: 32090
Joined: Wed Apr 27, 2005 11:28 pm
Location: into the black
Blog: View Blog (83)

Re: The Criminal N.S.A.

Postby seemslikeadream » Thu Sep 18, 2014 6:22 pm

Israel’s N.S.A. Scandal

By JAMES BAMFORD
SEPT. 16, 2014

WASHINGTON — IN Moscow this summer, while reporting a story for Wired magazine, I had the rare opportunity to hang out for three days with Edward J. Snowden. It gave me a chance to get a deeper understanding of who he is and why, as a National Security Agencycontractor, he took the momentous step of leaking hundreds of thousands of classified documents.

Among his most shocking discoveries, he told me, was the fact that the N.S.A. was routinely passing along the private communications of Americans to a large and very secretive Israeli military organization known as Unit 8200. This transfer of intercepts, he said, included the contents of the communications as well as metadata such as who was calling whom.

Typically, when such sensitive information is transferred to another country, it would first be “minimized,” meaning that names and other personally identifiable information would be removed. But when sharing with Israel, the N.S.A. evidently did not ensure that the data was modified in this way.

Mr. Snowden stressed that the transfer of intercepts to Israel contained the communications — email as well as phone calls — of countless Arab- and Palestinian-Americans whose relatives in Israel and the Palestinian territories could become targets based on the communications. “I think that’s amazing,” he told me. “It’s one of the biggest abuses we’ve seen.”

It appears that Mr. Snowden’s fears were warranted. Last week, 43 veterans of Unit 8200 — many still serving in the reserves — accused the organization of startling abuses. In a letter to their commanders, to Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and to the head of the Israeli army, they charged that Israel used information collected against innocent Palestinians for “political persecution.” In testimonies and interviews given to the media, they specified that data were gathered on Palestinians’ sexual orientations, infidelities, money problems, family medical conditions and other private matters that could be used to coerce Palestinians into becoming collaborators or create divisions in their society.

The veterans of Unit 8200 declared that they had a “moral duty” to no longer “take part in the state’s actions against Palestinians.” An Israeli military spokesman disputed the letter’s overall drift but said the charges would be examined.

It should trouble the American public that some or much of the information in question — intended not for national security purposes but simply to pursue political agendas — may have come directly from the N.S.A.’s domestic dragnet. According to documents leaked by Mr. Snowden andreported by the British newspaper The Guardian, the N.S.A. has been sending intelligence to Israel since at least March 2009.

The memorandum of agreement between the N.S.A. and its Israeli counterpart covers virtually all forms of communication, including but not limited to “unevaluated and unminimized transcripts, gists, facsimiles, telex, voice and Digital Network Intelligence metadata and content.” The memo also indicates that the N.S.A. does not filter out American communications before delivery to Israel; indeed, the agency “routinely sends” unminimized data.

Although the memo emphasizes that Israel should make use of the intercepts in accordance with United States law, it also notes that the agreement is legally unenforceable. “This agreement,” it reads, “is not intended to create any legally enforceable rights and shall not be construed to be either an international agreement or a legally binding instrument according to international law.”
It should also trouble Americans that the N.S.A. could head down a similar path in this country. Indeed, there is some indication, from a top-secret 2012 document from Mr. Snowden’s leaked files that I saw last year, that it already is. The document, from Gen. Keith B. Alexander, then the director of the N.S.A., notes that the agency had been compiling records of visits to pornographic websites and proposes using that information to damage the reputations of people whom the agency considers “radicalizers” — not necessarily terrorists, but those attempting, through the use of incendiary speech, to radicalize others. (The Huffington Post has published a redacted version of the document.)

In Moscow, Mr. Snowden told me that the document reminded him of the F.B.I.’s overreach during the days of J. Edgar Hoover, when the bureau abused its powers to monitor and harass political activists. “It’s much like how the F.B.I. tried to use Martin Luther King’s infidelity to talk him into killing himself,” he said. “We said those kinds of things were inappropriate back in the ’60s. Why are we doing that now? Why are we getting involved in this again?”

It’s a question that American and Israeli citizens should be asking themselves.
Mazars and Deutsche Bank could have ended this nightmare before it started.
They could still get him out of office.
But instead, they want mass death.
Don’t forget that.
User avatar
seemslikeadream
 
Posts: 32090
Joined: Wed Apr 27, 2005 11:28 pm
Location: into the black
Blog: View Blog (83)

Re: The Criminal N.S.A.

Postby seemslikeadream » Sun Sep 28, 2014 10:11 pm

The NSA is renting its technology to U.S. companies

By Kevin Collier on September 26, 2014
The National Security Agency (NSA), which develops surveillance tools that are both dazzling and terrifying, has been making money on the side by licensing its technology to private businesses for more than two decades.

So if you're looking to buy a tool to transcribe voice recordings in any language, a foolproof method to tell if someone's touched your phone's SIM card, or a version of email encryption that isn't available on the open market, try the world's most technologically advanced spy agency.

It's called the Technology Transfer Program (TTP), under which the NSA declassifies some of its technologies that it developed for previous operations, patents them, and, if they're swayed by an American company's business plan and nondisclosure agreements, rents them out.

The TTP itself isn't classified, though 2014 is the first year they've published a formal catalog. (Yes, there's a catalog.) Nor is it unique to the NSA. The Department of Defense (DoD), which includes the NSA under its umbrella, has a number of branches with similar programs.

The DoD funds a program at Montana State University, called TechLink, that acts as a broker between the military and private businesses that might be a good fit to license its technologies. According to Chanda Morris, TechLink's Communications Director, between 100 and 150 research labs under the DoD's umbrella participate, depending on how finely you categorize them.

"Under the heading of Air Force Research Laboratory, there's an Information Directorate, which is in Rome, New York," Morris told the Daily Dot. But you could break that down further. "There's an Aerospace Systems, which covers propulsion and craft fuel, and there's the Directed Energy Directorate in New Mexico," she said.

The NSA joined other DoD labs at the third annual "Defense Labs Tech Transfer" trade show in Maryland last week. It brought several technologies to show, including an organic integrated circuit that's small and extremely flexible—developed, one NSA representative told us, to sew into Air Force pilots' uniforms to give them a means of creating a long-distance GPS signal if they go down far from any phone towers.

NSA officials declined to say how much money the Technology Transfer program brings in. They did, however, state that individuals at the agency receive substantial bonuses if their programs are licensed.

"Per NSA Policy, inventors at NSA receive 25 percent of the royalties or other payments," NSA spokesperson Vanee Vines told the Daily Dot. She adds that the remainder, per U.S. law, goes toward "activities that increase the potential for transfer of the technology" within the agency. In other words, the rest of the money stays in-house.

While the NSA declined to say how much money the program made, there are figures to give an idea of its scale. According to the Washington Post's massive "black budget" report, the agency received $10.8 billion in funding in 2013, of which $429.1 million went towards research and technology development.

In addition to its own product booths at the Maryland trade show, the NSA brought along Integrata Security, a wireless security company founded, one representative said, entirely to bid for and build a product based on an exclusive NSA license. While the NSA and Integrata both refused to provide any details about their agreement, the trade publication BizJournals has reported that they had signed their deal in October 2013, yet Integrata didn't begin its first fundraising round until three months later.


Some of the items from the 2014 TTP catalog.

Many of the 102 technologies available in its 2014 catalog would probably strike the average person as impressive, but difficult to apply to a real-world business plan.

"I didn't see anything really cool," Bruce Schneier, a fellow at Harvard's Berkman Center for Internet and Society and a world-renowned computer security and cryptography, said after the Daily Dot showed him the catalog.

He was dismissive of the remarkability of the agency's cryptographical offerings. "It's not new, it's very old, a few decades," he said of one product, listed as a Cryptographic Efficient Elliptic Curve.

"It's a way to get your door locks a little bit better. Does that change the value of your house? Kind of, not really," he said. "These are all pieces of plumbing. Plumbing has value, but this is one of the problems of patent law. Patents really overstate the value of plumbing, of technology. It's a little value, sure, but it's never gonna make or break a business."

NSA's TTP is certainly limited by the U.S. Patent and Trade Office. Some of the technologies in the catalog are more than a decade old, and only declassified technologies can be patented.

"The patent system is (ideally) supposed to serve a disclosure function: The whole point is that inventors must explain exactly how their invention works to the public in exchange for getting limited exclusivity," said Parker Higgins, Director of Copyright Activism at the Electronic Frontier Foundation. "There are documented cases of people outside the NSA discovering or developing new stuff, to find out years later that the NSA already had done it but hadn't said anything."

Many of the listed technologies in the NSA’s TTP catalog are methods to either help transcribe recorded communications or sort through massive troves of transcriptions, calling to mind the NSA's ability to absorb huge quantities of people's communications without their knowledge. Vines declined to share specifics on why those available technologies were developed, or how they were used within the agency. "Our lawful mission is centered on foreign intelligence and information assurance in defense of the nation," she said.

One technology, called ScribeZone, which the NSA suggests "is ideal for teaching foreign language and can also be used for teaching English as a second language," improves efficiency of transcription of audio and video content from "any foreign language," the catalog claims. Another, called Aladdin, identifies transliterated terms, like names. A third, which the catalogue doesn't identify with a code name, helps users sort through massive troves of text by identifying nouns in a mass of text, deciding which ones are used most frequently, then automatically creating a list what the topic's about.

The NSA declined to say what prompted the agency to develop some of these technologies, many of which seem like innocuous ways to efficiently process large troves of data. But they take a more remarkable turn in light of some of the disclosures of advanced programs revealed by former NSA contractor Edward Snowden. A program called SOMALGET records every phone call in the Bahamas, according to documents Snowden leaked last year, as well as in Afghanistan, WikiLeaks claims.

Other technologies seem far simpler, almost to the point of being silly. Several are concerned with ensuring security with everyday objects, like tiny blocks to block access to a computer's USB port, or a "reusable tamper evident bag closure."

"Who needs that?" Schnier said. "I know Police Evidence Supply Corporation Inc. could make one of these, but it's not going to change the world."

The Daily Dot relayed one NSA employee's claim to Schneier, that the TTP was a means of injecting federally-funded research back into the U.S. economy.

"Bullshit," he responded. “The NSA's not stimulating the economy. They just said that and it sounds good. They just made that up."
Mazars and Deutsche Bank could have ended this nightmare before it started.
They could still get him out of office.
But instead, they want mass death.
Don’t forget that.
User avatar
seemslikeadream
 
Posts: 32090
Joined: Wed Apr 27, 2005 11:28 pm
Location: into the black
Blog: View Blog (83)

Re: The Criminal N.S.A.

Postby Grizzly » Thu Oct 02, 2014 9:27 pm

I had never worked at an actual NSA intercept site

Found this one clipped sentence (by me), to be interesting when coupled with the fact, that the very site it is written on, is indeed, entitled, 'The Intercept' ...

https://firstlook.org/theintercept/2014 ... sa-and-me/

The NSA and Me
By James Bamford

The tone of the answering machine message was routine, like a reminder for a dental appointment. But there was also an undercurrent of urgency. “Please call me back,” the voice said. “It’s important.”

What worried me was who was calling: a senior attorney with the Justice Department’s secretive Office of Intelligence Policy and Review. By the time I hung up the payphone at a little coffee shop in Cambridge, Mass., and wandered back to my table, strewn with yellow legal pads and dog-eared documents, I had guessed what he was after: my copy of the Justice Department’s top-secret criminal file on the National Security Agency. Only two copies of the original were ever made. Now I had to find a way to get it out of the country—fast.

It was July 8, 1981, a broiling Wednesday in Harvard Square, and I was in a quiet corner of the Algiers Coffee House on Brattle Street. A cool, souk-like basement room, with the piney aroma of frankincense, it made for a perfect hideout to sort through documents, jot down notes, and pore over stacks of newspapers while sipping bottomless cups of Arabic coffee and espresso the color of dark chocolate.
1967-Hawaii-Boat-21

The author in Hawaii, 1967

For several years I had been working on my first book, The Puzzle Palace, which provided the first in-depth look at the National Security Agency. The deeper I dug, the more troubled I became. Not only did the classified file from the Justice Department accuse the NSA of systematically breaking the law by eavesdropping on American citizens, it concluded that it was impossible to prosecute those running the agency because of the enormous secrecy that enveloped it. Worse, the file made clear that the NSA itself was effectively beyond the law—allowed to bypass statutes passed by Congress and follow its own super-classified charter, what the agency called a “top-secret birth certificate” drawn up by the White House decades earlier.

Knowing the potential for such an unregulated agency to go rogue, I went on to write two more books about the NSA, Body of Secrets, in 2001, and The Shadow Factory, in 2008. My goal was to draw attention to the dangers the agency posed if it is not closely watched and controlled—dangers that would be laid bare in stark detail by Edward Snowden years later.
“You Want to Hear Something Interesting?”

The idea of writing a book about the NSA had occurred to me several years earlier. During the war in Vietnam, I spent three years in the Navy at Pacific Fleet Headquarters in Hawaii. It was a nice venue a long way from the bloody battlefields, where the only dangers were rogue surfboards on Waikiki Beach and bar fights on Hotel Street. Assigned to an NSA unit, I experienced the war vicariously: One of my jobs every morning was reading a foot-high stack of overnight messages from the war zone, mostly NSA reports classified top secret and higher, and passing them on to whichever project officer had responsibility to simply read or take action.

Later, in law school and running low on cash, I decided to rejoin the Naval Reserve to help pay for living expenses. The Navy was very accommodating, allowing me to pick not only when I wanted to do my two weeks of active duty, but also where. So I decided to request two weeks in October 1974, which coincided with a school break. And for location I chose Puerto Rico—a nice warm island far from chilly Boston. Although I had NSA clearances, I had never worked at an actual NSA intercept site. Nevertheless, the Navy decided to send me down to Sabana Seca, one of the agency’s key listening posts, which focused on Cuba, the Caribbean, and Central and South America.

Like most listening posts at the time, Sabana Seca consisted of a gigantic circular antenna about half a mile wide and a hundred or so feet high, an odd structure that closely resembled its nickname—the “elephant cage.” Known as a Wullenweber antenna, it was used not only to intercept communications, but also to assist in triangulating where the transmissions were coming from. At the center of the elephant cage was the operations building, a windowless, two-story, gray cement Rubik’s cube. Inside were tall racks of receivers with blinking lights, big black dials, oval-shaped gauges, and silver toggle switches facing rows of earphone-clad men and women in blue Navy-issue dungarees.

Unfamiliar with the technology and unable to speak more than rudimentary Spanish, I spent my two weeks pushing a few papers and staying out of the way, hoping to avoid work as much as possible. But one day an intercept operator with whom I had downed a few beers at the base club the night before spotted me and waved me over. “You want to hear something interesting?” he said as he took off his earphones. I thanked him but explained I didn’t speak Spanish. “No, no,” he said, “It’s English.” So I put on the earphones and listened in to what appeared to be several Americans carrying on a conversation. I only heard a few snippets, not enough to get a sense of the topic, but I was surprised. “Interesting,” I said. “You get many Americans speaking?” He said they did on certain channels they were assigned to target. I thanked him, said something about getting another beer later that night, and wandered off to watch some other intercept operators pulling in long reams of blue teletype paper covered in Spanish.

It was only when I was back in Boston, where I had a part-time job as a student prosecutor with the Suffolk County district attorney’s office, that the conversation came back to me. I was working on a case in which the topic of a wiretap came up, and there was a long discussion about procedures for a warrant. I suddenly wondered what legal authority the intercept operators at Sabana Seca had to target American conversations. I did a little research in the law library, but could find nothing that gave the military any powers for warrantless eavesdropping on Americans.

A few weeks later, just before Christmas, The New York Times broke a series of stories by Seymour Hersh outlining Operation Chaos, the program by which the FBI, CIA, and other intelligence agencies targeted U.S. citizens involved in anti-war protests. The articles caused widespread public outrage, followed by a high-profile congressional investigation led by Senator Frank Church. I felt certain that whatever it was I saw—and heard—in Sabana Seca would soon be discovered.

But during the summer of 1975, as reports began leaking out from the Church Committee, I was surprised to learn that the NSA was claiming that it had shut down all of its questionable operations a year and a half earlier. Surprised because I knew the eavesdropping on Americans had continued at least into the prior fall, and may have still been going on. After thinking for a day or so about the potential consequences of blowing the whistle on the NSA—I was still in the Naval Reserve, still attending drills one weekend a month, and still sworn to secrecy with an active NSA clearance—I nevertheless decided to call the Church Committee.

It was July 1, and at first the staffer with whom I spoke sounded skeptical—someone calling out of the blue and accusing the NSA of lying. But after I mentioned my work at Sabana Seca, he asked how soon I could come down to Washington to testify. At 8:40 the next morning, I boarded American Airlines Flight 605 and took seat 13A—an unlucky number, I thought. It would be the first of numerous trips. The committee agreed to keep my name confidential and allowed me to testify in executive session in Sen. Church’s private office. Soon after, committee staffers flew down to Sabana Seca for a surprise inspection. Surprise, indeed. They were shocked to discover the program had never been shut down, despite the NSA’s claims.

Sebana Seca “elephant cage” site, 1994

“Just Because the Information Has Been Published Doesn’t Mean it Should No Longer Be Classified”

The discovery that the NSA had been lying to the Church Committee shocked me. But it also gave me the idea to write the first book about the agency. As more and more revelations came out about the NSA’s widespread, illegal eavesdropping activities, I found myself filled with questions. Where did the agency come from? What did it do? How did it operate? Who was watching it? In the summer of 1979, after a year of research, I submitted a proposal to Houghton Mifflin for The Puzzle Palace, and within a few months was awarded a book contract. It was the start of wild ride, taking on an agency so secret that even New Jersey Sen. Bill Bradley told me, at the time, that he had never heard of it.

The discovery that the NSA had been lying to the Church Committee shocked me. But it also gave me the idea to write the first book about the agency.

I soon learned that there was one major advantage to being first: The NSA had grown so confident that no one would ever dare to write about it that it had let its guard down. I would occasionally drive up to the agency, park in the executive parking lot, walk in the front door to the lobby, get some coffee and have a seat. All around me were employees from the CIA and foreign intelligence agencies, all waiting to be processed for their NSA visitor’s badge. As I read my paper and sipped my coffee, I quietly listened to them chat away about signals intelligence operations, new listening posts, cooperative agreements, and a host of other topics. No one ever asked who I was or why I was there. In the parking lot, I copied the license plate numbers of the dozen cars parked closest to the front entrance, then ran the numbers at the registry of motor vehicles. The result was a Who’s Who of the NSA’s leadership, as well as the liaison officers from America’s so-called Five Eyes surveillance partners: England, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand.

By the summer of 1981, I had also won several significant legal battles with the agency. As a result of an out-of-court settlement, the NSA was forced to give me a tour of the agency, detail the entire structure of its internal organization to me, and provide me interviews with senior officials. Even though the agency was virtually immune from the Freedom of Information Act, I managed to find a loophole that allowed me access to more than 6,000 pages of internal documents. I even worked out an agreement whereby they would provide me with an office in the agency for a week to go through the 6,000 pages. But then the NSA got its revenge—when they handed me the 6,000 pages, they were all out of order, as if they had been shuffled like a new deck of cards. Nothing in the Freedom of Information Act, it turns out, requires collation. The hostility became so intense that the director, Adm. Bobby Ray Inman, accused me of using a “hostage approach” in my battle to force the agency to give me documents and interviews.

But the NSA knew nothing about one of my biggest finds, which took place on the campus of the Virginia Military Institute. Nicknamed “the West Point of the South,” VMI housed the papers of William F. Friedman, a founder of both the NSA and of American cryptology. The NSA’s own auditorium is named after him. Yet Friedman had soured on the agency by the time he retired, and deliberately left his papers to a research library at VMI to get them as far away from the NSA as possible.

After Friedman’s death, and without his permission, agency officials traveled to the library, pulled out hundreds of his personal letters, and ordered them locked away in a secure vault. When I discovered what the NSA had done, I persuaded the library’s archivist to give me access to the letters, all of which were unclassified. Many were embarrassingly critical of the agency, describing its enormous paranoia and obsession with secrecy. Others contained clues to a secret trips that Friedman had made to Switzerland, where he helped the agency gain backdoor access into encryption systems that a Swiss company was selling to foreign countries.

Many were embarrassingly critical of the agency, describing its enormous paranoia and obsession with secrecy.

I also discovered that a former NSA director, Lt. Gen. Marshall Carter, had left his papers – including reams of unclassified documents from his NSA office – to the same research library at VMI. They included personal, handwritten correspondence from Carter’s British counterpart about listening posts, cooperative agreements, and other sensitive topics. Later, Carter gave me a long and detailed interview about the NSA. The agency knew nothing about either the documents or the interview.

Following the publication of my book, the NSA raided the research library, stamped many of the Friedman documents secret, and ordered them put back into the vault. “Just because information has been published,” NSA director Lincoln Faurer explained to The New York Times, “doesn’t mean it should no longer be classified.” Faurer also flew to Colorado, where Gen. Carter was living in retirement, met with him at the NSA listening post at Buckley Air Force Base, and threatened him with prosecution if he ever gave another interview or allowed anyone else access to his papers.

“Prima Facie Questions of Criminality”

But my biggest battle with the NSA came before my book was even published. Without the agency’s knowledge, I had obtained the criminal file that the Justice Department had opened on the NSA. Marked as Top Secret, the file was so sensitive that only two original copies existed. Never before or since has an entire agency been the subject of a criminal investigation. Senior officials at the NSA were even read their Miranda rights.

The secret investigation grew out of the final report by the Rockefeller Commission, a panel that had been set up by President Gerald Ford to parallel the Church Committee. Issued on June 6, 1975, the report noted that both the NSA and CIA had engaged in questionable and possibly illegal electronic surveillance. As a result, Attorney General Edward Levi established a secret internal task force to look into the potential for criminal prosecution. Focusing particularly on NSA, the task force probed more deeply into domestic eavesdropping than any part of the executive branch had ever done before.

I had heard rumors from several sources about such a probe, so I thought it would be worth requesting a copy of the file under FOIA. Nevertheless, I was surprised when the documents, with relatively few redactions, turned up at my door 10 months later. They included a lengthy, detailed “Report on Inquiry into CIA-Related Surveillance Activities” that laid out the investigation in stark detail, as well as a shorter draft “prosecutive summary” evaluating the potential for criminal prosecution. I was shocked that the Justice Department had released them to me without notifying the NSA. An official at Justice later told me that it was standard procedure not to notify the object of a criminal investigation (think John Gotti) once it is completed and requested under FOIA.

It turned out that just as with its investigations into organized crime, the Justice Department had received little cooperation from the potential criminal defendant – in this case, the NSA. Noting that the attitude of agency officials “ranged from circumspection to wariness,” the file made clear that the NSA had stonewalled investigators at every step. “One typically had to ask the right question to elicit the right answer or document,” an attorney for the Justice Department reported. “It is likely, therefore, that we had insufficient information on occasion to frame the ‘magic’ question.”

But the agency’s obstructionism didn’t prevent the Justice Department from finding evidence of serious wrongdoing. The draft prosecutive summary of the Justice Department’s investigative task force, dated March 4, 1977, and classified top secret detailed 23 categories of questionable eavesdropping operations. Five of the illegal activities were immune from prosecution because the statute of limitations had passed, and seven were found to “clearly possess no prosecutive potential.” The rest, however, were fair game for criminal prosecution. Discussing the agency’s Operation Minaret, for example, the full report concluded: “This electronic surveillance activity presents prima facie questions of criminality and is well within the limitations period.”

The prosecutive summary had been sent to Attorney General Benjamin Civiletti for further action. But any attempt to prosecute top officials of America’s most secret agency, the file warned, would almost certainly be met by finger-pointing and scapegoating. “There is likely to be much ‘buck-passing’ from subordinate to superior, agency to agency, agency to board or committee, board or committee to the President, and from the living to the dead,” the report cautioned.

In addition, calling the crimes “an international cause célèbre involving fundamental constitutional rights of United States citizens,” the task force pointed to the likelihood that the NSA would put political pressure on anyone who dared to testify against it. What’s more, the report added, defense attorneys for senior NSA officials would likely subpoena “every tenuously involved government official and former official” to establish that the illegal operations had been authorized from on high. “While the high office of prospective defense witnesses should not enter into the prosecutive decision,” the report noted, “the confusion, obfuscation, and surprise testimony which might result cannot be ignored.”

The report’s prosecutive summary also pointed to the NSA’s top-secret “charter” issued by the Executive Branch, which exempts the agency from legal restraints placed on the rest of the government. “Orders, directives, policies, or recommendations of any authority of the Executive branch relating to the collection . . . of intelligence,” the charter reads, “shall not be applicable to Communications Intelligence activities, unless specifically so stated.” This so-called “birth certificate,” the Justice Department report concluded, meant the NSA did not have to follow any restrictions placed on electronic surveillance “unless it was expressly directed to do so.” In short, the report asked, how can you prosecute an agency that is above the law?
“Put Down the Receiver, Leave the Room, and Keep Walking”

If the first shock to top officials at the NSA was the discovery that they were being investigated as potential criminals, the second shock was that I had a copy of the top secret file on the investigation. When the NSA discovered that the file was in my possession, director Bobby Inman wrote to the attorney general informing him that the documents contained classified information and should never have been handed over to me. But Civiletti, apparently believing that the file had been properly reviewed and declassified, ignored Inman’s protest.

Then, on January 20, 1981, Ronald Reagan was sworn into office. At the Justice Department, Civiletti was replaced by a new attorney general with a much more accommodating attitude when it came to the NSA: William French Smith.

A few months later, while I was working on a chapter of my book that dealt with the Five Eyes partnership, I sent a letter to George Gapp, the senior liaison officer from GCHQ, the NSA’s British counterpart. In the letter, I noted that documents released to me by the Justice Department implicated his agency in Operation Minaret, the illegal NSA program directed against American citizens. I asked whether he knew of GCHQ’s involvement in the operation and whether the agency was currently engaged in any similar activities in the United States.

The letter apparently set off a firestorm, both at the NSA and GCHQ. Lt. Gen. Faurer, who had replaced Inman as director, sent a letter to the new attorney general again pointing out that the documents in my possession contained top-secret material. Considering that they accused his agency of being a criminal enterprise, they were also embarrassing to the NSA, and potentially explosive. The decision was made to try to get them back from me before the publication of my book.

Thus the answering machine message I heard on that steamy day in Cambridge, while I was quietly working away at a back table in the Algiers Coffee House. The call was from Gerald Schroeder, a senior attorney with the Justice Department. When I called him back, he asked whether we could meet in Washington to discuss the file that had been released to me by his own department. The Reagan Justice Department, it seemed, now wanted to reverse the decision of the Carter Justice Department and get the documents back.

Long before the arrival of the internet, and the ability to transfer documents at the tap of a finger, I was very concerned about what the agency might do to retrieve the physical copy of the file in my possession. Years before, when David Kahn had written his monumental history of cryptology, the agency had considered placing him under surveillance and conducting a “surreptitious entry” into his Long Island home to steal the manuscript prior to publication. Decades earlier, after Herbert Yardley wrote about the Black Chamber, the predecessor to NSA, the Justice Department actually did steal the manuscript for his second book, preventing it from ever being published.

My first thought was to quickly make a duplicate of the file and get the copy out of the country. That would protect the documents not only from theft, but also from any court order prohibiting me from revealing their contents. With a copy beyond the jurisdiction of U.S. courts, a foreign newspaper could always publish the documents.

My first thought was to quickly make a duplicate of the file and get the copy out of the country.

I called a close friend who worked for the Insight Team, the investigative unit of London’s Sunday Times. She agreed to help. It turned out that an American journalist she knew was flying from Boston to London that night, and she quickly arranged for him to take the documents with him and give them to her to hide.

That night I met the journalist on a dark Boston street corner and passed him a package, with the understanding that I was not to tell him what it contained. He wanted as little information as possible, in case he was questioned later. Early the next morning, my friend at the Sunday Times called from London with a code indicating that all was well and that the documents were in a secure place.

With the documents safely beyond the reach of the Justice Department, I next turned to my next problem – finding an attorney to represent me. With the advance on my book totaling $7,500, spread over three years, I was in no position to seek out a white-shoe law firm on Beacon Hill. Instead, I called the ACLU’s Center for National Security Studies and explained my problem. They immediately put me in touch with Mark Lynch, a staff attorney at the center who had considerable experience going up against intelligence agencies, including the NSA. Lynch agreed to represent me.

On July 23, two weeks after I had received the phone call at the coffee shop, Lynch and I met with Schroeder for an hour and a half in the conference room of the center, a cluster of rooms in the stately Stewart Mott house on Capitol Hill. Schroeder began by insisting that the two documents had been released to me “by mistake.” The NSA and the CIA had determined that they contained information that was still classified, he said, and the Justice Department would like me to return them.

I politely informed Schroeder that the documents had been in my possession for more than two years, that material from them was already incorporated into my manuscript, and that the Carter administration had spent 10 months reviewing them before releasing the documents to me. There had been no mistake. In addition, because the documents raised questions about criminal activities by the NSA and CIA, I felt it was important for the public to be informed. In the end, we agreed to another meeting – but this time I insisted that since I had traveled to Washington for the first meeting, they would come to Boston for the next one.

The second meeting took place on August 14, in the editorial conference room of my publisher, Houghton Mifflin, on Beacon Hill. This time, the government dispensed with any attempt at politeness. Accompanying Schroeder were the NSA’s general counsel, Daniel Schwartz, and the agency’s director of policy, Eugene Yeates. They immediately began by interrogating me. How many copies of the document I had made? Whom I had given them to? Where were the documents now located? I responded that none of those questions were on the agenda; since my attorney could not be present, we had agreed in advance that the meeting was simply to allow them to explain the government’s position. Any questions, I said, would have to go through Mark Lynch. I pointed to the phone.

After placing a call to Lynch, Schroeder brought up the possibility of using the espionage statute to force me to return the documents. Lynch immediately asked to speak with me privately.

Once the three officials left the room, Lynch expressed worry over the way the meeting was going. The officials could have a subpoena or a restraining order or a warrant for my arrest in their pocket, he said. He advised me to put down the receiver, call Schroeder to the phone, leave the room – and keep walking. To this day, I still have no idea how long the three officials waited for me to return before finding their way out of the publishing house and back to Washington.

The fight quickly escalated. On September 24, after we informed Schroeder that I was going to use the documents in my book and that all further discussions would be pointless, I received a registered letter. “You are currently in possession of classified information that requires protection against unauthorized disclosure,” Schroeder wrote. “Under the circumstances, I have no choice but to demand that you return the two documents . . . Of course, you will have a continuing obligation not to publish or communicate the information.” To emphasize the point, on November 27 the Justice Department sent my attorney a letter stating that “there should be no misunderstanding of the Government’s position that Mr. Bamford holds information that is currently and properly classified” and that failure to return the documents could force federal prosecutors to resort to an unnamed “post-publication judicial remedy.”

Despite the threats, I refused to alter my manuscript or return the documents. Instead, we argued that according to Executive Order 12065, “classification may not be restored to documents already declassified and released to the public” under the Freedom of Information Act. That prompted the drama to move all the way up to the White House. On April 2, 1982, President Reagan signed a new executive order on secrecy that overturned the earlier one and granted him the authority to “reclassify information previously declassified and disclosed.”

We responded by citing the legal principle of ex post facto, arguing that even if the new executive order was legal, Reagan could not retroactively enforce it against me. The Puzzle Palace was published on schedule, in September 1982, with no deletions or alterations to the text. And ever since then, the NSA’s criminal file – still officially top secret, according to the NSA – has remained on my bookshelf.

supercomputerNSA supercomputer console, 1971

Wrongdoing Masquerading as Patriotism

More than three decades later, the NSA, like a mom-and-pop operation that has exploded into a global industry, now employs sweeping powers of surveillance that Frank Church could scarcely have imagined in the days of wired phones and clunky typewriters. At the same time, the Senate intelligence committee he once chaired has done an about face, protecting the agencies from the public rather than the public from the agencies.

It is a dangerous combination – one the Church Committee warned of long ago. “The potential for abuse is awesome,” the committee observed, especially when “checks and balances designed … to assure accountability have not been applied.” As the committee presciently noted in its report, “Intelligence collection programs naturally generate ever-increasing demands for new data.”

For proof, one need only look at the NSA’s ever-expanding array of surveillance techniques. The agency’s metadata collection program now targets everyone in the country old enough to hold a phone. The gargantuan data storage facility it has built in Utah may eventually hold zettabytes (1,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 bytes) of information. And the massive supercomputer that the NSA is secretly building in Oak Ridge, Tennessee, will search through it all at exaflop (1,000,000,000,000,000,000 operations per second) speeds.

Without adequate oversight, or penalties for abuse, the only protection that citizens have comes not from Congress or the courts, but from whistleblowers. As one myself, albeit in the most minor capacity, I understand what motivates someone to expose wrongdoing masquerading as patriotism. There is no graduate school for whistleblowing and no handbook for whistleblowers. It’s an imperfect science, and whistleblowers learn from the mistakes of their predecessors. Edward Snowden, Chelsea Manning, Tom Drake, Bill Binney and Kirk Wiebe all came from different backgrounds and worked in different fields. None joined the intelligence community to become a whistleblower, but each was driven by unchecked government abuse to tell the public what they knew to be true.

The solution is not to jail the whistleblowers, or to question the patriotism of those who tell their stories, but to do what Attorney General Edward Levi courageously attempted to do more than a third of a century ago – to have the criminal division of the Justice Department conduct a thorough investigation, and then to prosecute any member of the intelligence community who has broken the law, whether by illegally spying on Americans or by lying to Congress.

I would be happy to lend my copy of the NSA’s criminal file to Attorney General Eric Holder, if he would like to see how to begin. Or he can read it here.


“The more we do to you, the less you seem to believe we are doing it.”

― Joseph mengele
User avatar
Grizzly
 
Posts: 4722
Joined: Wed Oct 26, 2011 4:15 pm
Blog: View Blog (0)

Re: The Criminal N.S.A.

Postby Grizzly » Thu Oct 02, 2014 9:28 pm

I had never worked at an actual NSA intercept site

Found this one clipped sentence (by me), to be interesting when coupled with the fact, that the very site it is written on, is indeed, entitled, 'The Intercept' ...

https://firstlook.org/theintercept/2014 ... sa-and-me/

The NSA and Me
By James Bamford

The tone of the answering machine message was routine, like a reminder for a dental appointment. But there was also an undercurrent of urgency. “Please call me back,” the voice said. “It’s important.”

What worried me was who was calling: a senior attorney with the Justice Department’s secretive Office of Intelligence Policy and Review. By the time I hung up the payphone at a little coffee shop in Cambridge, Mass., and wandered back to my table, strewn with yellow legal pads and dog-eared documents, I had guessed what he was after: my copy of the Justice Department’s top-secret criminal file on the National Security Agency. Only two copies of the original were ever made. Now I had to find a way to get it out of the country—fast.

It was July 8, 1981, a broiling Wednesday in Harvard Square, and I was in a quiet corner of the Algiers Coffee House on Brattle Street. A cool, souk-like basement room, with the piney aroma of frankincense, it made for a perfect hideout to sort through documents, jot down notes, and pore over stacks of newspapers while sipping bottomless cups of Arabic coffee and espresso the color of dark chocolate.
1967-Hawaii-Boat-21

The author in Hawaii, 1967

For several years I had been working on my first book, The Puzzle Palace, which provided the first in-depth look at the National Security Agency. The deeper I dug, the more troubled I became. Not only did the classified file from the Justice Department accuse the NSA of systematically breaking the law by eavesdropping on American citizens, it concluded that it was impossible to prosecute those running the agency because of the enormous secrecy that enveloped it. Worse, the file made clear that the NSA itself was effectively beyond the law—allowed to bypass statutes passed by Congress and follow its own super-classified charter, what the agency called a “top-secret birth certificate” drawn up by the White House decades earlier.

Knowing the potential for such an unregulated agency to go rogue, I went on to write two more books about the NSA, Body of Secrets, in 2001, and The Shadow Factory, in 2008. My goal was to draw attention to the dangers the agency posed if it is not closely watched and controlled—dangers that would be laid bare in stark detail by Edward Snowden years later.
“You Want to Hear Something Interesting?”

The idea of writing a book about the NSA had occurred to me several years earlier. During the war in Vietnam, I spent three years in the Navy at Pacific Fleet Headquarters in Hawaii. It was a nice venue a long way from the bloody battlefields, where the only dangers were rogue surfboards on Waikiki Beach and bar fights on Hotel Street. Assigned to an NSA unit, I experienced the war vicariously: One of my jobs every morning was reading a foot-high stack of overnight messages from the war zone, mostly NSA reports classified top secret and higher, and passing them on to whichever project officer had responsibility to simply read or take action.

Later, in law school and running low on cash, I decided to rejoin the Naval Reserve to help pay for living expenses. The Navy was very accommodating, allowing me to pick not only when I wanted to do my two weeks of active duty, but also where. So I decided to request two weeks in October 1974, which coincided with a school break. And for location I chose Puerto Rico—a nice warm island far from chilly Boston. Although I had NSA clearances, I had never worked at an actual NSA intercept site. Nevertheless, the Navy decided to send me down to Sabana Seca, one of the agency’s key listening posts, which focused on Cuba, the Caribbean, and Central and South America.

Like most listening posts at the time, Sabana Seca consisted of a gigantic circular antenna about half a mile wide and a hundred or so feet high, an odd structure that closely resembled its nickname—the “elephant cage.” Known as a Wullenweber antenna, it was used not only to intercept communications, but also to assist in triangulating where the transmissions were coming from. At the center of the elephant cage was the operations building, a windowless, two-story, gray cement Rubik’s cube. Inside were tall racks of receivers with blinking lights, big black dials, oval-shaped gauges, and silver toggle switches facing rows of earphone-clad men and women in blue Navy-issue dungarees.

Unfamiliar with the technology and unable to speak more than rudimentary Spanish, I spent my two weeks pushing a few papers and staying out of the way, hoping to avoid work as much as possible. But one day an intercept operator with whom I had downed a few beers at the base club the night before spotted me and waved me over. “You want to hear something interesting?” he said as he took off his earphones. I thanked him but explained I didn’t speak Spanish. “No, no,” he said, “It’s English.” So I put on the earphones and listened in to what appeared to be several Americans carrying on a conversation. I only heard a few snippets, not enough to get a sense of the topic, but I was surprised. “Interesting,” I said. “You get many Americans speaking?” He said they did on certain channels they were assigned to target. I thanked him, said something about getting another beer later that night, and wandered off to watch some other intercept operators pulling in long reams of blue teletype paper covered in Spanish.

It was only when I was back in Boston, where I had a part-time job as a student prosecutor with the Suffolk County district attorney’s office, that the conversation came back to me. I was working on a case in which the topic of a wiretap came up, and there was a long discussion about procedures for a warrant. I suddenly wondered what legal authority the intercept operators at Sabana Seca had to target American conversations. I did a little research in the law library, but could find nothing that gave the military any powers for warrantless eavesdropping on Americans.

A few weeks later, just before Christmas, The New York Times broke a series of stories by Seymour Hersh outlining Operation Chaos, the program by which the FBI, CIA, and other intelligence agencies targeted U.S. citizens involved in anti-war protests. The articles caused widespread public outrage, followed by a high-profile congressional investigation led by Senator Frank Church. I felt certain that whatever it was I saw—and heard—in Sabana Seca would soon be discovered.

But during the summer of 1975, as reports began leaking out from the Church Committee, I was surprised to learn that the NSA was claiming that it had shut down all of its questionable operations a year and a half earlier. Surprised because I knew the eavesdropping on Americans had continued at least into the prior fall, and may have still been going on. After thinking for a day or so about the potential consequences of blowing the whistle on the NSA—I was still in the Naval Reserve, still attending drills one weekend a month, and still sworn to secrecy with an active NSA clearance—I nevertheless decided to call the Church Committee.

It was July 1, and at first the staffer with whom I spoke sounded skeptical—someone calling out of the blue and accusing the NSA of lying. But after I mentioned my work at Sabana Seca, he asked how soon I could come down to Washington to testify. At 8:40 the next morning, I boarded American Airlines Flight 605 and took seat 13A—an unlucky number, I thought. It would be the first of numerous trips. The committee agreed to keep my name confidential and allowed me to testify in executive session in Sen. Church’s private office. Soon after, committee staffers flew down to Sabana Seca for a surprise inspection. Surprise, indeed. They were shocked to discover the program had never been shut down, despite the NSA’s claims.

Sebana Seca “elephant cage” site, 1994

“Just Because the Information Has Been Published Doesn’t Mean it Should No Longer Be Classified”

The discovery that the NSA had been lying to the Church Committee shocked me. But it also gave me the idea to write the first book about the agency. As more and more revelations came out about the NSA’s widespread, illegal eavesdropping activities, I found myself filled with questions. Where did the agency come from? What did it do? How did it operate? Who was watching it? In the summer of 1979, after a year of research, I submitted a proposal to Houghton Mifflin for The Puzzle Palace, and within a few months was awarded a book contract. It was the start of wild ride, taking on an agency so secret that even New Jersey Sen. Bill Bradley told me, at the time, that he had never heard of it.

The discovery that the NSA had been lying to the Church Committee shocked me. But it also gave me the idea to write the first book about the agency.

I soon learned that there was one major advantage to being first: The NSA had grown so confident that no one would ever dare to write about it that it had let its guard down. I would occasionally drive up to the agency, park in the executive parking lot, walk in the front door to the lobby, get some coffee and have a seat. All around me were employees from the CIA and foreign intelligence agencies, all waiting to be processed for their NSA visitor’s badge. As I read my paper and sipped my coffee, I quietly listened to them chat away about signals intelligence operations, new listening posts, cooperative agreements, and a host of other topics. No one ever asked who I was or why I was there. In the parking lot, I copied the license plate numbers of the dozen cars parked closest to the front entrance, then ran the numbers at the registry of motor vehicles. The result was a Who’s Who of the NSA’s leadership, as well as the liaison officers from America’s so-called Five Eyes surveillance partners: England, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand.

By the summer of 1981, I had also won several significant legal battles with the agency. As a result of an out-of-court settlement, the NSA was forced to give me a tour of the agency, detail the entire structure of its internal organization to me, and provide me interviews with senior officials. Even though the agency was virtually immune from the Freedom of Information Act, I managed to find a loophole that allowed me access to more than 6,000 pages of internal documents. I even worked out an agreement whereby they would provide me with an office in the agency for a week to go through the 6,000 pages. But then the NSA got its revenge—when they handed me the 6,000 pages, they were all out of order, as if they had been shuffled like a new deck of cards. Nothing in the Freedom of Information Act, it turns out, requires collation. The hostility became so intense that the director, Adm. Bobby Ray Inman, accused me of using a “hostage approach” in my battle to force the agency to give me documents and interviews.

But the NSA knew nothing about one of my biggest finds, which took place on the campus of the Virginia Military Institute. Nicknamed “the West Point of the South,” VMI housed the papers of William F. Friedman, a founder of both the NSA and of American cryptology. The NSA’s own auditorium is named after him. Yet Friedman had soured on the agency by the time he retired, and deliberately left his papers to a research library at VMI to get them as far away from the NSA as possible.

After Friedman’s death, and without his permission, agency officials traveled to the library, pulled out hundreds of his personal letters, and ordered them locked away in a secure vault. When I discovered what the NSA had done, I persuaded the library’s archivist to give me access to the letters, all of which were unclassified. Many were embarrassingly critical of the agency, describing its enormous paranoia and obsession with secrecy. Others contained clues to a secret trips that Friedman had made to Switzerland, where he helped the agency gain backdoor access into encryption systems that a Swiss company was selling to foreign countries.

Many were embarrassingly critical of the agency, describing its enormous paranoia and obsession with secrecy.

I also discovered that a former NSA director, Lt. Gen. Marshall Carter, had left his papers – including reams of unclassified documents from his NSA office – to the same research library at VMI. They included personal, handwritten correspondence from Carter’s British counterpart about listening posts, cooperative agreements, and other sensitive topics. Later, Carter gave me a long and detailed interview about the NSA. The agency knew nothing about either the documents or the interview.

Following the publication of my book, the NSA raided the research library, stamped many of the Friedman documents secret, and ordered them put back into the vault. “Just because information has been published,” NSA director Lincoln Faurer explained to The New York Times, “doesn’t mean it should no longer be classified.” Faurer also flew to Colorado, where Gen. Carter was living in retirement, met with him at the NSA listening post at Buckley Air Force Base, and threatened him with prosecution if he ever gave another interview or allowed anyone else access to his papers.

“Prima Facie Questions of Criminality”

But my biggest battle with the NSA came before my book was even published. Without the agency’s knowledge, I had obtained the criminal file that the Justice Department had opened on the NSA. Marked as Top Secret, the file was so sensitive that only two original copies existed. Never before or since has an entire agency been the subject of a criminal investigation. Senior officials at the NSA were even read their Miranda rights.

The secret investigation grew out of the final report by the Rockefeller Commission, a panel that had been set up by President Gerald Ford to parallel the Church Committee. Issued on June 6, 1975, the report noted that both the NSA and CIA had engaged in questionable and possibly illegal electronic surveillance. As a result, Attorney General Edward Levi established a secret internal task force to look into the potential for criminal prosecution. Focusing particularly on NSA, the task force probed more deeply into domestic eavesdropping than any part of the executive branch had ever done before.

I had heard rumors from several sources about such a probe, so I thought it would be worth requesting a copy of the file under FOIA. Nevertheless, I was surprised when the documents, with relatively few redactions, turned up at my door 10 months later. They included a lengthy, detailed “Report on Inquiry into CIA-Related Surveillance Activities” that laid out the investigation in stark detail, as well as a shorter draft “prosecutive summary” evaluating the potential for criminal prosecution. I was shocked that the Justice Department had released them to me without notifying the NSA. An official at Justice later told me that it was standard procedure not to notify the object of a criminal investigation (think John Gotti) once it is completed and requested under FOIA.

It turned out that just as with its investigations into organized crime, the Justice Department had received little cooperation from the potential criminal defendant – in this case, the NSA. Noting that the attitude of agency officials “ranged from circumspection to wariness,” the file made clear that the NSA had stonewalled investigators at every step. “One typically had to ask the right question to elicit the right answer or document,” an attorney for the Justice Department reported. “It is likely, therefore, that we had insufficient information on occasion to frame the ‘magic’ question.”

But the agency’s obstructionism didn’t prevent the Justice Department from finding evidence of serious wrongdoing. The draft prosecutive summary of the Justice Department’s investigative task force, dated March 4, 1977, and classified top secret detailed 23 categories of questionable eavesdropping operations. Five of the illegal activities were immune from prosecution because the statute of limitations had passed, and seven were found to “clearly possess no prosecutive potential.” The rest, however, were fair game for criminal prosecution. Discussing the agency’s Operation Minaret, for example, the full report concluded: “This electronic surveillance activity presents prima facie questions of criminality and is well within the limitations period.”

The prosecutive summary had been sent to Attorney General Benjamin Civiletti for further action. But any attempt to prosecute top officials of America’s most secret agency, the file warned, would almost certainly be met by finger-pointing and scapegoating. “There is likely to be much ‘buck-passing’ from subordinate to superior, agency to agency, agency to board or committee, board or committee to the President, and from the living to the dead,” the report cautioned.

In addition, calling the crimes “an international cause célèbre involving fundamental constitutional rights of United States citizens,” the task force pointed to the likelihood that the NSA would put political pressure on anyone who dared to testify against it. What’s more, the report added, defense attorneys for senior NSA officials would likely subpoena “every tenuously involved government official and former official” to establish that the illegal operations had been authorized from on high. “While the high office of prospective defense witnesses should not enter into the prosecutive decision,” the report noted, “the confusion, obfuscation, and surprise testimony which might result cannot be ignored.”

The report’s prosecutive summary also pointed to the NSA’s top-secret “charter” issued by the Executive Branch, which exempts the agency from legal restraints placed on the rest of the government. “Orders, directives, policies, or recommendations of any authority of the Executive branch relating to the collection . . . of intelligence,” the charter reads, “shall not be applicable to Communications Intelligence activities, unless specifically so stated.” This so-called “birth certificate,” the Justice Department report concluded, meant the NSA did not have to follow any restrictions placed on electronic surveillance “unless it was expressly directed to do so.” In short, the report asked, how can you prosecute an agency that is above the law?
“Put Down the Receiver, Leave the Room, and Keep Walking”

If the first shock to top officials at the NSA was the discovery that they were being investigated as potential criminals, the second shock was that I had a copy of the top secret file on the investigation. When the NSA discovered that the file was in my possession, director Bobby Inman wrote to the attorney general informing him that the documents contained classified information and should never have been handed over to me. But Civiletti, apparently believing that the file had been properly reviewed and declassified, ignored Inman’s protest.

Then, on January 20, 1981, Ronald Reagan was sworn into office. At the Justice Department, Civiletti was replaced by a new attorney general with a much more accommodating attitude when it came to the NSA: William French Smith.

A few months later, while I was working on a chapter of my book that dealt with the Five Eyes partnership, I sent a letter to George Gapp, the senior liaison officer from GCHQ, the NSA’s British counterpart. In the letter, I noted that documents released to me by the Justice Department implicated his agency in Operation Minaret, the illegal NSA program directed against American citizens. I asked whether he knew of GCHQ’s involvement in the operation and whether the agency was currently engaged in any similar activities in the United States.

The letter apparently set off a firestorm, both at the NSA and GCHQ. Lt. Gen. Faurer, who had replaced Inman as director, sent a letter to the new attorney general again pointing out that the documents in my possession contained top-secret material. Considering that they accused his agency of being a criminal enterprise, they were also embarrassing to the NSA, and potentially explosive. The decision was made to try to get them back from me before the publication of my book.

Thus the answering machine message I heard on that steamy day in Cambridge, while I was quietly working away at a back table in the Algiers Coffee House. The call was from Gerald Schroeder, a senior attorney with the Justice Department. When I called him back, he asked whether we could meet in Washington to discuss the file that had been released to me by his own department. The Reagan Justice Department, it seemed, now wanted to reverse the decision of the Carter Justice Department and get the documents back.

Long before the arrival of the internet, and the ability to transfer documents at the tap of a finger, I was very concerned about what the agency might do to retrieve the physical copy of the file in my possession. Years before, when David Kahn had written his monumental history of cryptology, the agency had considered placing him under surveillance and conducting a “surreptitious entry” into his Long Island home to steal the manuscript prior to publication. Decades earlier, after Herbert Yardley wrote about the Black Chamber, the predecessor to NSA, the Justice Department actually did steal the manuscript for his second book, preventing it from ever being published.

My first thought was to quickly make a duplicate of the file and get the copy out of the country. That would protect the documents not only from theft, but also from any court order prohibiting me from revealing their contents. With a copy beyond the jurisdiction of U.S. courts, a foreign newspaper could always publish the documents.

My first thought was to quickly make a duplicate of the file and get the copy out of the country.

I called a close friend who worked for the Insight Team, the investigative unit of London’s Sunday Times. She agreed to help. It turned out that an American journalist she knew was flying from Boston to London that night, and she quickly arranged for him to take the documents with him and give them to her to hide.

That night I met the journalist on a dark Boston street corner and passed him a package, with the understanding that I was not to tell him what it contained. He wanted as little information as possible, in case he was questioned later. Early the next morning, my friend at the Sunday Times called from London with a code indicating that all was well and that the documents were in a secure place.

With the documents safely beyond the reach of the Justice Department, I next turned to my next problem – finding an attorney to represent me. With the advance on my book totaling $7,500, spread over three years, I was in no position to seek out a white-shoe law firm on Beacon Hill. Instead, I called the ACLU’s Center for National Security Studies and explained my problem. They immediately put me in touch with Mark Lynch, a staff attorney at the center who had considerable experience going up against intelligence agencies, including the NSA. Lynch agreed to represent me.

On July 23, two weeks after I had received the phone call at the coffee shop, Lynch and I met with Schroeder for an hour and a half in the conference room of the center, a cluster of rooms in the stately Stewart Mott house on Capitol Hill. Schroeder began by insisting that the two documents had been released to me “by mistake.” The NSA and the CIA had determined that they contained information that was still classified, he said, and the Justice Department would like me to return them.

I politely informed Schroeder that the documents had been in my possession for more than two years, that material from them was already incorporated into my manuscript, and that the Carter administration had spent 10 months reviewing them before releasing the documents to me. There had been no mistake. In addition, because the documents raised questions about criminal activities by the NSA and CIA, I felt it was important for the public to be informed. In the end, we agreed to another meeting – but this time I insisted that since I had traveled to Washington for the first meeting, they would come to Boston for the next one.

The second meeting took place on August 14, in the editorial conference room of my publisher, Houghton Mifflin, on Beacon Hill. This time, the government dispensed with any attempt at politeness. Accompanying Schroeder were the NSA’s general counsel, Daniel Schwartz, and the agency’s director of policy, Eugene Yeates. They immediately began by interrogating me. How many copies of the document I had made? Whom I had given them to? Where were the documents now located? I responded that none of those questions were on the agenda; since my attorney could not be present, we had agreed in advance that the meeting was simply to allow them to explain the government’s position. Any questions, I said, would have to go through Mark Lynch. I pointed to the phone.

After placing a call to Lynch, Schroeder brought up the possibility of using the espionage statute to force me to return the documents. Lynch immediately asked to speak with me privately.

Once the three officials left the room, Lynch expressed worry over the way the meeting was going. The officials could have a subpoena or a restraining order or a warrant for my arrest in their pocket, he said. He advised me to put down the receiver, call Schroeder to the phone, leave the room – and keep walking. To this day, I still have no idea how long the three officials waited for me to return before finding their way out of the publishing house and back to Washington.

The fight quickly escalated. On September 24, after we informed Schroeder that I was going to use the documents in my book and that all further discussions would be pointless, I received a registered letter. “You are currently in possession of classified information that requires protection against unauthorized disclosure,” Schroeder wrote. “Under the circumstances, I have no choice but to demand that you return the two documents . . . Of course, you will have a continuing obligation not to publish or communicate the information.” To emphasize the point, on November 27 the Justice Department sent my attorney a letter stating that “there should be no misunderstanding of the Government’s position that Mr. Bamford holds information that is currently and properly classified” and that failure to return the documents could force federal prosecutors to resort to an unnamed “post-publication judicial remedy.”

Despite the threats, I refused to alter my manuscript or return the documents. Instead, we argued that according to Executive Order 12065, “classification may not be restored to documents already declassified and released to the public” under the Freedom of Information Act. That prompted the drama to move all the way up to the White House. On April 2, 1982, President Reagan signed a new executive order on secrecy that overturned the earlier one and granted him the authority to “reclassify information previously declassified and disclosed.”

We responded by citing the legal principle of ex post facto, arguing that even if the new executive order was legal, Reagan could not retroactively enforce it against me. The Puzzle Palace was published on schedule, in September 1982, with no deletions or alterations to the text. And ever since then, the NSA’s criminal file – still officially top secret, according to the NSA – has remained on my bookshelf.

supercomputerNSA supercomputer console, 1971

Wrongdoing Masquerading as Patriotism

More than three decades later, the NSA, like a mom-and-pop operation that has exploded into a global industry, now employs sweeping powers of surveillance that Frank Church could scarcely have imagined in the days of wired phones and clunky typewriters. At the same time, the Senate intelligence committee he once chaired has done an about face, protecting the agencies from the public rather than the public from the agencies.

It is a dangerous combination – one the Church Committee warned of long ago. “The potential for abuse is awesome,” the committee observed, especially when “checks and balances designed … to assure accountability have not been applied.” As the committee presciently noted in its report, “Intelligence collection programs naturally generate ever-increasing demands for new data.”

For proof, one need only look at the NSA’s ever-expanding array of surveillance techniques. The agency’s metadata collection program now targets everyone in the country old enough to hold a phone. The gargantuan data storage facility it has built in Utah may eventually hold zettabytes (1,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 bytes) of information. And the massive supercomputer that the NSA is secretly building in Oak Ridge, Tennessee, will search through it all at exaflop (1,000,000,000,000,000,000 operations per second) speeds.

Without adequate oversight, or penalties for abuse, the only protection that citizens have comes not from Congress or the courts, but from whistleblowers. As one myself, albeit in the most minor capacity, I understand what motivates someone to expose wrongdoing masquerading as patriotism. There is no graduate school for whistleblowing and no handbook for whistleblowers. It’s an imperfect science, and whistleblowers learn from the mistakes of their predecessors. Edward Snowden, Chelsea Manning, Tom Drake, Bill Binney and Kirk Wiebe all came from different backgrounds and worked in different fields. None joined the intelligence community to become a whistleblower, but each was driven by unchecked government abuse to tell the public what they knew to be true.

The solution is not to jail the whistleblowers, or to question the patriotism of those who tell their stories, but to do what Attorney General Edward Levi courageously attempted to do more than a third of a century ago – to have the criminal division of the Justice Department conduct a thorough investigation, and then to prosecute any member of the intelligence community who has broken the law, whether by illegally spying on Americans or by lying to Congress.

I would be happy to lend my copy of the NSA’s criminal file to Attorney General Eric Holder, if he would like to see how to begin. Or he can read it here.


“The more we do to you, the less you seem to believe we are doing it.”

― Joseph mengele
User avatar
Grizzly
 
Posts: 4722
Joined: Wed Oct 26, 2011 4:15 pm
Blog: View Blog (0)

Re: The Criminal N.S.A.

Postby seemslikeadream » Thu Oct 30, 2014 4:57 pm

Entirely Coincidentally, NSA Signals Intelligence Director Moved To New Position After Conflicts Of Interest Were Exposed By Buzzfeed
from the that-thing-we-were-doing-anyway-but-just-not-until-right-now dept
The NSA's newly-developed concern for "optics" is being tested by employees both former and current. Keith Alexander, the NSA's longtime leading man, took his snooping show on the road, offering his expertise to banks for $1 million/month. But he couldn't leave it all behind, attempting to drag the current NSA CTO along with him by offering him an interesting -- but conflicting -- part-time position with IronNet Security. The NSA said, "That's fine." Then it said, "We're looking into it." Then it said nothing while Keith Alexander pulled the plug on the deal while simultaneously denying any sort of impropriety.

The story of Teresa Shea, SIGINT (Signals Intelligence) director for the NSA is even more convoluted and shady. Buzzfeed's Aram Roston has been digging into Shea and her husband's private ventures -- the latter of which at least appear to be direct beneficiaries of Teresa Shea's position.

The NSA has refused to comment on Shea's position and her husband's various SIGINT-related businesses, other than to point out how serious the agency is about ethics and possible conflicts of interest. So serious, in fact, that it refuses to discuss the issue beyond issuing boilerplate.

Now, Buzzfeed reports that Teresa Shea is no longer head of SIGINT, a decision surely entirely unrelated to Roston's investigatory efforts.
One of the nation’s top spies is leaving her position at the National Security Agency (NSA), a spokesman confirmed Friday, amid growing disclosures of possible conflicts of interest at the secretive agency…

The NSA provided a statement Friday that said Teresa Shea’s “transition” from the SIGINT director job was routine and “planned well before recent news articles.” The agency indicated she would remain employed, but did not provide specifics.
While this could mean that an ongoing internal ethics probe reached the same conclusions Roston's work did, it seems altogether too coincidental to have been "planned well before recent news articles." Then again, no one expects a federal spy agency to announce that "due to recent acts of journalism, Teresa Shea has been busted down to Entry Level Bulk Data Processor, pending further disciplinary action." But the agency doth seemingly protest too much, especially when its standard MO has been to brusquely shove aside every accusation with practiced ease.
In a statement Friday, NSA spokesman Michael Halbig said that “NSA considers regular rotations of senior leaders as a catalyst for achieving diverse, fresh perspectives on the nation’s critical national security challenges.” He added that “We value her leadership as a senior leader and look forward to her continued contribution to the mission to help defend the nation.”
Give it up, various NSA mouthpieces. This was a clean bust. I'm sure Shea was hoping to continue her run as head of SIGINT, something she probably finds more "invigorating" than whatever position she's been hastily shoved into while the agency waits for the ethically-troubling furor to die down.

This is a positive step, both for the agency and for the general public, which has been unofficially tasked with watching the watchers (including the watchers' watchers in the halls of Congress) over the past several years. Playing to the edges of ethical confines is no longer acceptable behavior. If the agency expects to be entrusted with the data and communications of the world, it needs to be above reproach on every observable level. This much has always been obvious to the agency's critics. That it's now readily apparent to the agency itself is a welcome change.
Mazars and Deutsche Bank could have ended this nightmare before it started.
They could still get him out of office.
But instead, they want mass death.
Don’t forget that.
User avatar
seemslikeadream
 
Posts: 32090
Joined: Wed Apr 27, 2005 11:28 pm
Location: into the black
Blog: View Blog (83)

Re: The Criminal N.S.A.

Postby seemslikeadream » Wed Nov 12, 2014 6:17 pm

Plumbing the Depths of NSA’s Spying
November 12, 2014

The complexity of the National Security Agency’s spying programs has made some of its ex-technical experts the most dangerous critics since they are among the few who understand the potential totalitarian risks involved, as ex-NSA analyst William Binney showed in an interview with journalist Lars Schall.


By Lars Schall

William Binney, who spent 36 years in the National Security Agency rising to become the NSA’s technical director for intelligence, has emerged as one of the most knowledgeable critics of excesses in the NSA’s spying programs, some of which he says managed to both violate the U.S. Constitution and prove inefficient in tracking terrorists.

Binney has been described as one of the best analysts in NSA’s history combining expertise in intelligence analysis, traffic analysis, systems analysis, knowledge management and mathematics (including set theory, number theory and probability). He resigned in October 2001 and has since criticized the NSA’s massive monitoring programs. After leaving the NSA, he co-founded Entity Mapping, LLC, a private intelligence agency, together with fellow NSA whistleblower J. Kirk Wiebe.

Lars Schall: You were invited this year as a witness by the NSA commission of the German parliament, the Bundestag. How has it been to speak there and what did you try to get across?

William Binney: I was there for about six hours testifying with a half hour break in the middle. So it was quite intense. There were so many questions. Some of them I didn’t have answers for because I didn’t have knowledge about it, and I tried to make those clear and tried to give them information about things I knew personally. I didn’t want to extrapolate beyond that.

Initially, they were asking questions about my background which was, I guess, setting the stage for the follow on questions, but in the long run they were interested in the relationships with the BND and the NSA. I think part of the break in the middle had to do with something that happened there and that a BND person was implicated in spying on the commission when it was investigating the relationship, and they were also passing that information to NSA, at least that was alleged at that time, I don’t know if that’s true or not.

Anyway, it was quite lengthy and very thorough, and my whole point was to try to get across to them that what NSA and the intelligence community in the Five Eyes, at least, and probably in some of the other countries (I don’t know exactly which ones and I’ve made this clear, but I think they’re not doing it alone) is the idea of collecting massive amounts of data is just like the STASI – except this time I kind of tried to get across to them that it’s like the STASI on super steroids.

As Wolfgang Schmidt, the former lieutenant colonel of East German STASI, commented about NSA’s surveillance program: For us, this would have been a dream come true. Well, that’s the whole point of it, it’s so invasive, it’s digital surveillance on a massive scale, and I tried to get that across to them. Because this is basically a fundamental threat to our democracy and every democracy around the world. You know, I call it over here in the United States the greatest threat to our democracy since our Civil War.

LS: Were there some questions that you would have expected that were not asked?

WB: No, I think they pretty much asked all the relevant questions, some of which I dealt with in close session, especially in dealing with the relationship between BND and NSA that I knew….

LS: What’s your view on how Germany is treating Edward Snowden?

WB: I think for the most part he got a lot of popular support in Germany. I think the government there is a little bit sensitive to it simply because of the close and enduring relationship between the United States government and the German government. So I think they’re trying to balance an act there between support from the general populace and also support for the US government from the existing agreements and cooperation with the German government….

LS: What’s your overall view on how the German government behaved in the NSA scandal?

WB: My personal belief is that they only now are starting to get into it and only now they are beginning to realize, just as over here Congress is beginning to realize, how much they cannot trust our own intelligence agencies. This is evident, for example, last year when two representatives attempted to get a bill passed in the House of Representatives to un-fund the NSA activity.

Basically, they just found out through the Snowden releases that a lot of the information they were been fed by the intelligence agencies and the administration was not true. And so they finally began to realize what was going on and tried to get an initiative to stop it. That’s when the President and the director at the time of NSA, Keith Alexander, lobbied the House of Representatives very heavily to defeat that bill, which they did, but the bill only lost by 12 votes in the House of Representatives – so that’s not a bad deal, it was a fairly close vote.

The issues are still going on over here and politically people are still talking trying to resolve it and we are trying to help them with that by publishing articles and things that we send over to Germany, as well as the things that need to be done to ensure that these intelligence agencies are kept inline by their governments respecting the rights of their citizens.

LS: A few months ago it was revealed that the NSA could have had access via the Bundesnachrichtendienst (BND) to data at the DE-CIX internet hub in Frankfurt. If this was the case – the DE-CIX Management GmbH Frankfurt denies that this took place – the BND would have violated German law. [See the press release by the DE-CIX Management GmbH Frankfurt (in German)] Can you tell us, please, how such arrangements between NSA and BND come about that are including breaches of law?

WB: The agencies like NSA and BND would set up a separate international agreement between the two agencies that would have to be passed and approved by at least some portion of the government. That is, your government would need to agree to it and so would ours, and that starts with the agencies agreeing on what to cooperate on and how to cooperate and what the ground rules are for that cooperation. That’s then passed to the House and Senate Intelligence Committees, or very restricted numbers of people in administration would also be able to see that kind of agreement, and the same would be true I assume on the BND side and the German government.

There should be some small subset of the German government that’s aware of these agreements and is monitoring them, though I don’t know what the conditions are within the BND and how they do it. Within the United States it’s the House and Senate intelligence committees and the FISA court that is supposed to oversee that these things don’t violate U.S. law, but in fact, what they have been doing over here is advocating violation of U.S. law. They are enabling that – it’s not the question of them doing oversight, they aren’t doing it….

And of course they are all doing it on the basis of fear-mongering of terrorism. They try to get everybody afraid so they will do whatever they want, that’s the kind of leverage that they are trying to use not just against the public, but also against Congress. It’s just all based on fear-mongering. The whole point is to get more money and build a bigger empire, which they have done. Over here, we’ve spent, for all the 16 agencies, close to a trillion dollars since 9/11. That’s really been a money-making proposition for them, this fear-mongering. Now they are doing it with cyber security. It’s how you control your population, how you manipulate them, and how you let them pay for things you want done.

LS: Is the BND merely a subsidiary or branch of the US intelligence apparatus?

WB: I wouldn’t call them a branch, but they are certainly a cooperating partner. Again, it’s all written out in agreements as to what the efforts are that they jointly share and work together on … and approved again by their agency’s heads and then it goes to certain parts of the governments for approval also. … I wouldn’t say that they’re working totally for them, they have their own agenda and own priorities. The cooperation occurs where there’s common interest and common concern about given activities, like terrorism or maybe dope smuggling and things like that.

LS: Is the NSA engaged in economic espionage related to Germany? And if this was the case, wouldn’t it be the task for the BND to prevent this from happening?

WB: You would think so. I can only assume from what it’s been printed that this is happening, but the question really becomes whether or not it is shared with U.S. companies to give them advantage in competition. I am sure that all governments around the world do this to some degree, depending on their capabilities and resources primarily. The question becomes whether or not it’s shared outside of the government channels to industry, for example to gain advantage.

You would expect that government people are keeping it within, but the problem here is in NSA: a good many of the people who are managing all the data that would contain that kind of information are in fact contractors working for other industrial partners in the United States. Some of them like Boeing have many interests and so does Lockheed Martin and so on. These are corporations where people are running that data and managing that data for NSA, so they have access to it. What they are doing to it is another question, but it’s a very risky situation in terms of industrial espionage.

LS: Your own career at NSA culminated as Technical Director for Intelligence in 2001. The very same year you retired. Why so?

WB: What happened after they wanted us to stop doing the ThinThread program, which was the one that solved the massive data problem related to the internet communications … they had to get rid of us, so that’s what they did. As part of that process they had to remove me from that rather high position and put me into a smaller position which was out of sight basically. They didn’t want Congress or anybody else to be aware of what I was doing or have access to me. That’s generally what they do when they don’t want people doing things, they move them out of their way.

LS: What did NSA do wrong when it came to uncovering the 9/11 plot? Edward Snowden “suggested that the United States had the proper intelligence ahead of 9/11 but failed to act.” [See “Read Snowden’s comments on 9/11 that NBC didn’t broadcast”, Russia Today, May 30, 2014.]

WB: Yes, that came out of Tom Drake’s use of ThinThread to go through the entire data base at NSA. He went through the data and analyzed it after the fact in early 2002, I believe. … He found out that NSA had, in fact, in its data base prior to 9/11 all the information necessary to find out who was involved, where they were – you know, to put the whole thing together and be able to stop it.

See, the problem with industry so involved in this and so inculcated inside of NSA – I mean, they are inseparable, they work in the same spaces, and when you do that they have a vested interest in continuing to get the next contracts so that they can keep getting more and more money. So what happens is, they try to keep the problem going instead of solving it. So they only do incremental improvements over time that keeps them in the primary position to get the follow on contracts to keep working on it. That’s basically how they’ve been doing it, and they’ve been doing it for decades, by the way, it’s standard practice that they use.

LS: Do you think the expansion of various NSA programs in reaction to 9/11 is justified?

WB: Absolutely not! That’s what I opposed right away. They should have stopped it by using automation against a focused target set for acquisition of information. In other words, they knew the basic targets and people connected to them or those that were in close relationship with them, and they could define that and pull that data out and focus their analytic effort on that and solve that problem, but they didn’t. Instead they decided to build a bigger agency and that they wanted a much larger budget and a much larger set of contractors and contracting agents. That was the path they took. I called that sacrificing the security of the people of the United States and of the people of the free world for money.

LS: NSA whistleblower Thomas Drake stated also in an interview with me that the nexus 9/11 – War on Terror is used as an excuse to expand programs that were existing pre-9/11. [See Tim Shorrock: “Exposing Bush’s historic abuse of power”, Salon, July 23, 2008.] One example, I think, would be Echelon. Could you tell us about the development of Echelon, please?

WB: I don’t know too much about what happened with Echelon, because that didn’t really deal with the fiber optic lines, and that’s really where the explosion occurred. The explosion in communications was occurring with the fiber optic lines. There are three types of attacks on it: Either they get corporate cooperation with the telecom companies or the companies running the fiber lines, and if they have that with or without the government’s knowledge (local government if it’s foreign) … then they can tap the lines there and do the acquisition there.

On the other hand, if they don’t have a company doing that, then they can go to their counterpart in the government to try to get an agreement like in Frankfurt to try to get taps on that line or in other places. If that’s agreed, then there’s a governmental approval to do that, at least in part by the agency involved, if not by the government itself, too. I don’t know that – I mean, that would be the part that would have to be investigated.

And the other possibility, if they can’t get a governmental cooperation or corporate cooperation, then they can unilaterally do it – that means they have ways and means to get access to the fiber lines without the cooperation of the government or of the company involved. That’s like the taps that they put on the lines between Google and all the major internet service providers when they are transferring data from their major storage centers back and forth … without the knowledge of the companies. That’s the kind of thing that they would do with anybody else that wouldn’t cooperate. In other words, if you want to find out if your lines are tapped, you would need to trace the line all the way through.

LS: On Aug. 17, 1975 Senator Frank Church stated on NBC’s “Meet the Press”: “In the need to develop a capacity to know what potential enemies are doing, the United States government has perfected a technological capability that enables us to monitor the messages that go through the air. Now, that is necessary and important to the United States as we look abroad at enemies or potential enemies. We must know, at the same time, that capability at any time could be turned around on the American people, and no American would have any privacy left such is the capability to monitor everything — telephone conversations, telegrams, it doesn’t matter.

“There would be no place to hide. If this government ever became a tyrant, if a dictator ever took charge in this country, the technological capacity that the intelligence community has given the government could enable it to impose total tyranny, and there would be no way to fight back because the most careful effort to combine together in resistance to the government, no matter how privately it was done, is within the reach of the government to know. Such is the capability of this technology.

“I don’t want to see this country ever go across the bridge. I know the capacity that is there to make tyranny total in America, and we must see to it that this agency and all agencies that possess this technology operate within the law and under proper supervision so that we never cross over that abyss. That is the abyss from which there is no return.”

How do those words sound today?

WB: They were right on the money. Frank Church captured it right away. The point is that they are in the process of perfecting this whole operation, and the point is that now that everybody has a greater capacity to communicate the invasion of privacy or the intrusion into what people’s lives is all about is even worse then what Frank Church could have known. Back then he was only thinking about and looking at the landline telephone calls, where now it’s not only that but also mobile phones, satellite phones, the internet, the computers, the tablets, and so on. All the networks people are carrying around.

There are at least over 3 ½ billion phones in the world, and something very similar in terms of computers. The explosion has been tremendous both in terms of volume and in terms of numbers. Frank Church couldn’t have dreamt about that in his time; he was just talking about a smaller segment of what was available that time. And now the intrusion is even greater.

And I would also point out that those were part of the fundamental grounds for the impeachment of Richard Nixon. They were preparing to throw him out of office, when he resigned. But at that time under the programs MINARETTE at NSA and COINTELPRO at FBI and CHAOS at CIA, Nixon was only spying on a few thousands of people. Now they are doing hundreds of millions in the US, there are almost 300 million US citizens, not counting the billion plus in the rest of the world. If you’re just talking about the US, they’re now doing virtually everybody. If you use a phone or a computer or any kind of bank card or if you’re writing a check or do any kind of that thing, you’re being spied on. So the intrusion is so much greater and so much more encompassing today.

But we are not even thinking about impeaching people. We should have impeached George W. Bush and Richard Cheney for doing this to begin with, but we didn’t. And that’s why they kept it all in secret, by the way – they knew that they were violating the U.S. Constitution and they knew they were also violating the laws. That’s also why they had to give the telephone companies retroactive immunity, because they gave them access to the telephone lines and to the fiber optic lines that carried not only the telephone but also the internet. And they also gave them all the records of their customers, which all were violations of the laws and violations of constitutional rights of U.S. citizens in the First, Fourth and Fifth Amendment, at a minimum.

LS: Hearing that I have to ask: Are you disappointed from the reaction of your countrymen related to those NSA revelations?

WB: Yes, but I think that most of them still don’t understand what that really means. I do have some hope here from some of the initial feedback to “CITIZENFOUR”, the movie by Laura Poitras on Edward Snowden, and some of the whistleblowing that we did. That’s been very positive, and I think it’s helping to educate the population here as to what that really means. I think once they really understand what’s going on and what their government is doing to them, that they will in fact react to that and react in a positive way and force the government to change, which they should.

LS: I would also like to discuss some questions related to PROMIS, a software for data mining, that was developed by Bill Hamilton’s software firm INSLAW and stolen by the U.S. Justice Department / U.S. intelligence agencies. Dr. Norman Bailey was the Reagan National Security Council staff person in 1981 responsible for the new Signal Intelligence mission for NSA known as “Follow the Money.”

According to my information, Dr. Bailey told INSLAW that NSA briefed him on the fact that it had obtained the PROMIS software from the U.S. Department of Justice and used it as the principal software installed on computers of wire transfer clearing houses, commercial banks, investment banks, credit card companies, and international financial institutions for real-time surveillance of electronic fund transfers through the banking sector. Dr. Bailey also confirmed the use of PROMIS as “the principal software element” of “Follow the Money” later on publicly in 2008. [For more information on NSA’s “Follow the Money” SIGINT mission and PROMIS see Lars Schall: “Follow the Money: The NSA’s real-time electronic surveillance of bank transactions”, LarsSchall.com, Feb. 2, 2014.]

Were you aware, while an employee at NSA, of the use of PROMIS by NSA for its “Follow the Money” bank surveillance mission?

WB: I was not personally aware of the program PROMIS or how NSA used it. I did know that there was an effort to look at money transfers, it was a matter of following that for terrorism, for dope smuggling, just international crime. But I wasn’t aware of the PROMIS program.

LS: In retrospective, what would you like to say about PROMIS? I mean, the whole case still isn’t settled although it began in the 1980s and there’s no doubt about it that the software was stolen by U.S. intelligence agencies like CIA and NSA…

WB: I’m not surprised of that. I believe they tried to steal some of the intellectual capital we had after we had retired. The way they did it was to send the FBI to raid us, ultimately. I had expected them to actively attack our computers and try to find the information there. We knew these people and so we never documented anything in a computer file anywhere, nothing was documented in the sense that it would be usable for them, either on paper or electronically – so we were walking around with all this knowledge in our heads and not putting it down so that anybody could have it.

There was a large intelligence company in the United States, they tried a kind of forced takeover of us, but what they didn’t realize was that all the intellectual capital was in our brains and they could not take that over from us. There was nothing they could do to get the information from us. So they failed. And also the government failed when they were trying to get it from us.

PROMIS was a different story. They went into an agreement and my understanding is that they broke the agreement with Bill Hamilton. I think this is a court issue that should have been resolved in the courts a long time ago.

LS: So PROMIS has never been a topic among your colleagues at NSA?

WB: No, we never talked about it, and I’d never heard about the program PROMIS at all while I was working at NSA.

LS: Is Wall Street a major player of the Deep State in the U.S.?

WB: I certainly think it is politically anyway, because they do contribute a lot of money to the political campaigns. And of course they have their own lobbyists and all that. I can’t imagine them not having some input in the process somewhere. It only seems reasonable.

LS: Well, the CIA for example was formed and launched by investment bankers and lawyers from Wall Street.

WB: Yes, and they of course got billions from us. And if you take the case of Elliot Spitzer for example, he was in New York and going after the bankers for all the defrauding of people. He was going after them in a criminal way, and of course they get rid of him. They had the FBI look through all the data, I allege, because I don’t know where else they get it, the FBI had direct access through the PRISM program, they go into the name data bases at NSA, all the emails, phone calls and financial transactions in those data bases … for Elliot and find some evidence against him that they could use to leverage to get rid of him, which they did.

My question to begin with was what was their probable cause to do that in the beginning? I never really heard our government say anything about that, because they don’t like the Fourth Amendment, because it constrains what they can and can’t do. They want to have a free hand to get rid of anybody they want.

Like in my case, in the case of Kirk Wiebe, or also in Tom Drake’s case, they tried to get rid of us by falsifying evidence and drawing up an indictment against us. … I caught them at it, okay, so they finally dropped all that. But I mean, that’s our Department of Justice; that’s not justice, that’s criminal. So, what they’re doing, the House and Senate intelligence committees, the FISA court, the Department of Justice and the White House, they are trying to cover up any exposure of this, and that’s why they were really after Snowden, and that’s why they wanted to stop all those leaks. It’s exposing them for the crimes they were committing against the people of United States and against the people of the world.

LS: Two other questions: Who are the largest private contractors who manage IT and telecommunication systems for the NSA, and what is their access and potential use of the data to serve their private interests?

WB: Well, you see, that’s what I was talking about earlier: those who are managing the data for NSA are contractors and those are contracting organizations or companies that have many interests, not just in intelligence. They do have access there, and that’s a real danger of whether or not they would use that for industrial espionage to give them leverage and advantage in a competitive bidding for contracts internationally. That’s always a threat. I don’t know how they are monitoring that, and I don’t know what they are doing to ensure that that doesn’t happen.

Also, I would point out that these kinds of data acquisitions are not just limited to NSA and BND, there are other countries involved that also have sharing agreements and have the ability, like through XKeyscore, to see these data sets. That just opens up an immense array of potential abuses. I don’t know if they have agreements to monitor or prevent it or to stop it if they find it. I don’t know what they’re doing. (laughs.) They haven’t made it clear. I mean, they are doing all of this in secret anyway.

LS: And it’s quite a problem given the fact that roughly 70 percent of the U.S. intelligence budget is outsourced to corporate contractors. [See Tim Shorrock: “Spies for Hire: The Secret World of Intelligence Outsourcing”, Simon & Schuster, New York, 2008, p. 6.] — One more question, and I know it’s hard to answer, but I think it’s crucial: Are NSA systems used to manage the financial markets, for example related to the NY Fed, the operative arm of the Federal Reserve System?

WB: I do not know that the Treasury or any part of the Federal Reserve System is using those programs. They probably get the benefit of it indirectly, but I don’t know they are using them directly. They are part of the government, too, you know, they share knowledge across the government, how much of that I’m not sure. But again, whatever agreements were made, would be made within the U.S. government as to what kind of sharing would go on and the level to get access to it….

LS: How would you think the indirect use of those systems looks like?

WB: Here is what I think they would do: I would think that they would have the Treasury and all the banks report transfers of money in and out of the country. Also, I would think they would take cooperatively under the business records transfer all kinds of financial transactions, including not just credit cards, but also bank transfers of money back and forth between banks around the world. Also, all personal check-writing and transfers of money from individuals inside the country as well as anywhere else they can get. Those are the kinds of transfers they would be looking for. They are looking for patterns of money transferring that would be indicative of payoff for dope or payoff for money laundering operations or things like that. I would think they are doing that.

LS: And as you know the Treasury Department has this Office of Terrorism and Financial Intelligence as a Counterterrorism Finance Unit. Do you think the NSA works with them?

WB: I assume they do. The level of cooperation would be laid out in agreements again.

Lars Schall is a German financial journalist.
Mazars and Deutsche Bank could have ended this nightmare before it started.
They could still get him out of office.
But instead, they want mass death.
Don’t forget that.
User avatar
seemslikeadream
 
Posts: 32090
Joined: Wed Apr 27, 2005 11:28 pm
Location: into the black
Blog: View Blog (83)

Re: The Criminal N.S.A.

Postby seemslikeadream » Fri Nov 21, 2014 9:13 pm

:)

Utah Tries Where Congress Fails to Keep NSA Within Constitution
Friday, 21 November 2014 11:54
By Michael Boldin, Truthout | Report

Image
A coalition of grassroots groups from across the political spectrum joined forces to fly an airship over the NSA's data center in Bluffdale, Utah on Friday, June 27, 2014, to protest the government's illegal mass surveillance program. The environmental group Greenpeace flew its 135' long thermal airship over the data center carrying the message "NSA Illegal Spying Below". (Photo: EFF Photos / Greenpeace)
A coalition of grassroots groups from across the political spectrum joined forces to fly an airship over the NSA's data center in Bluffdale, Utah on Friday, June 27, 2014, to protest the government's illegal mass surveillance program. The environmental group Greenpeace flew its 135' long thermal airship over the data center carrying the message "NSA Illegal Spying Below". (Photo: EFF Photos / Greenpeace)

Will Truthout's mission continue in 2015 and beyond? That depends on readers like you. Make a tax-deductible donation now to sustain our work!

The failure of Congress to pass any meaningful reform of National Security Agency (NSA) surveillance powers has many activists looking for another approach to stop the massive spy agency. But if a state representative in Utah has his way, that approach will be to turn off the agency's water, and his state will be ground zero.

Less than 24 hours after reports broke that the USA Freedom Act failed to move forward in the Senate, a powerful interim committee for public utilities in the Utah state legislature held a hearing on a bill there that would start the process of turning off water and other state assistance to the recently-opened NSA data center in Bluffdale.

Introduced by Rep. Marc Roberts (R- Santaquin) late in the 2014 legislative session, the 4th Amendment Protection Act is a response to what many see as a violation of not just privacy rights by the NSA, but of public trust as well.

"The data center here was welcomed by the state of Utah with a promise that their activities would remain within Constitutional bounds," said Roberts. "I think we all know and are aware that has been violated," he continued.

The hearing was an opportunity for the bill to receive public input before it is formally reintroduced for the 2015 legislative session. One inside source said that committee members received "tons of emails" from the public in favor of the bill.

According to statements made at the hearing, when operating at full capacity, the NSA data center will require 1.7 million gallons of water to function each day, primarily to keep the servers from overheating and shutting down.

One committee member suggested that the NSA would simply reuse the water over and over in a closed loop, but a local data-center expert refuted this claim.

"A lot of the water that is consumed is evaporated into the atmosphere and is not sent back into the system," said Pete Ashdown, the founder and CEO of Utah's first independent and oldest internet service provider, XMission.

"What this tells us, first and foremost, is that this NSA facility cannot operate without Utah's help," said Mike Maharrey, executive director of the OffNow Project whose model legislation the Utah bill is based on. "And as Nevada showed us by turning off water to the Department of Energy (DOE), this strategy actually works," he continued.

Over a number of years, Nevada denied the DOE's five applications for the use of water to construct and operate the proposed high-level nuclear waste repository at Yucca Mountain. By doing so, they held the construction process up in court long enough that the project became unsustainable.

And in a 2007 ruling, a US district court in Las Vegas sided with the state. "The validity of Western states' groundwater rights and the right to regulate water in the public interest is not a right to be taken lightly, nor is it a right that can cavalierly be ignored or violated by a federal agency," wrote Judge Roger L. Hunt.

A Salt Lake Tribune report late last year noted that the NSA was getting a sweetheart deal on water. "Bluffdale agreed to sell water to the National Security Agency at a rate below its own guidelines and the Utah average in order to secure the contract and spur economic development in the town," wrote Nate Carlisle of the Tribune.

But determining just how much water the facility is using has been "difficult" according to Roberts. "I've tried to get that information from Bluffdale, but they won't disclose it," he said. Roberts also noted that at full capacity, usage would be equivalent to that used by more than 21,000 people, which in a state where water shortages and restrictions are common, was concerning to some.

"I'm concerned about not subsidizing the costs of this on the backs of Utah citizens," said one committee member.

"For 40 years we've waited on Congress to get the job done, and they failed once again," Maharrey continued, referring to Sen. Frank Church's 1975 warning about NSA powers. "We're done waiting for Congress to stop the NSA, and with bills like this, we'll stop the NSA whether Congress wants to or not."

Ashdown agreed. "I opposed the effort to turn off the water to the NSA data center last year because I was hoping the federal Congress would take action," he said. "They have tried three times to take action and failed three times. So I really do think it is a state issue at this point to show that we do not support these infringements on our rights."

According to Maharrey, a strong grassroots showing in the states is the path forward. "The only way we're going to win is if people get on the phone in all 50 states, urging their state representatives to introduce and support the 4th Amendment Protection Act."
Mazars and Deutsche Bank could have ended this nightmare before it started.
They could still get him out of office.
But instead, they want mass death.
Don’t forget that.
User avatar
seemslikeadream
 
Posts: 32090
Joined: Wed Apr 27, 2005 11:28 pm
Location: into the black
Blog: View Blog (83)

Re: The Criminal N.S.A.

Postby seemslikeadream » Mon Nov 24, 2014 11:16 am

Filling the Blanks in Snowden’s ‘Citizenfour’
November 23, 2014

Exclusive: To grasp the full story of Citizenfour, the documentary on Edward Snowden’s decision to expose NSA spying, you must go back four decades to see how the reality slowly dawned on Americans that their privacy and freedoms were at risk, writes James DiEugenio.

By James DiEugenio

In 1974, at about the time President Richard Nixon was resigning due to the Watergate scandal, director Francis Coppola released his haunting, compelling film about electronic surveillance, The Conversation. Centered within the lives of surveillance technicians and the powerful corporate officers who employed them, Coppola depicted a nightmare world: one fraught with the invisible threat of electronic spying at almost any place, at any time – including in public parks and inside private hotel rooms.

The film had a remarkable double twist at the end. The protagonist, played by Gene Hackman, has found out that, unbeknownst to him, the people who hired him used his work to stage a killing. In turn, they find out about his dangerous knowledge. The long last scene depicts Hackman literally dismantling his apartment, trying to find the microphone his murderous employers have placed in his room.

NSA whistleblower Edward Snowden speaking in Moscow on Oct. 9, 2013. (From a video posted by WikiLeaks)
NSA whistleblower Edward Snowden speaking in Moscow on Oct. 9, 2013. (From a video posted by WikiLeaks)
Coppola has said he never realized his film would play out against the backdrop of the Watergate scandal, which also had electronic surveillance at its center, this time politically, with the Republicans spying on the Democratic campaign headquarters for the 1972 presidential race.

In the wake of the Watergate imbroglio, some of the people on the Watergate Committee, such as Sen. Howard Baker, were not satisfied with the congressional investigation led by Sen. Sam Ervin. Baker felt that the role of the CIA in the two-year long ordeal had been glossed over.

This, plus the exposure of CIA counter-intelligence chief James Angleton’s domestic operations, gave birth to the Church Committee, headed by Sen. Frank Church, D-Idaho. It was the first full-scale inquiry into the crimes of the FBI and CIA.

As a result of the publicity given to that committee (back then such events were actually covered in the U.S. news media, not mocked and ignored), some reforms in the monitoring of the intelligence agencies were enacted. After these reforms were put in place, the Senate decided that there should also be some limits and controls placed upon electronic surveillance over alleged threats from domestic enemy operatives inside the United States.

The Birth of FISA

Therefore, a handful of senators, including Ted Kennedy, banded together in 1977 to pass the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act. The act allowed for surveillance of up to one year without a warrant over foreign targets. If one was not foreign, but an American citizen, a warrant had to be granted within 72 hours.

There was an eponymous special class of courts – known as the FISA courts – set up to deal with these cases. To review and issue the warrants, 11 judges are chosen by the Supreme Court for a period of seven years. When deciding to grant a warrant, the court usually consists of three judges.

The idea was that no American should be spied upon unless the government showed some kind of “probable cause” that the American citizen was an agent of a foreign power or terrorist organization. In other words, the judges were to provide some safeguard against unwarranted and unjustified spying by the government, albeit with their deliberations in secret and without an adversarial proceeding.

Frank Church had seen the awesome power of the FBI, CIA and NSA up close. He had seen what people like longtime FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover had done to Martin Luther King Jr., trying to coerce the civil rights leader over his personal life. Church had been exposed to MH CHAOS, the CIA’s domestic spying on radicals and the alternative press in the 1960s and 1970s. He had seen the documents on COINTELPRO, the FBI’s program to infiltrate and then undermine leftist, activist groups like the Black Panthers.

And Church had been one of the first outsiders to get an in-depth look at just what the technological capabilities of the National Security Agency were. Even back in 1975, Church was very much impressed and, at the same time, he was quite fearful. He made the following memorable quote in regards to the powers of the NSA:

“If a dictator ever took over, the NSA could enable it to impose a total tyranny, and there would be no way to fight back. That capability could at any time be turned around on the American people, and no American would have any privacy left, such is the capability to monitor everything: telephone conversations, telegrams, it doesn’t matter. There would be no place to hide.

“I don’t want to see this country ever go across the bridge. I know the capacity that is there to make tyranny total in America, and we must see to it that this agency and all agencies that possess this technology operate within the law and under proper supervision, so that we never cross over that abyss. That is the abyss from which there is no return.”

Spying on Dissent

Those comments were probably made because Church found out about Project Minaret, an early and limited attempt at domestic surveillance which targeted the communications of famous personages who criticized the Vietnam War, e.g., himself and King.

Project Minaret lasted from 1967 to 1973 and ended up targeting about 1,650 American citizens. These names were on Watch Lists made up by the executive intelligence agencies. There was no judicial oversight and no warrants were obtained.

With this in mind, Church, Ted Kennedy and others were seeking to balance the threat of domestic infiltration by foreign powers with some semblance of legal strictures to protect our fundamental freedoms, so that Coppola’s Kafkaesque vision did not become an American reality.

This imperfect balance was maintained for about two decades, from the creation of the FISA courts in 1978 to the start of the new millennium. Very few people had ever even heard of FISA courts or understood what they did. Then came George W. Bush and the Al-Qaeda attacks of Sept. 11, 2001. As the saying went, “everything changed.”

The vast expansion of the NSA’s spying began within a few months of those attacks. But the American public did not know about it until December 2005. In fact, President Bush appears to have lied about the program in public when he made two speeches in April 2004 in which he said any wiretaps his administration employed necessitated a court order.

He then added, “When we’re talking about chasing down terrorists, we’re talking about getting a court order before we do so.” He made the same claim at least three other times.

Then on Dec. 15, 2005, the New York Times published a story that revealed President Bush had allowed the NSA to “eavesdrop on Americans and others inside the United States to search for evidence of terrorist activity without court-approved warrants.” One source for the story said, “This is really a sea change. It’s almost a mainstay of this country that the NSA only does foreign searches.”

The story was written by James Risen and Eric Lichtblau. And it was revealed that the Times had sat on it for more than a year. Why? Because the White House pressured the newspaper not to print it. [See Consortiumnews.com’s “Spying and the Public’s Right to Know.”]

Scaring the Times

Bush and his aides had used all kinds of intimidation tactics to keep the story out of print. From saying the paper would be held responsible for any upcoming successful terrorist attack to threatening another Pentagon Papers-style lawsuit.

A key reason that the Times changed its mind and published the story in December 2005 was that Risen was including the information in his book, State of War, scheduled for release in January 2006. The Times editors judged that the potential embarrassment from continuing to sit on such a newsworthy story outweighed the risks of offending the Bush administration.

The hidden controversy about the story reveals that a number of people inside the NSA and the Intelligence Community were disturbed by what Bush had authorized them to do. And although Risen and Lichtblau used anonymous sources, the government apparently suspects that one major source for them was Justice Department lawyer Thomas Tamm and another was Jeffrey Alexander Sterling, a CIA operations officer.

Sterling is now under indictment for violation of the Espionage Act. Tamm’s house was raided by the FBI in 2007. Charges were not filed against Tamm, although the investigation continued until 2011.

It turned out that the release of the Times story and the subsequent legal skirmishes over the whistleblowers set a pattern in this legal area. Contrary to popular belief, Edward Snowden was not the first NSA employee to reveal the illegality of classified programs in the wake of 9/11, just the highest profile one. The drama around Snowden’s revelations also reflected the reality that, as the years rolled on, the scope of NSA spying grew exponentially.

The program that Bush authorized in late 2001 was titled STELLARWIND. It allowed “data mining” of Internet activity, e-mail communications, phone calls financial transactions. The fact that this was done on a massive scale precluded the formal vetting done by a FISA court.

Bush’s rationale for this program was that the U.S. had failed to stop the 9/11 attacks because its defenses were too timid, not aggressive enough. For instance, in the year 2001, FISA granted 932 warrants. What Bush was doing dwarfed that.

STELLARWIND was briefly discontinued in 2004 when Deputy Attorney General James Comey refused to renew it while his boss John Ashcroft was in the hospital. To his credit, when visited in the hospital by Bush’s representatives, Attorney General Ashcroft himself refused to sign. Bush then got FISA court chief judge Collen Kollar-Kotelly to approve the program — 30 months after it started. (The Guardian June 27, 2013)

A Mainstream Scandal

With the release of the Times story in December 2005 and Risen’s book, State of War, a month later, the controversy was propelled into the major media – onto the front pages and into the lead stories of TV news shows. That’s when the real trouble began.

The divisive issues were those of civil liberties, civil disobedience and the fundamental one: were what FISA, Bush and the NSA doing constitutional? Or, if under the cover of an undeclared “war on terror,” were Frank Church’s fears and Coppola’s nightmare vision now coming to fruition?

William Binney was one of the very first to protest from the inside in the wake of the New York Times story. Binney had 32 years in the NSA and was considered one of the finest cryptographic analysts they had. He had devised a program called THINTHREAD against incoming foreign communications. But the Bush White House ordered the NSA to drop the privacy controls on the program that guaranteed Americans would not be surveilled.

Since Binney understood that spying on Americans was illegal without a warrant, he and his friend and colleague Kirk Wiebe began making unwelcome entreaties to Congress and the Defense Department, even a Supreme Court justice. (Vanity Fair, “The Snowden Saga” May 2014)

As a reward for “going through channels,” Binney and Wiebe were flagged as leak suspects with their NSA superiors steering the FBI in their direction, Binney said in an email to me. Binney added that the NSA “apparently got our names form the DOD IG’s [Inspector General's] office – as we were the ones to file the DOD IG complaint about NSA fraud waste and corruption.” (Bureaucratically, the NSA is under the Defense Department.)

Binney had his house raided by FBI agents. He was dragged out of the shower with a gun aimed at him. The excuse for the raid was the agents were looking for the sources for the New York Times story.

NSA Whistleblowers

Thomas Drake was another NSA official who had complained about NSA abuses to other government agencies. He then went to the newspapers, specifically the Baltimore Sun. Drake was formally charged under the Espionage Act of 1917. The government had no real case under that statute, but the expense and time of the legal ordeal essentially broke up Drake’s life. Today he is employed by an Apple Store. (ibid)

But the role of Drake goes much further than the Vanity Fair article took it. That article stated that Drake had exposed waste, fraud and abuse at NSA, which is only part of the story. He went much further than that.

In a memorandum sent to President Obama on Jan. 7, 2014 — predating the Vanity Fair piece — Drake revealed a major reason why he was charged and why others, like Binney, resigned. This memorandum was signed by Binney, Drake, former NSA division chief Ed Loomis, and Kirk Wiebe, former NSA senior analyst. To my knowledge, Consortiumnews.com was the only outlet that has printed it in its entirety.

The document states that National Intelligence Director James Clapper lied to Sen. Ron Wyden on March 12, 2013, during a formal session of the Senate Intelligence Committee. Wyden asked if the NSA collected any type of data on millions or hundreds of millions of Americans. Clapper replied in the negative. Yet this collection was going on since STELLARWIND.

What the memo revealed was that the whole pubic scandal about STELLARWIND was unnecessary because Binney, Loomis and Wiebe had devised a much better program called THINTHREAD. This did much the same thing, but it had encryption formulas entered into it so that records relating to American citizens would remain secret at least until a FISA court could decide on whether or not probable cause existed to open them.

The program was also cross-relational: “It united data associated with terrorists/criminals from all databases.” And it was relatively cheap. THINTHREAD was developed in-house for a paltry $3 million and could be fully deployed for about $300 million. But NSA Director Michael Hayden vetoed this program in favor of an outside contractor’s program called TRAILBLAZER, a decision made three weeks before the 9/11 attacks.

Bloating a Budget

One of the bureaucratic “advantages” of TRAILBLAZER was that it cost more than ten times as much as THINTHREAD and allowed the NSA and various members of Congress thus to show that they were doing more about terrorism – and helping out some favored contractors – even though TRAILBLAZER ultimately proved a failure and a waste of some $3.8 billion.

However, after 9/11, money was really no worry at the NSA. With the FBI and CIA taking the brunt of the blame for the failure to stop the attacks, Hayden had a great opportunity to build up the NSA’s budget and image, taking the code-breaking agency into the forefront of the U.S. intelligence community.

After 9/11, Drake tried unsuccessfully to revive THINTHREAD, but failed to scrape together enough money to complete a THINTHREAD content analysis program on NSA databases. This was how Drake learned that the NSA’s information on some of the 9/11 hijackers was not shared outside the agency.

Drake discovered that the NSA had produced a lengthy analytic report that broke open the entire structure of Al-Qaeda and associated groups, including the content of phone calls between hijacker Khalid al-Midhar in San Diego with the known Al-Qaeda safe house communications center in Yemen.

Drake’s information, of course, undermined the whole Bush/Cheney argument that if the U.S. only had a bulk collection program prior to 9/11, the attacks could have been prevented. Instead, the problem was an analytical failure to understand the import of information already collected. Piling on vast amounts of additional data arguably made the problem worse, burying the analysts in an unimaginably giant haystack of data and expecting them to locate the crucial needle.

As Drake noted, it was Vice President Dick Cheney who – in pursuit of collecting as much data as possible – got Hayden to violate the Fourth Amendment restrictions about the NSA’s spying on Americans.

In an ironic twist, Cheney misused the Khalid al-Midhar case transforming it into an example of how the NSA could have prevented the attacks if it only had more data – when, in fact, the NSA had this information in hand. But contradicting high-level officials on such sensitive matters will get employees not just drummed out of an agency, but indicted. As it did Drake.

Snowden and Drake

All of this is apropos to any informed discussion regarding the new film about Edward Snowden called Citizenfour because Snowden was well aware of what happened to Drake. Snowden once said people in the NSA were afraid to go public because of what had been done to Drake.

But why did Snowden approach filmmaker Laura Poitras? In August 2012, documentary director Poitras released a short film called The Program, which was billed as a work in progress. It was largely based on interviews with Binney in which he discusses his work on STELLARWIND and how, unbeknownst to him, that program was turned on Americans after the 9/11 attacks.

The short film also mentioned a huge depository being built in Utah to house massive amounts of data gathered by the NSA. Because of her work on this and other politically relevant films, Poitras told PBS that she was placed on Homeland Security’s Watch List and that she was frequently detained during border crossings with her work products searched.

But the first person we see in Citizenfour is not Snowden. Neither is it Poitras. It is columnist and blogger Glenn Greenwald, because of the three people Snowden tried to get in contact with to publicize the spy scandal at NSA, Greenwald was the first. (For some reason, the film leaves out the third person: Washington Post reporter Barton Gellman.)

The film takes its title from the fact that Snowden used that rubric as his encrypted email signature when he made some of his initial contact attempts. But Snowden was too mysterious and vague for Greenwald to deal with. Snowden also wanted him to employ some exotic encryption devices and sent Greenwald tutorials on how to use them. Greenwald put them aside and Snowden disappeared back into the blackness of cyberspace. That was in December of 2012.

Reaching Out

In January 2013, Citizenfour tried again, this time with Poitras. Greenwald had written about Poitras and her problems with Homeland Security, and Snowden had seen the film about Binney. Unlike Greenwald, Poitras was familiar with PGP encryption keys and even more exotic devices.

Snowden assured her, “I am a senior member of the intelligence community. … This will not be a waste of your time.” And this is how the film begins, with Poitras showing blown-up versions of these enigmatic early emails from an anonymous source claiming to be high up in the Intel community.

Poitras does not want to continue the communications stateside so she goes to Berlin to learn more about her anonymous informant. At this point, the film relates part of the Binney story. It also begins to touch upon the misuse of FISA courts in the massive overreach of NSA and describes the new storage facility in Utah.

Somehow Poitras was allowed to film a hearing before a court about the government’s use of a private phone company, AT&T, to monitor thousands, if not hundreds of thousands of cell phones. The lawyers for the government clearly do not want to disclose certain aspects of the program. One of the judges gets the message and says words to the effect that you would rather us not be here at all.

Poitras cuts to a briefing by an Occupy Wall Street technology leader. He is telling a small room full of representatives how the government and the NSA can trace their calls through their cell phones and also their financial transactions through their bank cards and credit cards. In other words, the government can trace their actions day by day to put together where they were at certain times.

Since we know the Occupy Wall Street movement was under surveillance, this scene has a chilling overtone to it because it cuts to the quick of what Frank Church was worried about: NSA surveillance turned on domestic targets for purely political purposes. In this case, it was the suppression of a leftist populist movement.

Meeting in Hong Kong

From here Poitras cuts to a series of officials, like Clapper, misrepresenting the reach and impact of programs like STELLARWIND. We then go to Snowden’s communications requesting a formal meeting with Poitras and Greenwald in Hong Kong. This happens on June 3, 2013.

Much of this part of the film is shot in Snowden’s rather small rented room in a Hong Kong hotel. Poitras is never on camera. But Ewen MacAskill from The Guardian is. Since the paper employed Greenwald, the whole project came under the UK newspaper’s purview.

The American editor of the paper, Janine Gibson, wanted a veteran presence in the mix. So MacAskill is the second person in the room as we watch the renegade NSA employee begin to disclose some of the deepest secrets of the so-called “war on terror.”

Snowden talks about one of the things that actually disgusted him while working for the NSA, that the employees actually got to watch drone strikes in real time on their desktop computers. They would watch the drones approach the target and then circle it for, at times, hours on end.

Snowden then says to Greenwald that he does not want the issue to be about him personally. That is not the way he sees it. To Snowden, this is rather a simple schematic, it’s State Power vs. Citizen Power. He then adds that the great promise of the internet has now been compromised because of the use of it as a tool of surveillance.

Here, I should interject an example to convey how real that Snowden’s issues are. A few months ago, in advance of a major conference on the Kennedy assassination in Pittsburgh, a former investigator for the House Select Committee on Assassinations asked me by email how I got a summary of an interview that he did with the late David Phillips. Like Snowden, he sent me his communications encrypted. But even at that, I did not wish to reply online.

When I saw him in person, I explained to him how I got the Top Secret summary but I had held back from communicating this information by email because of the chilling effect caused by knowledge about programs like STELLARWIND.

Through the PRISM

As the documentary unfolds, Snowden explains two more programs: TEMPORA, and PRISM. For TEMPORA, the NSA contracted out work to the British GCHQ, the NSA’s UK equivalent, to tap into hundreds of the world’s fiber optic network cables, which allows for spying on more than 600 million telephone actions per day.

But beyond that, the program allows the user to intercept emails, check people’s access to internet web sites, and see what they are posting on Facebook.

This is conducted through the so-called Five Eyes alliance, the loose union of the intelligence communities of America, England, Canada, Australia and New Zealand. Poitras takes her camera to the wind-blown coast of England and shows how the GCHQ has attached probes to trans-Atlantic cables when they hit British soil.

Another program, PRISM, is used by the NSA domestically. Snowden secured a 41-frame Power Point presentation on it. The aim of this program is to collect private electronic data belonging to users of major internet carriers like Gmail, AOL, Skype and YouTube.

With the exposure of PRISM, Snowden cut out one of the most often used defenses by both the Bush and Obama administrations, namely, that they were collecting only “metadata,” that is, only the times and durations of communications. PRISM collects the contents of emails, online chats, cloud-stored files, and much more.

In fact, PRISM is so intrusive that there is a dispute over whether or not the aforementioned companies have agreed to let their clients be spied on. The companies denied they had cooperated with the NSA. But the government says the FISA courts have issued orders to do so that are presented to the companies in question. (See, for example, “Everything You need to Know about Prism”, by T.C. Sottek and Joshua Kopstein, in The Verge, July 17, 2013)

Brad Smith, a general counsel for Microsoft, gave the game away. Quoted for attribution, he said, “We believe the U.S. Constitution guarantees our freedom to share more information with the public, yet the government is stopping us.” (ibid) In other words, these private companies are now under the thumb of the NSA. But they don’t want to be held liable for a class-action lawsuit on invasion of privacy.

Real-Time Access

As Snowden notes in the film, PRISM is not just a recording device. It can be channeled backward and forwards in time. That is, once the target is identified, PRISM can access all the information from the company’s databank, from the past to the present and monitor it into the future.

One of the disclosures made by Snowden – that had a huge impact and that the film properly plays up – was the fact that Verizon had agreed to turn over records of millions of its customers to the NSA and FBI. This court order required the company to turn over on an “ongoing, daily basis” all phone calls in its systems, both within the U.S. and between the U.S. and other countries. (The Guardian, June 6, 2013)

This began in April 2013, and was renewed at 90-day intervals. In other words, it was done under President Obama. Without Snowden, it is unlikely this story would have ever seen the light of day because the court order expressly barred Verizon from disclosing the existence of the FBI’s request for the records or the court order itself. (ibid)

This points out a matter not dealt with in the film. Namely that Chief Justice John Roberts has stacked the FISA courts with judges who simply will not say no to any national security request, no matter how much it infringes on privacy and the Fourth Amendment. They have, for all intents and purposes, become rubber stamps for administration requests.

As we watch the film, one of the issues Greenwald and Snowden discuss is how much of the story should be about Snowden, who isn’t seeking out notoriety. He simply tells Greenwald that he grew up in North Carolina and Maryland and that he ended up working for the NSA through subcontractor Booz Allen Hamilton.

Snowden’s Biography

But, actually, Snowden’s life is much more interesting than he lets on and – in my view – should have been a bigger part of this film. Snowden comes from a military family. His father and grandfather were both in the Coast Guard, and he was born in the port town of Elizabeth City, North Carolina. In fact, many of the men in Snowden clan had careers in either law enforcement or the military.

The family moved to Maryland when Snowden was nine. In high school he became ill with mononucleosis, dropping out before his sophomore year. At this time, he became very interested in computer technology and took a number of advanced classes in community colleges and earned certification as a systems engineer.

He became obsessed with computer technology and tried to tear down systems to see how they worked. He then reconstructed them so they would work better. He began hanging out at an online chat room called Ars Technica.

When 9/11 happened, Snowden favored invading Iraq. And in May 2004, he joined the Army. “I felt I had an obligation as a human being to help free people from oppression,” he said later. (op. cit. Vanity Fair) After arriving at Fort Benning, Georgia, Snowden broke both legs in a training accident. After he was released from the military, he joined the CIA in 2006.

Snowden himself could not believe it. On Ars Technica he wrote, “I don’t have a degree of any type. In fact, I don’t even have a high school diploma. . . . and my co-workers have BSs, MSs and ten to fifteen years of experience. Employers fight over me. And I’m 22.”

Snowden worked in network security, allowing him to have a top-secret clearance. Less than a year later, he was transferred to Geneva with a diplomatic cover as part of the mission to the United Nations. He was given a four-bedroom government-issue apartment. And in some of his online posts, he said he was having a very nice time.

But it was also in Geneva that Snowden began to become ambivalent toward his job. As part of an undercover mission, he saw how the CIA got a banker drunk, encouraged him to drive, and then after he got in an accident, recruited him as an informant.

Snowden told The Guardian that he witnessed several instances like this in Europe and concluded, “Much of what I saw in Geneva really disillusioned me about how my government functions and what its impact in the world.” (ibid)

Indeed, it was at this point, in about 2008, that Snowden first thought about leaking confidential documents, in part because he felt that the Democratic candidate for president, Barack Obama, might change things.

Getting Angry

Shortly after Obama’s election, Snowden left the CIA. To this day, there are several versions why. But most observers agree that Snowden came back to America as somewhat of an angry young man. His online posts seem to indicate that he was rather conservative. For instance, he railed against Social Security.

But Snowden soon landed a job with Dell Computer, and the NSA was one of Dell’s biggest and most secret clients. Snowden began working on NSA projects in Japan, and in summer 2010, he was transferred back to Maryland where the NSA is based. Here he led a team of experts in designing state-of-the-art, cloud-computing platforms, and also technically sophisticated super computers for breaking passwords. (ibid)

Snowden then took another step upward and another change of locale. He became a high-level systems administrator in Hawaii. But there was also a change in the young man’s attitude. He now wore a sweatshirt sold by the Electronic Frontier Foundation, whose motto was “Defending your rights in the digital world.”

Snowden also began to complain about the NSA’s unlawful though authorized surveillance. When he was brushed off, he began to use his clearance and position as a systems administrator to delve into areas that were not related to his job description. In the summer of 2012, Snowden made his first illegal downloads.

Snowden also applied for a job directly with the NSA and was offered a position though he felt it was not high enough in the bureaucracy. So, he turned it down and applied for a position at Booz Allen Hamilton, a company owned by the politically well-connected Carlyle Group. He got a job in cyber security, saying later: “My position with Booz granted me access to lists of machines all over the world that the NSA hacked.”

By this time, spring 2013, Snowden was in communication with Greenwald, Poitras and Gellman. In May, he had all his documents ready to go. To this day, no one knows how many there were. Snowden kept downloading Top Secret documents until the end.

Finally, on May 17, he told his girlfriend he was leaving on a business trip. He went to Honolulu Airport and ended up in Hong Kong. He booked a room at the Mira in the Kowloon area.

Libertarian Leanings

All of this is only dealt with glancingly in the film, if at all. To me, it seems of paramount interest because, unlike say the Cambridge Five, the infamous British spy ring recruited by the Soviet Union, Snowden did what he did not for ideology but because he was genuinely offended by the NSA’s invasion of citizens’ privacy.

Politically speaking, Snowden appears to be more or less a moderate with libertarian leanings. If I were Poitras, I would have insisted some of this background make it into the film.

There is another aspect of the Snowden saga that I feel was slighted. We watch as Greenwald tells Snowden not to try and hide his identity. In fact, Snowden paid for his room at the Mira Hotel in Hong Kong with his own credit card. Greenwald says words to the effect: just do it out in the open, let them react to who you are.

Here Citizenfour introduces Julian Assange and Wikileaks, with Assange – aware of the harsh imprisonment of his leading source Pvt. Bradley (now Chelsea) Manning – arranging for Snowden to get out of Hong Kong before the State Department could close in on him. Assange and his assistant Sarah Harrison get Snowden a flight to Moscow for a stopover en route to his planned destination in Latin America. But the U.S. government charges Snowden under the Espionage Act and he has no choice but to seek asylum in Russia. Since the State Department cancelled Snowden’s passport, he remains in Russia.

Towards the end of the film, there are two ominous episodes. As Greenwald and his partner are traveling back to their home in Brazil, his partner is detained at Heathrow Airport for nine hours, the legal limit without making an arrest.

Journalist Jeremy Scahill then makes an appearance and poses the question: If one wants to communicate sensitive information today and be sure it’s not intercepted, how does one do it? The answer is to return to Watergate days, with conversations in parking lot garages late at night, while avoiding electronic communications.

The last scene is a bit problematic. Greenwald is visiting Snowden in Russia. They talk about how many people are on the Watch List today and communicate via written messages which are then ripped up.

Snowden is shocked at the figure of 1.2 million people, and we see this on a torn paper. I thought this was all strained. What was the need of communicating with written messages in Moscow? And both participants must have known the camera was there. After all it zoomed in for close-ups on the paper. So why rip up the paper on camera?

This was using the techniques of a dramatic scenarist in a documentary. Greenwald and Snowden came close to being actors here, rather than participants in a real-life drama.

There will be future movies on the Snowden story with actual actors playing the key protagonists, including a feature film by director Oliver Stone. But this documentary is a creditable first offering in the field.

James DiEugenio is a researcher and writer on the assassination of President John F. Kennedy and other mysteries of that era. His most recent book is Reclaiming Parkland.
Mazars and Deutsche Bank could have ended this nightmare before it started.
They could still get him out of office.
But instead, they want mass death.
Don’t forget that.
User avatar
seemslikeadream
 
Posts: 32090
Joined: Wed Apr 27, 2005 11:28 pm
Location: into the black
Blog: View Blog (83)

Re: The Criminal N.S.A.

Postby seemslikeadream » Sat Dec 27, 2014 5:30 pm

NSA dumps incriminating documents on Christmas Eve
Cory Doctorow at 9:00 am Fri, Dec 26, 2014


At 1:30pm on Christmas Eve, the NSA dumped a huge cache of documents on its website in response to a long-fought ACLU Freedom of Information Act request, including documents that reveal criminal wrongdoing.

The dump consists of its quarterly and annual reports to the President's Intelligence Oversight Board from Q4/2001 to Q1/2013. They were heavily redacted prior to release, but even so, they reveal that the NSA illegally spied on Americans, including a parade of user-errors in which NSA operatives accidentally spied on themselves, raided their spouses' data, and made self-serving errors in their interpretation of the rules under which they were allowed to gather and search data.

The NSA admits that its analysts "deliberately ignored restrictions on their authority to spy on Americans multiple times in the past decade."

The ACLU, which filed a lawsuit to access the reports, said the documents shed light on how the surveillance policies of NSA impact Americans and how information has sometimes been misused.

“The government conducts sweeping surveillance under this authority -— surveillance that increasingly puts Americans’ data in the hands of the NSA,” Patrick C. Toomey, staff attorney with the ACLU’s National Security Project, said in an e-mail.

“Despite that fact, this spying is conducted almost entirely in secret and without legislative or judicial oversight,” he said.

The reports show greater oversight by all three branches of government is needed, Toomey added.

The ACLU filed suit to turn a spotlight on an executive order governing intelligence activities that was first issued by President Ronald Reagan in 1981 and has been modified many times since then.

NSA Reports to the President's Intelligence Oversight Board (IOB)

NSA Reports It May Have Broken Laws With Decade of Spying on U.S. Citizens



Snowden Docs Lead to Discovery NSA Employees Spied on Spouses, Girlfriends


As news slowed on the 24th and people joined their families for Christmas Eve celebrations, the National Security Agency (NSA) released hundreds of pages of heavily redacted reports detailing various ways in which its intelligence gathering violated U.S. law over the past decade.

The pages describe scenarios in which the agency unlawfully collected phone records, emails and other data on U.S. citizens and foreign nationals, then shared the information with unauthorized recipients. The reports also describe private data being stored on unsecured computers and data being retained long after law required it to be destroyed.

The series of quarterly reports to the President’s Intelligence Oversight Board, which begins in 2001 and ends in 2013, was released in response to a Freedom of Information Act Lawsuit put forward by the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU).

“The ACLU only knew what to ask for because of the Snowden leaks,” Jesselyn Radack, National Security and Human Rights director at the Government Accountability Project who has been working on Edward Snowden’s legal team, told Think Progress. “There’s been semantics games with the NSA not using regular definitions for words like ‘collection’ and ‘analysis,’ which makes it very difficult to find the documents we’re looking for. Now, at least we have a road map and we know names of specific programs to ask about.”

The surveillance reports detail both intentional and unintentional violations of U.S. law. The NSA concludes in an executive summary, however, that the time procedure was broken “involve unintentional technical or human error.” In some cases, for instance, poorly trained agents accidentally searched themselves instead of their intended target.

“NSA takes even unintentional errors seriously and institutes corrective action, typically involving at a minimum a combination of training and technical measures designed to prevent recurrences, the report says. “Data incorrectly acquired is almost always deleted, referred to as the 'purge' process.”

Many of the intentional violations included officials ordering the surveillance of their significant others. In one case, a member of military intelligence obtained the communications of his wife who was stationed in another country. His punishment was a demotion in rank, a 45-day extension on his service and his pay was reduced by half for two months.

In another instance, a civilian employee ordered intelligence be gathered on the telephone number of his foreign-national girlfriend for about a month. This employee retired before an investigation was completed.

In one 2012 case, an NSA analyst abused her powers and “searched her spouse’s personal telephone directory without his knowledge to obtain names and telephone numbers for targeting.” When her actions were discovered, the agency simply advised her to cease her activities.

“In the very few cases that involve the intentional misuse of a signals intelligence system, a thorough investigation is completed,” the report said. “NSA goes to great lengths to ensure compliance with the Constitution, laws and regulations.”

The released documents are not likely to be a comprehensive account of ways in which the NSA’s surveillance violated U.S. law; previous revelations suggest there is more information still undisclosed. Back in July, for instance, former NSA analyst Edward Snowden claimed that a common practice within the agency is to circulate nude photographs that are found during surveillance—and nothing to that effect was reported in the recently published documents.

Commenting on the misuse of its surveillance powers, Patrick C. Toomey, a staff attorney with the ACLU’s National Security Project, told Bloomberg in an e-mail that “the government conducts sweeping surveillance under this authority—surveillance that increasingly puts Americans’ data in the hands of the NSA. Despite that fact, this spying is conducted almost entirely in secret and without legislative or judicial oversight.”
Mazars and Deutsche Bank could have ended this nightmare before it started.
They could still get him out of office.
But instead, they want mass death.
Don’t forget that.
User avatar
seemslikeadream
 
Posts: 32090
Joined: Wed Apr 27, 2005 11:28 pm
Location: into the black
Blog: View Blog (83)

Re: The Criminal N.S.A.

Postby seemslikeadream » Sat Jan 03, 2015 2:27 pm

If the Supreme Court tackles the NSA in 2015, it’ll be one of these five cases
How a church, terror suspects, and some lawyers are pushing privacy on the legal front.

by Cyrus Farivar - Jan 1 2015, 9:00am CST

Oliver Wunder
Roughly a year and a half since the first Snowden disclosures, there's already been a judicial order to shut down the National Security Agency's bulk metadata collection program.

The lawsuit filed by Larry Klayman, a veteran conservative activist, would essentially put a stop to unchecked NSA surveillance. And at the start of 2015, he remains the only plaintiff whose case has won when fighting for privacy against the newly understood government monitoring. However, it's currently a victory in name only—the judicial order in Klayman was stayed pending the government’s appeal.


A TOP APPEALS COURT TO HEAR WHY NSA METADATA SPYING SHOULD STAY OR GO
DC Circuit Court of Appeals may confirm ruling that ended practice, was stayed.
Klayman v. Obama is only one of a number of notable national security and surveillance-related civil and criminal cases stemming fully or partially from the Snowden documents. In 2014, a handful of these advanced far enough through the legal system that 2015 is likely to be a big year for privacy policy. One or more could even end up before the Supreme Court.

"I think it's impossible to tell which case will be the one that does it, but I believe that, ultimately, the Supreme Court will have to step in and decide the constitutionality of some of the NSA's practices," Mark Rumold, an attorney with the Electronic Frontier Foundation, told Ars.

Rumold is one of the attorneys in First Unitarian Church, a case that is challenging government surveillance much like Klayman. Along with that pair, headline watchers should set alerts for cases such as American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) v. Clapper, United States v. Moalin, and United States v. Muhtorov. Not only are there several other related cases that will likely be influenced by these decisions, but those five cases represent the strongest and most direct legal challenges to the current NSA surveillance state.

Ain't no party like a third party!

Before outlining the relevant cases, it's important to note the government's general justification for the legality of bulk metadata collection: the third-party doctrine.

This theory was codified most recently from a 1979 Supreme Court decision in Smith v. Maryland. In the case, the court found that individuals do not have an inherent privacy right to data that has already been disclosed to a third party. So with telecom data for instance, the government has posited that because a call from one person to another forcibly transits Verizon’s network, those two parties have already shared that data with Verizon. Therefore, the government argues, such data can't be private, and it’s OK to collect it.

But legal experts say that recent surveillance and privacy Supreme Court decisions could lead the courts to reconsider. The first Snowden revelation (published in June 2013) was that Verizon (and presumably other telecom firms) are routinely handing over all call records to the NSA. The metadata records include the date, times, and lengths of the calls.

In October 2013, the third-party doctrine was upheld. A Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act Court (FISA Court) judge ruled that there was no privacy interest in such metadata collected and analyzed by the NSA. In short, if it's OK to collect third-party data on one person, it's OK to collect it on a bunch of people.

Put another way, where one individual does not have a Fourth Amendment interest, grouping together a large number of similarly situated individuals cannot result in a Fourth Amendment interest springing into existence ex nihilo.

In sum, because the Application at issue here concerns only the production of call detail records or "telephony metadata" belonging to a telephone company, and not the contents of communications, Smith v. Maryland compels the conclusion that there is no Fourth Amendment impediment to the collection. Furthermore, for the reasons stated in—and discussed above, this Court finds that the volume of records being acquired does not alter this conclusion. Indeed, there is no legal basis for this Court to find otherwise.


COPS MUST HAVE A WARRANT TO SEARCH CELL PHONES, RULES SUPREME COURT
Court allows warrantless searches in "exigent" cases like abductions, bomb plots.
But consider two recent Supreme Court cases: United States v. Jones (2012) and Riley v. California (2014). Both were decided by rare unanimous opinions, and both indicate an awareness that modern tech has changed reasonable privacy. Jones determined that law enforcement does not have the authority to place a GPS tracker on a suspect without a warrant. Meanwhile, the court found in Riley that law enforcement cannot search a person’s phone incident to arrest without a warrant.

"[These cases] are strong signs that the Supreme Court is aware that rules that were created in a period of time when the court analyzed targeted surveillance do not blindly apply where the government is collecting huge quantities of information," Patrick Toomey, an attorney with the American Civil Liberties Union, told Ars.

"As the quantity expand, a new constitutional analysis arises. We think the same type of principle applies here. Smith v. Maryland is one suspect’s data over three days as opposed to the information contained in everyone’s call records contained for 10 years or more."

For his part, the EFF's Rumold agreed with this reasoning.

"Riley signals that the Supreme Court recognizes that technological distinctions matter, and we can't blindly apply old precedent to new technology," he added. "Jones, or at least the concurrences in Jones, signal that the scope and duration of surveillance makes a difference for constitutional purposes. Those twin principles put much of the NSA's domestic spying programs on pretty unsound constitutional footing."

Klayman versus Goliath

Case name: Klayman v. Obama
Status: Argued before District of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals in November 2014, awaiting ruling
Klayman filed his federal lawsuit at the District of Columbia District Court on June 6, 2013, the day after the first published disclosures from the Snowden leaks. That initial revelation showed that Verizon routinely handed over all metadata on its customers to the NSA. So as a Verizon customer, Klayman argued that his constitutional rights—not to mention the rights of all other Verizon customers—were violated as the result of this data handover. The government relied on the third-party doctrine in its defense.

Judge Richard Leon, a Republican appointee, agreed with Klayman’s argument. As he wrote in a December 16, 2013 memorandum opinion:

Indeed, the question in this case can more properly be styled as follows: when do present-day circumstances—the evolutions in the Government's surveillance capabilities, citizens' phone habits, and the relationship between the NSA and telecom companies—become so thoroughly unlike those considered by the Supreme Court 34 years ago that a precedent like Smith simply does not apply? The answer, unfortunately for the government, is now.



In sum, the Smith pen register and the ongoing NSA Bulk Telephony Metadata Program have so many significant distinctions between them that I cannot possibly navigate these uncharted Fourth Amendment waters using as my North Star a case that predates the rise of cell phones.
Unlike any of the other metadata-related cases thus far, Judge Leon ordered the government to immediately halt the Bulk Telephony Metadata Program and to destroy "any such metadata in its possession that was collected through the bulk collection program." However, he noted, "in light of the significant national security interests at stake in this case and the novelty of the constitutional issues, I will stay my order pending appeal."


IDAHO MOM’S SUIT OVER NSA DATABASE GETS A COOL RECEPTION FROM APPEALS COURT
Judge: "It appears to me it's the same data" allowed by Smith v. Maryland.
In early November 2014, Klayman arrived at that appeal. The case was heard again, this time before the District of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals. A ruling is expected in the forthcoming months.

Klayman is likely the first domino. There are a few other current cases making similar claims, and one is from June 2013 in fact. Like Klayman, Smith v. Obama argues that the government is violating plaintiff Anna Smith's rights by routinely collecting her metadata. Initially, a lower federal court in Idaho found that Smith "has no expectation of privacy in the telephone numbers that she dials." The case was heard at the 9th Circuit Court of Appeals in Seattle in December, and that appellate court is likely to rule sometime early in 2015.

Rand Paul v. Obama is a more high-profile Klayman-like example. The Kentucky senator filed in February 2014 in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia. But since the suit was filed in the same district as Klayman, it has been stayed pending Klayman’s appellate ruling.


Enlarge / Sen. Rand Paul (R-KY) is one of the plaintiffs in a lawsuit against President Barack Obama, arguing that the government's metadata program is illegal.
Gage Skidmore
Most recently, a Pennsylvania lawyer named Elliott Schuchardt joined the bandwagon and filed a suit in June 2014. In his amended complaint, Schuchardt went further than some of these other cases. Schuchardt v. Obama not only challenges metadata collection under the Section 215 of the PATRIOT Act, but it also contests other surveillance programs authorized by Executive Order 12333 and Section 702 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act Amendments Act (FISA AA). The case is still pending before the United States District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania.

What do free software zealots and gun owners have in common?

Case name: First Unitarian Church v. National Security Agency
Status: Pending in Northern District Court of California
Unlike Klayman and similar cases, First Unitarian Church v. National Security Agency was filed on behalf of a number of religious and non-profit groups. This collective runs the gamut, representing Muslims, gun owners, marijuana legalization advocates, and even the Free Software Foundation. In total, the suit represents the broadest challenge to the metadata collection program so far.


NEW LAWSUIT IS BROADEST CHALLENGE YET TO NSA SPYING
Marijuana users, gun owners, civil rights groups unite—helped by Snowden leaks.
The EFF filed this case in July 2013, and it's based on the idea that the NSA has been conducting dragnet spying for years. First Unitarian Church is by no means the first suit to make this allegation. And it's actually similar to another ongoing case (Jewel v. National Security Agency) that was also brought by the EFF.

Carolyn Jewel is a romance novelist who lives in Petaluma, California, north of San Francisco. In the original Jewel complaint (PDF), Jewel and other plaintiffs alleged that the government and AT&T were engaged in an "illegal and unconstitutional program of dragnet communications surveillance conducted by the NSA and other Defendants in concert with major telecommunications companies." The evidence stemmed from materials leaked by former San Francisco AT&T technician Mark Klein in 2006. For years, the case stalled in the court system, but it gained new life after the Snowden disclosures in 2013.

First Unitarian Church, meanwhile, takes the bulk collection of data and questions how it may reveal an individual's associations:

Plaintiffs’ associations and political advocacy efforts, as well as those of their members and staffs, are chilled by the fact that the Associational Tracking Program creates a permanent record of all of Plaintiffs’ telephone communications with their members and constituents, among others.
First Unitarian Church demands that the metadata program be declared unconstitutional and be shut down. The plaintiffs’ attempt to hold a court hearing regarding their attempt for summary judgment was denied earlier this month.

In a recent court filing, government lawyers pointed to Smith in their argument against summary judgment.

Indeed, as Plaintiffs acknowledge, it is the issue before the Ninth Circuit in Smith [v. Obama], virtually ensuring that the Ninth Circuit will soon rule on the very same claim, regarding the very same intelligence program, that Plaintiffs assert here. It would simply not be in the interests of judicial economy to hold a hearing on this very issue while it is pending for decision before the Ninth Circuit.
Judge Jeffrey White is also the presiding judge in Jewel, and it seems likely this particular case will wait until the 9th Circuit rules in Smith.

Just like stealing your datebook

Case name: ACLU v. Clapper
Status: Argued before 2nd Circuit Court of Appeals in September 2014, awaiting ruling
In September 2014, the 2nd Circuit Court of Appeals finally heard oral arguments in ACLU v. Clapper. The case was originally filed back in June 2013, days after the first Snowden revelations became public. A decision could come as soon as this month—and if so, it would be the first federal appellate court to rule on the validity of the NSA’s metadata program.


ACLU SUES FOUR TOP OBAMA ADMINISTRATION OFFICIALS OVER VERIZON METADATA SHARING
Group wants a judge to declare that "the Mass Call Tracking is unlawful."
ACLU v. Clapper is like the other cases outlined here, but it focuses specifically on the granularity involved in data collection. Clapper argues that the NSA metadata program is "akin to snatching every American’s address book—with annotations detailing whom we spoke to, when we talked, for how long, and from where. It gives the government a comprehensive record of our associations and public movements, revealing a wealth of detail about our familial, political, professional, religious, and intimate associations."

"The issues in these cases are similar," Ruthann Robson, a law professor at the City University of New York, told Ars by e-mail. "The first is a constitutional procedural hurdle of the plaintiffs' (challengers) standing to bring the claims. It is possible, however unsettling it may be, that no one has standing to challenge the NSA surveillance program, and thus the federal courts do not have power to consider the claims. Under the Fourth Amendment, the issues are whether the surveillance is a ‘search’ at all, making the Fourth Amendment applicable. And then, if it is a search, is the search ‘reasonable?’"

Nearly a year ago, on December 27, 2013, US District Judge William H. Pauley initially ruled in favor of the government in ACLU v. Clapper. As he wrote:

This blunt tool only works because it collects everything. Such a program, if unchecked, imperils the civil liberties of every citizen.


While robust discussions are underway across the nation, in Congress, and at the White House, the question for this Court is whether the Government’s bulk telephony metadata program is lawful. This Court finds it is.



The effectiveness of bulk telephony metadata collection cannot be seriously disputed. Offering examples is a dangerous stratagem for the Government because it discloses means and methods of intelligence gathering. Such disclosures can only educate America’s enemies. Nevertheless, the Government has acknowledged several successes in Congressional testimony and in declarations that are part of the record of this case.
Judge Pauley also noted that 15 different FISC judges have upheld the metadata program on 35 different occasions since May 2006.


SURVEILLANCE WATCHDOG CONCLUDES METADATA PROGRAM IS ILLEGAL, “SHOULD END”
Congress-approved board says NSA program “lacks a viable legal foundation."
Some subsequent external analysis disagrees with Judge Pauley's assertions. One congressional civil liberties watchdog found in January 2014 that the Section 215 metadata program "has contributed only minimal value in combating terrorism beyond what the government already achieves through these and other alternative means," adding that "cessation of the program would eliminate the privacy and civil liberties concerns associated with bulk collection without unduly hampering the government’s efforts, while ensuring that any governmental requests for telephone calling records are tailored to the needs of specific investigations."

The Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board (PCLOB) agreed with this outside analysis, concluding that there is "no instance in which the [metadata] program directly contributed to the discovery of a previously unknown terrorist plot or the disruption of a terrorist attack."

The September 2014 appeals hearing before the 2nd Circuit ran nearly two hours, an unusually long argument—normally the court gives just 10 or 15 minutes to each side for oral argument in an appeal case. C-SPAN was allowed to record and broadcast the full proceeding, another unusual step in an appeals court that's nearly always closed to cameras.

But like the other cases outlined here, Clapper is entirely focused on the NSA’s metadata collection program, which is authorized under Section 215 of the PATRIOT Act. Presently, Section 215 is set to expire on June 1, 2015 unless it is specifically re-authorized by Congress. As recently as February 2014, James Sensenbrenner (R-WI), author of the PATRIOT Act, said the House would let it expire absent intelligence and judicial revisions to rein in the abuses.

Earlier in 2013, Sensenbrenner filed his own amicus brief in ACLU v. Clapper.

The vast majority of the records collected will have no relation to the investigation of terrorism at all. This collection of millions of unrelated records is built-in to the mass call collection program. Defendants’ theory of "relevance" is simply beyond any reasonable understanding of the word. And it certainly is not what amicus intended the word to mean.



Defendants do not explain why Congress would have enacted such meaningless provisions. The bulk data collection program is unbounded in its scope. The NSA is gathering on a daily basis the details of every call that every American makes, as well as every call made by foreigners to or from the United States. How can every call that every American makes or receives be relevant to a specific investigation?

An $8,500 mistake

Case name: United States v. Moalin
Status: Convicted in Southern District Court of California, appeal pending in 9th Circuit Court of Appeals
In 2015, the 9th Circuit Court of Appeals will likely hear oral arguments in the only criminal case where the government is known to have used metadata collection to prosecute a terrorism-related case.


REPORT: NSA BULK METADATA COLLECTION HAS “NO DISCERNIBLE IMPACT”
New outside analysis shows 1 of 225 terrorism cases used metadata, but poorly.
United States v. Basaaly Saeed Moalin involves a Somali taxi driver who was convicted in federal court in San Diego on February 2013 on five counts. The counts include conspiracy to provide material support ($8,500) to the Somali terrorist group Al Shabaab, and Moalin was sentenced in November 2013 to 18 years in prison.

At congressional hearings in June 2013, FBI Deputy Director Sean Joyce testified that under Section 215, the NSA discovered Moalin conversing with a known terrorist overseas.

The case was domestic, but the FBI took over at that point. They began intercepting 1,800 phone calls over hundreds of hours from December 2007 to December 2008. The agency got access to hundreds of e-mails from Moalin’s Hotmail account, and this access was granted after the government applied for a court order at the FISC.

Moalin was arrested in December 2010. His lawyer, Joshua Dratel, did not learn of the NSA’s involvement until well after his client’s conviction. Dratel challenged the validity of the spying in court, requesting that the court compel the government to produce the FBI’s wiretap application to the FISC. The government responded with a heavily redacted 60-page brief, essentially arguing that as the case involved national security issues, such information could not be revealed.

Moalin is currently under appeal on the grounds that the NSA unconstitutionally abused its authority to target Moalin. Nearly all of 2014 has been taken up with delays in the case, even Moalin’s opening brief has yet to be filed. Court records show that it is due April 6, 2015.

"The Snowden disclosures have had a material impact on the case, as in an effort to counteract them (and justify the Section 215 metadata collection program), the government revealed in Congress for the first time (nearly six months after trial) that the investigation was instigated by Section 215 collection," Dratel told Ars by e-mail.

When snooping goes beyond metadata

Case name: United States v. Muhtorov
Status: Pending in District Court of Colorado
Different types of digital surveillance are authorized under various laws, but one particularly thorny one is Section 702 of the FISA Amendment Act. This authorizes PRISM and "upstream" collection programs like XKeyscore, which can capture digital content (not just metadata) primarily where one party is a non-US person outside the US. Executive Order 12333 is believed to generally cover instances where both parties are non-US persons and are both overseas—although EO 12333 can "incidentally" cover wholly domestic communication as well.

There are a number of pending cases impacted by challenges to this more invasive surveillance. While many court watchers have noted that any Section 215-related cases will likely be made irrelevant by Congressional action, cases that challenge Section 702 surveillance are equally, if not more, important.

"Even if one of the circuit courts invalidates the metadata program either under statutory or constitutional grounds, such a decision is likely to be mooted by Congress," Steve Vladeck, a law professor at American University, told Ars. "But there seems little interest in Congress to look at reforms to Section 702, which is why the litigation arising under that provision could be much more significant going forward."


IN RARE MOVE, TERRORISM SUSPECT CHALLENGES CORE OF WARRANTLESS SNOOPING LAW
Gov't notified Jamshid Muhtorov in October 2013 that it spied on him.
On January 2014, Jamshid Muhtorov became the first person to challenge warrantless collection of specific evidence in a criminal case against him. (The Supreme Court effectively shut down less-specific petitions last year, and the US government argues such data collection is authorized under Section 702.)

Muhtorov is an Uzbek human rights activist who has lived in the US as a permanent resident and refugee since 2007. He's accused of providing material support and resources to the Islamic Jihad Union (IJU), and the US believes the IJU is an Islamic terrorist group. The criminal trial was scheduled to begin in April 2012, but it's been beset with delays. Muhtorov plead not guilty during his arraignment hearing in March 2012.

Nearly two years ago, the Supreme Court decided in a 5-4 decision that even groups that have substantial reasons to believe that their communications are being surveilled by government intelligence agencies—such as journalists, activists, and attorneys with contacts overseas—have no standing to sue the federal government. The reason? They can't prove that they have been actively surveilled. It's a major catch-22 since those who were being watched weren't exactly going to be told about the surveillance.

All that changed in October 2013 when the Justice Department altered its policy, stating that when prosecutors used warrantless wiretaps against criminal defendants, the defendants must be told. Muhtorov became the first such person to receive such a notification.

Consequently, Muhtorov and his ACLU lawyers (including Patrick Toomey) filed a new motion against the government in his pending criminal case. In a 69-page brief, they argue that the "fruits of the [FISA AA] surveillance" be suppressed on the grounds that Muhtorov's Fourth Amendment rights, protecting against unreasonable search and seizure, were violated.

In October 2014, Muhtorov renewed his claim. In a motion "for notice of the surveillance techniques utilized by the government in its investigation," the defendant asks for notification of other kinds of surveillance, as authorized under Section 215, EO 12333, or other legislation.

Toomey and his other lawyers argued:

Notice of the government’s reliance on these surveillance techniques is essential to the due process rights of the defendants in this case. Without notice, the defendants cannot test whether the government’s evidence was, in fact, lawfully obtained—or whether government surveillance conducted without a warrant and without probable cause violated the defendants’ rights. Notice of surreptitious electronic surveillance is routinely required in criminal cases. Courts confronted this question with the advent of wiretapping decades ago and concluded that the government could not criminally prosecute an individual while keeping the sources of its evidence secret. Instead, defendants are entitled to know how the government monitored their communications and activities, and then to test—in an adversarial proceeding—whether the government’s evidence is derived from that surveillance.
Four other defendants in related cases—one in New York, one in California, and two in Oregon—received similar belated notices of surveillance. As Muhtorov’s attorneys observed, "almost all of them after they had already been tried or convicted." Those cases are United States v. Hasbajrami, United States v. Mihalik, United States v. Mohamud, and United States v. Khan, respectively.

The government’s response to Muhtorov’s motion is due by February 26, 2015.

Relentless surveillance

Case name: N/A
Status: Ongoing
Regardless of the status of these particular cases, the government continues its own argument. The current administration has consistently said the president’s Surveillance Program (PSP)—which Ars has reported on previously—gives the executive branch virtually unchecked authority to conduct extensive surveillance including the kinds outlined above. Surveillance under this legal authority continues to this very day, unabated.


THE EXECUTIVE ORDER THAT LED TO MASS SPYING, AS TOLD BY NSA ALUMNI
Feds call it “twelve triple three”; whistleblower says it's the heart of the problem.
In the weeks after the first Snowden documents, a leaked classified draft report by the NSA’s Inspector General was published by The Guardian and The Washington Post. It explored the PSP's beginnings and evolution.

The PSP's legal justification has been provided by a still highly classified document that President George W. Bush signed on October 4, 2001, entitled "Authorization for specified electronic surveillance activities during a limited period to detect and prevent acts of terrorism within the United States." In fact, the entire legal analysis of EO 12333 was redacted.


White House Office of Legal Counsel
While the authorization has never been published, the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) unexpectedly acknowledged it as part of a declassification review in December 2013. According to that NSA Inspector General draft leaked in 2013, the NSA wasn’t even allowed to see the legal authorization for at least two years.

On May 6, 2004, the Office of Legal Counsel within the White House prepared a 74-page memo to the attorney general to outline the legality of "The Program." The publicly released version has substantial redactions. It does, however, contain this noteworthy section:

The President has inherent constitutional authority as Commander in Chief and sole organ for the nation in foreign affairs to conduct warrantless surveillance of enemy forces for intelligence purposes to detect and disrupt armed attacks on the United States. Congress does not have the power to restrict the President's exercise of this authority.
Mazars and Deutsche Bank could have ended this nightmare before it started.
They could still get him out of office.
But instead, they want mass death.
Don’t forget that.
User avatar
seemslikeadream
 
Posts: 32090
Joined: Wed Apr 27, 2005 11:28 pm
Location: into the black
Blog: View Blog (83)

Re: The Criminal N.S.A.

Postby seemslikeadream » Mon Feb 16, 2015 11:03 am

Report: NSA Bracing for Major New Leaks
New Leaks Not Related to Edward Snowden
by Jason Ditz, February 15, 2015

Though the NSA is characteristically not publicly discussing the matter publicly, reports citing private comments from the officials say that the agency is bracing for “major” new leaks.

The leaks, according to the reports, are not related to Edward Snowden’s releases, and interestingly weren’t leaked by any insiders at all.

Rather, they are going to be technical data about how the NSA surveils people, and were uncovered by an unnamed cyber security firm operating outside of the United States.

It will be interesting to see how the administration reacts in that case. President Obama has been extremely hostile to whistleblowers within agencies, but with the data uncovered by people who weren’t working for the NSA or the US government to begin with, their options seem limited.
Mazars and Deutsche Bank could have ended this nightmare before it started.
They could still get him out of office.
But instead, they want mass death.
Don’t forget that.
User avatar
seemslikeadream
 
Posts: 32090
Joined: Wed Apr 27, 2005 11:28 pm
Location: into the black
Blog: View Blog (83)

Re: The Criminal N.S.A.

Postby seemslikeadream » Mon Feb 16, 2015 9:32 pm

Millions of computers may be compromised by US spyware - report
Kaspersky researchers and former intelligence officers reveal how spies found way to lodge code on disc drives produced by major electronics manufacturers

DDoS attacks are frequently costing the financial sector more than £100,000
Kaspersky said it found personal computers in 30 countries infected with spyware Photo: ALAMY
By Reuters12:29AM GMT 17 Feb 2015
The US National Security Agency (NSA) has devised a way of hiding spyware deep within hard drives made by several top manufacturers, giving the agency the means to eavesdrop on the majority of the world's computers, according to cyber researchers and former operatives.
That ability was part of a cluster of spying programmes discovered by Kaspersky Lab, the Moscow-based security software maker that has exposed a series of Western cyberespionage operations.
Kaspersky said it found personal computers in 30 countries infected with one or more of the spying programmes, with the most infections seen in Iran, followed by Russia, Pakistan, Afghanistan, China, Mali, Syria, Yemen and Algeria.
The targets included government and military institutions, telecommunication companies, banks, energy companies, nuclear researchers, media, and Islamic activists, Kaspersky said.
The company declined to name the country behind the spying campaign, but said it was closely linked to Stuxnet, the NSA-led cyberweapon that was used to attack Iran's uranium enrichment facility. The NSA is the agency responsible for gathering electronic intelligence on behalf of the United States.

A former NSA employee told Reuters that Kaspersky's analysis was correct, and that people still in the intelligence agency valued these spying programs as highly as Stuxnet. Another former intelligence operative confirmed that the NSA had developed the prized technique of concealing spyware in hard drives.
The NSA declined to comment.
The revelations of powerful new spying tools will harm the reputation of the US overseas, already damaged by massive leaks by Edward Snowden, the former NSA contractor, and increase suspicion of Western technology.
According to Kaspersky, the spies made a technological breakthrough by figuring out how to lodge malicious software in the obscure code called firmware that launches every time a computer is turned on.
Disc drive firmware is viewed by spies and cybersecurity experts as the second-most valuable real estate on a PC for a hacker, second only to the Bios code invoked automatically as a computer boots up.
So how do I test my Hard Drive firmware for #NSA spying virus/malware? @kaspersky
— Chris Pietschmann (@crpietschmann) February 17, 2015
Costin Raiu, lead Kaspersky researcher, said: "The hardware will be able to infect the computer over and over."
He said the spies only established full remote control over machines belonging to the most desirable foreign targets.
Kaspersky's reconstructions of the spying programs show they could work in disc drives sold by more than a dozen companies, comprising essentially the entire market. They include Western Digital Corp, Seagate Technology, Toshiba Corp, IBM, Micron Technology and Samsung Electronics.
Western Digital, Seagate and Micron said they had no knowledge of these spying programs. Toshiba and Samsung declined to comment. IBM did not respond to requests for comment.


Beyond Stuxnet and Flame: Equation 'most advanced' cybercriminal gang recorded
Summary:Security experts say The Equation Group surpasses every other threat actor known in complexity and sophistication.


By Charlie Osborne for Zero Day | February 16, 2015 -- 20:16 GMT (12:16 PST)

CANCUN, MEXICO: Kaspersky Labs has discovered the "ancestor" of Stuxnet and Flame, a threat actor which surpasses everything else in complexity and technique sophistication.

On Monday at the Kaspersky Labs Security Analyst Summit, the firm unveiled research concerning the existence of a cyberattack team dubbed The Equation Group. The group, which Kaspersky Lab Global Research and Analysis Team (GReAT) members dub the "ancestor" of Stuxnet and Flame operators, has been in operation dating back to 2001 and possibly as early as 1996.

The Equation Group uses multiple malware platforms, some of which go far beyond threats such as Regin in complexity and sophistication.

"The Equation group is probably one of the most sophisticated cyber attack groups in the world; and they are the most advanced threat actor we have seen," the company says.

After tracking over 60 threat actors responsible for cyberattacks across the globe, GReAT says that The Equation Group, active over two decades, goes beyond anything else the security team has tracked and witnessed.

According to Kaspersky Lab researchers, the group is unique in a number of ways: they use tools which are extremely complicated and expensive to develop; are very professional in the ways they infect victims, steal data and hide their activities, and they also use "classic" spying techniques to deliver malicious payloads to victims.

In order to infect victims, the group uses a variety of trojans and tools. Within The Equation Group's toolkit, you will also find at least two Stuxnet variants, Zero days and exploits which strike both Windows and Mac machines and browsers.

Kaspersky detected seven exploits in total used by The Equation group in their malware, and at least four were Zero days. In addition, there are a number of unknown exploits which are used in a chain to ensure success in infecting a machine.

Speaking at the conference, Costin Raiu, Director of the Global Research and Analysis Team at Kaspersky Lab said he assumes the group also has iPhone exploits, "but we have no confirmation so far."

The company have named specialist tools used by the group EquationLaser, EquationDrug, DoubleFantasy, TripleFantasy, Fanny and GrayFish, but the list is far from complete. However, each tool is sophisticated and professionally used.

screen-shot-2015-02-16-at-10-02-58-am.png
"These guys don't make mistakes. If they do, they do very, very rarely." Raiu said.

Two particular tools stand out from the crowd. Fanny -- named due to fanny.bmp file found on compromised systems -- is a computer worm created in 2008 which targets victims in the Middle East and Asia.

The worm, which infects USB hard drives, has been found "on thousands of USBs, and are still there," according to Raiu. The purpose of Fanny appears to be the mapping of air-gapped networks. In order to do so, the malware uses a "unique" USB-based command and control mechanism -- carving out a hidden storage space on the USB to store stolen data and carry out commands.

If Fanny infects a computer which is not connected to the Web, it will collect system information and save it in the hidden area. When the computer eventually connects to the Internet, the malware leaps into action and sends this data to a command and control (C&C) center.

screen-shot-2015-02-16-at-1-21-25-pm.png
If the cyberattacker wants to run commands on the air-gapped networks, these commands can be saved in the secret storage space and execute them.

The second prominent tool used by The Equation Group is a plugin, nls_933w.dll, which Kaspersky Lab security expert Vitaly Kamluk described as the "ultimate cyberattack tool, unique and super advanced." This plugin has the power to interact with a hard drive -- both traditional and SSD -- on a lower level.

Not only interact with -- but rewrite.

The infection, which Kamluk described as a "great headache even to detect," is able to reprogram a hard drive's firmware. By performing a rewrite, the group not only achieves an extreme level of persistence and the ability to survive disk reformatting, but the malware can also create a hidden storage area which is nigh-on impossible to detect.

Read this


Bluster, bravado and breaches: Today's 'terrorist' players in cybersecurity

Read More
The team has spotted 12 vendors so far which are vulnerable, including Seagate, Western Digital and Samsung.

Sadly, if you suspect you are infected, the team suggests you should "destroy the hard drive," according to Kamluk. Why? Not only can the malware survive a full operating system reinstall, but your stolen data -- potentially hidden within a secret storage space -- will always be at risk and may end up being sent to the group's C&C center.

The security team believes The Equation group is the "ancestor" of other threat actors such as Stuxnet and Flame, as the group has access to Zero days before they were used by Stuxnet and Flame. At some point, The Equation group shared these exploits with others. For example, in 2008 Fanny used two Zero days which were introduced into Stuxnet in June 2009 and March 2010.

Raiu said:

"It's important to point out that these two exploits were used in Fanny before they were integrated into Stuxnet, indicating the Equation group had access to these zero-days before the Stuxnet group. Actually, the similar type of usage of both exploits together in different computer worms, at around the same time, indicates that the Equation group and the Stuxnet developers are either the same or working closely together."
Using a C&C center, The Equation group comprises of over 300 domains and more than 100 servers hosted in countries including the US, UK, Panama and Colombia.

Since 2001, the Equation group has infected thousands -- or perhaps tens of thousands -- with their arsenal of bootkits and malware, according to Kaspersky. No-one is safe either: the team say that targets from a vast range of sectors including government, military, telecommunications, energy, nanotechnology and media have become victims.

Raiu estimates that up to 2,000 victims a month are being targeted. While this number in itself does not seem like a big deal, when you consider who is being targeted and the variety of tools at their disposal, the security expert says "it's getting pretty scary."
Mazars and Deutsche Bank could have ended this nightmare before it started.
They could still get him out of office.
But instead, they want mass death.
Don’t forget that.
User avatar
seemslikeadream
 
Posts: 32090
Joined: Wed Apr 27, 2005 11:28 pm
Location: into the black
Blog: View Blog (83)

Re: The Criminal N.S.A.

Postby seemslikeadream » Mon Feb 16, 2015 9:41 pm

Forbes

Equation = NSA? Researchers Uncloak Huge 'American Cyber Arsenal'

Security researchers have uncovered a trove of highly-sophisticated hacking tools used over the last 15 to 20 years to break into thousands of targets’ computers. There’s little doubt the malware and exploits used belonged to the National Security Agency, according to security experts.






How “omnipotent” hackers tied to NSA hid for 14 years—and were found at last
"Equation Group" ran the most advanced hacking operation ever uncovered.

by Dan Goodin - Feb 16, 2015 1:00pm CST
Image
Aurich Lawson
CANCUN, Mexico — In 2009, one or more prestigious researchers received a CD by mail that contained pictures and other materials from a recent scientific conference they attended in Houston. The scientists didn't know it then, but the disc also delivered a malicious payload developed by a highly advanced hacking operation that had been active since at least 2001. The CD, it seems, was tampered with on its way through the mail.

It wasn't the first time the operators—dubbed the "Equation Group" by researchers from Moscow-based Kaspersky Lab—had secretly intercepted a package in transit, booby-trapped its contents, and sent it to its intended destination. In 2002 or 2003, Equation Group members did something similar with an Oracle database installation CD in order to infect a different target with malware from the group's extensive library. (Kaspersky settled on the name Equation Group because of members' strong affinity for encryption algorithms, advanced obfuscation methods, and sophisticated techniques.)

Kaspersky researchers have documented 500 infections by Equation Group in at least 42 countries, with Iran, Russia, Pakistan, Afghanistan, India, Syria, and Mali topping the list. Because of a self-destruct mechanism built into the malware, the researchers suspect that this is just a tiny percentage of the total; the actual number of victims likely reaches into the tens of thousands.
Image

A long list of almost superhuman technical feats illustrate Equation Group's extraordinary skill, painstaking work, and unlimited resources. They include:

The use of virtual file systems, a feature also found in the highly sophisticated Regin malware. Recently published documents provided by Ed Snowden indicate that the NSA used Regin to infect the partly state-owned Belgian firm Belgacom.
The stashing of malicious files in multiple branches of an infected computer's registry. By encrypting all malicious files and storing them in multiple branches of a computer's Windows registry, the infection was impossible to detect using antivirus software.
Redirects that sent iPhone users to unique exploit Web pages. In addition, infected machines reporting to Equation Group command servers identified themselves as Macs, an indication that the group successfully compromised both iOS and OS X devices.
The use of more than 300 Internet domains and 100 servers to host a sprawling command and control infrastructure.
USB stick-based reconnaissance malware to map air-gapped networks, which are so sensitive that they aren't connected to the Internet. Both Stuxnet and the related Flame malware platform also had the ability to bridge airgaps.
An unusual if not truly novel way of bypassing code-signing restrictions in modern versions of Windows, which require that all third-party software interfacing with the operating system kernel be digitally signed by a recognized certificate authority. To circumvent this restriction, Equation Group malware exploited a known vulnerability in an already signed driver for CloneCD to achieve kernel-level code execution.
Taken together, the accomplishments led Kaspersky researchers to conclude that Equation Group is probably the most sophisticated computer attack group in the world, with technical skill and resources that rival the groups that developed Stuxnet and the Flame espionage malware.

"It seems to me Equation Group are the ones with the coolest toys," Costin Raiu, director of Kaspersky Lab's global research and analysis team, told Ars. "Every now and then they share them with the Stuxnet group and the Flame group, but they are originally available only to the Equation Group people. Equation Group are definitely the masters, and they are giving the others, maybe, bread crumbs. From time to time they are giving them some goodies to integrate into Stuxnet and Flame."

In an exhaustive report published Monday at the Kaspersky Security Analyst Summit here, researchers stopped short of saying Equation Group was the handiwork of the NSA—but they provided detailed evidence that strongly implicates the US spy agency.

First is the group's known aptitude for conducting interdictions, such as installing covert implant firmware in a Cisco Systems router as it moved through the mail.

Second, a highly advanced keylogger in the Equation Group library refers to itself as "Grok" in its source code. The reference seems eerily similar to a line published last March in an Intercept article headlined "How the NSA Plans to Infect 'Millions' of Computers with Malware." The article, which was based on Snowden-leaked documents, discussed an NSA-developed keylogger called Grok.

Third, other Equation Group source code makes reference to "STRAITACID" and "STRAITSHOOTER." The code words bear a striking resemblance to "STRAITBIZARRE," one of the most advanced malware platforms used by the NSA's Tailored Access Operations unit. Besides sharing the unconventional spelling "strait," Snowden-leaked documents note that STRAITBIZARRE could be turned into a disposable "shooter." In addition, the codename FOXACID belonged to the same NSA malware framework as the Grok keylogger.

Apart from these shared code words, the Equation Group in 2008 used four zero-day vulnerabilities—including two that were later incorporated into Stuxnet.


The similarities don't stop there. Equation Group malware dubbed GrayFish encrypted its payload with a 1,000-iteration hash of the target machine's unique NTFS object ID. The technique makes it impossible for researchers to access the final payload without possessing the raw disk image for each individual infected machine. The technique closely resembles one used to conceal a potentially potent warhead in Gauss, a piece of highly advanced malware that shared strong technical similarities with both Stuxnet and Flame. (Stuxnet, according to The New York Times, was a joint operation between the NSA and Israel, while Flame, according to The Washington Post, was devised by the NSA, the CIA, and the Israeli military.)
Beyond the technical similarities to the Stuxnet and Flame developers, Equation Group boasted the type of extraordinary engineering skill people have come to expect from a spy organization sponsored by the world's wealthiest nation. One of the Equation Group's malware platforms, for instance, rewrote the hard-drive firmware of infected computers—a never-before-seen engineering marvel that worked on 12 drive categories from manufacturers including Western Digital, Maxtor, Samsung, IBM, Micron, Toshiba, and Seagate.

The malicious firmware created a secret storage vault that survived military-grade disk wiping and reformatting, making sensitive data stolen from victims available even after reformatting the drive and reinstalling the operating system. The firmware also provided programming interfaces that other code in Equation Group's sprawling malware library could access. Once a hard drive was compromised, the infection was impossible to detect or remove.

Image
Enlarge / Forensics software displays some of the hard drives Equation Group was able to commandeer using malicious firmware.
Kaspersky Lab
While it's simple for end users to re-flash their hard drives using executable files provided by manufacturers, it's just about impossible for an outsider to reverse engineer a hard drive, read the existing firmware, and create malicious versions.

"This is an incredibly complicated thing that was achieved by these guys, and they didn't do it for one kind of hard drive brand," Raiu said. "It's very dangerous and bad because once a hard drive gets infected with this malicious payload it's impossible for anyone, especially an antivirus [provider], to scan inside that hard drive firmware. It's simply not possible to do that."

Image
Kaspersky Lab
Equation Group's work

One of the most intriguing elements of Equation Group is its suspected use of interdiction to infect targets. Besides speaking to the group's organization and advanced capabilities, such interceptions demonstrate the lengths to which the group will go to infect people of interest. The CD from the 2009 Houston conference—which Kaspersky declined to identify, except to say it was related to science—tried to use the autorun.inf mechanism in Windows to install malware dubbed DoubleFantasy. Kaspersky knows that conference organizers did send attendees a disc, and the company knows the identity of at least one conference participant who received a maliciously modified one, but company researchers provided few other details and don't know precisely how the malicious content wound up on the disc.

"It would be very easy to trace the attack back to the organizers and point them out, and this could in turn result in some very serious diplomatic incidents," Raiu said. "Our best guess is that the organizers didn't act in a malicious way against the participants, but [that] some of the CD-ROMs on their way to the participants were intercepted and replaced with the malicious variants."
Even less is known about a CD for installing Oracle 8i-8.1.7 for Windows sent six or seven years earlier, except that it installed an early Equation Group malware program known as EquationLaser. The conference and Oracle CDs are the only Equation Group interdictions that Kaspersky researchers have discovered. Given how little is known about the interdictions, they weren't likely to have been used often.

A separate method of infection relied on a worm introduced in 2008 that Kaspersky has dubbed Fanny, after a text string that appears in one of the zero-day exploits used by the worm to self-replicate. The then-unknown vulnerability resided in functions that process so-called .LNK files Windows uses to display icons when a USB stick is connected to a PC. By embedding malicious code inside the .LNK files, a booby-trapped stick could automatically infect the connected computer even when its autorun feature was turned off. The self-replication and lack of any dependence on a network connection made the vulnerability ideal for infecting air-gapped machines. (The .LNK vulnerability is classified as CVE-2010-2568.)

Some two years after first playing its role in Fanny, the .LNK exploit was added to a version of Stuxnet so that the worm could automatically spread through highly sensitive computers in Iran. Fanny also relied on an elevation-of-privilege vulnerability that was a zero day at the time the worm was introduced. In 2009, the exploit also made its way into Stuxnet, but by then, Microsoft had patched the underlying bug with the release of MS09-025.


Enlarge / The LNK exploit as used by Fanny.
Kaspersky Lab
A far more common infection vector was Web-based attacks that exploited vulnerabilities in Oracle's Java software framework or in Internet Explorer. The exploits were hosted on a variety of websites related to everything from reviews of technology products to discussions of Islamic Jihad. In addition to planting exploits on the websites, the attack code was also transmitted through ad networks. The wide range of exploit carriers may explain why so many of the machines Kaspersky observed reporting to its sinkholes were domain controllers, data warehouses, website hosts, and other types of servers. Equation Group, it seems, wasn't infecting only end user computers—it was also booby-trapping servers known to be accessed by targeted end users.

Equation Group exploits are notable for the surgical precision exercised to ensure that only an intended target was infected. One Equation Group-written PHP script that Kaspersky unearthed, for instance, checked if the MD5 hash of a website visitor's username was either 84b8026b3f5e6dcfb29e82e0b0b0f386 or e6d290a03b70cfa5d4451da444bdea39. The plaintext corresponding to the first hash is "unregistered," an indication that attackers didn't want to infect visitors who weren't logged in. The second hash has yet to be deciphered.

"We could not crack this MD5, despite using considerable power for several weeks, which makes us believe [the plaintext username] is a relatively complex one," Raiu said. "It definitely indicates that whoever is behind this username should not be infected by the Equation Group, [and] actually it shouldn't even see the exploit. I would assume this is either one of the group members (a fake identity), one of their partners, or a known identity of a previously infected victim."

The PHP script also took special care not to infect IP addresses based in Jordan, Turkey, and Egypt. Kaspersky observed users visiting the site who didn't meet any of these exceptions, yet they still weren't attacked—an indication that an additional level of filtering spared all but the most sought-after targets who visited the site.


Enlarge / An example of malicious PHP script Equation Group injected into hacked discussion forums.
Kaspersky Lab
More recently, Kaspersky has observed malicious links on the site standardsandpraiserepurpose[.]com that looked like

standardsandpraiserepurpose[.]com/login?qq=5eaae4d[SNIP]0563&rr=1&h=cc593a6bfd8e1e26c2734173f0ef75be3527a205
where the h value (that is, the text following the "h=") appears to be an SHA1 hash. Kaspersky has yet to crack those hashes, but company researchers suspect they're being used to serve customized exploits to specific people. The company is recruiting help from fellow white-hat hackers in cracking them. Other hashes include:

0044c9bfeaac9a51e77b921e3295dcd91ce3956a
06cf1af1d018cf4b0b3e6cfffca3fbb8c4cd362e
3ef06b6fac44a2a3cbf4b8a557495f36c72c4aa6
5b1efb3dbf50e0460bc3d2ea74ed2bebf768f4f7
930d7ed2bdce9b513ebecd3a38041b709f5c2990
e9537a36a035b08121539fd5d5dcda9fb6336423
The PHP exploit code also serves unique Web pages and HTML code to people visiting with iPhones, behavior that Kaspersky found telling.

"This indicates the exploit server is probably aware of iPhone visitors and can deliver exploits for them as well," Kaspersky's report published Monday explained. "Otherwise, the exploitation URL can simply be removed for these." The report also said one sinkholed server receives visits from a large pool of China-based machines that identify themselves as Macs in the browser user agent string. While Kaspersky has yet to obtain Equation Group malware that runs on OS X, they believe it exists.

Six codenames

In all, Kaspersky has tied at least six distinct pieces of malware to Equation Group. They include:
EquationLaser: an early implant in use from 2001 to 2004.

DoubleFantasy: a validator-style trojan designed to confirm if the infected person is an intended target. People who are confirmed get upgraded to either EquationDrug or GrayFish.

EquationDrug: also known as Equestre, this is a complex attack platform that supports 35 different modules and 18 drivers. It is one of two Equation Group malware platforms to re-flash hard drive firmware and use virtual file systems to conceal malicious files and stolen data.

It was delivered only after a target had been infected with DoubleFantasy and confirmed to be a target. It was introduced in 2002 and was phased out in 2013 in favor of the more advanced GrayFish.


Enlarge
GrayFish: the successor to EquationDrug and the most sophisticated of all the Equation Group attack platforms. It resides completely in the registry and relies on a bootkit to take hold each time a computer starts. Whereas EquationDrug re-flashed hard drives for six models, GrayFish re-flashed 12 classes of hard drives. GrayFish exploits a vulnerability in the CloneCD driver ElbyCDIO.sys—and possibly drivers of other programs—to bypass Windows code-signing requirements.


Enlarge / The VBR means Virtual Boot Record. It is a special area of the disk that is responsible for loading the operating system. The Pill is an injected piece of code ("blue pill", "red pill" - Matrix references) that is responsible for hijacking the OS loading. It works by carefully altering the loading mechanism to include malicious code that the OS blindly "swallows."
The BBSVC service is another GRAYFISH mechanism used when the Pill cannot be injected, for some unknown reason. It loads further stages of Grayfish at the time the OS starts. In essence, it's a weaker mechanism than the pill, because it exposes one single malicious executable on the hard drive of the victims. This is why BBSVC is a polymorphic executable, filled with gibberish and random data to make it hard to detect. The platform kernel "fvexpy.sys" is one of the core components of Grayfish. It is designed to run in Windows kernel mode and provide functions for the platform components.

GrayFish is the crowning achievement of the Equation Group. The malware platform is so complex that Kaspersky researchers still understand only a fraction of its capabilities and inner workings. Key to the sophistication of GrayFish is its bootkit, which allows it to take extraordinarily granular control of the machines it infects.

"This allows it to control the launching of Windows at each stage," Kaspersky's written report explained. "In fact, after infection, the computer is not run by itself anymore: it is GrayFish that runs it step by step, making the necessary changes on the fly."


Enlarge
Fanny: A computer worm that exploited what in 2008 were two zero-day vulnerabilities in Windows to self-replicate each time an infected USB stick was inserted into a targeted computer. The main purpose of Fanny was to conduct reconnaissance on sensitive air-gapped networks. After infecting a computer not connected to the Internet, Fanny collected network information and saved it to a hidden area of the USB drive. If the stick was later plugged in to an Internet-computer, it would upload the data to attacker servers and download any attacker commands. If the stick was later plugged into the air-gapped machine, the downloaded commands would be executed. This process would continue each time the stick was switched between air-gapped and Internet-connected machines.


Enlarge
Kaspersky Lab
TripleFantasy: A full-featured backdoor sometimes used in tandem with GrayFish.


Enlarge
Kaspersky Lab
Mistakes were made

No matter how elite a hacking group may be, Raiu said, mistakes are inevitable. Equation Group made several errors that allowed Kaspersky researchers to glean key insights into an operation that went unreported for at least 14 years.

Kaspersky first came upon the Equation Group in March 2014, while researching the Regin software that infected Belgacom and a variety of other targets. In the process, company researchers analyzed a computer located in the Middle East and dubbed the machine "Magnet of Threats" because, in addition to Regin, it was infected by four other highly advanced pieces of malware, including Turla, Careto/Mask, ItaDuke, and Animal Farm. A never-before-seen sample of malware on the computer piqued researchers' interest and turned out to be an EquationDrug module.

Following the discovery, Kaspersky researchers combed through their cloud-based Kaspersky Security Network of exploits and infections reported by AV users and looked for similarities and connections. In the following months, the researchers uncovered additional pieces of malware used by Equation Group as well as the domain names used to host command channels.
Perhaps most costly to the attackers was their failure to renew some of the domains used by these servers. Out of the 300 or so domains used, about 20 were allowed to expire. Kaspersky quickly registered the domains and, over the past ten months, has used them to "sinkhole" the command channels, a process in which researchers monitor incoming connections from Equation Group-infected machines.

One of the most severe renewal failures involved a channel that controlled computers infected by "EquationLaser," an early malware platform abandoned around 2003 when antivirus programs began to detect it. The underlying domain name remained active for years until one day, it didn't; Kaspersky acquired it and EquationLaser-infected machines still report to it.

"It's really surprising to see there are victims around the world infected with this malware from 12 years ago," Raiu said. He continues to see about a dozen infected machines that report from countries that include Russia, Iran, China, and India.

Raiu said 90 percent or more of the command and control servers were closed last year, although some remained active as recently as last month.

"We understand just how little we know. It also makes us reflect about how many other things remain hidden or unknown."
The sinkholes have allowed Kaspersky researchers to gather key clues about the operation, including the number of infected computers reporting to the seized command domains, the countries in which these compromised computers are likely located, and the types of operating systems they run.

Another key piece of information gleaned by Kaspersky: some machines infected by Equation Group are the "patients zero" that were used to seed the Stuxnet worm so it would travel downstream and infect Iran's Natanz facility.

"It is quite possible that the Equation Group malware was used to deliver the Stuxnet payload," Kaspersky researchers wrote in their report.

Other key mistakes were variable names, developer account names, and similar artifacts left in various pieces of Equation Group malware. In the same way cat burglars wear gloves to conceal their fingerprints, attackers take great care to scrub such artifacts out of their code before releasing it. But in at least 13 cases, they failed. Possibly the most telling artifact is the string "-standalonegrok_2.1.1.1" that accompanies a highly advanced keylogger tied to Equation Group.

Another potentially damaging artifact found by Kaspersky is the Windows directory path of "c:\users\rmgree5" belonging to one of the developer accounts that compiled Equation Group malware. Assuming the rmgree5 wasn't a randomly generated account name, it may be possible to link it to a developer's real-world identity if the handle has been used for other accounts or if it corresponds to a developer's real-world name such as "Richard Gree" or "Robert Greenberg."

Kaspersky researchers still don't know what to make of the 11 remaining artifacts, but they hope fellow researchers can connect the strings to other known actors or incidents. The remaining artifacts are:

SKYHOOKCHOW
prkMtx - unique mutex used by the Equation Group's exploitation library (gPrivLibh)
"SF" - as in "SFInstall", "SFConfig"
"UR", "URInstall" - "Performing UR-specific post-install..."
"implant" - from "Timeout waiting for the "canInstallNow" event from the implant-specific EXE!"
STEALTHFIGHTER (VTT/82055898/STEALTHFIGHTER/2008-10-16/14:59:06.229-04:00
DRINKPARSLEY - (Manual/DRINKPARSLEY/2008-09-30/10:06:46.468-04:00)
STRAITACID - (VTT/82053737/STRAITACID/2008-09-03/10:44:56.361-04:00)
LUTEUSOBSTOS - (VTT/82051410/LUTEUSOBSTOS/2008-07-30/17:27:23.715-04:00)
STRAITSHOOTER - STRAITSHOOTER30.exe
DESERTWINTER - c:\desert~2\desert~3\objfre_w2K_x86\i386\DesertWinterDriver.pdb
Hacking without a budget

The money and time required to develop the Equation Group malware, the technological breakthroughs the operation accomplished, and the interdictions performed against targets leave little doubt that the operation was sponsored by a nation-state with nearly unlimited resources to dedicate to the project. The countries that were and weren't targeted, the ties to Stuxnet and Flame, and the Grok artifact found inside the Equation Group keylogger strongly support the theory the NSA or a related US agency is the responsible party, but so far Kaspersky has declined to name a culprit. NSA officials didn't respond to an e-mail seeking comment for this story.

Update: Reuters reporter Joseph Menn said the hard-drive firmware capability has been confirmed by two former government employees. He wrote:

A former NSA employee told Reuters that Kaspersky's analysis was correct, and that people still in the intelligence agency valued these spying programs as highly as Stuxnet. Another former intelligence operative confirmed that the NSA had developed the prized technique of concealing spyware in hard drives, but said he did not know which spy efforts relied on it.
What is safe to say is that the unearthing of the Equation Group is a seminal finding in the fields of computer and national security, as important, or possibly more so, than the revelations about Stuxnet.

"The discovery of the Equation Group is significant because this omnipotent cyber espionage entity managed to stay under the radar for almost 15 years, if not more," Raiu said. "Their incredible skills and high tech abilities, such as infecting hard drive firmware on a dozen different brands, are unique across all the actors we have seen and second to none. As we discover more and more advanced threat actors, we understand just how little we know. It also makes us reflect about how many other things remain hidden or unknown."
Mazars and Deutsche Bank could have ended this nightmare before it started.
They could still get him out of office.
But instead, they want mass death.
Don’t forget that.
User avatar
seemslikeadream
 
Posts: 32090
Joined: Wed Apr 27, 2005 11:28 pm
Location: into the black
Blog: View Blog (83)

PreviousNext

Return to General Discussion

Who is online

Users browsing this forum: Belligerent Savant and 50 guests