US spy network’s successes failures & objectives detailed

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US spy network’s successes failures & objectives detailed

Postby seemslikeadream » Thu Aug 29, 2013 1:33 pm

U.S. spy network’s successes, failures and objectives detailed in ‘black budget’ summary


By Barton Gellman and Greg Miller, Thursday, August 29, 12:02 PM E-mail the writers

U.S. spy agencies have built an intelligence-gathering colossus since the attacks of Sept. 11, 2001, but remain unable to provide critical information to the president on a range of national security threats, according to the government’s top secret budget.

The $52.6 billion “black budget” for fiscal 2013, obtained by The Washington Post from former intelligence contractor Edward Snowden, maps a bureaucratic and operational landscape that has never been subject to public scrutiny. Although the government has annually released its overall level of intelligence spending since 2007, it has not divulged how it uses those funds or how it performs against the goals set by the president and Congress.

Read the documents
Budget

Inside the intelligence 'black budget'

View select pages from the Office of the Director of National Intelligence's top-secret 2013 budget with key sections annotated by The Washington Post.

The 178-page budget summary for the National Intelligence Program details the successes, failures and objectives of the 16 spy agencies that make up the U.S. intelligence community, which has 107,035 employees.

The summary describes cutting-edge technologies, agent recruiting and ongoing operations. The Washington Post is withholding some information after consultation with U.S. officials who expressed concerns about the risk to intelligence sources and methods. Sensitive details are so pervasive in the documents that The Post is publishing only summary tables and charts online.

“The United States has made a considerable investment in the Intelligence Community since the terror attacks of 9/11, a time which includes wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, the Arab Spring, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction technology, and asymmetric threats in such areas as cyber-warfare,” Director of National Intelligence James R. Clapper Jr. said in response to inquiries from The Post.

“Our budgets are classified as they could provide insight for foreign intelligence services to discern our top national priorities, capabilities and sources and methods that allow us to obtain information to counter threats,” he said.

Among the notable revelations in the budget summary:

•Spending by the CIA has surged past that of every other spy agency, with $14.7 billion in requested funding for 2013. The figure vastly exceeds outside estimates and is nearly 50 percent above that of the National Security Agency, which conducts eavesdropping operations and has long been considered the behemoth of the community.

•The CIA and NSA have launched aggressive new efforts to hack into foreign computer networks to steal information or sabotage enemy systems, embracing what the budget refers to as “offensive cyber operations.”

•The NSA planned to investigate at least 4,000 possible insider threats in 2013, cases in which the agency suspected sensitive information may have been compromised by one of its own. The budget documents show that the U.S. intelligence community has sought to strengthen its ability to detect what it calls “anomalous behavior” by personnel with access to highly classified material.

•U.S. intelligence officials take an active interest in foes as well as friends. Pakistan is described in detail as an “intractable target,” and counterintelligence operations “are strategically focused against [the] priority targets of China, Russia, Iran, Cuba and Israel.”

•In words, deeds and dollars, intelligence agencies remain fixed on terrorism as the gravest threat to national security, which is listed first among five “mission objectives.” Counterterrorism programs employ one in four members of the intelligence workforce and account for one-third of all spending.

•The governments of Iran, China and Russia are difficult to penetrate, but North Korea’s may be the most opaque. There are five “critical” gaps in U.S. intelligence about Pyongyang’s nuclear and missile programs, and analysts know virtually nothing about the intentions of North Korean leader Kim Jong Un.

Inside the intelligence 'black budget'

View select pages from the Office of the Director of National Intelligence's top-secret 2013 budget with key sections annotated by The Washington Post.

Formally known as the Congressional Budget Justification for the National Intelligence Program, the “Top Secret” blueprint represents spending levels proposed to the House and Senate intelligence committees in February 2012. Congress may have made changes before the fiscal year began on Oct 1. Clapper is expected to release the actual total spending figure after the fiscal year ends on Sept. 30.

The document describes a constellation of spy agencies that track millions of individual surveillance targets and carry out operations that include hundreds of lethal strikes. They are organized around five priorities: combating terrorism, stopping the spread of nuclear and other unconventional weapons, warning U.S. leaders about critical events overseas, defending against foreign espionage and conducting cyber operations.

In an introduction to the summary, Clapper said the threats now facing the United States “virtually defy rank-ordering.” He warned of “hard choices” as the intelligence community — sometimes referred to as the “IC” — seeks to rein in spending after a decade of often double-digit budget increases.

This year’s budget proposal envisions that spending will remain roughly level through 2017 and amounts to a case against substantial cuts.

“Never before has the IC been called upon to master such complexity and so many issues in such a resource-constrained environment,” Clapper wrote.

An espionage empire

The summary provides a detailed look at how the U.S. intelligence community has been reconfigured by the massive infusion of resources that followed the Sept. 11 attacks. The United States has spent more than $500 billion on intelligence during that period, an outlay that U.S. officials say has succeeded in its main objective: preventing another catastrophic terrorist attack in the United States.

The result is an espionage empire with resources and reach beyond those of any adversary, sustained even now by spending that rivals or exceeds the levels reached at the height of the Cold War.

This year’s total budget request was 2.4 percent below that of fiscal 2012. In constant dollars, it was roughly twice the estimated size of the 2001 budget and 25 percent above that of 2006, five years into what was then known as the “global war on terror.”

Historical data on U.S. intelligence spending is largely nonexistent. Through extrapolation, experts have estimated that Cold War spending likely peaked in the late 1980s at an amount that would be the equivalent of $71 billion today.

Spending in the most recent cycle surpassed that amount based on the $52.6 billion detailed in documents obtained by The Post, plus a separate $23 billion devoted to intelligence programs that more directly support the U.S. military.

Lee Hamilton, an Indiana Democrat who was a former chairman of the House Intelligence Committee and co-chairman of the commission that investigated the Sept. 11 attacks, said that access to budget figures has the potential to enable an informed public debate on intelligence spending for the first time, much as Snowden’s disclosures of NSA surveillance programs brought attention to operations that had assembled data on nearly every U.S. citizen.

View select pages from the Office of the Director of National Intelligence's top-secret 2013 budget with key sections annotated by The Washington Post.

“Much of the work that the intelligence community does has a profound impact on the life of ordinary Americans, and they ought not to be excluded from the process,” he said.

“Nobody is arguing that we should be so transparent as to create dangers for the country,” he said. But, he said, “there is a mindset in the national security community — leave it to us, we can handle it, the American people have to trust us. They carry it to quite an extraordinary length so that they have resisted over a period of decades transparency. . . . The burden of persuasion as to keeping something secret should be on the intelligence community, the burden should not be on the American public.”

Experts said that access to such details on U.S. spy programs is without precedent.

“It was a titanic struggle just to get the top-line budget number disclosed, and that has only been done consistently since 2007,” said Steven Aftergood, an expert at the Federation of American Scientists, a Washington, D.C., organization that provides analyses of national security issues. “But a real grasp of the structure and operations of the intelligence bureaucracy has been totally beyond public reach. This kind of material, even on a historical basis, has simply not been available.”

The only meaningful frame of reference came in 1994, when a congressional subcommittee inadvertently published a partial breakdown of the National Intelligence Program. At the time, the CIA accounted for just $4.8 billion of a budget that totaled $43.4 billion in 2012 dollars. The NSA and the National Reconnaissance Office, which operates satellites and other sensors, commanded far larger shares of U.S. intelligence budgets until years after the end of the Cold War.

During the past decade, they have taken a back seat to the CIA.

NSA was in line to receive $10.5 billion in 2013, and the NRO was to get $10.3 billion — both far below the CIA, whose share had surged to 28 percent of the total budget.

Overall, the U.S. government spends 10 times as much on Department of Defense as it does on spy agencies.

“Today’s world is as fluid and unstable as it has been in the past half century,” Clapper said in his statement to The Post. “Even with stepped up spending on the IC over the past decade, the United States currently spends less than one percent of GDP on the Intelligence Community.”

Dominant position

The CIA’s dominant position will likely stun outside experts. It represents a remarkable recovery for an agency that seemed poised to lose power and prestige after acknowledging intelligence failures leading up to the Sept. 11, 2001, attacks and the 2003 U.S.-led invasion of Iraq.

View select pages from the Office of the Director of National Intelligence's top-secret 2013 budget with key sections annotated by The Washington Post.

The surge in resources for the agency funded secret prisons, a controversial interrogation program, the deployment of lethal drones and a huge expansion of its counterterrorism center. The agency was transformed from a spy service struggling to emerge from the Cold War into a paramilitary force.

The CIA has devoted billions of dollars to recruiting and training a new generation of case officers, with the workforce growing from about 17,000 a decade ago to 21,575 this year.

The agency’s budget allocates $2.3 billion for human intelligence operations, and another $2.5 billion to cover the cost of supporting the security, logistics and other needs of those missions around the world. A relatively small amount of that total, $68.6 million, was earmarked for creating and maintaining “cover,” the false identities employed by operatives overseas.

There is no specific entry for the CIA’s fleet of armed drones in the budget summary, but a broad line item hints at the dimensions of the agency’s expanded paramilitary role, providing more than $2.6 billion for “covert action programs” that would include drone operations in Pakistan and Yemen, payments to militias in Afghanistan and Africa, and attempts to sabotage Iran’s nuclear program.

The black budget illuminates for the first time the intelligence burden of the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. For 2013, U.S. spy agencies were projected to spend $4.9 billion on what are labeled “overseas contingency operations.” The CIA accounted for roughly half of that figure, a sum factored into its overall $14.7 billion budget.

Those war expenditures are projected to shrink as the U.S. withdraws forces from Afghanistan. The budget also indicates that the intelligence community has cut the number of contractors it hires over the past five years by roughly 30 percent.

Critical blind spots

Despite the vast outlays, the budget blueprint catalogs persistent and in some cases critical blind spots.

Throughout the document, U.S. spy agencies attempt to rate their efforts in tables akin to report cards, generally citing progress but often acknowledging that only a fraction of their questions could be answered — even on the community’s foremost priority, counter-terrorism.

In 2011, the budget assessment says intelligence agencies made at least “moderate progress” on 38 of their 50 top counterterrorism gaps, the term used to describe blind spots. Several concern Lebanon’s Hezbollah movement, an enemy of Israel that has not attacked U.S. interests directly since the 1990s.

Other blank spots include questions about the security of Pakistan’s nuclear components when they are being transported, the capabilities of China’s next generation fighter aircraft, and how Russia’s government leaders are likely to respond “to potentially destabilizing events in Moscow, such as large protests and terrorist attacks.”

A chart outlining efforts to address key questions on biological and chemical weapons is particularly bleak. U.S. agencies set themselves annual goals of making progress in at least five categories of intelligence collection related to these weapons. In 2011, the agencies made headway on just two gaps; a year earlier the mark was zero.

The documents describe expanded efforts to “collect on Russian chemical warfare countermeasures” and assess the security of biological and chemical laboratories in Pakistan.

View select pages from the Office of the Director of National Intelligence's top-secret 2013 budget with key sections annotated by The Washington Post.

A table of “critical” gaps listed five for North Korea, more than for any other country that has or is pursuing a nuclear bomb.

The intelligence community seems particularly daunted by the emergence of “home grown” terrorists who plan attacks in the United States without direct support or instruction from abroad, a threat realized this year, after the budget was submitted, in twin bombings at the Boston Marathon.

The National Counterterrorism Center has convened dozens of analysts from other agencies in attempts to identify “indicators” that could help law enforcement understand the path from religious extremism to violence. The FBI was in line for funding to increase the number of agents surreptitiously tracking activity on jihadist Web sites.

But a year before the bombings in Boston the search for meaningful insight into the stages of radicalization was described as one of “the more challenging intelligence gaps.”

High-tech surveillance

The documents make clear that U.S. spy agencies’ long-standing reliance on technology remains intact. If anything, their dependence on high-tech surveillance systems to fill gaps in human intelligence has only intensified.

A section on North Korea indicates that the United States has all but surrounded the nuclear-armed country with surveillance platforms. There are distant ground sensors to monitor seismic activity and platforms to scan the country for signs that might point to construction of new nuclear sites. U.S. agencies seek to capture photos, air samples and infrared imagery “around the clock.”

In Iran, new surveillance techniques and technologies have enabled analysts to identify suspected nuclear sites that had not been detected in satellite images, according to the document.

In Syria, NSA listening posts were able to monitor unencrypted communications among senior military officials at the outset of the civil war there, a vulnerability that President Bashar al-Assad’s forces apparently later recognized. One of the NRO’s functions is to extract data from sensors placed on the ground near suspected illicit weapons sites in Syria and other countries.

Across this catalog of technical prowess, one category is depicted as particularly indispensable: signals intelligence, or SIGINT.

The NSA’s ability to monitor e-mails, phone calls and Internet traffic has come under new scrutiny in recent months as a result of disclosures by Snowden, who worked as a contract computer specialist for the agency before stockpiling secret document and then fleeing, first to Hong Kong and then Moscow.

The NSA was projected to spend $48.6 million on research projects to assist “coping with information overload,” an occupational hazard as the volumes of intake have increased sharply from fiber optic cables and Silicon Valley Internet providers.

The agency’s ability to monitor the communications of al-Qaeda operatives is described in the documents as “often the best and only means to compromise seemingly intractable targets.”

Signals intercepts have also been used to direct the flight paths of drones, gather clues to the composition of North Korea’s leadership and evaluate the response plans of Russia’s government in the event of a terrorist attack in Moscow.

The resources devoted to signals stealing are staggering.

Nearly 35,000 employees are listed under a sweeping category called the Consolidated Cryptologic Program, which includes the NSA as well as the surveillance and code-breaking components of the Air Force, Army, Navy and Marines.

Even the CIA devotes $1.7 billion, or nearly 12 percent of its budget, to technical collection efforts including a program called “CLANSIG” that former officials said is the agency’s more targeted version of the massive data collection operations of the NSA.

The CIA is pursuing tracking systems “that minimize or eliminate the need for physical access and enable deep concealment operations against hard targets.”

The agency has deployed new biometric sensors to confirm the identities and locations of al-Qaeda operatives. The system has been used in the CIA’s drone campaign.

The NSA is also planning high-risk covert missions, a lesser-known part of its work, to plant what it calls “tailored radio frequency solutions” in hostile territory — close-in sensors to intercept communications that do not pass through global networks.

Spending on satellite systems and almost every other category of collection are projected to remain stagnant or shrink in coming years, as Washington grapples with budget cuts across the government. But the 2013 intelligence budget called for increased investment in SIGINT.

Counter-intelligence programs

The budget includes a lengthy section on funding for counter-intelligence programs designed to protect against the danger posed by foreign intelligence services as well as betrayals from within the U.S. spy ranks.

The document describes programs to “mitigate insider threats by trusted insiders who seek to exploit their authorized access to sensitive information to harm U.S. interests.”

The agencies had budgeted for a major counterintelligence initiative in fiscal 2012, but most of those resources were diverted to an all-hands, emergency response to successive floods of classified data released by the anti-secrecy group WikiLeaks.

For this year, the budget promised a renewed “focus . . . on safeguarding classified networks” and a strict “review of high-risk, high-gain applicants and contractors” — the young, nontraditional computer coders with the skills the NSA needed.

Among them was Snowden, then a 29-year-old contract computer specialist who had been trained by the NSA to circumvent computer network security. He was copying thousands of highly classified documents at an NSA facility in Hawaii, and preparing to leak them, as the agency embarked on a security sweep.

“NSA will initiate a minimum of 4,000 periodic reinvestigations of potential insider compromise of sensitive information,” according to the budget, scanning its systems for “anomalies and alerts.”

Julie Tate contributed to this report.
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Re: US spy network’s successes failures & objectives detaile

Postby Wombaticus Rex » Thu Aug 29, 2013 1:42 pm

•The CIA and NSA have launched aggressive new efforts to hack into foreign computer networks to steal information or sabotage enemy systems, embracing what the budget refers to as “offensive cyber operations.”

•The NSA planned to investigate at least 4,000 possible insider threats in 2013, cases in which the agency suspected sensitive information may have been compromised by one of its own. The budget documents show that the U.S. intelligence community has sought to strengthen its ability to detect what it calls “anomalous behavior” by personnel with access to highly classified material.

•U.S. intelligence officials take an active interest in foes as well as friends. Pakistan is described in detail as an “intractable target,” and counterintelligence operations “are strategically focused against [the] priority targets of China, Russia, Iran, Cuba and Israel.”

•In words, deeds and dollars, intelligence agencies remain fixed on terrorism as the gravest threat to national security, which is listed first among five “mission objectives.” Counterterrorism programs employ one in four members of the intelligence workforce and account for one-third of all spending.

•The governments of Iran, China and Russia are difficult to penetrate, but North Korea’s may be the most opaque. There are five “critical” gaps in U.S. intelligence about Pyongyang’s nuclear and missile programs, and analysts know virtually nothing about the intentions of North Korean leader Kim Jong Un.


The fact this is published at all is surreal. If you're just going to .pdf all your strategic & tactical thinking, what is the secrecy for?

Oh yeah! Covering up crimes against your own citizens.
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Re: US spy network’s successes failures & objectives detaile

Postby barracuda » Fri Aug 30, 2013 10:51 am

The CIA requested $14.7 billion for 2013.


I'm very skeptical of these figures. The annual operating costs for GOOG surpasses this amount.
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Re: US spy network’s successes failures & objectives detaile

Postby Wombaticus Rex » Fri Aug 30, 2013 10:58 am

Also bear in mind that .gov is not the CIA's sole source of funds.

In fact, this recent RI thread makes it pretty clear they're using some of Google's budget, too.
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Re: US spy network’s successes failures & objectives detaile

Postby seemslikeadream » Fri Aug 30, 2013 11:23 am

oh yeah ask Daniel

Up in Smoke? 24 Tons of Cocaine in “No Peek Burn Run”
Posted on August 20, 2013 by Daniel Hopsicker

Its called a "burn run."

When the government of Costa Rica asked for assistance in disposing of a huge stash of cocaine and other drugs they’d accumulated during the past two years worth of drug trafficking busts—in airports, in airplanes, and on the high seas—the US was only too willing to help.

According to a spokeswoman for the DEA in Miami, it went off without a hitch. At least that's what the DEA says. If anyone actually saw the drugs destroyed, they're not talking.


A 24-ton no peek burn run
From Dover AFB, the Air Force sent crew of 12 aboard a C-17 Globemaster called the “Spirit of Delaware,” a huge military cargo plane half-a-football field long and almost as wide, that despite its size can land on short (3500 ft) runways even if they’re unpaved or unimproved.

The C-17 picked up the cocaine at San Jose’s International Airport. Pallets of cocaine from the OIJ evidence warehouse were loaded in two vans. The transfer was overseen by 200 Costa Rican military and law enforcement officers in tactical vehicles.

“I can confirm that we did assist Cost Rica in destroying 24 tons of cocaine. It took place at an undisclosed location outside Miami,” a DEA spokeswoman stated. “You’re the first person to ask.”

24 tons of cocaine is worth as much as three-quarters of a billion dollars. Yet the spokeswoman was unfazed. Her tone was matter-of-fact. “We just took care of it,” she said.

Except, if anyone saw Costa Rica’s cocaine go up in smoke, they have yet to come forward.

So far, the explanations on offer are less than satisfactory.

Seldom-asked questions
It started with a question that hardly ever comes up. “How are we going to get rid of all this cocaine?”

But law enforcement officials in Costa Rica were asking it several months ago. Or, at least, “allegedly" asking it.

Because while no one is questioning that Costa Rica sent 24 tons of cocaine to the US to be incinerated, the operation has been received with what can be characterized as somewhere between skepticism and disbelief.

For one thing, the atmospherics are all wrong. Like the ritualized perp walk every notorious drug baron endures when caught, drug burnings are spectator events in Latin America, filled with ritual pomp. If he's there, El Presidente wears the sash of office. Generals in mirrored Raybans, decked out like beauty queens, medals shining like bling.

When Latin American drug agencies incinerate huge amounts of seized narcotics, which happens on a regular basis, there’s often a reviewing stand. Representatives from all the federal agencies involved in the bust stand around and smile. They watch each other. They eye the drugs. There’s a couple of speeches. There's the traditional group picture in front of the piled-up dope.

Only then do they fire up the torches, and set fire to the bonfire. Spectators discreetly move downwind.

But not this time.

24 tons of cocaine, representing two years worth of interdiction by Costa Rica’s Coast Guard Service, the Justice Dept (OIJ), the Border Police, the Fuerza Publica (national police force) will meet a peculiarly low-key fate.

When the C-17 arrives in Miami, a Costa Rican judge is on the plane. At least, he's rumored to have been on the plane. The judge and the Costa Rican Consul in Miami are supposed to be on hand to confirm the delivery and destruction of the cocaine.

No such advisory has been forthcoming.

The biggest question: “Why?”
Most Latin American nations get rid of seized drugs by piling it up in a field and lighting a match. So why not Costa Rica?

“It had to do with new regulations from the Costa Rican EPA,” said the DEA’s spokeswoman. Cocaine, she insisted, requires special incinerators that burn at 816 Celsius (1,500 Fahrenheit), with multiple chambers that filter out the hazardous fumes and leave nothing but carbon dioxide.

Pieced together from several Costa Rican newspapers, the story of how 24 tons of cocaine flew to Miami on a US Government plane goes like this:

Prior to the massive airlift of cocaine to Miami in late July, Costa Rica's Justice Dept (the OIJ) used to destroy seized drugs at a cement factory incinerator, until several unfortunate incidents resulted in the cancellation of the contract.

Bags holding 20 kilograms of pure cocaine began to go "missing."

Costa Rica went back to stockpiling their seized swag. Later, when employees began to complain they couldn’t walk around the drug warehouse because it was stuffed to the brim with cocaine, the cement factory agreed to donate a mini-incinerator, which burns up to 300 kilograms per hour of cocaine.

“By February of 2012 they’d burned so much coke that the incinerator began to malfunction. Fumes began escaping the incinerator’s chambers. Those involved—including judges supervising the destruction—began getting high.”

Math for Meth-heads
While DEA officials are understandably reluctant to look a 24-ton gift horse made of cocaine in the mouth, Costa Rica’s big donation raises a puzzling question: Why doesn't the math add up?

Where exactly did Costa Rica get the 24 tons of cocaine they're turning over to the gringos?

"The cocaine had been seized over the course of the last two years during anti-drug operations in the country,” reported Costa Rica’s online newspaper CRHoy.com.

Two years. Two years worth of seizures would be June 2011 through June 2013.

In 2012 Costa Rican drug seizures totaled 15.5 tons. In 2011 they seized 7.4 tons. This year, when the US Air Force came calling, they were at about 5 tons.

Take half of the 2011 total (3.5), all of 2012 (15.5 tons) and year to date through July in 2013(5 tons.)

That’s roughly 24 tons, about the same amount they turned over to the DEA.

Except… remember that mini-incinerator the cement factory gave them that broke, but not before successfully incinerating what newspapers said was up to 300 kilograms per hour, for an unspecified length of time?

If the mini-incinerator worked for just one day before it broke down, Costa Rican officials would have shaved 7 tons of cocaine off their total. The C-17 cargo flight to Miami would have had just 14 tons of cocaine aboard.

So—in addition to the cocaine seized by Costa Rica over two years—where did the additional 7 tons of cocaine the USAF flying to Miami come from?

50-yard line seats for the Army-Navy game?


After 24 tons of pure cocaine from Costa Rica fell into their laps, US officials were perhaps understandably smug. It was the first hopeful sign that the Mexican drug cartels’ vise-like grip on US cocaine supply may be easing. The 24-ton import allowed the DEA to cut Mexican cartels’ market share in the US by at least five percent.

To convey the thanks of a grateful nation, Costa Rican officials should expect at least some 50-yard line seats at next year’s Army-Navy game. Especially if the coke is as pure as has been rumored.

"Costa Rica is today the closest the U.S. has to a protectorate in Central America," said Sam Logan, director of Southern Pulse, a risk-analysis firm focused on Latin America.

Perhaps because of the publicity, Costa Rica’s Dept. of Investigations (OIJ in Spanish) announced they will “no longer send” cocaine or other controlled substances to the United States. The way they phrased it suggests the 24 ton shipment was more than a one-time event.

Of course, in the drug trade, one never knows. Apparently, that’s the point.

Irregularities surrounded the flight.
Although it was a big story all over Central America, the massive coke haul to Miami didn’t make the papers in the States. One reason it played big in Costa Rica involves a curious circumstance peculiar to that country.

Because Costa Rica has no military, their constitution requires legislative permission for any foreign military forces to enter the country. And, in fact, a Commander Bradley Ripkey from the US Coast Guard sent a letter to Costa Rican officials requesting permission for the Air Force plane to land.

A brief investigation discovered that Bradley Ripkey is, as advertised, a US Coast Guard Commander. So, there's that.

But the Costa Rica Star revealed that no official permission had been given to allow the U.S. military flight into Costa Rican airspace. Nor were legislators informed about the massive transfer of narcotics into American hands.

"We are investigating the government for what happened,” said the leader of one of Costa Rica’s leftist parties.

“There is no law regulating the export of drugs. It's a unique situation to put them onto a U.S. military plane.”

A unique situation? Not hardly. The legislator was being too kind.

A long history of unique situations
Surely he remembered the Contras. Surely he remembered Oliver North?

Surely he remembered CIA pilot Barry Seal flying weapons down to the Contras on old C-123 military cargo planes, and then flying back with a cargo hold filled with tightly-wrapped packages of cocaine.

Surely he remembered CIA official John Hull, who used a landing strip on his ranch in Costa Rica to send planes north filled with drugs?

None of them are allowed into the tiny nation-state of Costa Rica today. They've been permanently barred for drug trafficking.

It is comforting to know that DEA chief administrator Michelle Leonhart, who traipsed around Afghanistan a few years ago on the arm of American drug trafficker Oliver North, will someday face sanctions too, just maybe not in this life.
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Re: US spy network’s successes failures & objectives detaile

Postby barracuda » Fri Aug 30, 2013 12:02 pm

24 tons of cocaine is worth as much as three-quarters of a billion dollars.


Let's not go overboard. Maybe you could make $750 million selling whacked dime bags, but the wholesale value of this amount is less than a fifth of that, which is one good reason the US has an occupation force in Afghanistan rather than Costa Rica.
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Re: US spy network’s successes failures & objectives detaile

Postby Wombaticus Rex » Fri Aug 30, 2013 12:03 pm

The US has occupation forces in most of South America, though, let's not lose sight of that fact just because it's been normalized since the 1980's.
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Re: US spy network’s successes failures & objectives detaile

Postby barracuda » Fri Aug 30, 2013 12:11 pm

Sure, but it just seems as if the military presence is South America is more about the profitability of selling guns than flake.
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