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by American Dream » Tue Apr 15, 2014 11:07 am
by American Dream » Tue May 20, 2014 11:20 am
by Luther Blissett » Thu Jun 19, 2014 11:36 pm
by JackRiddler » Fri Jun 20, 2014 12:18 am
American Dream » Tue May 20, 2014 10:20 am wrote:http://libcom.org/news/99-problems-03112011
by American Dream » Fri Jun 20, 2014 12:46 am
by seemslikeadream » Fri Jun 20, 2014 1:30 am
by American Dream » Fri Jun 20, 2014 6:27 am
by JackRiddler » Fri Jun 20, 2014 10:20 am
by American Dream » Fri Jun 20, 2014 10:44 am
JackRiddler » Thu Jun 19, 2014 11:18 pm wrote:
Arg. Really?
Anti-Semitism! An exclusive focus on bankers as opposed to other capitalists! A failure to understand how capitalism really works as a system! The Nazi version of "socialism"! None of these, and none of all the other wrong ideas listed in this article, follow necessarily from the idea that there is a ruling class. This article confuses and obscures through an immense, disingenuous, and highly sanctimonious misrepresentation of the “1% vs. 99%” rhetoric. As one who was among the many anarchists trying to push this idea home with the majority of Americans already 30+ years ago, I am grateful that, thanks to Occupy, the message finally got through:
There is a ruling class. It comprises far fewer than 1% of the population. Its management is executed through what the great anarchist thinker C. Wright Mills identified as the power elite, the system's functional executives. They number no more than a few tens of thousands. The ruling class possesses group consciousness, agency and strategies. It maintains itself through clubs and traditions. It commands the majority of socioeconomic capital through holding companies, foundations and other ownership arrangments, and thus concentrates in its hands nearly all the policy and investment decisions that count. It holds the allegiance of about 15% of the population whose own relative wealth and prosperity derive from serving as its consultants, engineers, managers. Most of its members are aware that they are part of the ruling class; that their wealth derives through exploitation and outright war on the lower classes; and that those who deny this reality are its welcome patsies.
The proposition that there is a ruling class in no way contradicts that "the problems of environmental devastation, poverty, racism, militarization, patriarchy, education cuts, and austerity are serious ones" and need not at all entail "that we,” the 99% so so to speak, “are somehow pure or that we have no part in perpetuating these things among ourselves." On the contrary, "we" are constantly stuck in a process of scapegoating the weakest among us through ideologies and practices of racism, militarization and patriarchy, or by supporting “education cuts, and austerity.” To shift attention upwards is not to imply that all "misfortunes are thrust upon us from above." It is to understand that no matter how complicit we all are, power is concentrated and the system will not change without its de-concentration. If we have agency, and therefore responsibility, we cannot afford to be blind to the even more fateful agency of the 1%.
The ruling class have names and addresses and traceable bank accounts. At the peak, they are a few hundred billionaires who own and control more than 90% of the rest of us, and who benefit most from the exploitation that entails that some among the lower classes will starve or die or be set to kill each other. Maintenance of their power depends on its abuse. Toppling them and expropriating and socializing the disposable wealth that they have accumulated is not a panacea, it does not absolve us of our own role in this system, but it is absolutely essential to systemic change. This is not a call for their physical extermination, and it is especially not a call to misidentify the rich owning elements as anything other than the rich owning elements, as an ethnic or religious identity. There needs to be a steep confiscatory tax on the wealth of the 1%, and a socialization of the biggest corporations, banks, foundations and trusts.
A part of this wealth should be redistributed, but most of it – the land, the resources, the capital – needs to be reinvested in a different economy, with ecology and justice and a sustainable living for all replacing the abstractions of the “market” and the glorification of individual riches as the guiding values. Hard work and good ideas will still allow a minority of lucky people to accumulate vast fortunes, except “vast” will be redefined as ten or twenty times the average, as opposed to the present system that allows Godzillas like Gates and Kochs to arise in our midst, to destroy cities and be worshipped for it. Where there are billionaires, there will still be people who possess millions, and others who possess dirt, except the latter will not be starving and dying.
A toppling of the power elite and expropriation of the present 1% is a prerequisite (among many) for any scenario that might alter the outcome of the extinction event that the present economic system has initiated.
HOOSIER NATION (AMERICAN THIRD POSITION)
Matthew Parrott of Hoosier Nation, the Indianapolis branch of the White nationalist American Third Position party (now the American Freedom Party), attended at least one Occupy Indianapolis gathering.
Just before this, Parrott wrote an essay for Counter-Currents naming the 1% as a “a cosmopolitan cabal of Jews and their technocratic puppets.” Regarding Occupy, he said, “White Nationalists who carried the torch through our darkest decades would have died to have a shot at diving into this civil unrest. They would have loved to wade into leaderless mobs of desperate youths who are angry about international bankers and the Federal Reserve. The overwhelming majority of people showing up for these events are White.”41
A week later he went to Occupy Indianapolis and made a man-on-the-scene video, interviewing various participants. Even though he clearly identified himself as a White nationalist, the video was posted on an Occupy Indianapolis Facebook group (causing a disagreement with an anti-fascist group). He also photographed himself and a friend holding a sign saying, “End the Fed / Occupy K Street, too!” Parrott wrote about his positive reception: “Our experience was peaceful and positive, affirming my suspicion that the majority of the Occupy Indianapolis attendees were fed up with the same corporate and federal abuses the majority of the Tea Party protesters are fed up with.” 42 His colleague “Tristania” posted a comment on the White nationalist website Stormfront, saying that “it was a very good opportunity for outreach” and that “it’s about cherry picking people from those audiences and recruiting them to our side.”43
Parrot has since disbanded Hoosier Nation and, with Matthew Heimbach, founded the Traditional Youth Network—current darlings of the White nationalist scene.
The most prominent figure on the Far Right to endorse Occupy was David Duke, a former Republican state representative from Louisiana and an elder statesman of the U.S. White nationalist movement. In a video from October 2011, “Occupy Zionist Wall Street,” Duke denounced the “Zionist thieves at the Federal Reserve” and “the most powerful criminal bank in the world, the Zionist Goldman Sachs, run by that vulture-nosed bottom feeder, Lloyd Blankfein.” The video has received more than 100,000 views to date. Duke later wrote on the White supremacist web forum Stormfront that “OWS is an opportunity. … Grab this opportunity!”22
White nationalists also participated in some of the movement’s less high-profile iterations, such as Occupy Indianapolis (OI). Matt Parrott of Hoosier Nation—the local branch of the White nationalist American Third Position Party, now called the American Freedom Party—attended OI, and made a video interviewing participants. He wrote: “Our experience was peaceful and positive, affirming my suspicion that the majority of the Occupy Indianapolis attendees were fed up with the same corporate and federal abuses the majority of the Tea Party protesters are fed up with.”23 His colleague “Tristania” posted a comment on Stormfrontsaying that “it was a very good opportunity for outreach” and that “it’s about cherry picking people from those audiences and recruiting them to our side.”24
Parrott posted his video on the OI Facebook page, which the Hoosier Anti-Racist Movement (HARM) took issue with. Although the video was removed, HARM eventually split from OI, claiming that it had “become a safe place for conspiracy-theories, antisemitism, racism, anti-worker sentiment, pro-sweatshop propaganda, and religious intolerance.” Other OI activists contacted HARM to complain of racial harassment at the Occupation itself.25 (A representative from the OI Facebook page denied that the administrators were racists or antisemites, and said that because of splits in OI, the Facebook page had no connection to the physical occupation by the time of the racial incidents.)
by JackRiddler » Fri Jun 20, 2014 11:03 am
Engineering Empire: An Introduction to the Intellectuals and Institutions of American Imperialism
http://www.hamptoninstitution.org/engin ... zGO-4XigV5
Educating yourself about empire can be a challenging endeavor, especially since so much of the educational system is dedicated to avoiding the topic or justifying the actions of imperialism in the modern era. If one studies political science or economics, the subject might be discussed in a historical context, but rarely as a modern reality; media and government voices rarely speak on the subject, and even more rarely speak of it with direct and honest language. Instead, we exist in a society where institutions and individuals of power speak in coded language, using deceptive rhetoric with abstract meaning. We hear about 'democracy' and 'freedom' and 'security,' but so rarely about imperialism, domination, and exploitation.
The objective of this report is to provide an introduction to the institutional and social structure of American imperialism. The material is detailed, but should not be considered complete or even comprehensive; its purpose is to function as a resource or reference for those seeking to educate themselves about the modern imperial system. It's not an analysis of state policies or the effects of those policies, but rather, it is an examination of the institutions and individuals who advocate and implement imperial policies. What is revealed is a highly integrated and interconnected network of institutions and individuals - the foreign policy establishment - consisting of academics (so-called "experts" and "policy-oriented intellectuals") and prominent think tanks.
Think tanks bring together prominent academics, former top government officials, corporate executives, bankers, media representatives, foundation officials and other elites in an effort to establish consensus on issues of policy and strategy, to produce reports and recommendations for policy-makers, functioning as recruitment centers for those who are selected to key government positions where they have the ability to implement policies. Thus, think tanks function as the intellectual engines of empire: they establish consensus among elites, provide policy prescriptions, strategic recommendations, and the personnel required to implement imperial policies through government agencies.
Among the most prominent American and international think tanks are the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR), the Bilderberg meetings, the Trilateral Commission, the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), the Brookings Institution, the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, and the Atlantic Council. These institutions tend to rely upon funding from major foundations (such as Rockefeller, Ford, Carnegie, etc.) as well as corporations and financial institutions, and even various government agencies. There is an extensive crossover in leadership and membership between these institutions, and between them and their funders.
Roughly focusing on the period from the early 1970s until today, what emerges from this research is a highly integrated network of foreign policy elites, with individuals like Henry Kissinger, Zbigniew Brzezinski, Brent Scowcroft, and Joseph Nye figuring prominently in sitting at the center of the American imperial establishment over the course of decades, with powerful corporate and financial patrons such as the Rockefeller family existing in the background of American power structures.
Meet the Engineers of Empire
Within the U.S. government, the National Security Council (NSC) functions as the main planning group, devising strategy and policies for the operation of American power in the world. The NSC coordinates multiple other government agencies, bringing together the secretaries of the State and Defense Departments, the CIA, NSA, Joint Chiefs of Staff, and various other government bodies, with meetings directed by the National Security Adviser, who is generally one of the president's most trusted and influential advisers. In several administrations, the National Security Adviser became the most influential voice and policy-maker to do with foreign policy, such as during the Nixon administration (with Henry Kissinger) and the Carter administration (with Zbigniew Brzezinski).
While both of these individuals were top government officials in the 1970s, their influence has not declined in the decades since they held such positions. In fact, it could be argued that both of their influence (along with several other foreign policy elites) has increased with their time outside of government. In fact, in a January 2013 interview with The Hill, Brzezinski stated: "To be perfectly frank - and you may not believe me - I really wasn't at all conscious of the fact that the defeat of the Carter administration [in 1980] somehow or another affected significantly my own standing... I just kept doing my thing minus the Office of the National Security Adviser in the White House." [1]
David Rothkopf has written the official history of the National Security Council (NSC) in his book, Running the World: The Inside Story of the National Security Council and the Architects of American Power, published in 2005. Rothkopf writes from an insiders perspective, being a member of the Council on Foreign Relations, a visiting scholar at the Carnegie Endowment, he was Under Secretary of Commerce for International Trade Policy and Development in the Clinton administration, and is currently president and CEO of Garten Rothkopf, an international advisory firm, CEO of Foreign Policy magazine, previously CEO of Intellibridge Corporation, and was also a managing director at Kissinger Associates, an international advisory firm founded and run by Henry Kissinger. In his book on the NSC, Rothkopf noted that, "[e]very single national security advisor since Kissinger is, in fact, within two degrees of Kissinger," referring to the fact that they have all "worked with him as aides, on his staff, or directly with him in some capacity," or worked for someone in those categories (hence, within "two degrees").[2]
For example, General Brent Scowcroft, who was National Security Advisor (NSA) under Presidents Ford and George H.W. Bush, was Kissinger's Deputy National Security Advisor in the Nixon administration; Zbigniew Brzezinski, Carter's NSA, served on the faculty of Harvard with Kissinger, also served with Kissinger on the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board during the Reagan administration, both of them are also members (and were at times, board members) of the Council on Foreign Relations, as well as members of the Trilateral Commission, and they are both currently trustees of the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS). Other NSA's with connections to Kissinger include: Richard Allen, NSA under Reagan, who worked for Kissinger in the Nixon administration; William P. Clark, NSA under Reagan, who worked for Kissinger's former aide, Alexander Haig at the State Department; Robert McFarlane, also NSA under Reagan, worked with Kissinger in the Nixon administration; John Poindexter, also NSA for Reagan, was McFarlane's deputy; Frank Carlucci, also NSA in the Reagan administration, worked for Kissinger in the Nixon administration; Colin Powell, NSA for Reagan (and Secretary of State for George W. Bush), worked for Carlucci as his deputy; Anthony Lake, Clinton's NSA, worked directly for Kissinger; Samuel Berger, also NSA for Clinton, was Lake's deputy; Condoleezza Rice, NSA for George W. Bush, worked on Scowcroft's NSC staff; and Stephen Hadley also worked for Kissinger directly.[3]
The foreign policy establishment consists of the top officials of the key government agencies concerned with managing foreign policy (State Department, Pentagon, CIA, NSC), drawing upon officials from within the think tank community, where they become well acquainted with corporate and financial elites, and thus, become familiar with the interests of this group of people. Upon leaving high office, these officials often return to leadership positions within the think tank community, join corporate boards, and/or establish their own international advisory firms where they charge hefty fees to provide corporations and banks with strategic advice and use of their international political contacts (which they acquired through their time in office). Further, these individuals also regularly appear in the media to provide commentary on international affairs as 'independent experts' and are routinely recruited to serve as 'outside' advisors to presidents and other high-level officials.
No less significant in assessing influence within the foreign policy establishment is the relative proximity - and relationships - individuals have with deeply entrenched power structures, notably financial and corporate dynasties. Arguably, both Kissinger and Brzezinski are two of the most influential individuals within the foreign policy elite networks. Certainly of no detriment to their careers was the fact that both cultivated close working and personal relationships with what can be said to be America's most powerful dynasty, the Rockefeller family.
Dynastic Influence on Foreign Policy
At first glance, this may appear to be a rather obscure addition to this report, but dynastic power in modern state-capitalist societies is largely overlooked, misunderstood, or denied altogether, much like the concept of 'empire' itself. The lack of discourse on this subject - or the relegation of it to fringe 'conspiratorial' views - is not reason enough to ignore it. Far from assigning a conspiratorial or 'omnipotent' view of power to dynastic elements, it is important to place them within a social and institutional analysis, to understand the complexities and functions of dynastic influence within modern society.
Dynastic power relies upon a complex network of relationships and interactions between institutions, individuals, and ideologies. Through most of human history - in most places in the world - power was wielded by relatively few people, and often concentrated among dynastic family structures, whether ancient Egypt, imperial Rome, ancient China, the Ottoman Empire or the European monarchs spreading their empires across the globe. With the rise of state-capitalist society, dynastic power shifted from the overtly political to the financial and economic spheres. Today's main dynasties are born of corporate or banking power, maintained through family lines and extended through family ties to individuals, institutions, and policy-makers. The Rockefellers are arguably the most influential dynasty in the United States, but comparable to the Rothschilds in France and the UK, the Wallenbergs in Sweden, the Agnellis in Italy, or the Desmarais family in Canada. These families are themselves connected through institutions such as the Bilderberg Group and the Trilateral Commission, among others. The power of a corporate-financial dynasty is not a given: it must be maintained, nurtured, and strengthened, otherwise it will be overcome or made obsolete.
The Rockefeller family has existed at the center of American power for over a century. Originating with the late 19th century 'Robber Baron' industrialists, the Rockefellers established an oil empire, and subsequently a banking empire. John D. Rockefeller, who had a personal fortune surpassing $1 billion in the first decade of the 20th century, also founded the University of Chicago, and through the creation and activities of the Rockefeller Foundation (founded in 1913), helped engineer higher education and the social sciences. The Rockefeller family - largely acting through various family foundations - were also pivotal in the founding and funding of several prominent think tanks, notably the Council on Foreign Relations, the Asia Society, Trilateral Commission, the Group of Thirty, and the Bilderberg Group, among many others.
The patriarch of the Rockefeller family today is David Rockefeller, now in his late 90s. To understand the influence wielded by unelected bankers and billionaires like Rockefeller, it would be useful to simply examine the positions he has held throughout his life. From 1969 until 1980, he was the chairman and CEO of Chase Manhattan Bank and from 1981 to 1999 he was the chairman of the International Advisory Committee of Chase Manhattan, at which time it merged with another big bank to become JPMorgan Chase, of Rockefeller served as a member of the International Advisory Council from 2000 to 2005. David Rockefeller was a founding member of the Bilderberg Group in 1954, at which he remains on the Steering Committee; he is the former chairman of Rockefeller Group, Inc. (from 1981-1995), Rockefeller Center Properties (1996-2001), and the Rockefeller Brothers Fund, at which he remains as an advisory trustee. He is chairman emeritus and life trustee of the Museum of Modern Art, and the founder of the David Rockefeller Fund and the International Executive Service Corps.
David Rockefeller was also the chairman of the Council on Foreign Relations from 1970 to 1985, of which he remains to this day as honorary chairman; is chairman emeritus of the board of trustees of the University of Chicago; honorary chairman, life trustee and chairman emeritus of the Rockefeller University Council, and is the former president of the Harvard Board of Overseers. He was co-founder of the Global Philanthropists Circle, is honorary chairman of the Committee Encouraging Corporate Philanthropy (CECP), and is an honorary director of the Peterson Institute for International Economics. David Rockefeller was also the co-founder (with Zbigniew Brzezinski) of the Trilateral Commission in 1973, where he served as North American Chairman until 1991, and has since remained as honorary chairman. He is also the founder and honorary chairman of the Americas Society and the Council of the Americas.
It should not come as a surprise, then, that upon David Rockefeller's 90th birthday celebration (held at the Council on Foreign Relations) in 2005, then-president of the World Bank, James Wolfensohn delivered a speech in which he stated that, "the person who had perhaps the greatest influence on my life professionally in this country, and I'm very happy to say personally there afterwards, is David Rockefeller, who first met me at the Harvard Business School in 1957 or '58." He went on to explain that in the early 20th century United States, "as we looked at the world, a family, the Rockefeller family, decided that the issues were not just national for the United States, were not just related to the rich countries. And where, extraordinarily and amazingly, David's grandfather set up the Rockefeller Foundation, the purpose of which was to take a global view." Wolfensohn continued:
So the Rockefeller family, in this last 100 years, has contributed in a way that is quite extraordinary to the development in that period and has given ample focus to the issues of development with which I have been associated. In fact, it's fair to say that there has been no other single family influence greater than the Rockefeller's in the whole issue of globalization and in the whole issue of addressing the questions which, in some ways, are still before us today. And for that David, we're deeply grateful to you and for your own contribution in carrying these forward in the way that you did. [4]
Wolfensohn of course would be in a position to know something about the influence of the Rockefeller family. Serving as president of the World Bank from 1995 to 2005, he has since founded his own private firm, Wolfensohn & Company, LLC., was been a longtime member of the Steering Committee of the Bilderberg Group, an honorary trustee of the Brookings Institution, a trustee of the Rockefeller Foundation, and is a member of the Council on Foreign Relations. Wolfensohn's father, Hyman, was employed by James Armand de Rothschild of the Rothschild banking dynasty (after whom James was named), and taught the young Wolfensohn how to "cultivate mentors, friends and contacts of influence."[5] In his autobiography of 2002, Memoirs, David Rockefeller himself wrote:
For more than a century ideological extremists at either end of the political spectrum have seized upon well-publicized incidents such as my encounter with Castro to attack the Rockefeller family for the inordinate influence they claim we wield over American political and economic institutions. Some even believe we are part of a secret cabal working against the best interests of the United States, characterizing my family and me as 'internationalists' and of conspiring with others around the world to build a more integrated global political and economic structure--one world, if you will. If that's the charge, I stand guilty, and I am proud of it. [6]
In the United States, the Rockefeller family has maintained a network of influence through financial, corporate, educational, cultural, and political spheres. It serves as a logical extension of dynastic influence to cultivate relationships among the foreign policy elite of the U.S., notably the likes of Kissinger and Brzezinski.
Intellectuals, 'Experts,' and Imperialists Par Excellence: Kissinger and Brzezinski
Both Kissinger and Brzezinski served as professors at Harvard in the early 1950s, as well as both joining the Council on Foreign Relations around the same time, and both also attended meetings of the Bilderberg Group (two organizations which had Rockefellers in leadership positions). Kissinger was a director at the Rockefeller Brothers Fund from 1956 until 1958, and thereafter became an advisor to Nelson Rockefeller. Kissinger was even briefly brought into the Kennedy administration as an advisor to the State Department, while Brzezinski was an advisor to the Kennedy campaign, and was a member of President Johnson's Policy Planning Council in the State Department from 1966 to 1968. When Nixon became president in 1969, Kissinger became his National Security Advisor, and eventually also took over the role of Secretary of State.
In 1966, prior to entering the Nixon administration, Henry Kissinger wrote an article for the journal Daedalus in which he proclaimed the modern era as "the age of the expert," and went on to explain: "The expert has his constituency - those who have a vested interest in commonly held opinions; elaborating and defining its consensus at a high level has, after all, made him an expert." [7] In other words, the "expert" serves entrenched and established power structures and elites ("those who have a vested interest in commonly held opinions"), and the role of such an expert is to define and elaborate the "consensus" of elite interests. Thus, experts, as Henry Kissinger defines them, serve established elites.
In 1970, Brzezinski wrote a highly influential book, Between Two Ages: America's Role in the Technetronic Era, which attracted the interest of Chase Manhattan Chairman (and Chairman of the Council on Foreign Relations) David Rockefeller. The two men then worked together to create the Trilateral Commission, of which Kissinger became a member. Kissinger remained as National Security Advisor for President Ford, and when Jimmy Carter became President (after Brzezinski invited him into the Trilateral Commission), Brzezinski became his National Security Advisor, also bringing along dozens of other members of the Trilateral Commission into the administration's cabinet.
In a study published in the journal Polity in 1982, researchers described what amounted to modern Machiavellis who "whisper in the ears of princes," notably, prominent academic-turned policy-makers like Walt Rostow, Henry Kissinger, and Zbigniew Brzezinski. The researchers constructed a 'survey' in 1980 which was distributed to a sample of officials in the State Department, CIA, Department of Defense and the National Security Council (the four government agencies primarily tasked with managing foreign policy), designed to assess the views of those who implement foreign policy related to how they measure influence held by academics. They compared their results with a similar survey conducted in 1971, and found that in both surveys, academics such as George Kennan, Hans Morgenthau, Henry Kissinger, and Zbigniew Brzezinski were listed as among the members of the academic community who most influenced the thinking of those who took the survey. In the 1971 survey, George Kennan was listed as the most influential, followed by Hans Morgenthau, John K. Galbraith, Henry Kissinger, E.O. Reischauer and Zbigniew Brzezinski; in the 1980 survey, Henry Kissinger was listed as the most influential, followed by Hans Morgenthau, George Kennan, Zbigniew Brzezinski and Stanley Hoffmann. [8]
Of the fifteen most influential scholars in the 1980 survey, eleven received their highest degree from a major East Coast university, eight held a doctorate from Harvard, twelve were associated with major East Coast universities, while seven of them had previously taught at Harvard. More than half of the top fifteen scholars had previously held prominent government positions, eight were members of the Council on Foreign Relations, ten belonged to the American Academy of Arts and Sciences and eight belonged to the American Political Science Association. Influence tended to sway according to which of the four government agencies surveyed was being assessed, though for Kissinger, Morgenthau and Brzezinski, they "were equally influential with each of the agencies surveyed." The two most influential academic journals cited by survey responses were Foreign Affairs (run by the Council on Foreign Relations), read by more than two-thirds of those who replied to the survey, and Foreign Policy, which was read by more than half of respondents. [9]
In a 1975 report by the Trilateral Commission on The Crisis of Democracy, co-authored by Samuel Huntington, a close associate and friend of Zbigniew Brzezinski, the role of intellectuals came into question, noting that with the plethora of social movements and protests that had emerged from the 1960s onwards, intellectuals were asserting their "disgust with the corruption, materialism, and inefficiency of democracy and with the subservience of democratic government to 'monopoly capitalism'." Thus, noted the report: "the advanced industrial societies have spawned a stratum of value-oriented intellectuals who often devote themselves to the derogation of leadership, the challenging of authority, and the unmasking and delegitimation of established institutions, their behavior contrasting with that of the also increasing numbers of technocratic policy-oriented intellectuals."[10] In other words, intellectuals were increasingly failing to serve as "experts" (as Henry Kissinger defined it), and were increasingly challenging authority and institutionalized power structures instead of serving them, unlike "technocratic and policy-oriented intellectuals."
The influence of "experts" and "technocratic policy-oriented intellectuals" like Kissinger and Brzezinski was not to dissipate going into the 1980s. Kissinger then joined the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), taught at Georgetown University, and in 1982, founded his own consulting firm, Kissinger Associates, co-founded and run with General Brent Scowcroft, who was the National Security Advisor for President Ford, after being Kissinger's deputy in the Nixon administration. Scowcroft is also a member of the Council on Foreign Relations, the Trilateral Commission, CSIS, and The Atlantic Council of the United States, which also includes Kissinger and Brzezinski among its leadership boards. Scowcroft also founded his own international advisory firm, the Scowcroft Group, and also served as National Security Advisor to President George H.W. Bush.
Kissinger Associates, which included not only Henry Kissinger and Brent Scowcroft, but also Lawrence Eagleburger, Kissinger's former aide in the Nixon administration, and Undersecretary of State for Political Affairs in the Reagan administration, and briefly as Deputy Secretary of State in the George H.W. Bush administration. These three men, who led Kissinger Associates in the 1980s, made a great deal of money advising some of the world's leading corporations, including ITT, American Express, Coca-Cola, Volvo, Fiat, and Midland Bank, among others. Kissinger Associates charges corporate clients at least $200,000 for "offering geopolitical insight" and "advice," utilizing "their close relationships with foreign governments and their extensive knowledge of foreign affairs."[11]
While he was Chairman of Kissinger Associates, advising corporate clients, Henry Kissinger was also appointed to chair the National Bipartisan Commission on Central America by President Reagan from 1983 to 1985, commonly known as the Kissinger Commission, which provided the strategic framework for Reagan's terror war on Central America. As Kissinger himself noted in 1983, "If we cannot manage Central America... it will be impossible to convince threatened nations in the Persian Gulf and in other places that we know how to manage the global equilibrium." [12] In other words, if the United States could not control a small region south of its border, how can it be expected to run the world?
Between 1984 and 1990, Henry Kissinger was also appointed to Reagan's (and subsequently Bush Sr.'s) Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board, an organization that provides "advice" to the President on intelligence issues, which Brzezinski joined between 1987 and 1989. Brzezinski also served as a member of Reagan's Chemical Warfare Commission, and from 1987 to 1988, worked with Reagan's U.S. National Security Council-Defense Department Commission on Integrated Long-Term Strategy, alongside Henry Kissinger. The Commission's report, Discriminate Deterrence, issued in 1988, noted that the United States would have to establish new capabilities to deal with threats, particularly in the 'Third World,' noting that while conflicts in the 'Third World' "are obviously less threatening than any Soviet-American war would be," they still "have had and will have an adverse cumulative effect on U.S. access to critical regions," and if these effects cannot be managed, "it will gradually undermine America's ability to defend its interest in the most vital regions, such as the Persian Gulf, the Mediterranean and the Western Pacific."[13]
Over the following decade, the report noted, "the United States will need to be better prepared to deal with conflicts in the Third World" which would "require new kinds of planning." If the United States could not effectively counter the threats to U.S. interests and allies, notably, "if the warfare is of low intensity and protracted, and if they use guerrilla forces, paramilitary terrorist organizations, or armed subversives," or, in other words, revolutionary movements, then "we will surely lose the support of many Third World countries that want to believe the United States can protect its friends, not to mention its own interests." Most 'Third World' conflicts are termed "low intensity conflict," referring to "insurgencies, organized terrorism, [and] paramilitary crime," and therefore the United States would need to take these conflicts more seriously, noting that within such circumstances, "the enemy" is essentially "omnipresent," meaning that the enemy is the population itself, "and unlikely ever to surrender."[14]
From Cold War to New World Order: 'Containment' to 'Enlargement'
At the end of the Cold War, the American imperial community of intellectuals and think tanks engaged in a process that continues to the present day in attempting to outline a geostrategic vision for America's domination of the world. The Cold War had previously provided the cover for the American extension of hegemony around the world, under the premise of 'containing' the Soviet Union and the spread of 'Communism.' With the end of the Cold War came the end of the 'containment' policy of foreign policy. It was the task of 'experts' and 'policy-oriented intellectuals' to assess the present circumstances of American power in the world and to construct new strategic concepts for the extension and preservation of that power.
In 1990, George H.W. Bush's administration released the National Security Strategy of the United States in which the Cold War was officially acknowledged as little more than a rhetorical deception. The document referenced U.S. interventions in the Middle East, which were for decades justified on the basis of 'containing' the perceived threat of 'communism' and the Soviet Union. The report noted that, "even as East-West tensions diminish, American strategic concerns remain." Threats to America's "interests" in the region, such as "the security of Israel and moderate Arab states" - otherwise known as ruthless dictatorships - "as well as the free flow of oil - come from a variety of sources." Citing previous military interventions in the region, the report stated that they "were in response to threats to U.S. interests that could not be laid at the Kremlin's door." In other words, all the rhetoric of protecting the world from communism and the Soviet Union was little more than deception. As the National Security Strategy noted: "The necessity to defend our interests will continue." [15]
When Bush became president in 1989, he ordered his national security team - headed by Brent Scowcroft - to review national security policy. Bush and Scowcroft had long discussed - even before the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait - the notion that the U.S. will have to make its priority dealing with "Third World bullies" (a euphemism referring to U.S. puppet dictators who stop following orders). At the end of the Cold War, George Bush declared a 'new world order,' a term which was suggested to Bush by Brent Scowcroft during a discussion "about future foreign-policy crises." [16]
Separate from the official National Security Strategy, the internal assessment of national security policy commissioned by Bush was partly leaked to and reported in the media in 1991. As the Los Angeles Times commented, the review dispensed with "sentimental nonsense about democracy." [17] The New York Times quoted the review: "In cases where the U.S. confronts much weaker enemies, our challenge will be not simply to defeat them, but to defeat them decisively and rapidly... For small countries hostile to us, bleeding our forces in protracted or indecisive conflict or embarrassing us by inflicting damage on some conspicuous element of our forces may be victory enough, and could undercut political support for U.S. efforts against them." [18] In other words, the capacity to justify and undertake large-scale wars and ground invasions had deteriorated substantially, so it would be necessary to "decisively and rapidly" destroy "much weaker enemies."
Zbigniew Brzezinski was quite blunt in his assessment of the Cold War - of which he was a major strategic icon - when he wrote in a 1992 article for Foreign Affairs, the journal of the Council on Foreign Relations, that the U.S. strategic discourse of the Cold War as a battle between Communist totalitarianism and Western democracy was little more than rhetoric. In Brzezinski's own words: "The policy of liberation was a strategic sham, designed to a significant degree for domestic political reasons... the policy was basically rhetorical, at most tactical." [19] In other words, it was all a lie, carefully constructed to deceive the American population into accepting the actions of a powerful state in its attempts to dominate the world.
In 1992, the New York Times leaked a classified document compiled by top Pentagon officials (including Paul Wolfowitz and Dick Cheney) devising a strategy for America in the post-Cold War world. As the Times summarized, the Defense Policy Guidance document "asserts that America's political and military mission in the post-cold-war era will be to ensure that no rival superpower is allowed to emerge in Western Europe, Asia or the territories of the former Soviet Union." The document "makes the case for a world dominated by one superpower whose position can be perpetuated by constructive behavior and sufficient military might to deter any nation or group of nations from challenging American primacy." [20]
In the Clinton administration, prominent "policy-oriented intellectuals" filled key foreign policy positions, notably Madeleine Albright, first as ambassador to the UN and then as Secretary of State, and Anthony Lake as National Security Advisor. Anthony Lake was a staffer in Kissinger's National Security Council during the Nixon administration (though he resigned in protest following the 'secret' bombing of Cambodia). Lake was subsequently recruited into the Trilateral Commission, and was then appointed as policy planning director in Jimmy Carter's State Department under Secretary of State (and Trilateral Commission/Council on Foreign Relations member) Cyrus Vance. Richard Holbrooke and Warren Christopher were also brought into the Trilateral Commission, then to the Carter administration, and resurfaced in the Clinton administration. Holbrooke and Lake had even been college roommates for a time. Madeleine Albright had studied at Columbia University under Zbigniew Brzezinski, who was her dissertation advisor. When Brzezinski became National Security Adviser in the Carter administration, he brought in Albright as a special assistant. [21]
Anthony Lake was responsible for outlining the 'Clinton Doctrine,' which he elucidated in a 1993 speech at Johns Hopkins University, where he stated: "The successor to a doctrine of containment must be a strategy of enlargement - enlargement of the world's free community of market democracies." This strategy "must combine our broad goals of fostering democracy and markets with our more traditional geostrategic interests," noting that, "[o]ther American interests at times will require us to befriend and even defend non-democratic states for mutually beneficial reasons." [22] In other words, nothing has changed, save the rhetoric: the interest of American power is in "enlarging" America's economic and political domination of the world.
In 1997, Brzezinski published a book outlining his strategic vision for America's role in the world, entitled The Grand Chessboard. He wrote that "the chief geopolitical prize" for America was 'Eurasia,' referring to the connected landmass of Asia and Europe: "how America 'manages' Eurasia is critical. Eurasia is the globe's largest continent and is geopolitically axial. A power that dominates Eurasia would control two of the world's three most advanced and economically productive regions. A mere glance at the map also suggests that control over Eurasia would almost automatically entail African subordination."[23] The "twin interests" of the United States, wrote Brzezinski, were, "in the short-term preservation of its unique global power and in the long-run transformation of it into increasingly institutionalized global cooperation." Brzezinski then wrote:
To put it in a terminology that hearkens back to the more brutal age of ancient empires, the three grand imperatives of imperial geostrategy are to prevent collusion and maintain security dependence among the vassals, to keep tributaries pliant and protected, and to keep the barbarians from coming together.[24]
The officials from the George H.W. Bush administration who drafted the 1992 Defense Policy Guidance report spent the Clinton years in neoconservative think tanks, such as the Project for the New American Century (PNAC). Essentially using the 1992 document as a blueprint, the PNAC published a report in 2000 entitled Rebuilding America's Defenses: Strategy, Forces, and Resources for a New Century. In contrast to previous observations from strategists like Brzezinski and Scowcroft, the neocons were not opposed to implementing large-scale wars, declaring that, "the United States must retain sufficient forces able to rapidly deploy and win multiple simultaneous large-scale wars." The report stated that there was a "need to retain sufficient combat forces to fight and win, multiple, nearly simultaneous major theatre wars" and that "the Pentagon needs to begin to calculate the force necessary to protect, independently, US interests in Europe, East Asia and the Gulf at all times."[25]
Drafted by many of the neocons who would later lead the United States into the Iraq war (including Paul Wolfowitz), the report recommended that the United States establish a strong military presence in the Middle East: "the United States has for decades sought to play a more permanent role in Gulf regional security. While the unresolved conflict with Iraq provides the immediate justification, the need for a substantial American force presence in the Gulf transcends the issue of the regime of Saddam Hussein."[26]
When the Bush administration came to power in 2001, it brought in a host of neoconservatives to key foreign policy positions, including Paul Wolfowitz, Donald Rumsfeld and Dick Cheney. As one study noted, "among the 24 Bush appointees who have been most closely identified as neocons or as close to them, there are 27 links with conservative think tanks, 19 with their liberal counterparts and 20 with 'neocon' think tanks," as well as 11 connections with the Council on Foreign Relations.[27]
The 2002 U.S. National Security Strategy announced by the Bush administration, thereafter referred to as the "Bush doctrine," which included the usual rhetoric about democracy and freedom, and then established the principle of "preemptive war" and unilateral intervention for America's War of Terror, noting: "the United States will, if necessary, act preemptively. The United States will not use force in all cases to preempt emerging threats, nor should nations use preemption as a pretext for aggression. Yet in an age where the enemies of civilization openly and actively seek the world's most destructive technologies, the United States cannot remain idle while dangers gather."[28] The doctrine announced that the U.S. "will constantly strive to enlist the support of the international community, [but] we will not hesitate to act alone, if necessary, to exercise our right of self-defense by acting preemptively against terrorists."[29]
A fusion of neoconservative and traditional liberal internationalist "policy-oriented intellectuals" was facilitated in 2006 with the release of a report by the Princeton Project on National Security (PPNS), Forging a World of Liberty Under Law: U.S. National Security in the 21st Century, co-directed by G. John Ikenberry and Anne-Marie Slaughter. Ikenberry was a professor at Princeton and the Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs. He had previously served in the State Department Policy Planning staff in the administration of George H.W. Bush, was a senior associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, a senior fellow at the Brookings Institution, and a member of the Council on Foreign Relations. Anne-Marie Slaughter was Dean of the Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs, has served on the board of the Council on Foreign Relations, the New America Foundation, the National Endowment for Democracy, New American Security, the Truman Project, and the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), and has also served on the boards of McDonald's and Citigroup, as well as often being a State Department adviser.
While the Bush administration and the neoconservatives within it had articulated a single vision of a 'global war on terror,' the objective of the Princeton Project's report was to encourage the strategic acknowledgement of multiple, conflicting and complex threats to American power. Essentially, it was a project formed by prominent intellectual elites in reaction to the myopic and dangerous vision and actions projected by the Bush administration; a way to re-align strategic objectives based upon a more coherent analysis and articulation of the interests of power. One of its main critiques was against the notion of "unilateralism" advocated in the Bush Doctrine and enacted with the Iraq War. The aim of the report, in its own words, was to "set forth agreed premises or foundational principles to guide the development of specific national security strategies by successive administrations in coming decades."[30]
The Honourary Co-Chairs of the Project report were Anthony Lake, Clinton's former National Security Adviser, and George P. Shultz, former U.S. Secretary of Labor and Secretary of the Treasury in the Nixon administration, U.S. Secretary of State in the Reagan administration, president of Bechtel Corporation, and was on the International Advisory Council of JP Morgan Chase, a director of the Peterson Institute for International Economics, a member of the Hoover Institution, the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, and was on the boards of a number of corporations.
Among the co-sponsors of the project (apart from Princeton) were: the Brookings Institution, the Council on Foreign Relations, the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, the Centre for International Governance Innovation, Oxford, Stanford, the German Marshall Fund, and the Hoover Institution, among others. Most financing for the Project came from the Woodrow Wilson School/Princeton, the Ford Foundation, and David M. Rubenstein, one of the world's richest billionaires, co-founder of the global private equity firm the Carlyle Group, on the boards of Duke University, the Brookings Institution, the Council on Foreign Relations, President of the Economic Club of Washington, and the International Business Council of the World Economic Forum. [31]
Among the "experts" who participated in the Project were: Henry Kissinger, Zbigniew Brzezinski, Eliot Cohen, Francis Fukuyama, Leslie Gelb, Richard Haas, Robert Kagan, Jessica Tuchman Matthews, Joseph S. Nye, James Steinberg, and Strobe Talbott, among many others. Among the participating institutions were: Princeton, Harvard, Yale, CSIS, the Brookings Institution, Council on Foreign Relations, Carnegie Endowment, Federal Reserve Bank of New York, World Bank, the State Department, National Security Council, Citigroup, Ford Foundation, German Marshall Fund, Kissinger Associates, the Scowcroft Group, Cato Institute, Morgan Stanley, Carlyle Group. Among the participants in the Project were no less than 18 members of the Council on Foreign Relations, 10 members of the Brookings Institution, 6 members of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, and several representatives from foreign governments, including Canada, Australia, and Japan.[32]
The Road to "Hope" and "Change"
After leaving the Clinton administration, Madeleine Albright founded her own consulting firm in 2001, The Albright Group, since re-named the Albright Stonebridge Group, co-chaired by Albright and Clinton's second National Security Adviser Samuel Berger, advising multinational corporations around the world. Albright is also chair of Albright Capital Management LLC, an investment firm which focuses on 'emerging markets.' Albright is also on the board of directors of the Council on Foreign Relations, is a professor at Georgetown University School of Foreign Service, chairs the National Democratic Institute for International Affairs, the Pew Global Attitudes Project, and is president of the Truman Scholarship Foundation. She is also on the board of trustees of the Aspen Institute, a member of the Atlantic Council, and in 2009 was recruited by NATO Secretary-General Anders Fogh Rasmussen to chair the 'group of experts' tasked with drafting NATO's New Strategic Concept for the world.
Kissinger, Scowcroft, and Albright are not the only prominent "former" statespersons to have established consulting firms for large multinational conglomerates, as the far less known Brzezinski Group is also a relevant player, "a consulting firm that provides strategic insight and advice to commercial and government clients," headed by Zbig's son, Ian Brzezinski. Ian is a Senior Fellow at the Atlantic Council and also sits on its Strategic Advisors Group, having previously served as a principal at Booz Allen Hamilton, a major global consulting firm. Prior to that, Ian Brzezinski was Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Europe and NATO Policy in the Bush administration, from 2001 to 2005, and had previously served for many years on Capitol Hill as a senior staff member in the Senate. Zbigniew Brzezinski's other son, Mark Brzezinski, is currently the U.S. Ambassador to Sweden, having previously been a corporate and securities associate at Hogan & Hartson LLP, after which he served in Bill Clinton's National Security Council from 1999 to 2001. Mark Brzezinski was also an advisor to Barack Obama during his first presidential campaign starting in 2007. Among other notable advisors to Obama during his presidential campaign were Susan Rice, a former Clinton administration State Department official (and protégé to Madeleine Albright), as well as Clinton's former National Security Advisor Anthony Lake. [33]
No less significant was the fact that Zbigniew Brzezinski himself was tapped as a foreign policy advisor to Obama during the presidential campaign. In August of 2007, Brzezinski publically endorsed Obama for president, stating that Obama "recognizes that the challenge is a new face, a new sense of direction, a new definition of America's role in the world." He added: "Obama is clearly more effective and has the upper hand. He has a sense of what is historically relevant and what is needed from the United States in relationship to the world."[34] Brzezinski was quickly tapped as a top foreign policy advisor to Obama, who delivered a speech on Iraq in which he referred to Brzezinski as "one of our most outstanding thinkers."[35] According to an Obama campaign spokesperson, Brzezinski was primarily brought on to advise Obama on matters related to Iraq. [36]
Thus, it would appear that Brzezinski may not have been exaggerating too much when he told the Congressional publication, The Hill, in January of 2013 that, "I really wasn't at all conscious of the fact that the defeat of the Carter administration somehow or another affected significantly my own standing... I just kept doing my thing minus the Office of the National Security Adviser in the White House." While Brzezinski had advised subsequent presidents Reagan and Bush Sr., and had close ties with key officials in the Clinton administration (notably his former student and NSC aide Madeleine Albright), he was "shut out of the George W. Bush White House" when it was dominated by the neoconservatives, whom he was heavily critical of, most especially in response to the Iraq War. [37]
In the first four years of the Obama administration, Brzezinski was much sought out for advice from Democrats and Republicans alike. On this, he stated: "It's more a case of being asked than pounding on the doors... But if I have something to say, I know enough people that I can get in touch with to put [my thoughts] into circulation." When Afghan President Hamid Karzai visited Washington, D.C. in early 2013, Brzezinski was invited to a special dinner hosted by the Afghan puppet leader, of which he noted: "I have a standard joke that I am on the No. 2 or No. 3 must-visit list in this city... That is to say, if a foreign minister or an ambassador or some other senior dignitary doesn't get to see the President, the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, the National Security Adviser, then I'm somewhere on that other list as a fallback."[38]
Today, Zbigniew Brzezinski is no small player on the global scene. Not only is he an occasional and unofficial adviser to politicians, but he remains in some of the main centers of strategic planning and power in the United States. Brzezinski's background is fairly well established, not least of all due to his role as National Security Adviser and his part in the creation of the Trilateral Commission with David Rockefeller in 1973. Brzezinski was also (and remains) a member of the Council on Foreign Relations, and was a director of the CFR from 1972 to 1977. Today, he is a member of the CFR with his son Mark Brzezinski and his daughter Mika Brzezinski, a media personality on CNBC. Brzezinski is a Counselor and Trustee of the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), and he is also co-Chair (with Carla A. Hills) of the Advisory Board of CSIS, composed of international and US business leaders and current and former government officials, including: Paul Desmarais Jr. (Power Corporation of Canada), Kenneth Duberstein (Duberstein Group), Dianne Feinstein (U.S. Senator), Timothy Keating (Boeing), Senator John McCain, Senator John D. Rockefeller IV, and top officials from Chevron, Procter & Gamble, Raytheon, Lockheed Martin, Exxon Mobil, Toyota, and United Technologies.[39]
And now we make our way to the Obama administration, the promised era of "hope" and "change;" or something like that. Under Obama, the two National Security Advisors thus far have been General James L. Jones and Tom Donilon. General Jones, who was Obama's NSA from 2009 to 2010, previously and is now once again a trustee with the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS). Just prior to becoming National Security Advisor, Jones was president and CEO of the U.S. Chamber of Commerce's Institute for 21st Century Energy, after a career rising to 32nd commandant of the Marine Corps and commander of U.S. European Command. He was also on the boards of directors of Chevron and Boeing, resigning one month prior to taking up his post in the Obama administration.
Shortly after Jones first became National Security Advisor, he was speaking at a conference in February of 2009 at which he stated (with tongue-in-cheek), "As the most recent National Security Advisor of the United States, I take my daily orders from Dr. Kissinger, filtered down through General Brent Scowcroft and Sandy Berger... We have a chain of command in the National Security Council that exists today."[40] Although said in jest, there is a certain truth to this notion. Yet, Jones only served in the Obama administration from January 2009 to October of 2010, after which he returned to more familiar pastures.
Apart from returning as a trustee to CSIS, Jones is currently the chairman of the Brent Scowcroft Center on International Security and is on the board and executive committee of the Atlantic Council (he was previously chairman of the board of directors from 2007 to 2009). Jones is also on the board of the East-West Institute, and in 2011 served on the board of directors of the military contractor, General Dynamics. General Jones is also the president of his own international consulting firm, Jones Group International. The Group's website boasts "a unique and unrivaled experience with numerous foreign governments, advanced international relationships, and an understanding of the national security process to develop strategic plans to help clients succeed in challenging environments." A testimonial of Jones' skill was provided by Thomas Donohue, the president and CEO of the U.S. Chamber of Commerce: "Few leaders possess the wisdom, depth of experience, and knowledge of global and domestic economic and military affairs as General Jones."[41]
Obama's current NSA, Thomas E. Donilon, was previously deputy to General James Jones, and worked as former Assistant Secretary of State and chief of staff to Secretary of State Warren Christopher in Clinton's administration. From 1999 to 2005, he was a lobbyist exclusively for the housing mortgage company Fannie Mae (which helped create and pop the housing bubble and destroy the economy). Donilon's brother, Michael C. Donilon, is a counselor to Vice President Joseph Biden. Donilon's wife, Cathy Russell, is chief of staff to Biden's wife, Jill Biden. [42] Prior to joining the Obama administration, Thomas Donilon also served as a legal advisor to banks like Goldman Sachs and Citigroup. [43]
CSIS: The 'Brain' of the Obama Administration
While serving as national security advisor, Thomas Donilon spoke at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in November of 2012. He began his speech by stating that for roughly half a century, CSIS has been "the intellectual capital that has informed so many of our national security policies, including during the Obama administration... We've shared ideas and we've shared staff."[44]
Indeed, CSIS has been an exceptionally influential presence within the Obama administration. CSIS launched a Commission on 'Smart Power' in 2006, co-chaired by Joseph S. Nye, Jr. and Richard Armitage, with the final report delivered in 2008, designed to influence the next president of the United States on implementing "a smart power strategy." Joseph Nye is known for - among other things - developing the concept of what he calls "soft power" to describe gaining support through "attraction" rather than force. In the lead-up to the 2008 presidential elections, Nye stated that if Obama became president, it "would do more for America's soft power around the world than anything else we could do."[45]
Joseph Nye is the former Dean of the Kennedy School, former senior official in the Defense and State Departments, former Chair of the National Intelligence Council, and a highly influential political scientist who was rated in a 2008 poll of international relations scholars as "the most influential scholar in the field on American foreign policy," and was also named as one of the top 100 global thinkers in a 2011 Foreign Policy report. Nye is also Chairman of the North American Group of the Trilateral Commission, is on the board of directors of the Council on Foreign Relations, a member of the board of trustees of the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), and a former director of the Institute for East-West Security Studies, the International Institute of Strategic Studies, and a former member of the advisory committee of the Institute of International Economics.
Richard Armitage, the other co-chair of the CSIS Commission on Smart Power, is the President of Armitage International, a global consulting firm, and was Deputy Secretary of State from 2001-2005 in the George W. Bush administration, Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs in the Reagan administration, and is on the boards of ConocoPhillips, a major oil company, as well as ManTech International and Transcu Group, and of course, a trustee at CSIS.
In the Commission's final report, A Smarter, More Secure America, the term 'smart power' was defined as "complementing U.S. military and economic might with greater investments in soft power," recommending that the United States "reinvigorate the alliances, partnerships, and institutions that serve our interests," as well as increasing the role of "development in U.S. foreign policy" which would allow the United States to "align its own interests with the aspirations of people around the world." Another major area of concern was that of "[b]ringing foreign populations to our side," which depended upon "building long-term, people-to-people relationships, particularly among youth." Further, the report noted that "the benefits of free trade must be expanded" and that it was America's responsibility to "establish global consensus and develop innovative solutions" for issues such as energy security and climate change. [46]
The forward to the report was authored by CSIS president and CEO, John Hamre, who wrote: "We have all seen the poll numbers and know that much of the world today is not happy with American leadership," with even "traditional allies" beginning to question "American values and interests, wondering whether they are compatible with their own." Hamre spoke for the American imperial establishment: "We do not have to be loved, but we will never be able to accomplish our goals and keep Americans safe without mutual respect." What was needed, then, was to utilize their "moment of opportunity" in order "to strike off on a big idea that balances a wiser internationalism with the desire for protection at home." In world affairs, the center of gravity, wrote Hamre, "is shifting to Asia." Thus, "[a]s the only global superpower, we must manage multiple crises simultaneously while regional competitors can focus their attention and efforts." What is required is to strengthen "capable states, alliances, partnerships, and institutions." Military might, noted Hamre, while "typically the bedrock of a nation's power," remains "an inadequate basis for sustaining American power over time."[47]
In their summary of the report, Nye and Armitage wrote that the ultimate "goal of U.S. foreign policy should be to prolong and preserve American preeminence as an agent for good." The goal, of course, was to 'prolong and preserve American preeminence,' whereas the notion of being 'an agent for good' was little more than a rhetorical add-on, since for policy-oriented intellectuals like those at CSIS, American preeminence is inherently a 'good' thing, and therefore preserving American hegemony is - it is presumed - by definition, being 'an agent for good.' Nye and Armitage suggested that the U.S. "should have higher ambitions than being popular," though acknowledging, "foreign opinion matters to U.S. decision-making," so long as it aligns with U.S. decisions, presumably. A "good reputation," they suggested, "brings acceptance for unpopular ventures." This was not to mark a turn away from using military force, as was explicitly acknowledged: "We will always have our enemies, and we cannot abandon our coercive tools." Using "soft power," however, was simply to add to America's arsenal of military and economic imperialism: "bolstering soft power makes America stronger."[48]
Power, they wrote, "is the ability to influence the behavior of others to get a desired outcome," noting the necessity of "hard power" - military and economic strength - but, while "[t]here is no other global power... American hard power does not always translate into influence." While technological advances "have made weapons more precise, they have also become more destructive, thereby increasing the political and social costs of using military force." Modern communications, they noted, "diminished the fog of war," which is to say that they have facilitated more effective communication and management in war-time, "but also heightened the atomized political consciousness," which is to say that it has allowed populations all over the world to gain access to information and communication outside the selectivity of traditional institutions of power.[49]
These trends "have made power less tangible and coercion less effective." The report noted: "Machiavelli said it was safer to be feared than to be loved. Today, in the global information age, it is better to be both." Thus, "soft power... is the ability to attract people to our side without coercion," making "legitimacy" the central concept of soft power. As such, if nations and people believe "American objectives to be legitimate, we are more likely to persuade them to follow our lead without using threats and bribes." Noting that America's "enemies" in the world are largely non-state actors and groups who "control no territory, hold few assets, and sprout new leaders for each one that is killed," victory becomes problematic: "Militaries are well suited to defeating states, but they are often poor instruments to fight ideas." Thus, victory in the modern world "depends on attracting foreign populations to our side," of which 'soft power' is a necessity. [50]
Despite various "military adventures in the Western hemisphere and in the Philippines" in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, "the U.S. military has not been put in the service of building a colonial empire in the manner of European militaries," the report read, acknowledging quite plainly that while not a formal colonial empire, the United States was an imperial power nonetheless. Since World War II, "America has sought to promote rules and order in a world in which life continues to be nasty, brutish, and short for the majority of inhabitants." While "the appeal of Hollywood and American products can play a role in inspiring the dreams and desires of others," soft power is not merely cultural, but also promotes "political values" and "our somewhat reluctant participation and leadership in institutions that help shape the global agenda." However, a more "interconnected and tolerant world" is not something everyone is looking forward to, noted the authors: "ideas can be threatening to those who consider their way of life to be under siege by the West," which is to say, the rest of the world. Smart power, then, "is neither hard nor soft - it is the skillful combination of both," and "means developing an integrated strategy, resource base, and tool kit to achieve American objectives, drawing on both hard and soft power." [51]
Other members of the CSIS Commission on Smart Power included: Nancy Kassebaum Baker, former US Senator and member of the advisory board of the Partnership for a Secure America; General Charles G. Boyd, former president and CEO of the Business Executives for National Security, former director of the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR); as well as Maurice Greenberg, Thomas Pickering, David Rubenstein and Obama's newest Secretary of Defense, Chuck Hagel.
It's quite apparent that members of the CSIS Commission and CSIS itself would be able to wield significant influence upon the Obama administration. Joseph Nye has even advised Hillary Clinton while she served as Secretary of State. [52] Perhaps then, we should not be surprised that at her Senate confirmation hearing in January of 2009, Clinton declared the era of "rigid ideology" in diplomacy to be at an end, and the foreign policy of "smart power" to be exercised, that she would make decisions based "on facts and evidence, not emotions or prejudice."[53]
Before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Clinton declared: "We must use what has been called smart power, the full range of tools at our disposal - diplomatic, economic, military, political, legal, and cultural - picking the right tool, or combination of tools, for each situation." She quoted the ancient Roman poet Terence, "in every endeavor, the seemly course for wise men is to try persuasion first," then added: "The same truth binds wise women as well."[54]
While Joseph Nye had coined the term "soft power" in the 1990s, Suzanne Nossel coined the term "smart power." Nossel was the chief operating officer of Human Rights Watch, former executive at media conglomerate Bertelsmann, and was a former deputy to UN Ambassador Richard Holbrooke in the Clinton administration. She coined the term "smart power" in a 2004 issue of Foreign Affairs, the journal of the Council on Foreign Relations, after which time Joseph Nye began using it, leading to the CSIS Commission on Smart Power. At the Senate hearing, Senator Jim Webb stated, "the phrase of the week is 'smart power'." Nossel commented on Clinton's Senate hearing: "Hillary was impressive... She didn't gloss over the difficulties, but at the same time she was fundamentally optimistic. She's saying that, by using all the tools of power in concert, the trajectory of American decline can be reversed. She'll make smart power cool."[55]
Following the first six months of the Obama administration, Hillary Clinton was to deliver a major foreign policy speech to the Council on Foreign Relations, where she would articulate "her own policy agenda," focusing on the strengthening of "smart power." One official involved in the speech planning process noted that it would include discussion on "U.S. relations with [and] management of the great powers in a way that gets more comprehensive." The speech was long in the making, and was being overseen by the director of the State Department's Policy Planning Council, Anne-Marie Slaughter. [56]
Slaughter was director of Policy Planning in the State Department from 2009 to 2011, where she was chief architect of the Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review, designed to better integrate development into U.S. foreign policy, with the first report having been released in 2010. She is also a professor of politics and international affairs at Princeton, was co-Chair of the Princeton Project on National Security, former Dean of the Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs, served on the boards of the Council on Foreign Relations (2003-2009), the New America Foundation, the National Endowment for Democracy, New American Security, the Truman Project, and formerly with CSIS, also having been on the boards of McDonald's and Citigroup. Slaughter is currently a member of the Aspen Strategy Group, the CFR, a member of the board of directors of the Atlantic Council, and has been named on Foreign Policy's Top 100 Global Thinkers for the years 2009-2012.
In preparation for her speech at the Council on Foreign Relations, according to the Washington Post blog, Plum Line, Clinton "consulted" with a "surprisingly diverse" group of people, including: Henry Kissinger, George Schultz, Zbigniew Brzezinski, Paul Farmer, Joseph Nye, Francis Fukuyama, Brent Scowcroft, Strobe Talbott (president of the Brookings Institution), John Podesta, and Richard Lugar, as well as Defense Secretary Robert Gates, then-National Security Advisor General James Jones, and President Obama himself.[57]
When Clinton began speaking at the Council on Foreign Relations in Washington, D.C., she stated: "I am delighted to be here in these new headquarters. I have been often to, I guess, the mother ship in New York City, but it's good to have an outpost of the Council right here down the street from the State Department. We get a lot of advice form the Council, and so this will mean I won't have as far to go to be told what we should be doing and how we should think about the future." Many in the world do not trust America to lead, explained Clinton, "they view America as an unaccountable power, too quick to impose its will at the expense of their interests and our principles," but, Clinton was sure to note: "they are wrong." The question, of course, was "not whether our nation can or should lead, but how it will lead in the 21st century," in which "[r]igid ideologies and old formulas don't apply." Clinton claimed that "[l]iberty, democracy, justice and opportunity underlie our priorities," even though others "accuse us of using these ideals to justify actions that contradict their very meaning," suggesting that "we are too often condescending and imperialistic, seeking only to expand our power at the expense of others."[58]
These perceptions, explained Clinton, "have fed anti-Americanism, but they do not reflect who we are." America's strategy "must reflect the world as it is, not as it used to be," and therefore, "[i]t does not make sense to adapt a 19th century concert of powers, or a 20th century balance of power strategy." Clinton explained that the strategy would seek to tilt "the balance away from a multi-polar world and toward a multi-partner world," in which "our partnerships can become power coalitions to constrain and deter [the] negative actions" of those who do not share "our values and interests" and "actively seek to undermine our efforts." In order to construct "the architecture of global cooperation," Clinton recommended "smart power" as "the intelligent use of all means at our disposal, including our ability to convene and connect... our economic and military strength," as well as "the application of old-fashioned common sense in policymaking... a blend of principle and pragmatism." Noting that, "our global and regional institutions were built for a world that has been transformed," Clinton stated that "they too must be transformed and reformed," referencing the UN, World Bank, IMF, G20, OAS, ASEAN, and APEC, among others. This "global architecture of cooperation," said Clinton, "is the architecture of progress for America and all nations."[59]
Just in case you were thinking that the relationship between CSIS and the Obama administration was not strong enough, apparently both of them thought so too. CSIS wields notable influence within the Pentagon's Defense Policy Board, which is chaired by the president and CEO of CSIS, John Hamre. A former Deputy Defense Secretary in the Clinton administration, Hamre is a member of the Aspen Strategy Group, sits on the board of defense contractors such as ITT, SAIC, and the Oshkosh Corporation, as well as MITRE, a "not-for-profit" corporation which "manages federally funded research and development centers." The Defense Policy Board provides the Secretary of Defense, as well as the Deputy Secretary and Undersecretary of Defense "with independent, informed advice and opinion on matters of defense policy;" from outside 'experts' of course. [60]
Also on the board is Sam Nunn, the chairman of CSIS, co-chair and CEO of the Nuclear Threat Initiative (NTI), former U.S. Senator from 1972-1996, member of the Council on Foreign Relations, and currently on the boards of General Electric, the Coca-Cola Company, Hess Corporation, and was recently on the boards of Dell and Chevron. Other CSIS trustees and advisors who sit on the Defense Policy Board are Harold Brown, Henry Kissinger, James Schlesinger, Brent Scowcroft, General Jack Keane, and Chuck Hagel. [61]
Harold Brown was the Secretary of Defense in the Carter administration, honorary director of the Atlantic Council, member of the boards of Evergreen Oil and Philip Morris International, former partner at Warburg Pincus, director of the Altria Group, Trustee of RAND Corporation, and member of the Trilateral Commission and the Council on Foreign Relations. James Schlesinger was the former Defense Secretary in the Nixon and Ford administrations, Secretary of Energy in the Carter administration, was briefly director of the CIA, a senior advisor to Lehman Brothers, Kuhn, Loeb Inc., and was on George W. Bush's Homeland Security Advisory Council. He is currently chairman of the MITRE Corporation, a director of the Sandia National Corporation, a trustee of the Atlantic Council and is a board member of the Henry M. Jackson Foundation.
Brent Scowcroft, apart from being Kissinger's deputy in the Nixon administration, and the National Security Advisor in the Ford and Bush Sr. administrations (as well as co-founder of Kissinger), is currently a member of the Council on Foreign Relations, the Trilateral Commission, the Atlantic Council, and founded his own international advisory firm, the Scowcroft Group. General Jack Keane, a senior advisor to CSIS, is the former Vice Chief of Staff of the US Army, current Chairman of the board for the Institute for the Study of War; Frank Miller, former Defense Department official in the Reagan, Bush Sr., and Clinton administrations, served on the National Security Council in the George W. Bush administration, joined the Cohen Group in 2005, currently a Principal at the Scowcroft Group, and serves on the U.S.-European Command Advisory Group, is a member of the Council on Foreign Relations, a Director of the Atlantic Council, and he serves on the board of EADS-North America (one of the world's leading defense contract corporations).
Kissinger's record has been well-established up until present day, though he has been a member of the Defense Policy Board since 2001, thus serving in an advisory capacity to the Pentagon for both the Bush and Obama administrations, continues to serve on the steering committee of the Bilderberg meetings, is a member of the Trilateral Commission and he is currently an advisor to the board of directors of American Express, on the advisory board of the RAND Center for Global Risk and Security, honorary chairman of the China-United States Exchange Foundation, the board of the International Rescue Committee, and is on the International Council of JPMorgan Chase.
Another member of the Policy Board who was a trustee of CSIS was Chuck Hagel, who is now Obama's Secretary of Defense. Prior to his new appointment, Hagel was a US Senator from 1997 to 2009, after which he was Chairman of the Atlantic Council, on the boards of Chevron, Zurich's Holding Company of America, Corsair Capital, Deutsche Bank America, MIC Industries, was an advisor to Gallup, member of the board of PBS, member of the Council on Foreign Relations, and was a member of the CSIS Commission on Smart Power. Hagel also served on Obama's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board, an outside group of 'experts' providing strategic advice to the president on intelligence matters.
Other members of the Defense Policy Board (who are not affiliated with CSIS) are: J.D. Crouch, Deputy National Security Advisor in the George W. Bush administration, and is on the board of advisors of the Center for Security Policy; Richard Danzig, Secretary of the Navy in the Clinton administration, a campaign advisor to Obama, and is the current Chairman of the Center for a New American Security; Rudy de Leon, former Defense Department official in the Clinton administration, a Senior Vice President at the Center for American Progress, and is a former vice president at Boeing Corporation; John Nagl, president of the Center for a New American Security, and is a member of the Council on Foreign Relations; William Perry, former Secretary of Defense in the Clinton administration, who now sits on a number of corporate boards, a senior fellow at the Hoover Institution, on the board of the Nuclear Threat Initiative (NTI), and has served on the Carnegie Endowment; Sarah Sewall, former Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Peacekeeping and Humanitarian Assistance in the Clinton administration, on the board of Oxfam America, and was a foreign policy advisor to Obama's election campaign; and Larry Welch, former Chief of Staff of the US Air Force in the Reagan administration. More recently added to the Defense Policy Board was none other than Madeleine Albright.
Imperialism without Imperialists?
The 'discourse' of foreign affairs and international relations failing to adequately deal with the subject of empire is based upon a deeply flawed perception: that one cannot have an empire without imperialists, and the United States does not have imperialists, it has strategists, experts, and policy-oriented intellectuals. Does the United States, then, have an empire without imperialists? In the whole history of imperialism, that would be a unique situation.
Empires do not happen by chance. Nations do not simply trip and stumble and fall into a state of imperialism. Empires are planned and directed, maintained and expanded. This report aimed to provide some introductory insight into the institutions and individuals who direct the American imperial system. The information - while dense - is far from comprehensive or complete; it is a sample of the complex network of imperialism that exists in present-day United States. Regardless of which president or political party is in office, this highly integrated network remains in power.
This report, produced exclusively for the Hampton Institute, is to serve as a reference point for future discussion and analysis of 'geopolitics' and foreign policy issues. As an introduction to the institutions and individuals of empire, it can provide a framework for people to interpret foreign policy differently, to question those quoted and interviewed in the media as 'experts,' to integrate their understanding of think tanks into contemporary politics and society, and to bring to the surface the names, organizations and ideas of society's ruling class.
It is time for more of what the Trilateral Commission dismissively referred to as "value-oriented intellectuals" - those who question and oppose authority - instead of more policy-oriented imperialists. The Geopolitics Division of the Hampton Institute aims to do just that: to provide an intellectual understanding and basis for opposing empire in the modern world.
Empires don't just happen; they are constructed. They can also be deconstructed and dismantled, but that doesn't just happen either. Opposing empire is not a passive act: it requires dedication and information, action and reaction. As relatively privileged individuals in western state-capitalist societies, we have both the opportunity and the responsibility to understand and oppose what our governments do abroad, how they treat the people of the world, how they engage with the world. It is our responsibility to do something, precisely because we have the opportunity to do so, unlike the majority of the world's population who live in abject poverty, under ruthless dictators that we arm and maintain, in countries we bomb and regions we dominate. We exist in the epicenter of empire, and thus: we are the only ones capable of ending empire.
by American Dream » Fri Jun 20, 2014 11:20 am
JackRiddler » Fri Jun 20, 2014 9:20 am wrote:Note that I revised the above post to refine and add points, after thinking of it this morning:
viewtopic.php?f=8&t=37774&p=545367#p545367
In overcoming false dichotomies, and false categories in general, leftists like the above need to stop actively confounding class consciousness with "conspiracy theory," or to confound the idea of the "1%" with ideas of evil cabals. The ruling class and the power elite are functional categories. Their membership, activities, agency, institutions, wealth and power and thus politics are not secret. Most of these attributes are openly displayed and, in many contexts celebrated. We are told to worship them and believe whatever they say, respect that they get to decide everything, not just how private wealth is invested but also how public policy is made. They are the wealth creators, the smartest people in the room, innovators and precious investors and job-givers, respectable successful business people, charitable philanthropists who are giving back, or at the very least, the reality we are not allowed ever to change, the foundations who give the grants so we'd better conform to what the grant application requires. To see and speak of the obvious -- to identify and unite against the class enemy, not to exterminate them as people but so as to call for an end to their power, to understand that expropriation is a prerequisite to ending the present socioeconomic order and destructive system of production -- none of this should be forbidden to us because of some kind of extreme anarcho-horizontal or anti-authoritarian or hyper-purist desire to remember equally at all times all forms of oppression or privilege and our individual participation in them. It is not in contradiction with the "intersectional" struggles, it is not to forget racism or patriarchy.
5 THE PROBLEM OF COMPOSITION
The 2011 protesters put their bodies and their suffering on display, in public squares, in order to reveal the human consequences of an unrelenting social crisis. But they did not remain in that conceptual space for long. Occupiers spontaneously opted for direct democracy and mutual aid, in order to show the powers that be that another form of sociality is possible: it is possible to treat human beings as equal in terms of their right to speak and their right to be heard.
In the course of the occupations, horizontalist models of organisation tended to become ends in themselves. Faced with implacable and/or insolvent state-power, the occupiers turned inwards, to find within their self-activity a human community — one in which there was no longer a need for hierarchy, leadership or status differentiation. It was enough to be present in the squares, in order to be counted. No other affiliation or allegiance was necessary; indeed, other affiliations were often viewed with suspicion. In this way, anti-government protests — which took it as their goal to shoo the plutocrats out of office — became anti-government protests in another sense. They became anti-political. Of course, this transformation should not be seen solely as a progression: it marked an oscillation in the orientation of the protesters, from outwards to inwards and back out again.
Searching for precursors to this feature of the movement of squares has proven difficult. The movement’s horizontalism was there in Argentina, in 2001. The movement also replicated the forms — consensus-based decision-making, above all — of the anti-globalisation protests (and before that, of the anti-nuclear protests). But the movement of squares was different because the square occupations lasted for so long. For that reason, the occupiers were forced to take their own reproduction as an object.29 The occupiers had to decide how to live together. Their ability to persist in the squares — to occupy for as long as it took to have an impact — was their only strength; their leverage was that they refused to leave. They adopted forms of governance that they claimed were better than the ones on offer in this broke and broken society.
It may be that the most relevant precursor to this feature of the movements is to be found in a previous square occupation, one that seems not to have been a direct reference for the 2011 protesters. That is Tiananmen Square. Despite his simplifications, Italian philosopher Giorgio Agamben captured something of the spirit of Tiananmen, in a way that is prescient of the 2011 protest movement. In The Coming Community, Agamben, speaking of “a herald from Beijing”, characterises Tiananmen as a movement whose generic demands for freedom and democracy belie the fact that the real object of the movement was to compose itself.30 The community that came together, in Tiananmen, was mediated “not by any condition of belonging” nor “by the simple absence of conditions”, but rather, “by belonging itself”.31 The goal of the demonstrators was to “form a community without affirming an identity” where “humans co-belong without any representable condition of belonging”.32
Agamben claims that, by disassociating themselves from all markers of identity, the occupiers of Tiananmen became “whatever singularities”.33 These whatever singularities remain precisely what they are, regardless of the qualities they happen to possess in any given moment. According to Agamben, in presenting themselves in this way, the occupiers necessarily ran aground on the representational logic of the state: the state sought to fix the occupiers into a specific identity, which could then be included or excluded as such. Thus, Agamben concludes: “wherever these singularities peacefully demonstrate their being-in-common, there will be a Tiananmen, and, sooner or later, the tanks will appear”.34
To form a community mediated by belonging itself, in Agamben’s sense, means the following: (1) The community is composed of all those who happen to be there; there are no other conditions of belonging. (2) The community does not mediate between pre-existing identities, in a coalitional politics; instead, it is born ex nihilo. (3) The community does not seek recognition by the state. It presents itself, at the limit, as an alternative to the state: real democracy, or even the overcoming of democracy. (4) The task of such a community is to encourage everyone else to desert their posts, in society, and to join the community, as “whatever singularities”. This description matches the self-conception of the 2011 occupiers. They, too, wanted to be whatever singularities, even if they referred to themselves in a less philosophical fashion.
But we should be clear: for Agamben, Tiananmen already consisted of whatever singularities. The separation between students and workers that pervaded the square, down to the details of where one could sit, falls out of his account, entirely. Yet despite its failings as a description, Agamben’s account captures something of the normative orientation of the movements. For it seems that in Tiananmen — as in the Plaza del Sol, Syntagma Square and Zucotti Park — the participants believed themselves to be beyond the determinations of the society in which they lived. The 2011 protesters certainly felt that way: they proposed to fight crony capitalism on that very basis.
The truth was, however, that the protesters remained firmly anchored to the society of which even their squares were a part. That was clear enough in the divisions between more “middle class” participants and the poor. But it wasn’t only that: individuals with all sorts of pre-existing affinities tended to congregate in this or that corner of the square. They set up their tents in circles, with the open flaps facing inwards. More insidious divisions emerged along gender lines. The participation of women in the occupations took place under the threat of rape by some of the men; women were forced to organise for their self-defence.35 Such divisions were not dissolvable into a unity that consisted only of consensus-based decision-making and collective cooking.
Here’s the thing: the fact that the 2011 movements presented themselves as already unified, as already beyond the determinations of a horrible society, meant that their internal divisions were usually disavowed. Because they were disavowed, those divisions could only appear as threats to the movement. That is not to say that internal divisions were simply suppressed: it was rather that divisions could only be resolved — within the confines of the squares — by forming another committee or promulgating a new rule of action.36
The movement was forced to look inward, in this way, because it was barred from looking outward. Without the capacity to move out of the squares and into society — without beginning to dismantle society — there is no possibility of undoing the class relation on which the proletariat’s internal divisions are based. The occupiers were thus contained within the squares, as in a pressure cooker. Class fractions that typically keep their distance from each other were forced to recognise one another and sometimes live together. In the tensions that resulted, the movement came up against what we call the problem of composition.
The composition problem names the problem of composing, coordinating or unifying proletarian fractions, in the course of their struggle. Unlike in the past — or at least, unlike in ideal-typical representations of the past — it is no longer possible to read class fractions as already composing themselves, as if their unity were somehow given “in-itself” (as the unity of the craft, mass or “social” worker). Today, no such unity exists; nor can it be expected to come into existence with further changes in the technical composition of production. In that sense, there is no predefined revolutionary subject. There is no “for-itself” class-consciousness, as the consciousness of a general interest, shared among all workers. Or rather, such consciousness can only be the consciousness of capital, of what unifies workers precisely by separating them.
The composition of the class thus appears, today, not as a pole of attraction within the class, but rather, as an unresolved problem: how can the class act against capital, in spite of its divisions? The movement of squares was — for a while — able to suspend this problem. The virtue of the occupations was to create a space between an impossible class struggle and a tepid populism, where protesters could momentarily unify, in spite of their divisions. That made for a qualitative leap in the intensity of the struggle. But at the same time, it meant that when the protesters came up against the composition problem, they found that problem impossible to solve.
For the occupiers came together by sidestepping the composition problem. They named their unity in the most abstract way: they were “indignant citizens” or “the 99 percent”. It would have been unfashionable to say that they were the working class or the proletariat, but it would have made no difference: every universal is abstract when the unity it names has no concrete existence. For these reasons, the unity of the occupiers was necessarily a weak unity. It could hold together only so long as the occupiers could contain the divisions that reappeared inside the camps — divisions that were already present in everyday social relations: race, gender, nation, age, etc.37 Is it possible to approach the composition problem from the opposite angle, to begin from the divisions within the proletariat, and on that basis, to pose the question of unity?
Perhaps it is only by deferring unity, to make divisions appear as such, that proletarians will be forced to pose the question of their real unification, against their unity-in-separation for capital. In that case, in order to really unite, proletarians will have to become the beyond of this society — and not in an imagined way, but rather, by relating to one another, materially, outside of the terms of the class relation.
Why is the proletariat so hopelessly divided, today, as compared to the past? This question is more accurately posed as follows: why do divisions within the proletariat appear so clearly on the surface of society? How did identity politics come to replace class-based politics?
In the past, it seemed possible to disavow non-class identities, on the basis of an all-encompassing class identity. That disavowal was supported by ongoing transformations in the mode of production: capital had created the industrial working class; it seemed that it would now draw more and more workers into the factories (or else, that all work would be transformed after the fashion of the factories). As the industrial working class grew in size and strength, it was expected to become more homogeneous. The factory would render divisions of race, gender and religion inessential, as compared to class belonging — that was the sole identity that mattered, at least according to the workers’ movement.
We would like to suggest that this vision of the future was possible only on the basis of a high demand for labour in industry. Of course, a high demand for labour has never really been a regular feature of capitalist societies (long booms are actually few and far between in capital’s history). Nevertheless, it is possible to say that the demand for labour in industry was typically higher in the past than it has been since the 1970s. For, in the past, workers were drawn into the industrial sector, not completely, but tendentially. That had effects: when the demand for labour in industry is high, capital is forced to hire workers who are normally excluded from high value-added segments of production, on the basis of gender, race, religion, etc. A high demand for labour breaks down prejudices among both managers and workers, on that basis. What is supposed to follow is a material convergence of workers’ interests.
That convergence did take place, at least to some extent, in the course of the workers’ movement.38 For example, in the US, agricultural mechanisation in the South displaced black sharecroppers, propelling their migration to booming Northern cities. There, blacks were absorbed into factories, and so also, into workers’ unions. The integration of black workers into unions did not occur without a struggle, nor was it ever completed. Nevertheless, it was underway in the 1960s.
Then, this integration ran up against external limits. Just as the door to integration was beginning to open, it was suddenly slammed shut. The industrial demand for labour slackened, first in the late 1960s and then, again, in the crisis years of the early 1970s. The last hired were first fired. For black Americans, jails replaced jobs. The growth of the prison population corresponded closely to the decline in industrial employment.
A similar turn of events took place on the world-scale. During the postwar boom, low-income countries were tendentially integrated into the club of industrialised nations. But they were integrated only as the postwar boom was reaching its limits. Indeed, they were integrated precisely because it was reaching its limits: as competition intensified, firms were compelled to scour the globe in search of cheap labour. Once the boom gave way to a long downturn, that integration broke down.
What has happened, since the 1970s, is that the surplus population has grown steadily. In essence, the growth of surplus populations put class integration into reverse; integration became fragmentation. That’s because the industrial demand for labour is low. With many applications for each job, managers’ prejudices (e.g certain “races” are lazy) have real effects, in determining who does or does not get a “good” job. As a result, some fractions of the class pool at the bottom of the labour market. What makes those fractions unattractive to certain employers then makes them very attractive to others — particularly in jobs where a high employee turnover is not really a cost to employers. The existence of a large surplus population creates the conditions for the separation out of a super-exploited segment of the class, which Marx called the stagnant surplus population. That separation reinforces prejudices among privileged workers, who know (on some level) that they got their “good” jobs based on employers’ prejudice. It also reinforces non-class identities among the excluded, since those identities form the basis of their exclusion.
However, while capital is no longer overcoming divisions, the very scrambled nature of the new divisions seems to weaken them, in certain ways. Because it is an ongoing process, we can perhaps say that, tendentially, the unfolding of the general law of capital accumulation undermines stable identity formations in all segments of the labour market. More and more people are falling into the surplus population; anyone can, potentially. Increasingly, the stable-unstable distinction is the one that regulates all the other distinctions within the working class. That leads to a widespread sense that all identities are fundamentally inessential, in two senses:
Not everyone, even within the most marginalised sections of the class, is excluded from stable jobs and public recognition. The present era has seen the rise of individuals from marginalised populations to the heights of power. That there are many women CEOs — and one black US president — gives everyone the impression that no stigma, no mark of abjection, is wholly insurmountable.
But also, the very nature of precarity is to dissolve fixed positions. Very few proletarians identify any of their qualifications or capacities as essential determinants of themselves. In a world without security there can be no pretence to normality, to identities that remain stable over time. Instead, lives are cobbled together, without a clear sense of progression. All lifestyles are commodified, their parts interchangeable. These features of a fragmented proletariat were present in the squares.
6 CONCLUSION: POINTS OF NO RETURN
What comes next? It is impossible to say in advance. What we know is that, at least for the moment, we live and fight within the holding pattern. The crisis has been stalled. In order to make the crisis stall, the state has been forced to undertake extraordinary actions. It is hard to deny that state interventions, over the past few years, have seemed like a last ditch effort. Interest rates are bottoming out at zero percent. The government is spending billions of dollars, every month, just in order to convince capital to invest in a trickle. For how long? And yet, for this long, at least, state interventions have worked. The crisis has been petrified. And its petrification has been the petrification of the struggle.
Indeed, since the crisis has been stalled, the class struggle remains that of the most eager and the worst off. Everyone else hopes that, if they keep their heads down, they will survive until the real recovery begins. Meanwhile, those engaged in struggle are themselves mostly lost in false hopes of their own: they hope that the state can be convinced to act rationally, to undertake a more radical Keynesian stimulus. The protesters hope that capitalism can be forced to rid itself of cronies and act in the interest of the nation. Unlikely to abandon this perspective — as long as it seems remotely plausible — anti-austerity struggles are themselves stuck in a holding pattern. They confront the objectivity of the crisis only in the state’s impassiveness in response to their demands.
We see three scenarios, going forward:
The holding pattern could be maintained for a while longer, so that a second wave of struggle, like the 2011–13 wave, might emerge within its confines. That second wave may remain tepid, like its predecessor often was. But it is also possible that it could become stronger, on the basis of real bonds that have been created over the past few years. If that happens, we could see the resurgence of a radical democratic movement, more popular than that of the anti-globalisation era. This movement would not necessarily focus on square occupations; it may announce itself by means of some other tactic, impossible to foresee. Such a movement, were it able to find a leverage point, might be able to renegotiate the terms on which the crisis is being managed. For example, protesters may be able to foist the fallout of the crisis on to the super rich: with a new Tobin Tax, progressive income taxes, or limitations on CEO pay. Perhaps rioters will form substantial organisations, which are able to press for the end of arbitrary police violence and a partial de-militarisation of police forces. Maybe Arab states can be made to raise public employment levels, in order to absorb a backlog of unemployed university graduates. In any case, all of these demands, even if they were achieved, would be like forming a workers’ council on the deck of the Titanic. They would be self-managing a sinking ship (though, admittedly, since the icebergs are melting, what that ship would hit is as yet unknown).
The holding pattern could be maintained for a while longer, but the second wave of struggle, within its confines, could look radically different than the first one. Perhaps — taking their cue from the movement of squares — proletarians will see an opening for a new, more or less informal, rank-and-file unionism. This unionism, if it infected the huge mass of unorganised, private-sector service workers, could radically transform the terms within which the crisis is managed. It might be possible, on that basis, to approach the composition problem from the other way around. Fast food workers are currently striking in the United States, demanding a doubling of their wages. What if they succeed and that success acts as a signal for the rest of the class to pour out onto the streets? It is important to remember that a massive shift in the terms of the class struggle does not always correspond to a rise in the intensity of the crisis. The objective and subjective moments of the class relation do not necessarily move in sync.
Finally, there could be an intensification of the crisis, a global bottoming out, beginning with a deep downturn in India or China. Or else, the winding down of Quantitative Easing could spiral out of control. The end of the holding pattern would scramble all the terms of the era we have described. Ours would no longer be an austerity crisis, but rather, something else entirely, affecting much broader sections of the population.
To blame corrupt politicians would no longer be possible, or at least, it would no longer be useful, since the possibility of a state management of the crisis would be foreclosed. That is not to say that revolution will suddenly appear on the table, as the only option left. To get worse is not necessarily to get better. The divisions within the proletariat run deep, and they only deepen with the further growth of the surplus population. It is entirely possible to imagine that class fractions will turn against each other, that hating one another, and ensuring that no one gets slightly better than anyone else, will take precedence over making the revolution.
by American Dream » Fri Jun 20, 2014 12:16 pm
JackRiddler » Fri Jun 20, 2014 10:03 am wrote:Wow, repeating post by TheBlackSheep » Tue Mar 25, 2014 9:23 am. Hadn't seen The Hampton Institute ("A Working Class Think Tank,") before and now I'm intrigued.
Rigorous and radical "conspiracy theory" means dropping that phrase as a category and turning to understandings of class and power structures. Those who enshroud the workings of class and power in mystified ideas of "conspiracy" are missing the point, as are those who spend all the time arguing against "conspiracy theory." They are symbiotes in confusion.
This is a great intro article. Refreshing to see something that can talk about Rockefeller and Brzezinski and global strategy, and understand this globalism is not the plot to destroy America that right wing conspiracy mechandisers imagine, but actually a perspective adopted in the service of class power, for an empire based above all in "America," i.e., American imperialism.Engineering Empire: An Introduction to the Intellectuals and Institutions of American Imperialism
http://www.hamptoninstitution.org/engin ... zGO-4XigV5
by JackRiddler » Fri Jun 20, 2014 12:41 pm
American Dream » Fri Jun 20, 2014 11:16 am wrote:I definitely agree with the overall thrust of your comments but I wonder what happens if we drop "that phrase as a category and turning to understandings of class and power structures". Since most of the (excellent) article is not about malefactors conspiring, in the usual sense of the word, where does that leave things? Surely we can keep the solid investigations of ARTICHOKE, PAPERCLIP and everything else and develop a stronger, clearer critique of "Elders of Zion" and other such bogus ideas...
by American Dream » Fri Jun 20, 2014 4:14 pm
JackRiddler » Fri Jun 20, 2014 11:41 am wrote:American Dream » Fri Jun 20, 2014 11:16 am wrote:I definitely agree with the overall thrust of your comments but I wonder what happens if we drop "that phrase as a category and turning to understandings of class and power structures". Since most of the (excellent) article is not about malefactors conspiring, in the usual sense of the word, where does that leave things? Surely we can keep the solid investigations of ARTICHOKE, PAPERCLIP and everything else and develop a stronger, clearer critique of "Elders of Zion" and other such bogus ideas...
To take the examples of ARTICHOKE, PAPERCLIP, also MK-ULTRA etc., these are programs of the U.S. government, although not resulting from a constitutional or legislative process. They are wrong and barbaric, objectively: "evil." Much about them is directly illegal, they are done in secrecy and so their structure and origins are conspiratorial. Nevertheless I'd avoid the "conspiracy" label as obfuscatory. That's what I'm arguing for. The issues at stake are secrecy, secret power, concentration of power, abuse of power, criminal behavior, lack of accountability and transparency, classification, national security ideology, "ends justify the means," and the practice of war (politics, class war, imperialism) through covert means on behalf of policy that may be overt, but is often itself secret. Elite control, secret government. All these concepts explain more than "conspiracy," which is either a) a narrow category of criminal law that tends to describe "rogues" and not elite action, since the latter is often preemptively legalized ("when the president does it, it isn't illegal") or in any case hegemonically seen as the action of a sovereign institution that represents "us"; or b) a mystifying term that immediately sets off pavlovian reactions and sets up a false dichotomy of woo vs. anti-woo.
“My notion of deep politics… posits that in every culture and society there are facts which tend to be suppressed collectively, because of the social and psychological costs of not doing so. Like all other observers, I too have involuntarily suppressed facts and even memories about the drug traffic that were too provocative to be retained with equanimity.”[1]
“Deep politics is a revision of Scott’s original concept of parapolitics first developed in The War Conspiracy. It responds to criticism that political conspiracies, like the murder of Kennedy, are too difficult to arrange and keep hidden…
“Scott came to see parapolitics as “too narrowly conscious and intentional to describe the deeper irrational movements which culminated collectively in the murder of the President.” In contrast deep political analysis presupposes “an open system with divergent power centers and goals” The collapse of the First Italian Republic in the mid-1990s, involving large-scale criminal influence in government, offers a telling example. It originated as an American parapolitical operation to suborn the threat of communism which parachuted prominent U.S. Mafia hoods into power in post-war Italy “[B]y the 1980s this . . . strategem had helped spawn a deep political system of corruption exceeding Tammany’s, and (as we know from the Andreotti trial of 1995) beyond the ability of anyone to call it off”. Another example… is the CIA-financed jihad against Russian occupiers in Afghanistan that flooded Europe with opium and helped create Osama bin Laden, a modern version of the Old Man of the Mountains, who’s [sic] 11th Century followers – the Assassins – “sacrificed for him in order to perpetuate his crimes”[2]
by Sounder » Sat Jun 21, 2014 9:16 am
American Dream » Tue May 20, 2014 10:20 am wrote:http://libcom.org/news/99-problems-03112011
jack wrote...Arg. Really?
Anti-Semitism! An exclusive focus on bankers as opposed to other capitalists! A failure to understand how capitalism really works as a system! The Nazi version of "socialism"! None of these, and none of all the other wrong ideas listed in this article, follow necessarily from the idea that there is a ruling class. This article confuses and obscures through an immense, disingenuous, and highly sanctimonious misrepresentation of the “1% vs. 99%” rhetoric. As one who was among the many anarchists trying to push this idea home with the majority of Americans already 30+ years ago, I am grateful that, thanks to Occupy, the message finally got through:
There is a ruling class.
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