Operation Clusterfuck: China Rolls Up CIA Assets, 2010

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Operation Clusterfuck: China Rolls Up CIA Assets, 2010

Postby Wombaticus Rex » Thu Aug 16, 2018 11:01 am

Via: https://foreignpolicy.com/2018/08/15/bo ... elligence/

Botched CIA Communications System Helped Blow Cover of Chinese Agents

It was considered one of the CIA’s worst failures in decades: Over a two-year period starting in late 2010, Chinese authorities systematically dismantled the agency’s network of agents across the country, executing dozens of suspected U.S. spies. But since then, a question has loomed over the entire debacle.

How were the Chinese able to roll up the network?

Now, nearly eight years later, it appears that the agency botched the communication system it used to interact with its sources, according to five current and former intelligence officials. The CIA had imported the system from its Middle East operations, where the online environment was considerably less hazardous, and apparently underestimated China’s ability to penetrate it.

“The attitude was that we’ve got this, we’re untouchable,” said one of the officials who, like the others, declined to be named discussing sensitive information. The former official described the attitude of those in the agency who worked on China at the time as “invincible.”

Other factors played a role as well, including China’s alleged recruitment of former CIA officer Jerry Chun Shing Lee around the same time. Federal prosecutors indicted Lee earlier this year in connection with the affair.

But the penetration of the communication system seems to account for the speed and accuracy with which Chinese authorities moved against the CIA’s China-based assets.

“You could tell the Chinese weren’t guessing. The Ministry of State Security (which handles both foreign intelligence and domestic security) were always pulling in the right people,” one of the officials said.

“When things started going bad, they went bad fast.”

The former officials also said the real number of CIA assets and those in their orbit executed by China during the two-year period was around 30, though some sources spoke of higher figures. The New York Times, which first reported the story last year, put the number at “more than a dozen.” All the CIA assets detained by Chinese intelligence around this time were eventually killed, the former officials said.

At first, U.S. intelligence officials were “shellshocked,” said one former official. Eventually, rescue operations were mounted, and several sources managed to make their way out of China.

One of the former officials said the last CIA case officer to have meetings with sources in China distributed large sums of cash to the agents who remained behind, hoping the money would help them flee.

When the intelligence breach became known, the CIA formed a special task force along with the FBI to figure out what went wrong. During the investigation, the task force identified three potential causes of the failure, the former officials said: A possible agent had provided Chinese authorities with information about the CIA asset network, some of the CIA’s spy work had been sloppy and might have been detected by Chinese authorities, and the communications system had been compromised. The investigators concluded that a “confluence and combination of events” had wiped out the spy network, according to one of the former officials.

Eventually, U.S. counterintelligence officials identified Lee, the former CIA officer who had worked extensively in Beijing, as China’s likely informant. Court documents suggest Lee was in contact with his handlers at the Ministry of State Security through at least 2011.

Chinese authorities paid Lee hundreds of thousands of dollars for his efforts, according to the documents. He was indicted in May of this year on a charge of conspiracy to commit espionage.

But Lee’s alleged betrayal alone could not explain all the damage that occurred in China during 2011 and 2012, the former officials said. Information about sources is so highly compartmentalized that Lee would not have known their identities. That fact and others reinforced the theory that China had managed to eavesdrop on the communications between agents and their CIA handlers.

When CIA officers begin working with a new source, they often use an interim covert communications system—in case the person turns out to be a double agent.

The communications system used in China during this period was internet-based and accessible from laptop or desktop computers, two of the former officials said.

This interim, or “throwaway,” system, an encrypted digital program, allows for remote communication between an intelligence officer and a source, but it is also separated from the main communications system used with vetted sources, reducing the risk if an asset goes bad.

Although they used some of the same coding, the interim system and the main covert communication platform used in China at this time were supposed to be clearly separated. In theory, if the interim system were discovered or turned over to Chinese intelligence, people using the main system would still be protected—and there would be no way to trace the communication back to the CIA. But the CIA’s interim system contained a technical error: It connected back architecturally to the CIA’s main covert communications platform. When the compromise was suspected, the FBI and NSA both ran “penetration tests” to determine the security of the interim system. They found that cyber experts with access to the interim system could also access the broader covert communications system the agency was using to interact with its vetted sources, according to the former officials.

In the words of one of the former officials, the CIA had “fucked up the firewall” between the two systems.

U.S. intelligence officers were also able to identify digital links between the covert communications system and the U.S. government itself, according to one former official—links the Chinese agencies almost certainly found as well. These digital links would have made it relatively easy for China to deduce that the covert communications system was being used by the CIA. In fact, some of these links pointed back to parts of the CIA’s own website, according to the former official.

...

Once Chinese intelligence obtained access to the interim communications system,­ penetrating the main system would have been relatively straightforward, according to the former intelligence officials. The window between the two systems may have only been open for a few months before the gap was closed, but the Chinese broke in during this period of vulnerability.

Precisely how the system was breached remains unclear. The Ministry of State Security might have run a double agent who was given the communication platform by his CIA handler. Another possibility is that Chinese authorities identified a U.S. agent—perhaps through information provided by Lee—and seized that person’s computer. Alternatively, authorities might have identified the system through a pattern analysis of suspicious online activities.

China was so determined to crack the system that it had set up a special task force composed of members of the Ministry of State Security and the Chinese military’s signals directorate (roughly equivalent to the NSA), one former official said.

Once one person was identified as a CIA asset, Chinese intelligence could then track the agent’s meetings with handlers and unravel the entire network. (Some CIA assets whose identities became known to the Ministry of State Security were not active users of the communications system, the sources said.)

One of the former officials said the agency had “strong indications” that China shared its findings with Russia, where some CIA assets were using a similar covert communications system. Around the time the CIA’s source network in China was being eviscerated, multiple sources in Russia suddenly severed their relationship with their CIA handlers, according to an NBC News report that aired in January—and confirmed by this former official.

The failure of the communications system has reignited a debate within the intelligence community about the merits of older, lower-tech methods for covert interactions with sources, according to the former officials.

There is an inherent paradox to covert communications systems, one of the former officials said: The easier a system is to use, the less secure it is.

The former officials said CIA officers operating in China since the debacle had reverted to older methods of communication, including interacting surreptitiously in person with sources. Such methods can be time-consuming and carry their own risks.


The disaster in China has led some officials to conclude that internet-based systems, even ones that employ sophisticated encryption, can never be counted on to shield assets.

“Will a system always stay encrypted, given the advances in technology? You’re supposed to protect people forever,” one of the former officials said.
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Re: Operation Clusterfuck: China Rolls Up CIA Assets, 2010

Postby Wombaticus Rex » Thu Aug 16, 2018 11:09 am

Via: https://www.nytimes.com/2017/05/20/worl ... onage.html

Killing C.I.A. Informants, China Crippled U.S. Spying Operations

Current and former American officials described the intelligence breach as one of the worst in decades. It set off a scramble in Washington’s intelligence and law enforcement agencies to contain the fallout, but investigators were bitterly divided over the cause. Some were convinced that a mole within the C.I.A. had betrayed the United States. Others believed that the Chinese had hacked the covert system the C.I.A. used to communicate with its foreign sources. Years later, that debate remains unresolved.

But there was no disagreement about the damage. From the final weeks of 2010 through the end of 2012, according to former American officials, the Chinese killed at least a dozen of the C.I.A.’s sources. According to three of the officials, one was shot in front of his colleagues in the courtyard of a government building — a message to others who might have been working for the C.I.A.

Still others were put in jail. All told, the Chinese killed or imprisoned 18 to 20 of the C.I.A.’s sources in China, according to two former senior American officials, effectively unraveling a network that had taken years to build.

...

The previously unreported episode shows how successful the Chinese were in disrupting American spying efforts and stealing secrets years before a well-publicized breach in 2015 gave Beijing access to thousands of government personnel records, including intelligence contractors. The C.I.A. considers spying in China one of its top priorities, but the country’s extensive security apparatus makes it exceptionally hard for Western spy services to develop sources there.

...

The first signs of trouble emerged in 2010. At the time, the quality of the C.I.A.’s information about the inner workings of the Chinese government was the best it had been for years, the result of recruiting sources deep inside the bureaucracy in Beijing, four former officials said. Some were Chinese nationals who the C.I.A. believed had become disillusioned with the Chinese government’s corruption.

...

As more and more sources vanished, the operation took on increased urgency. Nearly every employee at the American Embassy was scrutinized, no matter how high ranking. Some investigators believed the Chinese had cracked the encrypted method that the C.I.A. used to communicate with its assets. Others suspected a traitor in the C.I.A., a theory that agency officials were at first reluctant to embrace — and that some in both agencies still do not believe.

Their debates were punctuated with macabre phone calls — “We lost another one” — and urgent questions from the Obama administration wondering why intelligence about the Chinese had slowed.

The mole hunt eventually zeroed in on a former agency operative who had worked in the C.I.A.’s division overseeing China, believing he was most likely responsible for the crippling disclosures. But efforts to gather enough evidence to arrest him failed, and he is now living in another Asian country, current and former officials said.

There was good reason to suspect an insider, some former officials say. Around that time, Chinese spies compromised National Security Agency surveillance in Taiwan — an island Beijing claims is part of China — by infiltrating Taiwanese intelligence, an American partner, according to two former officials. And the C.I.A. had discovered Chinese operatives in the agency’s hiring pipeline, according to officials and court documents.[/b

Those who rejected the mole theory attributed the losses to sloppy American tradecraft at a time when the Chinese were becoming better at monitoring American espionage activities in the country. [b]Some F.B.I. agents became convinced that C.I.A. handlers in Beijing too often traveled the same routes to the same meeting points, which would have helped China’s vast surveillance network identify the spies in its midst.


Some officers met their sources at a restaurant where Chinese agents had planted listening devices, former officials said, and even the waiters worked for Chinese intelligence.

This carelessness, coupled with the possibility that the Chinese had hacked the covert communications channel, would explain many, if not all, of the disappearances and deaths, some former officials said. Some in the agency, particularly those who had helped build the spy network, resisted this theory and believed they had been caught in the middle of a turf war within the C.I.A.

...

China has been particularly aggressive in its espionage in recent years, beyond the breach of the Office of Personnel Management records in 2015, American officials said. Last year, an F.B.I. employee pleaded guilty to acting as a Chinese agent for years, passing sensitive technology information to Beijing in exchange for cash, lavish hotel rooms during foreign travel and prostitutes.

In March, prosecutors announced the arrest of a longtime State Department employee, Candace Marie Claiborne, accused of lying to investigators about her contacts with Chinese officials. According to the criminal complaint against Ms. Claiborne, who pleaded not guilty, Chinese agents wired cash into her bank account and showered her with gifts that included an iPhone, a laptop and tuition at a Chinese fashion school. In addition, according to the complaint, she received a fully furnished apartment and a stipend.


There's a lot of hot singles walking around Georgetown with "a fully furnished apartment and a stipend," any given summer.
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Re: Operation Clusterfuck: China Rolls Up CIA Assets, 2010

Postby Wombaticus Rex » Thu Aug 16, 2018 2:30 pm

The 2010-2012 timeline really interests me because this is exactly when Jared Cohen and Eric Schmidt were making triumphant tours around the think tank / silicon valley circuits talking about "The New Digital Age" -- and when Google's slouch towards Alphabet really began in earnest. Lo:

“The attitude was that we’ve got this, we’re untouchable,” said one of the officials who, like the others, declined to be named discussing sensitive information. The former official described the attitude of those in the agency who worked on China at the time as “invincible.”


Was some of that triumphalism the result of huffing some TED Talk style Tech Bro Fumes?

CIA had a classified, bespoke communications system that was "imported ... from its Middle East operations" and turn-key'd into their new China system. "Middle East operations" is exactly where Silicon Valley was making friends in high places, pulling off that Arab Spring maneuver again and again.

(Side note: Yasha Levine's "Surveillance Valley" is superb and necessary, covering the .mil/.gov nexus in Silicon Valley.)

When things were actually popping off, a lot of participants - actual arab spring arabs - were using a service called Hotspot Shield.
CEO is a notable dude https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/David_Gorodyansky
NYT profile https://bits.blogs.nytimes.com/2015/10/ ... e-censors/
Interview with him about business & server capacity https://www.fastcompany.com/1754491/web ... rab-spring

However, little of the coverage & scholarship on Arab Spring will glean us much about what the operators were using. Safe to bet CIA agents in the field were not relying on twitter DMs very often. I will keep digging around, though, always impossible to call which data points will open up some new connections.

I also wonder if Amazon's huge IT deal with CIA -- in 2013 -- was a result of their experience in China.
https://www.theatlantic.com/technology/ ... on/374632/

Via: https://www.reuters.com/article/amazon- ... IS20131008

Oct 7 (Reuters) - A U.S. court ruled in favor of Amazon.com Inc, which is locked in a dispute with International Business Machines over a $600 million cloud computing contract awarded by the Central Intelligence Agency, a court notice showed.

Amazon Web Services (AWS), a unit of online retailer Amazon.com, beat out IBM earlier this year to win the CIA contract.


NYT chunk drawing a quick constellation of the cut-outs involved, per their Arab Spring post-mortem:

Via: https://www.nytimes.com/2011/04/15/world/15aid.html

A number of the groups and individuals directly involved in the revolts and reforms sweeping the region, including the April 6 Youth Movement in Egypt, the Bahrain Center for Human Rights and grass-roots activists like Entsar Qadhi, a youth leader in Yemen, received training and financing from groups like the International Republican Institute, the National Democratic Institute and Freedom House, a nonprofit human rights organization based in Washington, according to interviews in recent weeks and American diplomatic cables obtained by WikiLeaks.

The Republican and Democratic institutes are loosely affiliated with the Republican and Democratic Parties. They were created by Congress and are financed through the National Endowment for Democracy, which was set up in 1983 to channel grants for promoting democracy in developing nations. The National Endowment receives about $100 million annually from Congress. Freedom House also gets the bulk of its money from the American government, mainly from the State Department.


...so who was the vendor for 2010 era system? Who was the contractor that built their shitty China network? There's definitely something public domain and obvious I'm missing here.
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Re: Operation Clusterfuck: China Rolls Up CIA Assets, 2010

Postby dada » Fri Aug 17, 2018 11:07 pm

Wombaticus Rex wrote:...so who was the vendor for 2010 era system? Who was the contractor that built their shitty China network? There's definitely something public domain and obvious I'm missing here.


bbn? Raytheon, In-q-tel money flows in around that time. In-q-tel money in 04, raytheon in '09, says wiki.

Wild guessing, stabbing in the dark. Blind archery, classic ninja arts skill.

Can't underestimate the ninja skills. Not that I'm any blind master. More like Link with a blindfold on, firing off bombarrows at random. That way I'm bound to hit something.

You know what would be a great place to hide intelligence architecture r and d? Big gaming. Namco Bandai. nintendo. Who could possibly find anything under the endless mountains of video game trash on the internet. Or even better, just keep that arm of your giant video game tech corp off the internet entirely. Be perfect hiding spot.

Great thread. "In the words of one of the former officials, the CIA had “fucked up the firewall” between the two systems." is getting serious consideration as my new signature.
Both his words and manner of speech seemed at first totally unfamiliar to me, and yet somehow they stirred memories - as an actor might be stirred by the forgotten lines of some role he had played far away and long ago.
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Re: Operation Clusterfuck: China Rolls Up CIA Assets, 2010

Postby Grizzly » Sat Aug 18, 2018 2:26 am

Interesting, that William Harry ( take my security clearance, too ) McRaven is chummy w/ Rear Adm. Brian Losey who is in deep on "Fat Leonard," in the Navy bribery scandal...


Admiral McRaven’s military bona fides—he’s often credited with rewriting the book on special operations tactics and, later, playing a crucial role in tracking down Saddam Hussein and overseeing the raid that killed Osama bin Laden—make him an indispensable voice on not just the holiday but what patriotism means in politically divided times.


https://www.texasmonthly.com/podcast/admiral-william-h-mcraven-conversation-patriotism-fourth-july/

Is Carl Oglesby roiling in his grave? Are we looking at another Yankee And Cowboy War? 2.0?

Also, this: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Chinese_espionage_in_the_United_States
2010-2012 compromise of CIA network

Between 2010 and 2012, the Chinese government was able to arrest or kill between 18 and 20 CIA assets within China.[27] A joint CIA/FBI counterintelligence operation, codenamed "Honey Bear", was unable to definitely determine the source of the compromises, though theories include the existence of a mole, cyber-espionage, or poor tradecraft.[27] Mark Kelton, then the Deputy Director of the National Clandestine Service for Counterintelligence, was initially skeptical that a mole was to blame.[27]

In January 2018, a former CIA officer named Jerry Chun Shing Lee[nb 1] was arrested at John F. Kennedy International Airport, on suspicion of helping dismantle the CIA's network of informants in China.[30][31]

Operation Aurora:
Operation Aurora was a series of cyber attacks conducted by advanced persistent threats such as the Elderwood Group based in Beijing, China, with ties to the People's Liberation Army.[2] First publicly disclosed by Google on January 12, 2010, in a blog post,[1] the attacks began in mid-2009 and continued through December 2009.[3]

The attack has been aimed at dozens of other organizations, of which Adobe Systems,[4] Juniper Networks[5] and Rackspace[6] have publicly confirmed that they were targeted. According to media reports, Yahoo, Symantec, Northrop Grumman, Morgan Stanley[7] and Dow Chemical[8] were also among the targets.

As a result of the attack, Google stated in its blog that it plans to operate a completely uncensored version of its search engine in China "within the law, if at all", and acknowledged that if this is not possible it may leave China and close its Chinese offices.[1] Official Chinese sources claimed this was part of a strategy developed by the U.S. government.[9]

The attack was named "Operation Aurora" by Dmitri Alperovitch, Vice President of Threat Research at cyber security company McAfee. Research by McAfee Labs discovered that "Aurora" was part of the file path on the attacker's machine that was included in two of the malware binaries McAfee said were associated with the attack. "We believe the name was the internal name the attacker(s) gave to this operation," McAfee Chief Technology Officer George Kurtz said in a blog post.[10]

According to McAfee, the primary goal of the attack was to gain access to and potentially modify source code repositories at these high tech, security and defense contractor companies. "[The SCMs] were wide open," says Alperovitch. "No one ever thought about securing them, yet these were the crown jewels of most of these companies in many ways—much more valuable than any financial or personally identifiable data that they may have and spend so much time and effort protecting."[11]
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operation_Aurora
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Re: Operation Clusterfuck: China Rolls Up CIA Assets, 2010

Postby dada » Sat Aug 18, 2018 10:42 pm

Admiral McRaven said 'make your bed.' And Gershom Scholem said 'there's something fascist about an ordered house.'

--

Yankee cowboy war 2.0. Like a rematch, in silicon valley? The Silicon Bowl. Or are you saying something else that I'm missing here, Griz.

--

"a mole, cyber-espionage, or poor tradecraft." How about "and" poor tradecraft. Also, of course moles. Plural. Remember, China wrote the book on spies. Literally.

Poor, sloppy tradecraft, no matter how you slice it.

But look how China positions itself. Do everything, deny everything.

Simple strategy. And what can anyone do about it? China got what we call capitalist leverage.

I don't know, looks to me like they're outplaying everyone. And yet, they appear vulnerable. Top cat, posing as the underdog. I don't think America will ever learn how to use a strategy like that. Even if it tried, I don't think the world would buy it. This is a strategy that takes years and years to craft. A strategy of underestimation. The long game. Very long.

meh, just some thoughts. Meanwhile, from the bottom of the sea: In January and February 2018, Chinese government hackers reportedly stole 614 gigabytes of data from a Naval Undersea Warfare Center-affiliated contractor.[46] The compromised material reportedly included information on a project dubbed "Sea Dragon", as well as United States Navy submarine cryptographic systems and electronic warfare.[46]
Both his words and manner of speech seemed at first totally unfamiliar to me, and yet somehow they stirred memories - as an actor might be stirred by the forgotten lines of some role he had played far away and long ago.
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Re: Operation Clusterfuck: China Rolls Up CIA Assets, 2010

Postby liminalOyster » Sun Aug 19, 2018 12:39 pm

"It's not rocket surgery." - Elvis
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Re: Operation Clusterfuck: China Rolls Up CIA Assets, 2010

Postby dada » Sun Aug 19, 2018 2:47 pm

Right? Just deny everything.

Very different from western intelligence strategy. 'We can neither confirm nor deny...' looks wishy-washy by comparison. Surkov's 'You hypocrites cannot prove anything' strategy looks weaksauce by comparison, too.

It's like post-modern truth games are a retreat into a defensive position. And it doesn't even matter, because China isn't even playing the same game.

I guess the simple analogy would be something like, western intelligence is still under the illusion that it's playing on Kissinger's realpolitik chessboard, but Surkov started playing star trek 3d chess without telling them. China's game is Go. Has been the whole time.
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Re: Operation Clusterfuck: China Rolls Up CIA Assets, 2010

Postby dada » Sat Sep 01, 2018 6:11 pm

Thinking about China's weakness. Something about being insulted by what one would expect to be petty flies for an iron bull like China, things that seem like they'd be easily shrugged off. Instead they respond. If I could put a name to it, maybe I'd call it an unnecessary, irrational need to 'save face.' Seemingly unnecessary and irrational from where I'm sitting, at least.

Not just China's weakness, of course. Lots of individuals are like that, too. In individuals it's a simple tell any poker player knows, reveals someone's feelings of insecurity about the cards they're holding.

Notice Surkov-strategy players don't have a tell like that. Could be they're confident in the cards, better bluffers, or perhaps just a bit mental. Although playing at being a bit mental is a bluffer's strategy, too.

But I'm talking China, here, and giving some examples:

Operation Aurora. Wiki say "According to a diplomatic cable from the U.S. Embassy in Beijing, a Chinese source reported that the Chinese Politburo directed the intrusion into Google's computer systems. The cable suggested that the attack was part of a coordinated campaign executed by "government operatives, public security experts and Internet outlaws recruited by the Chinese government." [...] According to The Guardian's reporting on the leak, the attacks were "orchestrated by a senior member of the Politburo who typed his own name into the global version of the search engine and found articles criticising him personally.""

Of course maybe that's just what we're supposed to think. China making it look like they have the insecurity tell. Because it's difficult to believe a whole op like that would come about for that reason. But then there's this from chinese espionage in the us wiki:

"In January 2013, The New York Times reported that it was the victim of hacking attempts originating from China during the previous four months after it published an article on Prime Minister Wen Jiabao. According to the newspaper, the "attacks appear to be part of a broader computer espionage campaign against American news media companies that have reported on Chinese leaders and corporations.""

That seems more plausible, and also supports the 'ridiculous responses arising from an uncontrollable need to save face' theory.

Then there's this, from MSS China wiki:

"In 2012, an executive assistant to MSS vice minister Lu Zhongwei was found to have been passing information to the CIA. Lu Zhongwei was not formally charged, but that incident was said to have infuriated Hu Jintao and led to a tightening on information dissemination and increased counterintelligence activities in Beijing and abroad."

That one would be the most understandable. Even one spy matters. And China takes great pride in their spies. Would be very upsetting to find out you got one-upped in spies at any point.

Although, doomed spies. Lu was not formally charged.
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