Modern Monetary Theory

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Re: Modern Monetary Theory

Postby Elvis » Tue Nov 06, 2018 6:17 am

It was a very small sum ($120M) and in no way represents the kind of catastrophic default so breathlessly predicted by the budget hawks.

The reasons it happened are so hazy (it's Congress' fault!—no, Treasury had a computer glitch!—no, someone forgot to write the check!), I wouldn't be surprised if it was inside sabatoge of the Carter economy—so the Reagan/Casey gang could then turn around and say, in today's terms, "OMG Carter tax & spend FAIL!"

Anyway, the title is typically wrong: the instruments were T-bills, not bonds.



History
When Did The U.S. Last Default On Treasury Bonds?
3:44
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Transcript

July 11, 20113:00 PM ET
Heard on All Things Considered

A potential default on U.S. treasury bonds isn't as unprecedented as politicians would have you think. In 1979, the U.S. failed to make timely payments to its bondholders — and the results weren't pretty. Robert Siegel speaks with Ball State University finance professor Terry Zivney, who co-authored a journal article called "The Day the United States Defaulted on Treasury Bills," about the results of that last default.

ROBERT SIEGEL, host:

Politicians and commentators commonly speak of a potential default on U.S. Treasury bonds as something unprecedented. But back in 1979, the country did get a glimpse of what happens when we don't pay bondholders in full and on time. And it's not pretty.

More than 20 years ago, professor Terry Zivney, who's now a professor of finance at Ball State University in Indiana, co-authored a journal article called "The Day the United States Defaulted on Treasury Bills." Professor Zivney, welcome to the program.

Professor TERRY ZIVNEY (Finance, Ball State University): Thank you for having me.

SIEGEL: And take us back to the spring of 1979. How was it that the Treasury did not redeem some Treasury bills that came due in April and May?

Prof. ZIVNEY: Well, that's a little bit of a mystery even to me. I believe it was similar to the situation we have now, where Congress was debating raising the debt ceiling. And in the process of all these - the wrangling going on, some of the little paperwork details, like writing checks, got lost in the process. And so they didn't get written.

SIEGEL: The Treasury actually pleaded that they had bookkeeping problems, computer problems in paying off people.

Prof. ZIVNEY: Oh, they said, yes. They said there were technical errors, word-processing errors. But I'm sure the thousands of people that did not receive their $120 million were not, you know, mollified by hearing it was just a technical difficulty.

SIEGEL: A hundred-twenty million dollars was the amount of federal debt that was at issue. You apply the dictionary definition of default, and this was a default on the debt they held. But $120 million was a tiny sliver of the Treasury's debt.

Prof. ZIVNEY: Yes, it was. The Treasury had around $800 billion outstanding at that time, so it was a very small proportion. However, professor Richard Marcus of the University of Wisconsin, Milwaukee, and I did some research. And we concluded that the defaults of 1979 raised the interest rates that the government had to pay on their securities by about six-tenths of 1 percent.

SIEGEL: Six-tenths of 1 percent - not on $120 million, but you're saying on the 800 billion, almost a trillion dollars.

Prof. ZIVNEY: Yes. And so six-tenths of 1 percent of a trillion dollars is around $6 billion a year on a $120 million mistake.

SIEGEL: Now, you say that the cost of this small default in 1979 was an increase in the interest rates the government was paying of six-tenths of 1 percent - at the rate of six-tenths of 1 percent a year. For how long did the Treasury still have to pay that - if you will, that premium for default, or when did it go away?

Prof. ZIVNEY: Well, I can't say for sure when it went away. During the period of our study, which was over a year - six months on either side of this default - we saw no signs of that extra rate going away.

SIEGEL: But everyone could see that the Congress did get around to extending the debt limit, and they were going to continue paying off all of the government's creditors. That didn't bring the rate right down a couple of days after all this happened?

Prof. ZIVNEY: No, it didn't. In our study, we found that the rate stayed up at least through the end of our study, which was six months after the original default. There was no sign that the rates were declining.

So I think the markets remember. They say OK, you had a problem; you had a blemish - again, just like any individual case. All other investors are a little bit weary of you, going forward. Maybe next the time they'll be the person that doesn't get their $120 million.

SIEGEL: Well, professor Zivney, thank you very much for talking with us.

Prof. ZIVNEY: Ah, you're more than welcome. Thank you for having me.

SIEGEL: Professor Terry Zivney, a professor of finance at Ball State University in Muncie, Indiana.

https://www.npr.org/2011/07/11/13777334 ... sury-bonds
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Re: Modern Monetary Theory

Postby Elvis » Tue Nov 06, 2018 7:19 am

Here are 1.5 trillion reasons why the banking sector resists MMT and the wide-open possibilities it implies for programs like federally funded free education.

Over 44 million Americans collectively hold nearly $1.5 trillion in student debt.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Student_debt


Check this from March this year; at this time I don't know the fate of the proposed bill:

By Josh Mitchell and
AnnaMaria Andriotis
Updated March 7, 2018 5:51 p.m. ET

Banks Want a Bigger Piece of Your Student Loan


Lobbying group pushes to limit how much individuals can borrow from government programs

Private lenders are pushing to break up the government’s near-monopoly in the $100 billion-a-year student-loan market.

The banking industry’s main lobbying group, the Consumer Bankers Association, is pressing for the government to institute caps on how much individual graduate students and parents of undergraduates can borrow from the government to cover tuition.


That could lead more families to turn to private lenders to cover portions of their bills, meaning lower interest rates for households with good credit histories and constrained funding for households with blemished records.

A group of investors also is lobbying for legislation to provide a clearer legal framework for “income-share agreements,” under which private investors provide money upfront to cover tuition in exchange for a portion of a student’s income after school. Firmer rules would help spur more agreements, the group said.

At stake is potentially billions of dollars in new business for private lenders, a group dominated by SLM Corp., better known as Sallie Mae, Wells Fargo & Co., and Discover Financial Services .

The U.S. Education Department makes about 90% of student loans annually, a market that totaled $107 billion in new originations in the most recent academic year, according to the College Board.

Student debt has more than doubled over the past decade, driven by a boom in college enrollment during the recession and rising tuition. Roughly a fifth of all student debt outstanding—excluding debt held by borrowers still in school—sits in accounts that are at least 90 days delinquent, according to the New York Federal Reserve.

Private lenders pushed for legislative changes in previous years to no avail, but now they are receiving a more welcome reception from congressional Republicans and the Trump administration.

House Republicans, looking to revamp higher-education policies for the first time in a decade, have included the industry’s proposals in a wide-ranging bill unveiled in November, which they hope to pass this year.


Education on Loan

[graph]: The federal government's share of the student loan market has increased in the past decade. New student loansSource: The College BoardNote: In 2016 dollars. For academic years ending in calendar year shown. 2017 is an estimate. Federal loans include loans made directly by the government and federally guaranteed loans.

Student loans made by lenders other than the federal government during the last academic year, 2016-2017, totaled $11.6 billion, down 51%, after inflation, from a decade earlier, according to the College Board.

Private student lending has fallen in part because banks tightened underwriting standards after the 2007-2009 financial crisis. It also has dropped because of moves by Congress to allow students to borrow more directly from the government. Starting in 2006, most graduate students have been able to borrow unlimited amounts. Parents also face no restrictions on how much they can borrow under the Parent Plus program.

The Republican bill—Promoting Real Opportunity, Success, and Prosperity through Education Reform, or Prosper, Act :ohno: —calls for limits on the total federal student-loan amounts certain borrowers can receive. Many graduate students wouldn’t be able to borrow more than $150,000 in total federal loans for undergraduate and graduate studies. Parents in many cases would be limited to about $56,000 per dependent. That could mean students who attend pricey schools or those who go on for advanced degrees will go to the private student lenders to cover additional borrowing needs.

The House bill—introduced by Rep. Virginia Foxx (R., N.C.), chairwoman of the House education committee, late last year—cleared the panel in December and now requires approval of the full House. A vote hasn’t been set. Her Senate counterpart, Lamar Alexander (R., Tenn.), has yet to introduce companion legislation this year.

Critics say some of the industry’s proposals would hurt taxpayers and students who lack the credit to qualify for private-sector loans. Some schools and student advocates add that setting stricter dollar limits on federal loans would limit many students from attending schools of their choice.

“The number one priority of Wall Street banks is their own bottom line,” Sen. Elizabeth Warren (D., Mass.), a member of the Senate education committee, said in a statement. “Pushing more students to borrow private loans from banks without consumer protections is a terrible idea.”

Banks counter that the government’s policy of extending loans to college and graduate students, no questions asked, has led to high default rates, runaway tuition inflation and taxpayer costs.

[video]

“We absolutely believe there is a role for the federal government. What we don’t want to see is continued nearly unlimited lending that has been fueling a rise in tuition costs,” said Kristen Fallon, vice president of congressional affairs for the Consumer Bankers Association.

Private lenders won’t make loans to cover tuition at schools of dubious quality, Ms. Fallon says. “They’re making some assessment on the value proposition” of individual schools, she said. “We think that is absolutely necessary.”

CBA leaders have met with lawmakers and Trump administration officials to push for the changes, a spokesman said. The group spent $3.5 million in lobbying last year on all issues, according to the nonprofit Center for Responsive Politics.

Private student lenders target the most creditworthy borrowers. That includes parents of undergraduate students and graduate students with an established history of paying debts on time. Most private lenders require high credit scores, and about 90% of the loan dollars they extend to undergraduates have parent or other adult cosigners attached to them, according to MeasureOne, which tracks lending in the private student-loan sector.

Several private lenders are offering lower interest rates than what the federal government charges to the most creditworthy borrowers. And unlike federal loans, most private loans don’t charge an origination fee when borrowers sign up for the loan.

Private lenders hope low interest rates, which often start at about 4% to 5% for the most creditworthy borrowers, will persuade applicants to take out private loans. A federal program known as “Plus” loans for graduate students and parents of undergraduates that are given out during the current academic year have rates of 7%, regardless of how high or low borrowers credit scores are. The government currently charges rates of 4.45% for undergraduate loans.

The government relies on interest payments from creditworthy borrowers to offset the money it loses on defaults from other borrowers and thereby keep the federal loan program solvent. :roll: :wallhead:


Write to Josh Mitchell at joshua.mitchell@wsj.com and AnnaMaria Andriotis at annamaria.andriotis@wsj.com

Appeared in the March 8, 2018, print edition as 'Banks Push for Student Loans.'


https://www.wsj.com/articles/banks-look ... 1520418600
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Re: Modern Monetary Theory

Postby JackRiddler » Tue Nov 06, 2018 5:05 pm

.

Really on fire here, with the bit about the 1979 "default" (and the excuses are indeed bizarre!) and finding the Ruml article:

Elvis » Tue Nov 06, 2018 3:44 am wrote:Its evident focus on corporate income tax is unsurprising considering the source (Wall Street)—but—Ruml does make good points as to why it's an odious tax. Randall Wray argues, just as Ruml does below, that if the aim of the corporate income tax is to reduce income inequality, it's much better to tax the owners, as opposed to the entire enterprise, where it adversely affects employment and prices (lose/lose). Ruml points out the problem of the owners shielding their investment incomes from income taxes.


If you lowered/abolished the corporate tax but raised the income tax, why wouldn't the owners just pay themselves less? Either way, it's theirs to dispose of, which I guess is why the dual taxation was imposed in the first place. Back when income tax was highest on the top brackets (90% into Eisenhower era), the response was to invest more, so it had an arguable public purpose.

Let's not pretend all productive enterprise is good, or that all corporations are engaged in productive enterprise. What about the ones that are just fronts for managing fortunes. A lot of rich people will be happy to keep the money in their "corporation" (their wealth management org, however structured legally) and pay themselves later. I think every tax scheme you're going to devise for them is just going to be gamed, at least until we say that fortunes above a certain level should not exist and should be expropriated.

My philosophical differences here are great. Obviously Wray is fine with capitalism, I am not. Basically, these entities should not be private and for-profit. That's always going to go sideways. They are for example incapable of intentional obsolescence (i.e., for ecological or social reasons, it should be possible to say a given industry needs to wrap up and go away, and not have it resist and insist that petroleum is freedom and fight for that for another century until the last exploitable net-energy drop is burned).

Basically, I have a problem with any solution that leaves this much investable capital in the hands of private gain-seekers to dispose however makes money for them, even if they're not your usual sociopaths. Of course I have a problem with "government" per se, to not be disastrous this requires a revolution in democracy, education, civic attitude, the works.

In a less utopian version I would want to convert corporate income tax to cover resource/carbon/pollution and other externalized costs as assessed from actual activity. (But plenty of activities should just be prohibited over the shortest possible timeframe. Not carbon tax but forcing zero-carbon a.s.a.p. All this needs socialization and a state much stronger and autonomous relative to capital.)

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Re: Modern Monetary Theory

Postby Elvis » Thu Nov 08, 2018 3:38 am

JackRiddler wrote:In a less utopian version I would want to convert corporate income tax to cover resource/carbon/pollution and other externalized costs as assessed from actual activity. (But plenty of activities should just be prohibited over the shortest possible timeframe. Not carbon tax but forcing zero-carbon a.s.a.p. All this needs socialization and a state much stronger and autonomous relative to capital.)


I agree with pretty much everything in your post, but for the presentI think a "less utopian version" is the effective approach. (The "my special brand of class struggle or nothing" types and the "spiritually superior/above-it-all" chatterboxes will dismiss any practical measures, but, as the murderous consequences of such head-up-ass thinking pour in—fuck them.)

In 2018 a U.S. politician can say "I'm a socialist" and still get elected; anyone who says "capitalism needs to end" will be run out of town on a rail. They can only bite off what the electorate can chew.
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Re: Modern Monetary Theory

Postby Elvis » Thu Nov 08, 2018 4:06 am

By now I've watched numerous lectures by Stephanie Kelton, and they're all good, and each one adds some new dimension to my understanding. But this year she's really honed her message and makes effective use of graphics and props. The lecture below, recorded just last month at Stony Brook University—where she is professor of public policy and economics—is the best I've seen yet.

Significantly, after her 40-minute 'show' (she makes it fun, involving the audience), she's interviewed by no less than the president of Stony Brook himself, Samuel L. Stanley Jr. Judging by his excellent questions, Dr. Stanley gets it—and likes it—and it's encouraging that the head of a prestigious school like Stony Brook is supporting Kelton's message.

Yeah, I'm on a honeymoon with MMT, but consider that Kelton, Wray, Mosler and others have been courting it for more than 30 years now. Its time has arrived.



https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=WS9nP-BKa3M

Presidential Lecture Series: Stephanie Kelton
4,485 views

Stony Brook University
Published on Oct 18, 2018

"But How Will We Pay for It? Making Public Money Work for Us" - Oct. 15, 2018

Our nation’s finances are a blistering topic. Democrats blame Republicans for "blowing up the deficit" with tax cuts, while Republicans insist that programs such as Social Security and Medicare are the real drivers of our fiscal mess. As politicians fight over who’s at fault, an important debate is getting lost in the fog.

Professor Kelton casts a different light on these fiscal feuds and the budget deficit, arguing that both sides are missing the bigger picture when it comes to paying for our future.

Stephanie Kelton is a professor of public policy and economics at Stony Brook University. Before joining Stony Brook, she chaired the Economics Department at the University of Missouri—Kansas City, where she taught for seventeen years. She served as chief economist on the U.S. Senate Budget Committee (Democratic staff) in 2015 and as a senior economic adviser to Bernie Sanders’s 2016 presidential campaign. She is a former editor-in-chief of the top-ranked blog New Economic Perspectives and member of the TopWonks network of the nation’s best thinkers.
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Re: Modern Monetary Theory

Postby Elvis » Thu Nov 08, 2018 4:47 am

More on why we can't have nice things:

Michael Hudson is another smart cookie, with a new (2017) book, J Is For Junk Economics: A Guide to Reality in the Age of Deception. Here are two excerpts from an interview transcript. Entire interview at link—there are five parts* this is just the fourth, I haven't seen the others yet—or see the 12-minute video below.


http://michael-hudson.com/2017/03/why-d ... g-profits/

Why Deficits Hurt Banking Profits
By Michael
Monday, March 6, 2017 Interviews

Economist Michael Hudson takes on the mythology surrounding government budgets and explains how the term ‘stability’ has been used as a cover for financial fraud.

. . .

The advantage of governments creating money is they don’t have to pay interest, because the spending is self-financing. Bank lobbyists cry about how large the government debt is, but this is debt that is not expected to be repaid. Adam Smith wrote that no government has ever paid its debt.

I think it’s easiest for most Americans to understand this by looking at Europe. Under the Eurozone’s rules, central banks are not allowed to create much money. As a result the economies of Europe are shrinking into austerity. Greece is the most notorious example. Here you have unemployment among youth up to 50% as the economy for the last five years is suffering from the worst depression since the 1930s. Yet the government is not able to spend the money needed to rebuild the economy. The banks won’t let them do it.

The aim of neoliberals is to prevent governments from spending money to revive growth by running deficits. Their argument is: “If a government can’t run a deficit, then it can’t spend money on roads, schools and other infrastructure. They’ll have to privatize these assets – and banks can create their own credit to let investors buy these assets and run them as rent-extracting monopolies.”

The bank strategy continues: “If we can privatize the economy, we can turn the whole public sector into a monopoly. We can treat what used to be the government sector as a financial monopoly. Instead of providing free or subsidized schooling, we can make people pay $50,000 to get a college education, or $50,000 just to get a grade school education if families choose to if you go to New York private schools. We can turn the roads into toll roads. We can charge people for water, and we can charge for what used to be given for free under the old style of Roosevelt capitalism and social democracy.”


This idea that governments should not create money implies that they shouldn’t act like governments. Instead, the de facto government should be Wall Street. Instead of governments allocating resources to help the economy grow, Wall Street should be the allocator of resources – and should starve the government to “save taxpayers” (or at least the wealthy). Tea Party promoters want to starve the government to a point where it can be “drowned in the bathtub.”

But if you don’t have a government that can fund itself, then who is going to govern, and on whose terms? The obvious answer is, the class with the money: Wall Street and the corporate sector. They clamor for a balanced budget, saying, “We don’t want the government to fund public infrastructure. We want it to be privatized in a way that will generate profits for the new owners, along with interest for the bondholders and the banks that fund it; and also, management fees. Most of all, the privatized enterprises should generate capital gains for the stockholders as they jack up prices for hitherto public services.”

The reason why the European countries, the United States and other countries ran budget deficits for so many years is because they want to keep this infrastructure in the public domain, not privatized. The things that government spends money on – roads, railroads, schools, water and other basic needs – are the kind of things that people absolutely must obtain. So they’re the last things you want to privatize. If they’re privatized instead of being publicly funded, they can be monopolized. Most public spending programs are for such natural monopolies.

The guiding idea of a well-run economy is to keep natural monopolies out of private hands. This was not done in Russia after 1991. Its disaster under the neoliberals is a classic example. It led to huge immigration rates, shortening life spans, rising disease rates and drug use. You can see how to demoralize a country if you can stop the government from spending money into the economy. That will cause austerity, lower living standards and really put the class war in business. So what Trump is suggesting is to put the class war in business, financially, with an exclamation point.

[more...]


and more:

SHARMINI PERIES: You talked about the implications of cutting government spending and, in fact, your myth number 18 deals with this. You describe this myth as saying that cutbacks in public spending will bring the government budget into balance, restoring stability. And you just demonstrated through the Russian example that this is quite misleading and in fact has the opposite effect and destabilizes the population. So this policy Trump seems to endorse – the cutback in public spending – give us some examples of how this could affect society.

MICHAEL HUDSON: You used the word “stability” and this is often a slogan to prevent thought. George Orwell didn’t use the term “junk economics,” but he defined what doublethink is. The function is to prevent thought. “Stability” is akin to the “Great Moderation.” Remember how economists running up to the 2008 crisis said, “This is a Great Moderation.”

We now know that it was the most unstable decade in a century. It was a decade of financial fraud, it was a decade where economic inequality between wealth and the rest of the economy widened. So what made it moderate? Alan Greenspan went before the Senate Committee and gave a long talk on what was so “stable”? He said that what’s stable is that workers haven’t gone on strike. They are so deeply in debt, they owe so much money that they’re one paycheck away from missing an electric utility payment. So they’re afraid to strike. They’re afraid even to protest against working conditions. They’re afraid to ask that their wages be increased to reflect their productivity. What’s stable is the wealthy people, Greenspan’s constituency, the five percent or the one percent get all of the income and the people get nothing. That is stability according to Alan Greenspan.

Words like “stability” or similar euphemisms are used to make people think that somehow the economy is stable and normal. The reality is that it is being slowly squeezed. That’s basically what happened in the Great Moderation. The government was cutting back spending on social programs, dismantling the New Deal array of consumer protection agencies, which Trump also wants to get rid of. The first thing he wanted to get rid of, he said, is Elizabeth Warren’s Consumer Financial Protection Agency. The problem for Republicans serving their bank lobbyists is that it’s trying to prevent fraud – and that limits consumer choice. Just like we let people go to MacDonald’s and buy junk food and junk sodas to get obese, we have to let them have the free choice to put their pension funds in Wall Street companies that are going to cheat them.

These are the Wall Street firms that have paid tens of billions of dollars for the financial fraud they’ve committed. The Republicans want to dismantle all of the penalties against financial fraud, against cheating consumers. That would reduce the amount of money that sector can extract, and these people are what’s driving the economy. But they’re driving the economy largely by debt leveraging bordering on fraud. That’s the kicker in all this.

By dismantling government spending on the Consumer Financial Protection Agency, the public news agencies, the National Endowment for the Arts, you’re stripping the economy away and making the American economy like what Margaret Thatcher did in England. You make it less dynamic, a less lively place, and above all a poorer economy. That is the aim of these “reforms,” which mean undoing what reforms used to mean for the last century.

These words and the vocabulary used in the press dovetail into each other to paint a picture of a fictitious economy. The aim is to make people think that they’re living in a parallel universe, unable to use a vocabulary and economic concepts to explain just why life is so unfair and why they’re being squeezed so badly.

Above all, the aim is to dissuade them from thinking about how it doesn’t have to be this way. There is no natural law that says that they should be squeezed by debt, monopolies and fraud. But that kind of thinking requires an alternative program – and an alternative program requires recapturing the language to explain what it is that you’re trying to create as an alternative.



‘J is for Junk Economics’: Michael Hudson on TRNN (4/5)

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=cQmrg8cIjdQ


*All five parts of the series can be found here:
https://www.youtube.com/results?search_ ... on+on+TRNN
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Re: Modern Monetary Theory

Postby Elvis » Fri Nov 09, 2018 1:45 am

Stephanie Kelton on The Jimmy Dore Show! :jumping:



https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=5baKgv7Zl5g
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Re: Modern Monetary Theory

Postby Elvis » Sat Nov 10, 2018 6:56 am

Elvis » Sat Nov 10, 2018 3:54 am wrote:Correction—the once-usual $5B TGA target balance has risen—new information:


https://medium.com/new-york-fed/what-mi ... fa8292cd07

the U.S. Treasury holds cash balances at the Federal Reserve in the Treasury General Account (TGA), its primary “checking account.” Before the crisis, Treasury targeted a TGA balance of $5 billion on most days; those balances increased during the global financial crisis. In May 2015, the Treasury announced plans to hold a level of cash generally sufficient to cover one week of outflows to help protect against a potential interruption in market access. Since that cash management policy went into effect, TGA balances have averaged around $250 billion, reaching as high as $440 billion.


In 2015, given a $5B daily TGA balance, if Treasury drained the TGA every day for a year, to pay for federal spending, the total would be about $1.25 trillion.

In 2015, federal expenditures were $3.688 trillion.

So, no way the TGA balance covered expenditures. "Outflows" means added bank reserves, not paying out budget expenditures.

(Why is this reminding me of a shell game? "Is the spending money under shell A, or shell B? Or is it behind Door Number One?")



P.S. Office of Fiscal Services website still says the daily target is "$5B to $7B." So hard to find solid information.
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Re: Modern Monetary Theory

Postby JackRiddler » Sat Nov 10, 2018 7:25 pm

.

I'd not be sure you would find a published record of the Treasury account online by the day. Certainly doubt this is published in real time.

Kelton at Stony Brook really is the new champion video for fastest best possible intro.

I don't think I'd seen the sequence of cartoons since 1937. (That's the year when FDR was slammed for the deficit and the "court packing" plan and cut spending, and of the big new recession.) That is incredibly effective, showing the predictions of utter doom with the same tropes through the decades as the total debt mounts from $37 billion to $19 trillion... and they never come true. (The closest was in the 1970s, and that was the decade of profit crisis, transition to full fiat, inflation and oil shocks, ending with full neoliberal-monetarist takeover. I think faith was shakiest then.)

Very, very effective chart of sectoral surpluses vs. deficits over time at 15:43.

Most of all, starting after 25:30, the devastating listing of all periods with surplus in U.S. history, each of them coming in immediate prelude to each of the country's signature crash-depressions of 1819, 1837, 1857, 1873, 1893, and 1929. If anyone wants to argue this is not causal, they still have to bloody well explain it as something more than a coincidence.

She could have elaborated more in her comment on 1998-2001, the Clinton surplus years, with the recession in 2001 which she also links vaguely to the 2008 crash a few years later. (!) Way to vague a way to put it when all the others are bullseyes. Every other crash-depression came during the surplus-accumulation. Very important correlation, not to be watered down. As she does point out, the stagnation had started in the wake of the 2000 dot-com crash, here's the NASDAQ:

Image

The index declines were proportionately comparable to 2008, if more limited because the affected sectors though seen as cutting edge were not as globally networked or overleveraged. This crisis was scrubbed away by the immediate post 9/11 actions of massive bailout and war-stimulus and Fed already going to near ZIRP, setting off the extreme years of the housing bubble. But that makes 2008 a different animal, and I'll argue why it was at some point but don't have the time for it now.

.

Since I'm also doing general political economy stuff here, I happened to catch this having a burek at a Bosnian kitchen yesterday:

JPMorgan CEO: U.S. economy is doing fine
Amanpour

JPMorgan Chase CEO Jamie Dimon tells Christiane Amanpour that the U.S. economy is looking very strong going into 2019.Source: CNN


https://edition.cnn.com/videos/world/20 ... ld-videos/

21:30 video


(sell! sell!!!)

He mentioned he was unhappy with Trump's "demogagy" and "populism" before issuing the biggest possible endorsement. Everything's great because of tax cuts and "reasonable" deregulation, which Obama had opposed. (So much ingratitude. Guy saves their asses every fucking way, and this is how they honor it.) No surprise, but it's good to have the affirmation of what we already know Wall Street thinks, coming from its current #1 spokes-monarch. No surprise, it's how they've also reacted to Bolsonaro.

Later on he's almost starts crying talking how wonderful Macron is, the perfect leader, the greatest man, trying to do what is right for his society!

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Re: Modern Monetary Theory

Postby Elvis » Mon Nov 12, 2018 5:06 am

JackRiddler wrote:Very, very effective chart of sectoral surpluses vs. deficits over time at 15:43.

Most of all, starting after 25:30, the devastating listing of all periods with surplus in U.S. history, each of them coming in immediate prelude to each of the country's signature crash-depressions of 1819, 1837, 1857, 1873, 1893, and 1929. If anyone wants to argue this is not causal, they still have to bloody well explain it as something more than a coincidence.


Yes, I've shared those two timelines around, especially the surpluses vs. deficits graphs; they're pretty much a "closer," very hard if not impossible to refute those lines' mirror images. I thought I'd posted them before but maybe not. I created a simpler heading for the first:

Deficit - Surplus.jpg


The second is about the same but adds the international sector, also interesting to track:

Sector Balances.jpg


She could have elaborated more in her comment on 1998-2001, the Clinton surplus years, with the recession in 2001 which she also links vaguely to the 2008 crash a few years later. (!) Way to vague a way to put it when all the others are bullseyes.


I noticed that too, and I think I heard Randall Wray tack on the 2008 crisis as well. Ashamed to say that when talking with gf about it, I couldn't resist tacking it on either, with a lame "helping create the conditions for 2008" type remark. I figured it was a stretch and felt my normally solid ground go a bit shaky.

But — it occurs to me that Robert Rubin would certainly have urged on Clinton's budget surplus, while also persuading Clinton to repeal Glass–Steagall, which did help set the stage for 2008. It's entirely possible that Rubin knew what he was doing, if surplus effects down the line would have helped Goldman Sachs commit a gazillion-dollar fraud. It was a conspiracy, but just how complex, who can say.
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Re: Modern Monetary Theory

Postby Elvis » Mon Nov 12, 2018 7:02 am

Has this September Krugman piece been posted? Microeconomics leads to the personal/household/business budget analogy. This business of sidelining macroeconomics has been rather *convenient* hasn't it...you could almost say it was a coincidence:

https://www.nytimes.com/2018/09/16/opin ... nkish.html
Archive snapshot in case of paywall: http://archive.is/0034d#selection-389.27-393.26


Quoting the first half:

What Do We Actually Know About the Economy? (Wonkish)
Macroeconomics is better than you think, microeconomics worse, and data are limited

By Paul Krugman
Opinion Columnist
Sept. 16, 2018

In a couple of days I’m giving a luncheon talk to the New York chapter of the National Association of Business Economists, and the title of this essay was the title I provided for the talk. To be honest, it was a bit of a dummy title, and I wasn’t at all sure what I would actually say; but I’ve been spending some time trying to pin things down, and found myself wanting to put it together in a little essay. So here are some meta reflections on economic knowledge, inspired in part but not entirely by the financial crisis and its aftermath.

Now, obviously the crisis has inspired both soul-searching among economists and a lot of outside criticism. But I’d argue that most of both the internal soul-searching and the outsider criticism is off-base.

Among macroeconomists, the self-criticism seems to me to be mainly too narrow: people berate themselves for, say, not giving financial markets a bigger role in their models, but few have done what they should, which is to question the whole direction macroeconomics has gone these past four decades or so.

Among economists more generally, a lot of the criticism seems to amount to the view that macroeconomics is bunk, and that we should stick to microeconomics, which is the real, solid stuff. As I’ll explain in a moment, that’s all wrong. In fact, in an important sense the past decade has been a huge validation for textbook macroeconomics; meanwhile, the exaltation of micro as the only “real” economics both gives microeconomics too much credit and is largely responsible for the ways macroeconomic theory has gone wrong.

Finally, many outsiders and some insiders have concluded from the crisis that economic theory in general is bunk, that we should take guidance from people immersed in the real world – say, business leaders — and/or concentrate on empirical results and skip the models. In reality, however, advice from business leaders has generally been worse than useless this past decade, while the voices in the air heard by madmen in authority have, as usual, given very bad advice. And while empirical evidence is important and we need more of it, the data almost never speak for themselves – a point amply illustrated by recent monetary events.

So let me talk about three things:

- The unsung success of macroeconomics

- The excessive prestige of microeconomics

- The limits of empiricism, vital though it is


The clean little secret of macroeconomics

There’s a story about quantum physics – not sure where I read it – about the rivalry between the physicists Julian Schwinger and Richard Feynman. Schwinger was first to work out how to do quantum electrodynamics, but his methods were incredibly difficult and cumbersome. Feynman hit upon a much simpler approach – his famous diagrams – which turned out to be equivalent, but vastly easier to use.

Schwinger, as I remember the story, was never seen to use a Feynman diagram. But he had a locked room in his house, and the rumor was that that room was where he kept the Feynman diagrams he used in secret.

Modern macroeconomics is a bit like that, if you can imagine Schwinger in control of all the journals and in a position to prevent anyone from publishing the simpler version. What’s the equivalent of Feynman diagrams? Something like IS-LM, which is the simplest model you can write down of how interest rates and output are jointly determined, and is how most practicing macroeconomists actually think about short-run economic fluctuations. It’s also how they talk about macroeconomics to each other. But it’s not what they put in their papers, because the journals demand that your model have “microfoundations.”


Now, the thing about IS-LM-type analysis is that using it isn’t that big a deal in normal times, but it makes some very strong predictions – predictions very much at odds with many peoples’ priors — about abnormal times. Specifically, this kind of analysis says that when there is a really big adverse shock to demand – say, from the collapse of a major housing bubble – there’s a regime change, and neither monetary nor fiscal policy have the same effects they do in normal times.

On the monetary side, old-fashioned macro says that once interest rates have been driven down to the zero lower bound, monetary policy loses traction. Even huge increases in the monetary base (bank reserves plus currency in circulation) won’t be inflationary. In fact, if you add in another old-fashioned approach some of us keep in our locked offices – Tobin-style analysis of the banking system* – you conclude that big increases in the monetary base won’t even do much to expand broader measures of the money supply.

We all know what happened. The Bernanke Fed massively expanded the monetary base, by a factor of almost five. There were dire warnings that this would cause inflation and “debase the dollar.” But prices went nowhere, and not much happened to broader monetary aggregates (a result that, weirdly, some economists seemed to find deeply puzzling even though it was exactly what should have been expected.)

What about fiscal policy? Traditional macro said that at the zero lower bound there would be no crowding out – that deficits wouldn’t drive up interest rates, and that fiscal multipliers would be larger than under normal conditions. The first of these predictions was obviously borne out, as rates stayed low even when deficits were very large. The second prediction is a bit harder to test, for reasons I’ll get into when I talk about the limits of empiricism. But the evidence does indeed suggest large positive multipliers.

The overall story, then, is one of overwhelming predictive success. Basic, old-fashioned macroeconomics didn’t fail in the crisis – it worked extremely well. In fact, it’s hard to think of any other example of economic models working this well – making predictions that most non-economists (and some economists) refused to believe, indeed found implausible, but which came true. Where, for example, can you find any comparable successes in microeconomics?

But, you say, we didn’t see the Great Recession coming. Well, what do you mean “we,” white man? OK, what’s true is that few economists realized that there was a huge housing bubble. But that’s not a failure of fundamental models: the models certainly would have predicted that a bursting bubble that slashed residential investment by 4 percent of GDP and destroyed $7 trillion in homeowners’ equity would cause a severe recession. What happened was that economists refused to believe that home prices could be that out of touch with reality.

That’s not exactly a problem with macroeconomics; to some extent it’s a problem with financial economics, but mainly I think it reflected the general unwillingness of human beings (a category that includes many though not necessarily all economists) to believe that so many people can be so wrong about something so big.

The bottom line: the past decade has been a vindication, not a refutation, of good old-fashioned macro. Which brings me to the flip side: microeconomics is not as great as advertised.


The dirty little secret of microeconomics

I spent much of my academic, pre-public intellectual career straddling two surprisingly distinct economics sub-fields. To normal human beings the study of international trade and that of international macroeconomics might sound like pretty much the same thing. In reality, however, the two fields used very different models, had very different intellectual cultures, and tended to look down on each other. Trade people tended to consider international macro people semi-charlatans, doing ad hoc stuff devoid of rigor. International macro people considered trade people boring, obsessed with proving theorems and offering little of real-world use.

Both sides were, of course, right.

Anyway, I think it’s fair to say that over the past few decades the economics profession has tended to take the micro side of this debate. Microeconomic theory, grounded in rigorous derivation of individual behavior from utility maximization, was taken as the gold standard. Old-fashioned macroeconomics, based on loose psychological propositions like the marginal propensity to consume, and often describing aggregate relationships without explicitly describing what individuals were doing, was considered dubious and uncouth.

Indeed, macroeconomists were sufficiently hurt by the sneers of microeconomists that they spent several decades trying to make their field as much like micro as they could.

But does microeconomics really deserve its reputation of moral and intellectual superiority? No.

[more...]


* Krugman cites this 1963 paper by James Tobin, Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper #159 "Commercial Banks as Creators of "Money"." It's 18 pages, I've read page to 11 so far, and can recommend for the theory, plus Tobin has a rather funny and colorful style (for an economist). Intend to learn more about Tobin.
http://cowles.yale.edu/sites/default/fi ... /d0159.pdf


Also: The Krugman NYT article above echoes this Krugman academic paper from 2000 (10pp PDF):

https://www.princeton.edu/~pkrugman/oxrep.pdf

HOW COMPLICATED DOES THE MODEL HAVE TO BE?
OXFORD REVIEW OF ECONOMIC POLICY, VOL. 16, NO. 4

PAUL KRUGMAN
Princeton University

Simple macroeconomic models based on IS-LM have become unfashionable because of their lack of micro-
foundations, and are in danger of being effectively forgotten by the profession.
Yet while thinking about
micro-foundations is a productive enterprise, complex models based on such foundations are not necessar-
ily more accurate than simple, ad-hoc models. Three decades of attempts to base aggregate supply on
rational behaviour have not displaced the Phillips curve; inter-temporal models of consumption do not
offer reliable predictions about aggregate demand. Meanwhile, the ease of use of small models makes them
superior for many practical applications. So we should not allow them to be driven out of circulation.

I. A VANISHING ART

Two years before writing this piece I was assigned
by my then department to teach Macroeconomics I
for graduate students. Ordinarily this course is
taught by someone who specializes in macro-
economics; and whatever topics my popular writ-
ings may cover, my professional specialities are
international trade and finance, not general macro-
economic theory. However, MIT had a temporary
staffing problem, which is itself revealing of the
current state of macro, and I was called in to fill the
gap.

The problem was this: MIT’s first macro segment is
a half-semester course, which is supposed to cover
the ‘workhorse’ models of the field—the standard
approaches that everyone is supposed to know, the
models that underlie discussion at, say, the Fed,
Treasury, and the IMF. In particular, it is supposed
to provide an overview of such items as the IS-LM
model of monetary and fiscal policy, the AS-AD
approach to short-run versus long-run analysis, and
so on. By the standards of modern macro theory,
this is crude and simplistic stuff, so you might think
that any trained macroeconomist could teach it. But
it turns out that that isn’t true.

You see, younger macroeconomists—say, those
under 40 or so—by and large don’t know this stuff.


Their teachers regarded such constructs as the IS-
LM model as too ad hoc , too simplistic, even to be
worth teaching—after all, they could not serve as
the basis for a dissertation. Now MIT’s younger
macro people are certainly very smart, and could
learn the material in order to teach it—but they
would find it strange, even repugnant. So in order to
teach this course MIT has relied, for as long as I can
remember, on economists who learned old-fash-
ioned macro before it came to be regarded with
contempt. For a variety of reasons, however, MIT
couldn’t turn to the usual suspects that year, and I
had to fill the gap.

Now you might say, if this stuff is so out of fashion,
shouldn’t it be dropped from the curriculum? But the
funny thing is that while old-fashioned macro has
increasingly been pushed out of graduate pro-
grammes—it takes up only a few pages in either the
Blanchard–Fischer (1989) or Romer (1996) text-
books that I assigned, and none at all in many other
tracts—out there in the real world it continues to be
the main basis for serious discussion. After 25 years
of rational expectations, equilibrium business cy-
cles, growth and new growth, and so on, when the
talk turns to the next move by the Fed, the European
Central Bank, or the Bank of Japan, when one tries
to see a way out of Argentina’s dilemma, or ask why
Brazil’s devaluation turned out relatively well, one
almost inevitably turns to the sort of old-fashioned,
small-model macro that I taught that spring.

Why does the old-fashioned stuff persist in this
way? I don’t think the answer is intellectual con-
servatism. Economists, in fact, are in general
neophiles, always looking for something radical and
different. Anyway, I have seen over and over again
how young economists, trained to regard IS-LM and
all that with contempt if they even know what it is,
find themselves turning to it after a few years in
Washington or New York. There’s something about
primeval macro that pulls us back to it; if Hicks
hadn’t invented IS-LM in 1937, we would end up
inventing it all over again.

But what is it that makes old-fashioned macro so
compelling? The answer, I would argue, is that we
need small, ad-hoc models as part of our intellectual
tool-box.

Since the 1970s, macroeconomic theory has been
driven in large part by an attempt to get rid of the ad-
hockery. The most prominent and divisive aspect of
that drive has been the effort to provide micro-
foundations for aggregate supply. But efforts to
provide micro-foundations for aggregate demand—
by grounding individual decisions in intertemporal
optimization—have been almost equally determined.
The result has been a turning away from simple,
ad-hoc models of the IS-LM genre.

What I would argue is that this tendency has gone
too far. Of course we should do the more compli-
cated models; of course we should strive for a
synthesis that puts macroeconomics on a firmer
micro-foundation. But for now, and for the foresee-
able future, the little models retain a vital place in the
discipline.

[more...]

“The purpose of studying economics is not to acquire a set of ready-made answers to economic questions, but to learn how to avoid being deceived by economists.” ― Joan Robinson
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Re: Modern Monetary Theory

Postby JackRiddler » Mon Nov 12, 2018 8:11 am

.

Okay, okay, Mr. Hyde (Clinton Propagandist) sometimes is a kindly Dr. Jekyll (actual scholar).

I wonder if economics tracks are still started as 101 Micro and 102 Macro? The words are so powerful, deceptive, and hard to uproot. Almost everyone at some point learns these two terms, microeconomics and macroeconomics, and most never use them again; but even among those who go much further in trying to understand or who actually study economics (that late-19th century wrong turn taken by political economy), the impression created by the linguistic complementarity is hard to shake. Most of what is presented as micro is a different theoretical animal from macro, operating from a different map of the world and approach to observing it. They are more like two disciplines or schools, but the names still falsely imply they are the big-picture and small-mechanics studies of the same observable phenomena proceeding from shared assumptions. Broadly speaking they are complementary only in a functional sense: micro is capitalist faith for individuals, macro is an effort to navigate the capitalist ship.

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Re: Modern Monetary Theory

Postby JackRiddler » Mon Nov 12, 2018 8:25 am

Image

What's the source of this? (This time not meant as skeptical. I always require one.)

Like most I find it easier to remember and talk about the times when I guessed right, rather than the probably equal number of times I got it wrong. A strong memory from 2000: Gore and Bush debate. I don't know whether this part was before or after the kayfabe in which Gore advocated enlightened world leadership (nation bombing) while Bush hilariously counseled against entanglements and "nation-building" (also nation bombing). They're on to the main part of the show, arguing about how best to spend the glorious high surplus expected to continue after the election, with an estimated $2 trillion yet to collect. This was being framed by all as the main policy issue. Bush wants to "give it back" through tax cuts. Gore wants to sequester it as a Social Security "lockbox." As I was still an idiot about these things, or rather a properly educated capitalist citizen, I thought Gore was right, when of course now I understand both were just talking voodoo about imaginary accounting entries. The tax cut (for the rich as usual) was of course far the worse idea, for its distorting effects, for redistributing upward and rewarding the exploiter class with more means to buy politicians. Nevertheless, my most powerful, overwhelming thought, perhaps driven by a still-smouldering rage over the U.S. bombing campaign in Yugoslavia, was that this too was a sham debate among the imperialists. There would be no surplus after the election. There would be war. This was not my precognition but a sound intuitive understanding of social-systemic programming. As true as that ended up being, today I would further know that the surplus presents a bigger crisis than the vanquished deficit had ever been. The god of capitalism needed to see it burning on the sacrificial altar, before He would give America a blessing for the new harvest.

Note US was running a capital accounts surplus as late as the early-1980s. Amazing what 10-15 points on treasuries that cannot possibly default will do.

.
Last edited by JackRiddler on Mon Nov 12, 2018 10:39 pm, edited 2 times in total.
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Re: Modern Monetary Theory

Postby Elvis » Mon Nov 12, 2018 10:10 am

JackRiddler wrote:Image

What's the source of this?


I believe got it either from a Mosler page, a Wray page or a Kelton page; they all use it. The closest reverse image search result suggests it was this page:

http://www.netrootsmass.net/2011/07/l-r ... budgeting/

There, the graph is captioned: "2010q4b Sector Financial Balances by Scott Fullwiler"

Scott Fullwiler | Faculty/Staff Directory | College of Arts and Sciences
cas.umkc.edu/economics/about-us/faculty-staff-directory/name/scott-fullwiler/

Dr. Scott Fullwiler is an Assistant professor in Economics.
cas.umkc.edu/economics/about-us/faculty-staff-directory/name/scott-fullwiler/

So we have a graphmaker. Fullwiler at UMKC would make him a colleague of Wray, right?

The graph is also in the Primer you posted upthread:

http://neweconomicperspectives.org/2011 ... locks.html
MMT Primer

The posts from the MMT Primer series have been collected and organized into Randy’s latest book, Modern Money Theory. It makes for a much more coherent read and is highly recommended for anyone seriously interested in the MMT perspective. (Available from Amazon.com)


As I understand it, Kelton is the founder of the neweconomicperspectives blog. I could have lifted the chart there, but the one I saved is a bit blurry, although I might have enlarged is very slightly to be sized similar to the other one.

Anyway, that'll teach me to always record the source!
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Re: Modern Monetary Theory

Postby JackRiddler » Fri Nov 16, 2018 6:00 pm

.

Very enjoyable and insightful article from a few months ago with gossip, theory, and news.

https://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/st ... 3cdba15121

POLITICS

05/20/2018 07:23 am ET Updated May 21, 2018

Stephanie Kelton Has The Biggest Idea In Washington
Once an outsider, her radical economic thinking won over Wall Street. Now she’s changing the Democratic Party.

By Zach Carter

ILLUSTRATION: DAMON DAHLEN/HUFFPOST PHOTOS: GETTY

For most of her career, Stephanie Kelton was accustomed to being ridiculed. It started in grad school.

At Cambridge University in the late 1990s, she signed up for an economics course taught by Willem Buiter, who later became the chief economist at Citigroup. When she asked a question about money in a particular model, he turned, red-faced with fury, and unloaded on her. “If you are the type of person who thinks money is important,” she recalls him saying, “then you are probably the same type of person who enjoys sitting in your basement and beating yourself with a rubber hose.”

The words obviously left an impression. Kelton ― who is now 48 and has been teaching economics herself for more than 16 years ― repeats them, twice, to make sure they’re transcribed correctly. Buiter didn’t respond to a request for comment.

She’s been receiving (slightly) more polite versions of the same dressing down ever since. Conservatives have accused her of worshipping a “magic money tree,” and Paul Krugman dismissed her ideas in a 2011 New York Times column as a naive blueprint for hyperinflation that carried “a sort of eerie resemblance to John Galt’s speech in Atlas Shrugged” ― a ruthless insult among her left-leaning friends.

Kelton’s core idea ― that the government can’t run out of money or go bankrupt, no matter how much it spends ― hasn’t really changed since the days when Buiter and Krugman were trashing her thinking. But it seems the world has. Today she is a full-fledged member of the American power elite, juggling television bookings with MSNBC’s Chris Hayes and Bloomberg TV’s Joe Weisenthal, writing op-eds for The New York Times and being quoted in The Wall Street Journal.

Pod Save America and Financial Times want her on their podcasts. She’s got a book deal with Public Affairs, and Bloomberg View has signed her up as its newest columnist ― but she isn’t sure that gig is worth the time, given her packed speaking schedule. In May alone, she’s being flown to Las Vegas to debate a former International Monetary Fund chief economist before heading to Monaco to moderate a panel on artificial intelligence. After that, the House of Lords in London.

Everybody wants a piece of Kelton these days because a simple, radical idea she has been workshopping her entire career is the next big thing in Democratic Party politics. She calls it the job guarantee ― a federal program offering a decent job to every American who wants to work, in every county in the country, at any phase of the business cycle.

It’s a practical expression of her monetary thinking. To her, governments aren’t directly constrained by how much programs cost. The serious concern is inflation, and a job guarantee would revolutionize the way the United States manages the value of the dollar, forcing the Federal Reserve to stop creating unemployment when it wants to keep prices down.

Politicians like the job guarantee for a simpler reason: Everybody gets a decent job. The idea is getting traction in the Senate. Bernie Sanders’ office is writing a bill that would create such a program, with help from Elizabeth Warren’s office and support from Kirsten Gillibrand. Even supercentrist Cory Booker has signed off on a pilot version. The Center for American Progress, a leading Democratic think tank, is subtly trying to take credit for the concept (while watering it down).

The sudden respect for Kelton’s big idea isn’t the result of a public clamor for cutting-edge economic theory or an impromptu burst of self-reflection among Washington policymakers. It is instead a story about power and political legitimacy, about the way public officials use economists to block or advance social change and about how economists build credibility by circulating through the cocktail parties, expense-account dinners and conference rooms of high finance.

A onetime college dropout at California State University in Sacramento, Kelton has managed to earn the esteem of both Sanders and an oddball clique of multimillionaire Wall Street traders. Even in hindsight, her journey through this heady milieu seems improbable, almost impossible.

Money doesn’t grow on rich people.
Stephanie Kelton
Five years ago, Kelton had a teaching position at the University of Missouri at Kansas City that was partly financed by Warren Mosler, a Wall Street veteran who lives in the Virgin Islands to keep his tax bill down. His politics were flexible. He calls himself a progressive today, but he started pitching his economic ideas to Donald Rumsfeld in the steam room of a racquetball club in the early 1990s.

Mosler’s true passion is for proving smart people wrong, and his work at Bankers Trust in the 1970s instilled in him some unorthodox ideas about money. When people didn’t take those ideas seriously, he had an ax to grind.

So he started putting up funding for academic research at the Center for Full Employment and Price Stability in Kansas City and Bard College’s Levy Institute, hoping to flesh out his observations into a more formalized school of thought. The economists he helped support ― Kelton, L. Randall Wray, Pavlina Tcherneva, Scott Fullwiler, Mathew Forstater ― eventually called their ideas modern monetary theory, or MMT.

Modern monetary theorists believe that confusion around money has distracted economists from the real things that affect the economic health of society ― natural resources, technology, available labor. Money is a tool governments use to manage these variables and solve social problems. It is not a scarce resource that governments have to track down in order to pay for projects.

Mosler figured this out by making enormous amounts of money placing big bets on deeply indebted governments. “Insolvency is never an issue with nonconvertible currency and floating exchange rates,” he argued in a HuffPost blog.

Kelton’s version is simpler: “Money doesn’t grow on rich people.”

But influence does. And Mosler knew a lot of rich people from his days in high finance, including Maurice Samuels, who made millions for himself and Harvard University when he helped manage its endowment during the George W. Bush years. Samuels was MMT-friendly. He made a killing betting on the Italian lira in a Mosler-inspired trade in the 1990s, and in 2013, he talked another Wall Street alum, Andres Drobny, into hosting a dinner on MMT and suggested he invite Kelton to explain the doctrine.

Kelton didn’t come to MMT through glitzy banking connections. Her father served in the military, and she spent her childhood roaming between Illinois, California and North Carolina. She left Cal State in 1991 when the pay at a local furniture store seemed enough to fulfill her modest ambitions. When she went back to school a couple of years later, she became fascinated by ideas that mainstream economists had long since abandoned. After graduation, she traveled to Cambridge, England, to get her master’s at the temple of John Maynard Keynes.

Studying Keynesian economics was not a fast track to power and wealth in the 1990s. At the time, even top Democrats in Washington considered Keynes little more than a curiosity from the Great Depression. The hot topics in the field were innovation, creative destruction and a future in which information technology rendered the political problems of the 20th century obsolete.

Over the years, Kelton grew accustomed to working among professional outsiders ― liberal bloggers, obscure economists and nerdy political activists. Even today, with the book deal and a house in New York on Long Island’s North Shore with a private kayak dock, there’s still more than a little wide-eyed Midwesterner to her personality. Her favorite spot in Stony Brook ― she teaches at the Center for the Study of Inequalities, Social Justice and Policy at the State University of New York campus there ― is a kitschy diner called Crazy Beans with red-glitter vinyl upholstery.

When Drobny reached out to her, Kelton agreed to stop by the 21 Club in Manhattan to talk about MMT, expecting a small event with a few friends.

“Instead, I show up and there are dozens of people, and they wanted me to talk for two hours,” said Kelton. “I had no speaking notes, nothing.”

The 21 Club is not Crazy Beans. Frequented by presidents, CEOs and celebrities from Ernest Hemingway to Jay-Z, its private dining menu features $180 sea bass and four-figure wine bottles. Drobny’s firm bills itself as a macroeconomic research outfit, but it’s more like an expensive, exclusive club for very rich, very eccentric intellectuals, including Peter Thiel — people who own private islands and financial gurus who leave jobs at Goldman Sachs because the money isn’t good enough.

After a few deep breaths, Kelton started her talk. It was a hit. “One guy wanted to take her to Congress,” Drobny recalled. Another wrote a note to all of Drobny’s clients saying Kelton could revolutionize the way the Fed managed the economy and wanted to start popularizing a new economic metric called the Kelton curve. Her inbox was flooded with follow-up questions, including a note from BNP Paribas chief economist Julia Coronado requesting a private briefing.

If you listen to Kelton long enough, you notice that she never refers to “bankers” or “Wall Street” with the derisive tone common among her political allies. She talks instead about “the financial community.” She’s perfectly aware of how far to the right the politics of Big Finance skew, but she views it more like a peculiar subculture than a dark underworld. After all, Wall Street took her under its wing before Democrats took her seriously.

“The financial community ― if you can be persuasive with an unconventional argument, they don’t care about it being unconventional,” she said. “They want to be right.” There’s real money on the line, and fresh ideas can provide a competitive advantage.

In Washington, by contrast, being right rarely matters. Politicians don’t generally turn to economists for new insight into how the world works. Economists instead serve as a kind of credibility shield ― experts who can be trotted out to assure the public that there are very complex and sophisticated reasons political leaders should be doing the things they do. A big part of any Washington economics job is providing a sense of scientific certainty to political judgments that are, by their very nature, uncertain. This is true for big policy changes as well as straightforward tasks like projecting growth rates and government revenue.

The job, in other words, is to back up your team. Getting a policy decision wrong isn’t such a big deal, as long as everyone else on the team blows the same call. The Democratic Party today, for instance, generally regards the bank deregulation it pursued during Bill Clinton’s presidency as a mistake ― but plenty of economists who advocated it ended up with important jobs in Barack Obama’s administration.

As a result, politically relevant economists fetishize orthodoxy. Nobody with political experience really welcomes a new idea that explains why previous economic policies were wrong. And if Kelton’s MMT doctrine is right, then the way nearly every politician talks about government debt, deficits and even money itself is mostly wrong.

“The basic idea is that the government can’t run out of money,” Kelton said. “It creates money just by spending.”

When people talk about government profligacy bankrupting their grandchildren or triggering a cataclysmic debt crisis, Kelton argues, they’re conflating the experience of a typical family, which has to get money from somewhere outside the household to meet expenses, with that of a sovereign government, which creates money as part of its basic operation.

In one of her most important academic papers, published in 2000, Kelton maintains that government doesn’t actually finance its activity by levying taxes or issuing bonds. Instead, it creates money by spending it into existence. If a government wants to build a road, it calls some contractors and puts money in their bank accounts to pay for it. Where does this money come from? The same place all money comes from: thin air.

This means, among other things, that the government can always pay for whatever it wants ― housing, health care, tanks, whatever. But it doesn’t mean governments can just spend infinite amounts without any consequences, she emphasized. Eventually inflation becomes an issue when the amount of money in circulation gets ahead of the productive capacity of the workforce.

But even inflation doesn’t impose a hard limit on policy options. The Federal Reserve can raise interest rates to deal with it, Congress can raise taxes to pull money out of circulation or even impose price controls. All those have their drawbacks, but depending on circumstances, any of them might be preferable to reducing government spending. It all depends on what a society needs. Those needs, Kelton thinks, should be the primary focus of study ― not the immediate impact on the federal budget deficit, a metric that dominates policy discourse in Washington.

The left-wing appeal of these ideas is obvious. With inflation stubbornly low over the past 35 years, Kelton’s work suggests Democrats have plenty of fiscal room to not only protect Social Security and Medicare but also expand them and propose ambitious new programs. But MMT is also attractive to certain elements of the superrich. Because if we don’t have to worry so much about how much these programs cost, then there is no pressing need to raise taxes in order to pay for them.

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After the 21 Club dinner, Drobny invited Kelton to a small, select conference he was hosting in Santa Monica, California, where she met Larry Summers, a Clinton treasury secretary and Obama economic adviser, who asked her to send him the best 40 pages of material on MMT available. By October 2013, Kelton was on stage explaining MMT at Columbia University alongside Nobel laureate and former Clinton adviser Joseph Stiglitz. Charles Schwab wanted her to present at its Impact conference the next month. The month after that, she spoke at Harvard.

Her career had changed tracks. She wasn’t just a clever economist with some quirky ideas anymore. Her credibility with Wall Street began to register as academic clout.

The great irony of Kelton’s career is that her breakthrough with the financial elite created her breakthrough with the American left. In the fall of 2014, she got a call from Sanders. He was taking over as the ranking minority member of the Senate budget committee and needed a chief economist.

“We wanted somebody who could walk into a room with establishment economists and tell them that they were wrong,” said Warren Gunnels, Sanders’ policy director.

That was essentially what Kelton did every time she addressed Wall Streeters about MMT. “I never speak to audiences that are already on board,” she said. “It always feels like going into the lion’s den. But then they love it.”

There are thousands of left-wing economists. But it’s hard for the economically inexpert to distinguish brilliant creativity from quackery. Kelton’s social credentials with Wall Street helped her stand out.

And Sanders liked the ambition of her policy vision. Perhaps more important, he liked the way she talked about Franklin D. Roosevelt. When Sanders asked her what he should do on the budget committee, she said he should pick up FDR’s unfinished agenda from 1944 ― an economic bill of rights. The top item on that agenda was a good job for everyone, guaranteed.

Sanders hired her as the minority’s chief economist on the budget committee, and when he started his presidential run, she agreed to serve as an adviser to the campaign.

Like most politicians, Sanders doesn’t get his economic ideas from studying economic theory. They’re an extension of his moral intuitions, according to several former staffers. He’s much more interested in Pope Francis than in Thomas Piketty. Sanders likes FDR because he spoke clearly and forcefully about economic justice as a moral and political right, and Sanders likes Kelton because she can communicate not just about inflation but also about rights and justice.

When she teaches at Stony Brook, she supplements the chart-and-graph drudgery of economic analysis with current events and a strong dose of history. This year she’s going over the Freedom Budget proposed by A. Philip Randolph, a civil rights leader who organized the 1963 March on Washington. The Freedom Budget ― first presented in 1966 ― is an “almost perfect document,” Kelton says after class. She particularly likes that its author doesn’t force the government to choose between providing a job as a civil right, and providing other priorities, like funding the military.

“The jobs pay for themselves,” she says, by creating new socially productive stuff that makes its way into the economy. What matters isn’t the deficit but whether these new work hours can generate something useful.

Kelton thinks it’s obvious that there’s plenty of room for more work today. Poverty and unemployment are tricks played on the economy by money ― there are no material or productive barriers to eliminating either one.

But it’s hard for many to believe that achieving such ambitious goals wouldn’t come with some other searing social price. While she got Sanders’ attention talking about economic rights and social justice, he balked at the implications of her broader theory. He had been pounding Republicans on the deficit for years and didn’t want to give it up. He had voted against the expensive Iraq War, the George W. Bush administration’s Big Pharma–friendly Medicare prescription drug benefit and the Bush tax cuts, arguing they were too expensive and diverted resources from programs that would genuinely help the middle class. While Kelton the radical theorist wanted Sanders to shrug off deficits, Sanders the politician wanted to pay for his plan by taxing the rich.

Gunnels said Sanders “does believe that the wealthy and large corporations need to pay their fair share in taxes and we can use that to rebuild our crumbling infrastructure and Medicare and tuition for all Americans.” And Kelton and Sanders discussed their theoretical differences before she was hired. “He wanted to make sure that Stephanie understood that ― that when she came on she was working to advance the agenda of Sen. Sanders,” said Gunnels.

For all its ambition, Sanders’ agenda wasn’t very creative. It just expanded the scope of existing programs that liberals already liked. The minimum wage would be higher. Tuition at public universities would be not just reduced, but free. Medicare would be available to everyone, with better coverage. Kelton didn’t have a problem with any of it, but almost nothing distinctive about her economic thinking ended up in the platform.

She thought her boss was walking into a trap by insisting that higher taxes on the rich and economic growth could pay for everything he wanted to do. She was right. When the campaign enlisted University of Massachusetts at Amherst economist Gerald Friedman to calculate the cost of Sanders’ platform, Friedman relied on overly optimistic assumptions in his modeling. Economists aligned with rival Democratic candidate Hillary Clinton pounced, accusing the Sanders operation of fiscal irresponsibility and economic illiteracy. Sanders staffers still wince at the memory. The numbers shouldn’t have mattered, but they didn’t add up.

To project some intellectual legitimacy for the campaign, Kelton corralled economists into signing letters in support of individual Sanders policies. She got over 200 signatures from people backing a $15 minimum wage and 170 endorsing his plan to break up the banks. This was not an easy task, since nearly every economist with political experience expected Sanders to lose and most saw little reason to get themselves on Clinton’s bad side a few months before she secured the Democratic nomination. Even Friedman endorsed Clinton.

But by 2016, Kelton had some impressive connections. When she noticed Columbia University economist Jeffrey Sachs criticizing Clinton’s foreign policy on cable news, she reached out to see if he could find other common ground with Sanders. It should not have been a natural fit. During the 1990s, Sachs was a proponent of shock-therapy neoliberal economics ― a swift transition from state-dominated economies to market-based pricing and delivery. It proved a disaster in Russia, where he was a top adviser to the government. He has since drifted leftward, but remains a card-carrying member of the D.C. establishment, a mainstay of MSNBC’s “Morning Joe” and superelite conferences like the Aspen Ideas Festival and the World Economic Forum in Davos, Switzerland.

Sachs endorsed Sanders and invited him to a conference at the Vatican, where the senator got to meet one of his heroes, Pope Francis. In one of the oddest political unions of the past 30 years, Sanders returned the favor by writing the introduction to Sachs’ latest book. The Sachs connection boosted Sanders’ credibility in Washington, and the campaign relished getting him in front of the camera. Economics is as much about prestige as it is about math.

Kelton refuses to criticize Sanders or her time in his employ. She likes him, and she’s proud of her work for the campaign. But other staffers say she was obviously underutilized by the three white men at the top of the organization. The Sanders camp’s struggles with race and gender aren’t exactly breaking news, but in Kelton’s case, it’s hard to distinguish the campaign’s gender trouble from general incompetence or the sexism that pervades the economics profession.

Male economists dominate senior positions internationally and hold 86 percent of tenured jobs in academic doctoral programs, while the number of women entering graduate programs has flatlined at about 33 percent for nearly two decades. The pattern overflows into journalism: The people who cover economic policy for major news outlets tend to look like this. (Hi!) Power and expertise are heavily gendered ideas in America, and so economics, the most powerful form of modern expertise, is a heavily gendered discipline.

Economists don’t like to acknowledge this because it undermines the status of male economists ― who tend to hold more conservative views than their female colleagues ― and the intellectual primacy of the field. It’s a reminder that politics are ultimately governed by social relations, not financial abstractions. In 2005, Summers, the most prominent Democratic Party economist of this generation, gave a lecture downplaying sexism in academic sciences while positing that “issues of intrinsic aptitude” might account for the dearth of female science professors.

He quickly apologized amid a tremendous outcry. But econ is still a bro’s world. A study published last year analyzed the words that were most closely associated with women economists on the popular message board Economics Job Market Rumors. The results are gross: “hotter,” “lesbian,” “bb,” “sexism,” “tits,” “anal,” “marrying,” “feminazi,” “slut.”

Kelton hasn’t been immune to this. She knows men don’t get lectured about rubber hoses, but she doesn’t volunteer complaints about the discipline in casual conversation. Her passion is for economic theory ― probably the most male-dominated sector of the field ― and she’d rather explain to Summers why he’s wrong about Keynes than why he’s wrong about women.

When pressed, she acknowledges the profession can be a minefield. Kelton teaches plenty of feminist economics in her courses, but early in her career, she avoided publishing research on policies that are obviously gendered, like child care and the pay gap.

“It’s easy to get pigeonholed as a women’s economist,” she said. “I’m an economist.”

The basic idea is that the government can’t run out of money. It creates money just by spending.
Stephanie Kelton

Usually, being on the losing end of a lefty Democratic Party presidential run is a career blow. But Clinton’s loss to Donald Trump exploded the existing hierarchy of party experts. Her team of economists, which had expected to be running various government agencies, is instead plugging away at think tanks and universities just like the Sanders crew.

As a result, a new class of intellectuals is getting a shot at crafting the next slate of Democratic priorities, and Kelton is one of the most important economists in their ranks.

When she isn’t busy teaching or working out the economic effects of eliminating student debt, she gets invited to strategy sessions with Senate Minority Leader Chuck Schumer (D-N.Y.), and maintains a strong relationship with the Sanders team. She’s no longer working for his Senate office, but she’s a fellow at the new Sanders Institute, a think tank devoted to progressive policy ideas. In February she connected Sanders with Darrick Hamilton and Sandy Darity, two economists who specialize in the economics of racial inequality. Darity, who teaches at Duke in North Carolina, and Hamilton, who works at the New School in New York, had been putting together a proposal for one of Kelton’s favorite ideas: the job guarantee.

Kelton was already developing a similar proposal with MMT economists. But Hamilton and Darity’s work, which had a stronger focus on infrastructure than Kelton’s, intrigued Sanders, as did their more straightforward focus on economic and racial inequality. Both proposals envision the government’s hiring more than 10 million people who are currently sitting on the economic sidelines, though they differ in the way the program is administered and what kinds of jobs are offered.

After the call, Sanders announced that the job guarantee will be his next major policy initiative. Though the legislative details haven’t been announced, anybody in the job guarantee program would receive at least a $15-an-hour wage and health insurance. Just about everyone in Washington expects it to be the centerpiece of a 2020 Sanders presidential run.

Plenty of liberal economists are skeptical. Even if Kelton doesn’t like focusing on the cost of the plan, the price tag is big: Hamilton and Darrity’s version would run $543 billion a year, or about 3 percent of the U.S. economy, and Kelton’s would come in at about $378 billion a year for the first five years before rising modestly. It would reshuffle labor markets, automatically raising the minimum wage to $15 an hour, requiring significant corporate reorganizations and unpredictable price increases.

The logistics are also formidable: The federal government would need to coordinate with states, municipalities and nonprofits all over the country to get millions of people into new jobs and establish an effective bureaucracy to manage the enterprise through the ups and downs of the business cycle.

Kelton isn’t too worried. People are debating the idea seriously. Some lawmakers are thinking beyond the deficit and asking how much it would grow the economy (hundreds of billions of dollars a year), or improve productivity by developing and maintaining new skills. In April, freshman Rep. Ro Khanna (D-Calif.) called Kelton “one of the most thoughtful and creative economists of our generation,” saying her ideas had “moved the entire debate in Congress.”

It’s too early to know if she can move the country, as well. But nobody is screaming about rubber hoses.

“I believe employment should be a right,” she insists. “Values come first, technical details are next.”


Zach Carter
Senior Reporter, HuffPost
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