by seemslikeadream » Thu Oct 27, 2005 12:11 pm
He gave me great hope that this treason will not stand. If you get a chance watch it on <br><!--EZCODE LINK START--><a href="http://www.cspan.org/" target="top">www.cspan.org/</a><!--EZCODE LINK END--><br><br>The White House cabal<br>By Lawrence B. Wilkerson, LAWRENCE B. WILKERSON served as chief of staff to Secretary of State Colin L. Powell from 2002 to 2005.<br><br><br>IN PRESIDENT BUSH'S first term, some of the most important decisions about U.S. national security — including vital decisions about postwar Iraq — were made by a secretive, little-known cabal. It was made up of a very small group of people led by Vice President Dick Cheney and Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld.<br><br>When I first discussed this group in a speech last week at the New America Foundation in Washington, my comments caused a significant stir because I had been chief of staff to then-Secretary of State Colin Powell between 2002 and 2005.<br><br>ADVERTISEMENT <br> <br>But it's absolutely true. I believe that the decisions of this cabal were sometimes made with the full and witting support of the president and sometimes with something less. More often than not, then-national security advisor Condoleezza Rice was simply steamrolled by this cabal.<br><br>Its insular and secret workings were efficient and swift — not unlike the decision-making one would associate more with a dictatorship than a democracy. This furtive process was camouflaged neatly by the dysfunction and inefficiency of the formal decision-making process, where decisions, if they were reached at all, had to wend their way through the bureaucracy, with its dissenters, obstructionists and "guardians of the turf."<br><br>But the secret process was ultimately a failure. It produced a series of disastrous decisions and virtually ensured that the agencies charged with implementing them would not or could not execute them well.<br><br>I watched these dual decision-making processes operate for four years at the State Department. As chief of staff for 27 months, I had a door adjoining the secretary of State's office. I read virtually every document he read. I read the intelligence briefings and spoke daily with people from all across government.<br><br>I knew that what I was observing was not what Congress intended when it passed the 1947 National Security Act. The law created the National Security Council — consisting of the president, vice president and the secretaries of State and Defense — to make sure the nation's vital national security decisions were thoroughly vetted. The NSC has often been expanded, depending on the president in office, to include the CIA director, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Treasury secretary and others, and it has accumulated a staff of sometimes more than 100 people.<br><br>But many of the most crucial decisions from 2001 to 2005 were not made within the traditional NSC process.<br><br>Scholars and knowledgeable critics of the U.S. decision-making process may rightly say, so what? Haven't all of our presidents in the last half-century failed to conform to the usual process at one time or another? Isn't it the president's prerogative to make decisions with whomever he pleases? Moreover, can he not ignore whomever he pleases? Why should we care that President Bush gave over much of the critical decision-making to his vice president and his secretary of Defense?<br><br>Both as a former academic and as a person who has been in the ring with the bull, I believe that there are two reasons we should care. First, such departures from the process have in the past led us into a host of disasters, including the last years of the Vietnam War, the national embarrassment of Watergate (and the first resignation of a president in our history), the Iran-Contra scandal and now the ruinous foreign policy of George W. Bush.<br><br>But a second and far more important reason is that the nature of both governance and crisis has changed in the modern age.<br><br>From managing the environment to securing sufficient energy resources, from dealing with trafficking in human beings to performing peacekeeping missions abroad, governing is vastly more complicated than ever before in human history.<br><br>Further, the crises the U.S. government confronts today are so multifaceted, so complex, so fast-breaking — and almost always with such incredible potential for regional and global ripple effects — that to depart from the systematic decision-making process laid out in the 1947 statute invites disaster.<br><br>Discounting the professional experience available within the federal bureaucracy — and ignoring entirely the inevitable but often frustrating dissent that often arises therein — makes for quick and painless decisions. But when government agencies are confronted with decisions in which they did not participate and with which they frequently disagree, their implementation of those decisions is fractured, uncoordinated and inefficient. This is particularly the case if the bureaucracies called upon to execute the decisions are in strong competition with one another over scarce money, talented people, "turf" or power.<br><br>It takes firm leadership to preside over the bureaucracy. But it also takes a willingness to listen to dissenting opinions. It requires leaders who can analyze, synthesize, ponder and decide.<br><br>The administration's performance during its first four years would have been even worse without Powell's damage control. At least once a week, it seemed, Powell trooped over to the Oval Office and cleaned all the dog poop off the carpet. He held a youthful, inexperienced president's hand. He told him everything would be all right because he, the secretary of State, would fix it. And he did — everything from a serious crisis with China when a U.S. reconnaissance aircraft was struck by a Chinese F-8 fighter jet in April 2001, to the secretary's constant reassurances to European leaders following the bitter breach in relations over the Iraq war. It wasn't enough, of course, but it helped.<br><br>Today, we have a president whose approval rating is 38% and a vice president who speaks only to Rush Limbaugh and assembled military forces. We have a secretary of Defense presiding over the death-by-a-thousand-cuts of our overstretched armed forces (no surprise to ignored dissenters such as former Army Chief of Staff Gen. Eric Shinseki or former Army Secretary Thomas White).<br><br>It's a disaster. Given the choice, I'd choose a frustrating bureaucracy over an efficient cabal every time.<br><br><br><!--EZCODE LINK START--><a href="http://www.prospect.org/weblog/archives/2005/10/index.html#008117" target="top">www.prospect.org/weblog/archives/2005/10/index.html#008117</a><!--EZCODE LINK END--><br><br><br>HADLEY NAMED. La Repubblica has a dynamite series this week on the origin of the yellowcake forgeries. Laura Rozen reports: <br>With Patrick Fitzgerald widely expected to announce indictments in the CIA leaks investigation, questions are again being raised about the murky matter that first led to the appointment of the special counsel: namely, how the Bush White House came into possession of discredited Italian intelligence reports claiming that Iraq sought uranium "yellowcake" from Niger. <br>The key documents supposedly proving the Iraqi attempt turned out to be crude forgeries on official stationery stolen from the African nation's Rome embassy. Among the most tantalizing aspects of the debate over the Iraq War is the origin of those fake documents and the role of the Italian intelligence services in disseminating them. <br><br>In an explosive series of articles appearing this week in the Italian newspaper La Repubblica, investigative reporters Carlo Bonini and Giuseppe d'Avanzo reveal how Niccolo Pollari, chief of Italy's military intelligence service, known as SISMI, brought the Niger yellowcake story directly to the White House after his insistent overtures had been rejected by the Central Intelligence Agency in 2001 and 2002. <br><br>Today's exclusive report in La Repubblica reveals that Pollari met secretly in Washington on September 9, 2002, with then–Deputy National Security Adviser Stephen Hadley. Their secret meeting came at a critical moment in the White House campaign to convince Congress and the American public that war in Iraq was necessary to prevent Saddam Hussein from developing nuclear weapons. <br><br>The La Repubblica article quotes a Bush administration official saying, "I can confirm that on September 9, 2002, general Nicolo Pollari met Stephen Hadley."<br><br>Laura will have more on this story later today. <br><br><br>and this<br><br><!--EZCODE LINK START--><a href="http://bellaciao.org/en/article.php3?id_article=7256" target="top">bellaciao.org/en/article.php3?id_article=7256</a><!--EZCODE LINK END--><br><br> JANUARY 2001 BREAK-IN AT NIGER EMBASSY<br><br>At night, <!--EZCODE FONT START--><span style="font-size:x-small;"><!--EZCODE BOLD START--><strong>between the first and second of the January 2001, a mysterious thief came to the embassy of Niger in Rome</strong><!--EZCODE BOLD END--></span><!--EZCODE FONT END--> and into the residence of the counselor in charge. It turned out that some letterhead and seals (see photocopy) were missing. A second dossier on Niger-Iraq trade soon came into Martino’s hands, one that included references to uranium trafficking. Martino claims he got it from embassy personnel and that he thought it was authentic.<br><br><br><br>http://www.repubblica.it/2005/j/sezioni/esteri/iraq69/bodv/bodv.html<br>Please excuse the translation I had to use this, it can be used for the rest of the article<br>http://www.freetranslation.com/<br>"Pollari went to the White House to offer its truth on the Iraq" The dossier on the uranium from the Niger did<br>not involve the Ioc of CARLO BONINI and GIUSEPPE OF REMAINDER<br><br>ROME - For Nicolò Pollari, director of the Earthquakes, the rules of its occupation I am inequivoche. It says to Republic: "I Am the director of the intelligence and the mine alone institutional speaker, after the 11 September, was at Washington the director of the Ioc, George Tenet. How it is obvious, I speak only with him. ..". But it is actual truth that our barbefinte have working only with the Ioc? Or they supported also the clandestine efforts of the intelligence parallel created from Dick Cheney and Paul Wolfowitz with the "group Iraq", the office for Special plans of the Pentagon, the office of the national security advisor, specific to find the useful tests for the "change of regime" to Baghdad? <br><br>It is a fact that, to the eve of the war in Iraq and with the supervision of the diplomatic advisor of Palace Chigi, Gianni Castellaneta (today ambassador in the Usa), the director of the Earthquakes organizes to Washington its diary with the staff of Condoleezza Rice, in those national years security advisor to the White House. Republic is in a position to document this double platform of the government and of the Italian intelligence. At least one of the meetings "very little institutional" of Pollari and, how they the secret agents say, it "accomplishment of a system" that holds together Government - Intelligence - Information. <br><br>Short recapitulation. The Earthquakes of Nicolò Pollari wants to credit the iraqui purchase of uranium crude to build a nuclear bomb. The diagram of the game is rather transparent. The cards "authentic" on an attempt to purchase in Niger (old "intelligence" Italian of the eighties) the door in gift the vicecapo of the Center Earthquakes of Rome (Antonio Nucera). They come bundled with other card built to the bell' and better with a theft simulated in the embassy of the Niger (if they extract of it card addressed and you stamp). The documents come shown from the men of Pollari to the agents of the station Ioc of Rome while a "mailman" of the Earthquakes, a such one of name Rocco Martino, delivers them to London to the MI6 of sir Richard Dearlove. It is the before instantaneous one. It returns useful to tell the second chapter of the Large organizing Deciet in Italy to build the necessity of a military intervention in Iraq. It already we saw. Greg Thielmann, former director of the front desk of intelligence of the Department of State, itself meeting place on the table the report "Italian" on the uranium. It does not remember the exact date. <br><br><br><br><br>"Pollari andò alla Casa Bianca<br>per offrire la sua verità sull'Iraq"<br>Il dossier sull'uranio dal Niger non coinvolgeva la Cia<br>di CARLO BONINI e GIUSEPPE D'AVANZO<br><br> <br>ROMA - Per Nicolò Pollari, direttore del Sismi, le regole del suo mestiere sono inequivoche. Dice a Repubblica: "Sono il direttore dell'intelligence e il mio solo interlocutore istituzionale, dopo l'11 settembre, è stato a Washington il direttore della Cia, George Tenet. Come è ovvio, io parlo soltanto con lui...". Ma è proprio vero che le nostre barbefinte hanno lavorato soltanto con la Cia? Oppure hanno sostenuto anche gli sforzi clandestini dell'intelligence parallela creata da Dick Cheney e Paul Wolfowitz con il "gruppo Iraq", l'Office for Special plans del Pentagono, l'ufficio del consigliere per la Sicurezza nazionale, determinatissimi a trovare le prove utili per il "cambio di regime" a Bagdad? <br><br>È un fatto che, alla vigilia della guerra in Iraq e con la supervisione del consigliere diplomatico di Palazzo Chigi, Gianni Castellaneta (oggi ambasciatore negli Usa), il direttore del Sismi organizza a Washington la sua agenda con lo staff di Condoleezza Rice, in quegli anni consigliere per la Sicurezza nazionale alla Casa Bianca. Repubblica è in grado di documentare questo doppio binario del governo e dell'intelligence italiana. Almeno uno degli incontri "molto poco istituzionali" di Pollari e, come dicono gli agenti segreti, la "realizzazione di un sistema" che tiene insieme Governo - Intelligence - Informazione. <br><br>Breve riepilogo. Il Sismi di Nicolò Pollari vuole accreditare l'acquisto iracheno di uranio grezzo per fabbricare una bomba nucleare. Lo schema del gioco è alquanto trasparente. Le carte "autentiche" su un tentativo di acquisto in Niger (vecchia "intelligence" italiana degli anni Ottanta) le porta in dote il vicecapo del Centro Sismi di Roma (Antonio Nucera). Vengono affastellate con altra cartaccia costruita alla bell'e meglio con un furto simulato nell'ambasciata del Niger (se ne ricavano carta intestata e timbri). I documenti vengono mostrati dagli uomini di Pollari agli agenti della stazione Cia di Roma mentre un "postino" del Sismi, un tale di nome Rocco Martino, li consegna a Londra al MI6 di sir Richard Dearlove. <br> <br>È la prima istantanea. Torna utile per raccontare il secondo capitolo del Grande Inganno organizzato in Italia per costruire la necessità di un intervento militare in Iraq. Lo abbiamo già visto. Greg Thielmann, ex direttore del bureau di intelligence del Dipartimento di Stato, si ritrova sul tavolo il report "italiano" sull'uranio. Non ricorda la data esatta. <br><br>http://nuralcubicle.blogspot.com/2005/10/berlusconi-behind-fake-yellowcake.html<br>Double-Dealers and Dilettantes--the Men Behind Nigergate Were All Italians.<br><br>The military intervention in Iraq was justified by two revelations: Saddam Hussein attempted to acquire unprocessed uranium (yellowcake) in Niger (1) for enrichment with centrifuges built with aluminum tubes imported from Europe(2). The fabricators of the twin hoaxes (there was never any trace in Iraq of unprocessed uranium or centrifuges) were the Italian government and Italian military intelligence. La Repubblica has attempted to reconstruct the who, where and why of the manufacture and transfer to British and American intelligence of the dodgy dossier for war.<br><br>They are the same two hoaxes that Judith Miller, the reporter who betrayed her newspaper, published (together with Michael Gordon) on September 8, 2002. In a lengthy investigative piece for the New York Times, Miller reported that Saddam could have built an atomic weapon with those aluminum tubes. These were the goods that the hawks in the Bush administration were expecting. <br><br>The "war dance" which followed Judith Miller’s scoop seemed like "carefully-prepared theater” to an attentive media-watcher, Roberto Reale of Ultime Notizie (The Latest News).<br><br>Condoleezza Rice, who was then White House Security Advisor, said on CNN: We don’t want the smoking gun to look like a mushroom cloud. A menacing Dick Cheney told Meet the Press that We know with absolute certainty that Saddam is using his technical and commercial capacities to acquire the material necessary to enrich uranium to build a nuclear weapon. This was the beginning of an escalation of fear.<br><br>26 September 2002: Colin Powell warns the Senate: The Iraqi attempt to acquire uranium is proof of its nuclear ambitions.<br><br>19 December 2002: The information on Niger and the uranium is included in the three-page President’s Daily Briefing prepared each day by the CIA and the Department of State for George W. Bush. The ambassador to the United Nations, John Negroponte, added his stamp of approval: Why is Iraq dissimulating its purchase of Niger uranium?<br><br>more<br><br><br>http://crookedtimber.org/2005/10/25/la-repubblica-scoop/<br>....<br><br>It’s a fact that on the eve of the Iraq war, and under the supervision of the diplomatic advisor to the Foreign Ministry, Gianni Castellaneta (today ambassador to the USA), the director of SISMI organized his agenda in Washington with the staff of Condoleeza Rice, who was National Security Adviser to the White House at that time. La Repubblica is able to document this two track process between the government and Italian intelligence. At least one of these ‘barely official’ [molto poco istituzionali] meetings of Pollari’s was, according to secret service agents, the ‘creation of a system’ that would bring together government, intelligence and public affairs [informazione].<br><br>To summarize: Nicolo Pollari’s SISMI wanted to substantiate the [case for] the Iraqi acquisition of raw uranium to build a nuclear bomb. The game-plan was rather transparent. ‘Authentic’ documents relating to an attempted acquisition in Niger (old Italian intelligence from the 1980’s) were the dowry of the second-in-command of CISMI’s Roman headquarters (Antonio Nucera). They were bundled together with another fabricated document … through a simulated burglary on the Nigerien embassy (from which they had gotten headed notepaper and seals). The documents were shown by Pollari’s men to CIA station agents, and at the same time, a SISMI ‘postman’ by the name of Rocco Martino was sent to Sir Richard Dearlove of MI6 in London.<br><br>turning to the second chapter of the Great Swindle, organized in Italy, to build the case that military intervention in Iraq was necessary. … the Italian report on uranium …<br><br>… The CIA analysts thought the first report ‘very limited’ and ‘without the necessary details.’ INR analysts in the Department of State assessed the information as ‘highly suspect.’ … The immediate impact on the American Intelligence community wasn’t very gratifying for Pollari … Gianni Castellaneta advised him to look in ‘other directions’ too, while the minister of Defence, Antonio Martino invited him to meet ‘an old friend of Italy’s.’ The American friend was Michael Ledeen, an old fox in the ‘parallel’ intelligence community in the US, who had been declared an undesirable person in our country [Italy] in the 1980’s [editorial note – I understand that this claim was contested when it was made by Sidney Blumenthal]. Ledeen was at Rome on behalf of the Office of Special Plans, created at the Pentagon by Paul Wolfowiz to gather intelligence that would support military intervention in Iraq. A source at Forte Braschi told La Repubblica : “Pollari got a frosty reception from the CIA’s station head in Rome, Jeff Castelli, for this information on uranium. Castelli apparently let the matter drop [lascia cadere la storia]. Pollari got the hint and talked about it with Michael Ledeen.’ We don’t know what Michael Ledeen did in Washington. But at the beginning of 2002, Paul Wolfowitz convinced Dick Cheney that the uranium trail intercepted by the Italians had to be explored top to bottom. The vice-president, as the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence tells it, once again asked the CIA ‘very decisively’ to find out more about the ‘possible acquisition of Nigerien uranium.’ In this meeting, Dick Cheney explicitly said that this piece of intelligence was at the disposition of a “foreign service.”<br><br>… Forte Braschi says that “Pollari was incredibly cunning – he knew that it wasn’t enough to rely on the CIA to push the uranium story. It was necessary to work, as Palazzo Chigi and the Department of Defence had indicated, with the Pentagon and with the National Security Adviser, Rice. … An administration official has told La Repubblica “I can confirm that on September 9 2002, General Nicolo Pollari met Stephen Hadley, the deputy to the National Security Adviser, Condoleeza Rice.”… SISMI’s ‘postman,’ Rocco Martino contacted a journalist for a weekly newspaper – edited by Carlo Rossella – to sell her the documents at issue. … Panorama had a worldwide scoop. Title “The War? It’s already begun,’ it spoke of ‘half a ton of uranium.’ … The government asked. The intelligence service gave. The media spread it. The government confirmed it. It was an old disinformation technique from the Cold War. Exaggerate the danger of the threat. Terrify and convince public opinion of it.<br><br>more<br> <p></p><i>Edited by: <A HREF=http://p216.ezboard.com/brigorousintuition.showUserPublicProfile?gid=seemslikeadream@rigorousintuition>seemslikeadream</A> at: 10/27/05 10:15 am<br></i>