http://atimes.com/atimes/Middle_East/KG10Ak02.html
A leaner, meaner Iranian regime
By Mahan Abedin
Briefly, it looked like 1978-1979 all over again. The riots that engulfed Tehran - and to a much lesser extent a few other major cities - were ostensibly a protest at what the demonstrators (and their purported political leaders) considered to be "rigged" elections. They were quickly suppressed or fizzled out because they were directionless and failed to articulate any coherent or realizable aims.
While the election results were indeed surprising and raised eyebrows everywhere - not least in the inner sanctums of the Islamic Republic - allegations of massive fraud are to this point unproven. While some tinkering may have occurred, fraud on the scale that is being alleged by two of the opposition candidates would have elicited a considerably greater amount of protest and resistance from within the system.
While many seasoned Iran observers - including the country's best-placed journalists - were predicting a close race that would be won by Mir Hossein Mousavi, this author cautioned before the elections that it is entirely possible that incumbent Mahmud Ahmadinejad could win again, and not necessarily by a narrow margin (
A bigger struggle lies ahead, Asia Times Online, June 13, 2009).
But the current issues are no longer about an allegedly rigged election. The focus once again is about the type and extent of reforms needed to tailor Iran's institutions and politics for the 21st century.
The election outcome - and the resultant riots and the violence used to suppress the rioters - have produced an unequivocal victory for the ideological Islamic right. For the first time in the 30-year history of the Islamic Republic of Iran, one faction is completely dominant and the other factions are in complete disarray. This is uncharted territory and a great deal of planning, positioning and manipulation are needed to steer the right course, especially in the next four years.
While the ascendancy of the Islamic right will doubtless enhance the cohesion and maneuverability of the Islamic Republic, it remains to be seen whether this cohesion has been purchased at an unacceptably high price, in terms of dissent and long-term prospects for political stability.
The rise and rise of Ahmadinejad
The events of the past three weeks have had a depressing effect on supporters of the Islamic Republic around the world. The sight of large riots and street protests followed by the inevitable violence needed to restore public order and deter future rioters have inflicted considerable damage on the prestige and self-perception of the core supporters of the Islamic Revolution.
The Iranian revolution of 1979 triumphed on the back of unprecedented street protests and widespread popular legitimacy. For the past 30 years Iran's rulers have consistently tried to maintain and harness this popular legitimacy to push through a series of massive reforms and fundamental changes that has transformed the country beyond recognition. Any hint that this popular legitimacy may be waning inevitably undermines the ideological and institutional basis of the post-revolutionary order.
The disaster that engulfed the country in the immediate aftermath of the presidential elections is largely due to the leadership and management style of Ahmadinejad. A seasoned populist and an instinctive street fighter, Ahmadinejad is certainly the most remarkable product of the Iranian revolution.
Those who have consistently underestimated him in the past four years, were surprised by his remarkable political skills and a seemingly invincible will to power. During the election campaign (and especially during the unprecedented televised debates with the other contenders) Ahmadinejad took on the giants of the Iranian establishment and demolished them with seemingly effortless ease.
While he has broken every rule that governs the art of politics in the Islamic Republic, Ahmadinejad gained much sympathy in the country by attacking the corrupt oligarchs of the country, in particular former president Hashemi Rafsanjani and former speaker of parliament Ali Akbar Nategh Nouri.
Yet despite his stunning election victory (and leaving aside unproven allegations of election rigging) Ahmadinejad remains an intensely divisive figure. What really matters at this stage is not whether the elections were rigged in his favor, but that a considerable number of Iranians refuse to acknowledge him as their president. This lack of legitimacy amongst certain strata of Iranian society will undoubtedly cause a considerable number of problems in the next four years (and possibly beyond), and it remains to be seen whether the damage can be incrementally repaired.
Beyond popular legitimacy, Ahmadinejad's effect on the Islamic Republic (both as a cause and a state) has been unprecedented. Apart from the late Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, no single person has had so much influence on the evolution of the regime.
Immediately after Ahmadinejad's first election victory in June 2005 this author wrote an opinion piece for the Beirut-based Daily Star (
www.dailystar.com.lb) entitled "Ahmadinejad may end up being the clerics' bane", in which many of the events of the past four years were predicted.
It was not difficult to predict that Ahmadinejad would have a profound (and largely negative) effect on the Islamic Republic. He is the most formidable representative of the so-called second-generation revolutionaries, who form much of his political base. In some important respects he belongs to the extreme right-wing of the regime and espouses a vision and a set of policies that if taken to their logical conclusion - as they now have been - inevitably overturn the factional checks and balances of the regime. Coupled with his independent and eccentric personality, this political base and vision was likely to cause a breaking point some day. This occurred three weeks ago.
There has been a great amount of amateur analysis and lazy journalism about Ahmadinejad's background and support base. The embattled president has at one time or another been accused of taking part in the US hostage crisis of 1979-1981; having murdered exiled dissidents; being supported by the powerful Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC); and being a lackey of supreme leader Ayatollah Seyed Ali Khamenei. All of this is untrue.
Ahmadinejad is exactly what he appears to be; namely the most formidable leader of a faction that has incrementally broadened and deepened the scope of its reach and influence within the regime to the point where it is now completely dominant. Factional politics in the Islamic Republic - as we know it - has collapsed.
Remaking the Islamic Republic
The intervention of Khamenei in the political crisis that engulfed the country was a pointed reminder to the extreme right that it may have overturned factional politics, but it cannot ignore the mass ideological base of the regime.
Indeed, Khamenei's impassioned Friday prayer's speech on June 19 was directed largely to the ideological base of the regime. That is the several million mostly young men and women whose ultimate loyalty is not to any faction or political tendency but to the Islamic Republic as a whole. As far as this constituency is concerned, the cohesion, security and long-term viability of the Islamic regime are worth a million rigged elections. While Khamenei was forced to acknowledge Ahmadinejad (if only to make clear that the election result would stand) he was careful to rally the base of the regime along familiar ideological and emotional themes.
Khamenei's message to the world was clear: the Islamic Republic may have changed at the top but its base remains unchanged. This was a message intended first and foremost to Ahmadinejad and his inner circle. They may have removed key establishment figures from center-stage but in the long-term they have no option but to employ the same type of consensual politics that has ensured the survival of the Islamic Republic for the past thirty years.
There is much confusion about the role of Khamenei in the Islamic Republic. His official title is "leader of the Islamic Revolution" which many commentators have skewed into the half-correct term "supreme leader". While Khamenei plays an important coordination role at the top, his preferred method of intervention is by rallying the grassroots, with which he has a deep and symbiotic relationship.
Apart from his obvious supreme political and ideological role, his authority stems from the grassroots' belief that he has a special insight and wisdom and that his every word and action is designed to secure the interests of the system as a whole. This - rather than abstract ideological beliefs - is why his word is often considered as final.
The fact that key establishment figures - not least two of the losing presidential candidates - chose to ignore his final word by inciting their followers to continue with their protest, is more a symptom of the factional collapse discussed earlier than any disrespect per se for Khamenei.
Khamenei's crucial intervention on 19 June - and subsequent positions since - has put a brake on the instinctive drive of the Islamic right to carry out a widespread purge. The conditions have never been so ripe for a full-scale crackdown on dissent within the system. All the other factions, particularly the once-powerful Islamic left, are in complete disarray. Their leaders have been exposed as losers and their supporters have been left demoralized by the entire state machinery's acquiescence in the final victory of the Islamic right.
Most importantly, key establishment figures have now been decidedly marginalized. The biggest loser of all is former prime minister Mousavi. While Mousavi has legitimate grievances, he made a series of catastrophic mistakes immediately before and after the elections.
As the election campaign drew to a close many in Mousavi's camp were alarmed by his obvious political alliance with former presidents Mohammad Khatami and Rafsanjani. The alliance with Rafsanjani was particularly puzzling since the former president had played a leading role in marginalizing Mousavi in the summer of 1989, which led to Mousavi's "disappearance" from the scene for nearly 20 years.
Revelations that Mousavi's campaign was being funded by Rafsanjani alienated his core supporters in the Islamic left (who loath Rafsanjani) and further pushed him towards a constituency that has no base within the regime. Indeed, the street carnivals that characterized Mousavi's campaign were painful reminders of former president Khatami's electoral and political style.
Mousavi's greatest mistake came immediately after the end of polling when he declared himself the outright winner. The implication was clear: a contradictory result would be automatically treated as fraudulent. This was the main trigger for the riots that followed. Mousavi then made one mistake after another by persisting with his fundamental position that the elections had been "rigged" (without providing any convincing evidence) and refusing the solutions that were offered by mediators. These mistakes have destroyed Mousavi's standing amongst Islamic Republic loyalists (a substantial number of whom actually voted for him) and effectively consigned him to the very margins. While Khamenei has cautioned against edging out the former prime minister altogether, it is very difficult to see how he can be rehabilitated.
Another great loser is former president and arch-oligarch Rafsanjani. Having been defeated by Ahmadinejad in the 2005 presidential elections, Rafsanjani had been sniping at the government for the past four years. He threw everything into overthrowing Ahmadinejad, but his unlikely support for Mousavi seems to be his last throw of the dice. Although Rafsanjani distanced himself from the rioters - and Khamenei has directly supported him by chastising Ahmadinejad for accusing him of corruption on live national television - the expectations are that Rafsanjani (once the pillar of the system) will be gradually edged out.
Many other core establishment figures, including losing presidential contender Mehdi Karroubi and former Majlis (parliament) speaker Nategh Nouri, are expected to be edged out. But a widespread purge involving their followers is now unlikely. With a few exceptions, the Islamic Republic has generally avoided internal purges for fear of upsetting its ideological base. While the situation today is markedly different, there seems to be enough institutional mechanisms and ideological/political direction in place to prevent Ahmadinejad and his followers from putting a complete end to the once lively political scene of the Islamic Republic.
Towards a new consensus
The overthrow of factional politics in Iran is likely to prove a temporary phenomenon. Indeed, behind the scenes troubleshooters and mediators are already trying to forge a new consensus based on radical factional realignments.
One solution that is being taken particularly seriously in key political and intelligence circles is a “partnership of extremes”; that is a reconciliation between the core ideological left and ideological right. In other words the two extremes in the Islamic Republican spectrum would forge a wide-ranging political consensus to manage national politics for the next four years. This reconciliation has been made possible by the collapse of centrist and other factions, in particular the reformed left (led by Mousavi), the liberal left (led by Khatami), the technocrats (led by Rafsanjani), the traditional conservatives (led by Nategh-Nouri) and the more moderate ideological right (led by Ali Ardeshir Larijani).
The defection of a key Islamic left personality to the Ahmadinejad camp may be indicative of a much larger political shift. Seyed Amir Hossein Mahdavi's defection is important not only because of his position as a key Islamic left networker, but also because of his relative youth. Mahdavi is a member of the central committee of the Organization of the Mojahedin of the Islamic Revolution (OMIR - not to be confused with the Mojahedin-e-Khalq organization, which is an exiled dissident terrorist organization) and an important figure in Mousavi's (former) presidential campaigns headquarters.
Mahdavi's long and public revelations of the political, ideological and strategic "deviations" of OMIR are likely to spur further defections and possibly spell the end of this organization, which alongside the Forum of Militant Clergy, has been a key organizational pillar of the Islamic left for the past 30 years.
While the contours of a broader political alliance have still to be worked out, there are indications that at the grassroots level at least a substantial number of Islamic left personalities and activists are willing to fall behind Ahmadinejad and accept the public hegemony of the Islamic right.
But a durable compromise would require consensus-building on core domestic and foreign policy issues. In particular the Ahmadinejad government would have to co-opt certain traditional Islamic left policies; namely a serious (as opposed to rhetorical) fight against corruption; a more careful management of the economy (which will require rolling back some of the reforms instituted by Rafsanjani in the early 1990s); and a more culturally oriented (as opposed to repressive) approach towards Islamization. In the foreign policy sphere, Ahmadinejad will have to relinquish his plans to strike a limited deal with the United States, since any opening towards the "Great Satan" is anathema to the Islamic left.
There is much potential for cooperation not least because the base of the Islamic left and the Islamic right readily agree on a range of fundamental issues. The trick is in creating a new credible leadership for the Islamic left which can then negotiate in good faith with the formidable Ahmadinejad. Mahdavi's defection - centered as it is on the themes of youth and radicalism - is a tantalizing glimpse into the horse-trading and parapolitics that is going on behind the scenes.
The sum effect of this new political reality is going to be very disappointing to those people who had hoped that the brief period of street rioting and mayhem would spell the beginning of the end of the Islamic regime. Notwithstanding the damage to prestige and legitimacy, the emergence of a leaner and meaner regime will present new strategic opportunities for Islamic Republic loyalists in the region and beyond.
Mahan Abedin is a senior researcher in terrorism studies and a consultant to independent media in Iran. He is currently based in northern Iraq, where he is helping to develop local media capacity.
