The first global cyber war has begun

[wintler2]

Fascinatin! Seems to me the culture of Anon is uniquely adapted to glory hogs - it will lose nothing because some moralfag wants to be jesus, the lulz-ians will riff on it for eva and newbies will be drawn by the fuss.

It matters not really if Brown is pulling a hoax on the media, because it's pretty clear Anon has morphed from a goofy internet meme to a much more serious player alongside wikileaks in the new digital frontier against power players. However, I also believe in the power of comedy...the Yes Men, Reverend Billy and the Church of Stop Shopping, etc.

Exaclty, laughter is powerful.. when IS the next Rap News coming out, and will it feature Barrett Brown?!!

MOAR!!! MOAR!!! MOAR RAP NEWS!!!
WHY IS THERE NOT MAUR!?
*pounds on the desk*
MOAR
Guindonator 1 week ago 63

[Plutonia]

It matters not really if Brown is pulling a hoax on the media, because it's pretty clear Anon has morphed from a goofy internet meme to a much more serious player alongside wikileaks in the new digital frontier against power players. However, I also believe in the power of comedy...the Yes Men, Reverend Billy and the Church of Stop Shopping, etc.

Yeah, but as a name/facefag (lol) BB contravenes the central tenet of Anonymous, so he's something else. "Reckless" doesn't really [cut it.]

And I don't think his #opeternal ruin was/is a hoax. As I understand it, it's meant to be a campaign of harassment of Quantico personnel which he has begun implementing by published their identities and contact info and encouraging people to phone and fax them into submission. I mean, what is that?

Also, remember the Rick Roll? This is uncanny:






WHAT DOES IT MEANNN!!!!1????

[Plutonia]

AnonymousIRC

Retweet rank: 19548 - approx 99.39 percentile — Tweet this

Retweet rank is an indicator of how frequently you are retweeted. @AnonymousIRC is
19548th most-retweeted user on Twitter. Percentile is a relative score between 1-100 More

Location: The Internet
Web: http://anonops.ru
Bio: We are Anonymous. We are Legion. We do not forgive. We do not forget. We love you. Expect us.

http://www.retweetrank.com/AnonymousIRC/#

[Luther Blissett]

I just have to ask, where the heck were these guys during the Bush administration? Never the less, Anonymous seems to have gone from /b meme menace to establishing itself as the premiere rebel force in the 21st century.

I don't think that the technology and the overall ubiquitousness of the democratic social aspects of the Internet were quite ready. Even though the techniques and knowledge is old in web terms, we're really just collectively coming into this now.

[Plutonia]

Anonymous and the global correction

A loosely organised group of hackers is targeting oppressive regimes and says this is just the beginning.

Anonymous Last Modified: 16 Feb 2011 16:59 GMT

The tendency to relate past events to what is possible in the present becomes more difficult as the scope of the geopolitical environment changes. It is a useful thing, then, to ask every once in a while if the environment has recently undergone any particular severe changes, thereby expanding our options for the future.

Terminology, let alone our means of exchanging information, has changed to such a degree that many essential discussions in today's "communications age" would be entirely incomprehensible to many two decades ago.

As the social, political and technological environment has developed, some have already begun to explore new options, seizing new chances for digital activism - and more will soon join in. It is time for the rest of the world to understand why.

Service denied

When a release by WikiLeaks revealed the depravity of just how corrupt and horrid the Tunisian government really was, it prompted Tunisians to step up active dissent and take to the streets en masse for the first time.

In response, a loose network of participants within the international Anonymous protest organisation attacked non-essential government websites - those not providing direct services to Tunisians - at the prompting of our contacts.

Several such sites were replaced with a message of support to the Tunisian people, while others were pushed offline via distributed denial of service (DDoS) attacks, involving thousands of computer users who request large amounts of data from a website simultaneously, overwhelming it.

Other assistance programmes followed, even after the deposed Ben Ali fled the nation that reviled him, with Anonymous and other parties working with Tunisians - both in-country and abroad - to provide the nation's people with the tools and information resources they needed to begin building up new, reasonable political institutions capable of ensuring a freer civic life.

Our "Guide to Protecting the Tunisian Revolution" series - a collaboration between hundreds of veterans of traditional revolutionary movements as well as practitioners of "new activism" - were disseminated both online and in print; aside from tips on safety during confrontation and the like, these also explain how to establish secure yet accessible networks and communications for Tunisians, as well as instructions on establishing neighbourhood syndicates capable of uniting in common cause.

Already, such organisations are being established across Tunisia, just as they will be established elsewhere as the movement proceeds.

The seeds of cyber revolution

Anonymous is a means by which people across the globe can assist in the hard work being performed by the Tunisian people - who have long taken issue with their government, but first began protesting in earnest after a fruit vendor set himself ablaze in response to police cruelty.

The Anonymous movement itself grew out of message boards frequented mostly by young people with an interest in internet culture in general - and Japanese media in particular; in 2005, participants began "attacking" internet venues as a sort of sport, and in the process honed their skills in a way that proved useful in "information warfare".

In 2007, some users proposed that the Church of Scientology be exposed for its unethical and sometimes violent conduct, sparking a coordinated global protest movement that differed from anything else seen, and which still continues today.

The Australian government was later attacked for introducing new internet censorship laws, and in the meantime, those within Anonymous who see the subculture as a potential force for justice have launched other efforts while also building new strategies and recruiting individuals from across the globe - some of whom hold significant positions in media, industry, and the sciences.

For great justice

In the meantime, there are obstacles to overcome. Those within the Tunisian government who seek to deny liberty to "their" people are easy enough to deal with; the greatest threat to revolution comes not from any state but rather from those who decry such revolutions without understanding them.

In this case, the idea that a loose network of people with shared values and varying skill sets can provide substantial help to a population abroad is seen as quixotic - or even unseemly - by many of those who have failed to understand the past ten years, as well as those whose first instinct is to attack a popular revolt rather than to assist it.

Elsewhere, a number of US pundits decided to criticise the revolution as possibly destabilising the region; many of whom once demanded the invasions of Iraq and Afghanistan - and greeted every Arab revolt as the work of President Bush - but now see nothing for themselves in the cause of Arab liberty.

Some have even portrayed the movement as the work of radical Islamists - yet most cannot find Tunisia on a map.

Suffice to say that the results of our efforts are already on display and will become more evident as Tunisians use our tools and resources to achieve their greatest triumph. Those who wish to assist and are competent to do so can find us easily enough; the Tunisians had little trouble in doing so.

Although we have made great progress in convincing individuals from across the world to join our efforts in Tunisia, other campaigns, such as those taking place in Algeria and Egypt - both of which have seen government websites taken down and/or replaced by Anonymous, more must be done before the movement takes the next step towards a worldwide network capable of perpetual engagement against those who are comfortable with tyranny.

The revolution will be broadcast

Whatever effort is required, such a goal is not only possible, but rather unambitious.

There is a reason, after all, that those of us who have seen the movement up close have dedicated our lives to what it stands for, and have even violated the modern Western taboo of believing in something.

I have been involved with Anonymous in some capacity or another for about six years.

Looking back at my writing over that time, I have found that my predictions, while always enthusiastic, nonetheless turned out to have been conservative; when Australia became the first state to come under attack by this remarkable force, I proposed that we would someday see such allegedly inevitable institutions begin to crumble in the face of their growing irrelevance.

Someday turned out to be this year.

Today, I predict that Anonymous and entities like it will become far more significant over the next few years than is expected by most of our similarly irrelevant pundits - and this will, no doubt, turn out to be just as much of an understatement as anything else that has been written on the subject.

The fact is that the technological infrastructure that allows these movements has been in place for well under a decade - but phenomena such as WikiLeaks and Anonymous have already appeared, expanded, and even become players within the geopolitical environment; others have come about since.

This is the future, whether one approves or not, and the failure on the part of governments and media alike to understand, and contend with the rapid change now afoot, ought to remind everyone concerned why it is that this movement is necessary in the first place.

The author identifies as part of Anonymous, a loose collective of internet hacktivists which uses the technological infrastructure on which the globalised world depends to maintain a vigilante presence online.

[wintler2]

..and have even violated the modern Western taboo of believing in something.

They really are rebels!

[Plutonia]

Here's it is, straight from the dark heart of 4chan Oh wait....

SXSW 2011: 4Chan founder Christopher Poole on anonymity and creativity

4Chan founder defends site as a breeding ground for creativity and accuses Facebook's Mark Zuckerberg of being 'totally wrong' to describe online anonymity as 'cowardice'

Josh Halliday
guardian.co.uk, Sunday 13 March 2011 22.09 GMT



4Chan, the influential internet subculture which spawned Anonymous, Rickrolling and Rage Guy, is "misunderstood" as "the dark heart of the internet", its founder Christopher Poole said today.

Outlining his case for online anonymity – complete with a dig at Facebook founder Mark Zuckerberg – 24-year-old Poole argued that 4Chan's chaotic messageboard is a fertile breeding ground for creativity.

"It's riffing on a massive scale," Poole told a packed audience in the Austin Convention Centre. "4Chan is misunderstood – people like to think that /b/ [4Chan's infamously random subforum] is the dark heart of the internet. It isn't just that.

"People want to think everyone on 4Chan is a young rambunctious male. That's not accurate – it's a wide range of people using it. One of the things that 4Chan does that's really special is the way people come together to collaborate en masse. It's the process at which you arrive at the product that is fascinating."

Poole, better known by his online alias Moot, has long been a leading advocate of anonymity. It was one of the founding principles of 4Chan. It is this that sets him in stark contrast to Zuckerberg, two years his elder, who described anonymous internet posting as showing "a lack of integrity".

"Zuckerberg's totally wrong on anonymity being total cowardice. Anonymity is authenticity. It allows you to share in a completely unvarnished, raw way," Poole said, adding that the internet allows people to "reinvent themselves" as if they were moving home or starting a new job.

"The cost of failure is really high when you're contributing as yourself," he said.

Around one in four of 4Chan's 25 million monthly users are active contributors to the forum, according to Poole.

What would Poole do if he started 4Chan today? Well, it would look a lot like his weeks-old image manipulation and sharing project, Canvas. Still in closed beta, Poole says flinging open the doors to thousands of users would "dilute the culture" that already exists there – a stark contrast to 4Chan's early days (although Poole was just 15 at the time.)

"One of the mistakes I've made is believing in an invisible guiding hand as far as moderation goes. And that if you give the community the right structure they could police themselves," he admits.

"I've underestimated the value of having a real staff presence, and encouraging them to police the boards behind the scenes. When it's not clear that we're leading things it's like we're not there and that we don't care – it's extremely detrimental to community.

"At one point, we let it go [to the extent that] we were so far behind the scenes that when we came back it was met with a mixed reaction [from 4Chan users]."

[vanlose kid]

Lessons from Anonymous on cyberwar
A cyberwar is brewing, and Anonymous reprisal attacks on HBGary Federal shows how deep the war goes.
Haroon Meer Last Modified: 10 Mar 2011 16:11 GMT

"Cyberwar" is a heavily loaded term, which conjures up Hollywood inspired images of hackers causing oil refineries to explode.

Some security celebrities came out very strongly against the thought of it, claiming that cyberwar was less science, and more science fiction.

Last year on May 21, the United States Cyber Command (USCYBERCOM) reported reaching initial operational capability, and news stories abound of US soldiers undergoing basic cyber training, which all point to the idea that traditional super powers are starting to explore this arena.

Recent activities with one government contractor and Anonymous, however, show clearly that cyber operations have been going on for a long while, and that the private sector has been only too ready to fill the cyber mercenary role for piles of cash.

Anonymous vs. HBGary

Early in 2011, Aaron Barr submitted a talk to a security conference in which he planned to "focus on outing the major players of the anonymous group".

Barr, the CEO of Washington-based HBGary Federal, had spent time "infiltrating the group" using multiple identities on social networks and Anonymous IRC channels.

He was confident enough of his analysis to publish parts of it through the Financial Times. Barr (and indeed the rest of the company) planned to milk the exposure, lining up a string of meetings to profit from the research, from an interview with 60 Minutes to multiple potential deals with federal agencies.

The CEO of HBGary prepared a post explaining how they had flexed their "muscle today by revealing the identities of all the top management within the group Anonymous."

Anonymous were quick to respond.

Even while Barr was proclaiming victory and threatening to "take the gloves off", Anonymous were burrowing deeper into his network.

By the end of the attack, Barr's iPad was reputedly erased, his LinkedIn and Twitter accounts were hijacked, the HBGary Federal website was defaced, proprietary HBGary source code was stolen and with over 71,000 private emails now published to the internet, HBGary was laid bare.

In this, was our first lesson: The asymmetry of cyber warfare.

HBGary, a well-funded, pedigreed security company with strong offensive cyber capabilities was given a beating by a non-funded, loosely organised hacker collective.

The incident holds a string of lessons for those wishing to secure their networks from attack, but what's far more interesting is the leaked emails that give us insight into the murky world of "cyber contractors" and what’s being called "the military digital complex".

HBGary: cyberwar arms dealer

HBGary was formed by security research veteran Greg Hoglund, who has made a name for himself over the years doing research on rootkit technology.

A rootkit is a piece of software installed to ensure that an attacker is able to maintain control of a compromised computer. Rootkits are designed to avoid detection once installed.

Hoglund’s emails claim that his current products were built with "about 2 million in Uncle Sam's money", but this alone is no shocker. Governments fund technology research all the time, and HBGary were also building a commercial product.

What is shocking though, are some of the other details that came out in the wash.

The emails make it clear that HBGary sold rootkits and keyloggers (tools to record and exfiltrate keystrokes surreptitiously) to government contractors for prices between $60,000 and $200,000 each.

These pieces of "malware" would be tailored specifically to the clients needs, which undoubtedly reflected the state of the ultimate targets e.g.: "..test the tool against McAfee and Norton".

Some rootkits were fairly routine, while others clearly betrayed specific needs: "Runs on MS Windows XP sp2 and Office 2003, finds MS Office files using the XRK technique to exfiltrate files".

Even next generation rootkits were explored - to remain active despite the removal of a hard drive or to persist on a machine through the video card.

Make no mistake, these were offensive cyber tools, made to order.

0day exploits

Rootkits allow you to maintain control of a compromised machine, but one would still need an initial compromise vector.

Once again, the mail archives deliver: HBGary sales personnel can be seen making reference to "Juicy Fruit", their internal name for HBGary supplied 0day exploits.

0day refers to exploits that are currently unknown to the software vendor, making defence against 0day attacks sometimes impossible.

One email lists their 0day arsenal, which included attacks against Adobe Flash, Windows 2003, Sun Java and a host of other products.

The emails even differentiate between exploits that have been sold to a customer and those that are still exclusive.

Other emails include discussions on selling back-doored software to foreign governments and plans to create "themes for video games and movies appropriate for Middle East & Asia. These theme packs would contain back doors."

Clearly cyber attacks against foreign nationals appear to be fair game.

If the ethical line on such matters was slightly blurry, the line was completely obliterated with plans to combat WikiLeaks by targeting supporters of the cause:

From - Tue Feb 08 09:06:48 2011

Subject: Re: first cut
From: Aaron Barr <aaron@hbgary.com>
Date: Fri, 3 Dec 2010 08:32:12 -0500
Cc: Eli Bingham <ebingham@palantir.com>, BERICO-Sam.Kremin <skremin@bericotechnologies.com>
To: Matthew Steckman <msteckman@palantir.com>

One other thing. I think we need to highlight people like Glenn Greenwald. Glenn was critical in the Amazon to OVH transition and helped wikileaks provide access to information during the transition.
It is this level of support we need to attack. These are established proffessionals that have a liberal bent, but ultimately most of them if pushed will choose professional preservation over cause, such is the mentality of most business professionals. Without the support of people like Glenn wikileaks would fold.
Aaron

(Subsequent emails show that the project to target WikiLeaks was to be sold for $2 million dollars.)

Maybe HBGary was an outlier?

At this point we could make the jump that HBGary was a single bad apple, operating on the other side of the ethical line all on its own, but we would be wrong.

The email above indicates that the project to discredit WikiLeaks (and their supporters) was a joint operation by HBGary Federal, Palantir and BericoTechnologies, although the other companies involved were quick to distance themselves from HBGary after the Anonymous hack.

Endgame Systems, a company with almost no public footprint were also thrust into the spotlight, when several of their previously well-guarded reports and company presentations were shared amongst the emails.

In an early email to Aaron Barr, Endgame Systems made it clear that they had "been very careful NOT to have public face on our company". The CEO of Endgame Systems was clear: "Please let HBgary know we don't ever want to see our name in a press release."

So what exactly do the secretive Endgame Systems do? The company started by ex ISS and CIA executives promises (in private) "to provide our customers with the highest quality offensive CNA/CNE (Computer Network Attack/Computer Network Exploitation) software in the world".

Their overview makes it clear that they serve "the special requirements of the United States DoD and Intelligence Community".

Their leaked PowerPoint deck advertises subscriptions of $2,500,000 per year for access to 0day exploits, with slightly more affordable "intelligence feeds" effectively selling information on vulnerable servers by geographic region.

With a single report (and a big enough chequebook) you can find out all the servers vulnerable to attack in the Venezuelan government, along with the software required to exploit them. [Downloadable file]

Even just the CV's sent to HBGary for job applications turned out to be instructive, revealing details that are not often circulated in the public arena.

One candidate had "managed team of 15 persons, responsible for coordinating offensive computer network operations for the United States Department of Defense and other federal agencies."

Clearly offensive cyber operations far predate the 2009 founding of USCYBERCOM.

The email conversations make clear what many have known, that offensive cyber operations against individuals and nation states have been going on for a long, long time.

Experts who claim otherwise are misinformed at best, or actively spreading misinformation at worst. When it comes to cyberwar, the matter is best handled by William Gibson's famous quote: "The future is already here - it's just not very evenly distributed."

Haroon Meer is the founder of Thinkst, an applied research company with a deep focus on information security. He has contributed to several books on information security and has presented research at industry and academic conferences around the world.

The views expressed in this article are the author's own and do not necessarily reflect Al Jazeera' s editorial policy.

http://english.aljazeera.net/indepth/op ... 64808.html

*

[Plutonia]

Maybe HBGary was an outlier?

*

Nope. Here's another one:

Public Pad
Version 2
Saved March 16, 2011
Operation Metal Gear

This operation stems from a string of leaked HBGary emails wherein a company by the name of Booz Allen Hamilton, in direct contact with Aaron Barr, is believed to have bid on and successfully won the contract to develop an unnamed software from the US Air Force. This software will be known as "Metal Gear" for informational purposes.

We believe that Metal Gear involves an army of fake cyber personalities immersed in social networking websites for the purposes of manipulating the mass population via influence, crawling information from major online communities (such as Facebook), and identifying anonymous personalities via correlating stored information from multiple sources to establish connections between separate online accounts, using this information to arrest dissidents and activists who work anonymously.

The primary goal of this operation is to find out exactly what metal gear is and why they are developing it.

What is 'Metal Gear' ?
We codenamed the software that we believe Booz Allen Hamilton and some of their partners are working on.
The nature of the software is partially known, from the documents that we have seen and from what some employees have said it is a software that would allow a single agent to command an 'army' of sockpuppet accounts on social networking mediums. It is sophisticated enough to develop a 'profile' for each puppet to add a level of 'realism' to each. In short, there would be no fesiable way to distinguish between 100 people commenting on a subject, and 100 of these puppets doing the same.

This is nothing new for those of us familiar with how the net works. However, given recent events across the world, the idea behind Metal Gear seems to be 'weaponizing' sockpuppets, in order to influence the face of revolutions that are based within social networking sites.


Audio recording of our announcement (16th of March 2011)
http://ge.tt/5tzZlkq (try various browsers if stream does not work)

IBM Patent
http://www.faqs.org/patents/app/20090313274

http://hbgary.anonleaks.ch/phil_hbgary_com/14294h.html

Airforce contract
http://webcache.googleusercontent.com/s ... ogle.co.uk


The Patent:

http://www.faqs.org/patents/app/20090313274

Inventors:

Li Chen
(Documentation Needed)

Yongcheng Li
(Documentation Needed)

Govndaraj Sampathkumar
IBM Corporation 3901 S. Miami Blvd
Durham, NC 27703-9315, USA
+1-919-224-1190
gsampath@us.ibm.com

Ryan Urquhart
(Documentation Needed)

Agent:

HOLMAN IP LAW / IBM RSW
https://sites.google.com/a/holmaniplaw.com/www/profile
(This is the profile for Holman IP Law. It is no longer active.)

http://www.linkedin.com/in/holman
http://www.techpatents.com/jeff_holman.html
(These are profiles of Jeff Holman, formerly of Holman IP law, now with a firm called WH&H. Same person.)

http://bit.ly/fP0A44
(IBM RSW is believed to be an IBM office near the SW Regional Airport in Florida.)

4037 Del Prado Boulevard South, Cape Coral, FL
(239) 945-1013


Patent application number: 20090313274
http://www.ificlaims.com/ificls/IPC8_Co ... _final.asp



ALSO WORTH LOOKING INTO;
http://hbgary.anonleaks.ch/ted_hbgary_com/6555.html


Meeting/training class between NSA, USAF, HBGary, Booz Allen & other various sec companies
Note: Why are the exact same companies that are intrested in Metal Gear have a seminar about a malware analyzing software?

http://hbgary.anonleaks.ch/phil_hbgary_com/14294h.html

The purpose of the meeting/thing was to school them in Responder Pro
Phil Wallisch was the instructor..
Dox of guys in the meeting

Parties involved;

http://www.mandiant.com/
NSA
IBM
USAF
HBGary
Booz Allen Hamilton


Here's the list of folks who will be attending 'class':

Protip: call these people, ask them about Metal Gear, ask them about the air force, NSA, USAF, Aaron Barr. Get them worried, get them talking.

Keesok Han USAF Keesook.Han@rl.af.mil
keeseok@kangwon.ac.kr
http://bit.ly/dPFV23 - some document aboutKeeseok.
DEPARTMENT OF FUCKING HOMELAND SECURITY
http://www.ksea.org/KSEA/Newsletters/Fu ... 3_1982.pdf <- someone check this out, search for his name
<- whitepages say 3 or less with this name, it may also be Kesook, misspelt on purpose?

Jose Faura NSA NTOC faura2@gmail.com
http://hb.cryptologic.tk/greg_hbgary_com/13095.html
http://orlando.blockshopper.com/propert ... way_place/

Zane Lackey iSEC Partners zane@isecpartners.com
http://hbgary.anonleaks.ch/phil_hbgary_com/15070.html <- check this out
http://www.linkedin.com/pub/zane-lackey/4/340/66a ?
Have written book about :
H.323 Attack And IAX Attacks
Txt msg attacks

Scott Brown NSA - Blue Team sbrown@dewnet.ncsc.mil
> Scott K. Brown
> Technical Director
> NSA Blue Team
> (410) 854-6529
> sbrown@dewnet.ncsc.mil

George Peslis DISA george.peslis@disa.mil

Jimmy Lloyd DISA James.Lloyd@disa.mil
http://sellingtoarmy.com/uploads/Army_O ... an2011.pdf

Eric Potter DISA Eric.Potter@disa.mil

Phil Geneste BAH geneste_philip@bah.com

Patrick Upatham Verdasys pupatham@verdasys.com
Patrick Upatham
Security Solutions Manager
Verdasys, Inc.
Mobile: +1 339.222.4022

David Black IBM david.black@us.ibm.com
http://www.linkedin.com/in/dcblack?goba ... F3B5%2F43B
David Black
Engagement Manager
Emergency Response Service
IBM Security Services
Kansas City, Missouri USA
Office: (+001) 816-525-5494


Tim Sherald DISA timothy.sherald@disa.mil
> Tim Sherald
> Computer Scientist
> DISA FSO - IRRT (FS42)
> timothy.sherald@disa.mil
> timothy.sherald@disa.smil.mil
> Comm: 717-267-9370
> DSN: 570-9370
> Cell: 717-414-3450

Christina Smyre NSA clsmyre@nsa.gov
http://www.facebook.com/clsmyre <- real, matches with email
clsmyre@gmail.com
http://n-design.com/EN/other_pubs/Entri ... Sample.pdf <- someone dig in this

John Laliberte NSA
http://www.facebook.com/people/John-Laliberte/13949810 ?

AAPC G-PPE Task Force Members <----
http://www.fasab.gov/pdffiles/gppetf_roster.pdf
Eric Potter brought us to that link <- check it out

[Plutonia]

#OpMetalgear

Anonymous Radio clip - introductory statement and discussion of Booz Allen sock-puppetry capability: http://ge.tt/#5tzZlkq

Anonymous To Release Documents Showing ‘Virtual Armies’ Used To Identify Dissidents
Mar. 16 2011 - 2:49 pm | 667 views | 0 recommendations | 0 comments
By PARMY OLSON

Members of the international hacking group Anonymous claim to have documents and e-mails that put Virginia-based consulting company Booz Allen Hamilton at the center of accusations of developing software used against dissidents in countries including Azerbaijan.

Spokespeople at Booz Allen could not be reached for comment on the phone or via e-mail.

Anonymous adviser Barrett Brown claimed on the group’s Radio Payback show earlier today that the software had led to rebels in Azerbaijan, where Booz Allen has offices, getting arrested. The software creates “armies of fake people” through social media sites like Facebook, he said, which results in identifying dissidents with anonymous profiles, a method also known as astroturfing.

The information came to light through thousands of e-mails belonging to software security firm HBGary’s former CEO, Aaron Barr, who’s accounts were hacked by supporters of Anonymous after he claimed to have identified members of the group by (ironically) using fake profiles on social media.

Another member of the group known as Topiary says the information, which it promises to release within the next few hours, does not amount to “solid proof” but comes from informants who have worked closely with companies involved and can confirm that Booz Allen created the software, having allegedly won a contract with the U.S. Air Force. The hacker was also unsure if Booz Allen sold the software to the government of Azerbaijan or was using it on its behalf, but believes it may also have been used in Iraq.

“We know the U.S. Air Force and the Pentagon asked for it, we do know that Booz Allen and Aaron Barr [of HBGary] bid for the contract, we’ve got confirmation from Booz Allen themselves that the software exists,” he claims.

Booz Allen Hamilton is a technology and engineering consultancy that provides services primarily to the U.S. government in the defense, intelligence, and civil sectors, as well as corporations, institutions, and nonprofit organization, according to its web site.

“This entire thing is a result of leverage from the leaked HBGary emails,” says Topiary, “which was a result of leverage from an infiltrated Google Mail App of HBGary Federal, which was a result of leverage from Aaron Barr using the same password twice.”

Spyware patents:

HOLMAN IP LAW/IBM RSW
SALT LAKE CITY, UT US
1. 20100180159 METHOD, APPARATUS OR SOFTWARE FOR SELECTIVELY ACTIVATING A TRACE FUNCTION 07-15-2010
2. 20100169445 DEVICE, METHOD, AND COMPUTER PROGRAM PRODUCT FOR SUPPORTING CREATION OF REPLY MAIL 07-01-2010
3. 20100103925 System, method, and apparatus to correlate a TCAP web service request to an application server session 04-29-2010
4. 20100094822 System and method for determining a file save location 04-15-2010
5. 20100075756 Secondary controller for emulating a console controller 03-25-2010
6. 20100064233 System, method, and apparatus for generating a portlet by merging content from a plurality of portlets 03-11-2010
7. 20100042600 ROLE-BASED CONTACT LIST MANAGER - system and method for managing a contact list within a business process automation tool 02-18-2010
8. 20100017194 System and method for suggesting recipients in electronic messages 01-21-2010
9. 20100009756 System, method, and apparatus for portable gaming profiles 01-14-2010
10. 20100009755 System, method, and apparatus for associating a gaming profile using proximity of a wireless device 01-14-2010
11. 20090313274 Persona management system for communications 12-17-2009
12. 20090307595 System and method for associating semantically parsed verbal communications with gestures 12-10-2009
13. 20090303984 System and method for private conversation in a public space of a virtual world 12-10-2009
14. 20090282138 System, method, and apparatus for electronic communication initiation contingent on busyness 11-12-2009
15. 20090271716 System and method for real-time scheduling 10-29-2009
16. 20090265771 System and method for hosting multiple kerberos service principal names 10-22-2009
17. 20090265196 Apparatus, system, and method for collecting metrics from a non-monolithic website 10-22-2009
18. 20090216581 System and method for managing community assets 08-27-2009
19. 20090177977 SYSTEM AND METHOD FOR GROUP CONTROL IN A METAVERSE APPLICATION 07-09-2009
20. 20090177969 SYSTEM AND METHOD FOR ATTENDING A RECORDED EVENT IN A METAVERSE APPLICATION 07-09-2009
21. 20090138561 SYSTEM AND METHOD FOR SERVICE ORIENTED EMAIL CLIENT APPLICATION 05-28-2009
22. 20090106080 SYSTEM AND METHOD FOR MANAGING A SURVEY FOR A COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT ASSET 04-23-2009
23. 20090099895 SYSTEM AND METHOD FOR MANAGING ACCESS RIGHTS TO A PROJECT TEAM AREA FOR A COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT ASSET 04-16-2009
24. 20090048845 APPARATUS, SYSTEM, AND METHOD FOR VOICE CHAT TRANSCRIPTION 02-19-2009
25. 20090037407 SYSTEM AND METHOD FOR SORTING ATTACHMENTS IN AN INTEGRATED INFORMATION MANAGEMENT APPLICATION 02-05-2009
26. 20090024747 SYSTEM AND METHOD FOR VISUAL REPRESENTATION OF A SOCIAL NETWORK CONNECTION QUALITY 01-22-2009
http://www.faqs.org/patents/agn/10674

[JackRiddler]

nomo posted on another thread that barracuda locked on charges of second-degree thread proliferation:

» Thu Mar 17, 2011 3:24 pm
http://www.guardian.co.uk/technology/20 ... l-networks

Revealed: US spy operation that manipulates social media

Military's 'sock puppet' software creates fake online identities to spread pro-American propaganda



The US military is developing software that will let it secretly manipulate social media sites such as Facebook and Twitter by using fake online personas to influence internet conversations and spread pro-American propaganda.

A Californian corporation has been awarded a contract with United States Central Command (Centcom), which oversees US armed operations in the Middle East and Central Asia, to develop what is described as an "online persona management service" that will allow one US serviceman or woman to control up to 10 separate identities based all over the world.

The project has been likened by web experts to China's attempts to control and restrict free speech on the internet. Critics are likely to complain that it will allow the US military to create a false consensus in online conversations, crowd out unwelcome opinions and smother commentaries or reports that do not correspond with its own objectives.

The discovery that the US military is developing false online personalities – known to users of social media as "sock puppets" – could also encourage other governments, private companies and non-government organisations to do the same.

The Centcom contract stipulates that each fake online persona must have a convincing background, history and supporting details, and that up to 50 US-based controllers should be able to operate false identities from their workstations "without fear of being discovered by sophisticated adversaries".

Centcom spokesman Commander Bill Speaks said: "The technology supports classified blogging activities on foreign-language websites to enable Centcom to counter violent extremist and enemy propaganda outside the US."

He said none of the interventions would be in English, as it would be unlawful to "address US audiences" with such technology, and any English-language use of social media by Centcom was always clearly attributed. The languages in which the interventions are conducted include Arabic, Farsi, Urdu and Pashto.

Once developed, the software could allow US service personnel, working around the clock in one location, to respond to emerging online conversations with any number of co-ordinated Facebook messages, blogposts, tweets, retweets, chatroom posts and other interventions. Details of the contract suggest this location would be MacDill air force base near Tampa, Florida, home of US Special Operations Command.

Centcom's contract requires for each controller the provision of one "virtual private server" located in the United States and others appearing to be outside the US to give the impression the fake personas are real people located in different parts of the world.

It also calls for "traffic mixing", blending the persona controllers' internet usage with the usage of people outside Centcom in a manner that must offer "excellent cover and powerful deniability".

The multiple persona contract is thought to have been awarded as part of a programme called Operation Earnest Voice (OEV), which was first developed in Iraq as a psychological warfare weapon against the online presence of al-Qaida supporters and others ranged against coalition forces. Since then, OEV is reported to have expanded into a $200m programme and is thought to have been used against jihadists across Pakistan, Afghanistan and the Middle East.

OEV is seen by senior US commanders as a vital counter-terrorism and counter-radicalisation programme. In evidence to the US Senate's armed services committee last year, General David Petraeus, then commander of Centcom, described the operation as an effort to "counter extremist ideology and propaganda and to ensure that credible voices in the region are heard". He said the US military's objective was to be "first with the truth".

This month Petraeus's successor, General James Mattis, told the same committee that OEV "supports all activities associated with degrading the enemy narrative, including web engagement and web-based product distribution capabilities".

Centcom confirmed that the $2.76m contract was awarded to Ntrepid, a newly formed corporation registered in Los Angeles. It would not disclose whether the multiple persona project is already in operation or discuss any related contracts.

Nobody was available for comment at Ntrepid.

In his evidence to the Senate committee, Gen Mattis said: "OEV seeks to disrupt recruitment and training of suicide bombers; deny safe havens for our adversaries; and counter extremist ideology and propaganda." He added that Centcom was working with "our coalition partners" to develop new techniques and tactics the US could use "to counter the adversary in the cyber domain".

According to a report by the inspector general of the US defence department in Iraq, OEV was managed by the multinational forces rather than Centcom.

Asked whether any UK military personnel had been involved in OEV, Britain's Ministry of Defence said it could find "no evidence". The MoD refused to say whether it had been involved in the development of persona management programmes, saying: "We don't comment on cyber capability."

OEV was discussed last year at a gathering of electronic warfare specialists in Washington DC, where a senior Centcom officer told delegates that its purpose was to "communicate critical messages and to counter the propaganda of our adversaries".

Persona management by the US military would face legal challenges if it were turned against citizens of the US, where a number of people engaged in sock puppetry have faced prosecution.

Last year a New York lawyer who impersonated a scholar was sentenced to jail after being convicted of "criminal impersonation" and identity theft.

It is unclear whether a persona management programme would contravene UK law. Legal experts say it could fall foul of the Forgery and Counterfeiting Act 1981, which states that "a person is guilty of forgery if he makes a false instrument, with the intention that he or another shall use it to induce somebody to accept it as genuine, and by reason of so accepting it to do or not to do some act to his own or any other person's prejudice". However, this would apply only if a website or social network could be shown to have suffered "prejudice" as a result.

[American Dream]

[Plutonia]

RSA says security breach may have compromised SecurID
March 17, 2011 06:49 PM
By Hiawatha Bray, Globe Staff

RSA, the Bedford-based data security division of Hopkinton’s EMC Corp., said today that an attack on its computer systems may have compromised the reliability of SecurID, one of its chief products.

SecurID is used by 40 million people in 30,000 organizations worldwide, including banks and government agencies, the company said. RSA revealed the breach in documents filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission.

The company said that its customers weren’t directly affected by the breach, but should tighten their security practices just in case.

SecurID randomly generates a number once a minute, displaying it on a small device carried by a user. To gain entry to a computer network protected by SecurID, the user must type in this number, along with a traditional password.

In its filing, RSA said it does not expect the breach to materially affect its financial results.

[seemslikeadream]

ChamberLeaks: Military Contractors Palantir And Berico Under Scrutiny

Excerpt of contract between Berico and HBGary, signed by Berico co-founder Nick Hallam. Click to enlarge.
Last month, ThinkProgress revealed a campaign organized by lawyers for the U.S. Chamber of Commerce against its opponents using three security contractors, Palantir Technologies, Berico Technologies, and HBGary Federal. During an Armed Services Committee hearing on Wednesday, Rep. Hank Johnson (D-GA) asked military officials to provide contract information related to the government’s business with the firms involved in the Chamber proposal. Chairman Rep. Mac Thornberry (R-TX), requested that the information be made available to the full subcommittee.

Palantir, Berico, and HBGary may have used techniques and technologies developed under military contracts in their pro-Chamber campaign. For months, the security firms — who named their collaboration “Themis,” after the Roman goddess of law and order — worked on behalf of the Chamber’s law firm, Hunton & Williams LLP, creating electronic dossiers on political opponents of the Chamber through illicit means.

What is known about the business relationship between these firms?

BERICO TECHNOLOGIES: Berico’s co-founders, CEO Guy Filippelli and COO Nick Hallam have issued a statement claiming that Berico “does not condone or support any effort that proactively targets American firms, organizations or individuals,” calling the actions “reprehensible.”

However, Berico’s initial proposal to Hunton & Williams called for the “open source collection of information on target groups and individuals that appear organized to extort specific concessions through online slander campaigns.”

Furthermore, Berico COO Nick Hallam signed a contract with HBGary in November to “better conduct cyber investigations and corporate campaign analysis” in response to the request of Hunton & Williams.


Excerpt of nondisclosure agreement between Berico and HBGary, signed by Berico co-founder Nick Hallam. Click to enlarge.
In December, Hallam signed a nondisclosure agreement with HBGary to use Palantir on behalf of Hunton & Williams to “provide information, insight, and analysis relating to nongovernmental organization corporate campaigns and labor union corporate campaigns.”

In pursuit of this unethical project to proactively target the Chamber’s political adversaries, Berico employees then uploaded data scraped from Facebook onto Palantir’s servers.

Emails indicate that Berico CEO Guy Fillippelli met with Hunton & Williams partner Bob Quackenboss, the primary contact with the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, to negotiate pricing of the spying campaign.

PALANTIR TECHNOLOGIES: In his testimony, NSA director Gen. Keith Alexander described how Palantir’s tools provide the defense and intelligence communities “a way of visualizing what’s going on in the networks” [of terrorists]. Alexander explained that military contracts generally specify whether technologies developed for the defense department can be used for commercial applications.

Palantir co-founder and CEO Dr. Alex Karp has issued a statement that Palantir has “a commitment to building software that protects privacy and civil liberties.” However, Palantir was in fact the company that first asked HBGary to conduct illicit invasions of privacy.

Palantir was the first company approached by Hunton & Williams to conduct the pro-Chamber espionage campaign in the middle of October, 2010. Even before learning the identity of the law firm’s corporate client, Palantir’s Matthew Steckman then asked Barr to provide “digital intelligence collection” and “social media exploitation” — i.e., illicit and unethical hacking. Emails indicate that the pro-Chamber spying was approved by Palantir founder Alex Karp, the board of directors, and Palantir general counsel Matt Long.


Excerpt of contract between Berico and Palantir, signed by Berico co-founder Nick Hallam and Palantir general counsel Matt Long. Click to enlarge.
Under contract from Berico, Palantir developed a database designed to hold data scraped from social media sites, and both Berico and HBGary uploaded such illicit data to the Palantir servers. It is unknown whether Palantir has deleted all such data scraped from Facebook and LinkedIn for their projects. It is also unknown how much data scraped from social media sites still resides on other Palantir projects.

After the conspiracy was revealed, Berico and Palantir have cut ties with HBGary for its “reprehensible” “cyber attacks.” Palantir has now suspended software engineer Matthew Steckman “pending a thorough review of his actions.”

However, top officials of the Themis companies signed contracts to work together to use Barr’s “abhorrent” and “reprehensible” methods on behalf of Hunton & Williams and the U.S. Chamber of Commerce. Simply disowning HBGary and putting a “26-year-old software engineer” on leave shouldn’t make the questions about the extent of this unethical conspiracy go away.

[Cosmic Cowbell]

The true "Anon" I suspect is nothing more than an outgrowth/evolution of the Luelinks consortium. And what has happened in the past year is nothing but a troll within a troll. The use of certain terms and actions (Luefags, Moralfags, etc) as well as certain references to boxes (see "box cannons) leads me to suspect this. This group early on targeted/trolled particular websites/forums, especially those whose subject matter concerned "Woo" (GLP, Unknown Country and others). Years ago, as a mod elsewhere, I was exposed to these guys and actually trolled a site where these "actions" were discussed and planned. This is why one of the first targets of "Anon" was the CoS (all hail Xenu). As the web has grown (4chan, Youtube, Twitter), especially with regards to "social media", so too has this original group ("Luesers"). And they truly gets their kicks by manipulating others (especially "moralfags") to create chaos. If they can manipulate/point others at others to accomplish this, that's the real "lulz", if those "others" get caught, these are simply bonus lulz. Bottom line, true "Anons" could give less of a shit about practically anything -except anarchy and chaos of -any- kind. There is no good or evil factored into pursuit of this goal.

Here's a quoted comment from the Box Cannon link offered above:

LUElinks will probably make international news someday. 8000 teenagers, plus the main LUE board of thousands more...a bunch of scheming and smart teenagers...

It will be interesting when they do make the news.

This from 2005. They just go by a different name nowadays.

Without going into detail (although most RI vets will know what I'm referring to) I suspect we've seen Luesers (in some form or another) here in the past - don't ask if you can't figure out. They've just growed up is all. And as you'll see in the article below, apparently a few of the "moralfags" are starting to figure this out...

Inside Anonymous’ Secret War Room

John Cook and Adrian Chen — Dissident members of the internet hacktivist group Anonymous, tired of what they call the mob's "unpatriotic" ways, have provided law enforcement with chat logs of the group's leadership planning crimes, as well as what they say are key members' identities. They also gave them to us.

The chat logs, which cover several days in February immediately after the group hacked into internet security firm HBGary's e-mail accounts, offer a fascinating look inside the hivemind's organization and culture.

They demonstrate that, contrary to the repeated claims of Anonymous members, the group does have ad hoc leaders, with certain members doling out tasks, selecting targets, and even dressing down members who get out of line. They prove that, contrary to their claims, at least one of the hackers responsible for releasing the publishing the e-mail addresses of thousands of Gawker users last December is in fact a key member of Anonymous. They show a collective of ecstatic and arrogant activists driven to a frenzy by a sense of their own power—they congratulated one another when Hosni Mubarak resigned, as though Anonymous was responsible—and contain bald admissions of criminal behavior that could serve as powerful evidence in criminal proceedings if the internet handles are ever linked to actual people.

Full size
The logs are from an invite-only IRC chat channel called #HQ, populated by people calling themselves Sabu, Kayla, Laurelai, Avunit, Entropy, Topiary, Tflow, and Marduk.

They were supplied by two individuals who go by the names Metric and A5h3r4 and describe themselves as former Anonymous supporters who became increasingly disenchanted with the movement's tactics, particularly the extent to which the group's more sophisticated members tolerate children and teens participating in risky operations (British authorities arrested a 15-year-old and a 16-year-old in January, and Dutch police arrested a 16-year-old in December). They recently launched a firm they call Backtrace Security.

"The bastards are becoming arrogant sociopaths," said A5h3r4 via chat. "Acting first, not thinking of the consequences. They're recruiting children. I am a pretty far left person—I believe in privacy and free expression, but Anonymous is a vigilante group now. A mob without conscience. And I worry they will radicalize even more. In short, I believe they're on their way to becoming a genuine threat."

While Anonymous describes itself as a leaderless collective, the #HQ channel had a clear head honcho, a hacker who goes by the name of Sabu who claims credit for conducting the HBary hack. In plotting his next attack, on Hunton and Williams, a law firm that discussed hiring HBGary to conduct dirty tricks campaigns against Wikileaks supporters on behalf of its client Bank of America, Sabu threatens to "rape these niggers":

17:46 <&Sabu> hunton.com will be a nice fucking hit
17:46 <&marduk> hm see potential vulns [vulnerabilities]?
17:48 <&Sabu> yeah
17:48 <&Sabu> I see some potential openings
17:48 <&marduk> :]
17:49 <&Sabu> we could rape these niggers

Here is Sabu directing the other channel members to come up with a target list for their next hack, including potential media outlets and so-called "whitehat" internet security firms, and ordering Kayla to get working:

17:52 <&Sabu> can you guys put together a private pad containing a list of whitehat targets, lawyers, reporters, any media that requires counter-intelligence attack

[snip]

18:31 <&Sabu> guys im going offline I will be back online toorrow
18:31 <&Sabu> tomorrow I should have a new laptop
18:31 <&Sabu> muah
18:31 <&Sabu> and kayla
18:31 <&Sabu> please work on whitehat targets
18:34 <&marduk> will request
18:34 <@kayla> Sabu ofc <3

And here he is excoriating Laurelai, an HQ member who had created a set of instructions for how to carry out an Anonymous attack. Sabu derided it as a stupid move that would help federal investigators make a conspiracy case if leaked and generally make Anonymous look as devious as HBGary. In the same breath that he insists Anonymous is disorganized and leaderless, Sabu plays the role of a leader, enforcing unit discipline while the other members stand by. Laurelei fights back by criticizing Sabu for quickly going public with the HBGary hack, rather than secretly listening in on their e-mails for weeks, and Sabu responds by openly admitting to his involvement: "I'm the one that did the op, I rooted their boxes, cracked their hashes, owned their emails and social engineered their admins in hours."

04:44 <&Sabu> who the fuck wrote that doc
04:45 <&Sabu> remove that shit from existence
04:45 <&Sabu> first off there is no hierachy or leadership, and thus an operations manual is not needed

[snip]

04:46 <&Sabu> shit like this is where the feds will get american anons on rico act abuse and other organized crime laws
04:47 <@Laurelai> yeah well you could have done 100 times more effective shit with HBgary
04:47 <@Laurelai> gratted what we got was good
04:47 <&Sabu> if you're so fucking talented why didn't you root them yourselves?
04:47 <@Laurelai> but it could have been done alot better
04:47 <&Sabu> also we had a time restraint
04:48 <&Sabu> and as far as I know, considering I'm the one that did the op, I rooted their boxes, cracked their hashes, owned their emails and social engineered their admins in hours
04:48 <&Sabu> your manual is irrelevent.

[snip]

04:51 <&Sabu> ok who authored this ridiculous "OPERATIONS" doc?
04:51 <@Laurelai> look the guideline isnt for you
04:51 <&Sabu> because I'm about to start owning nigg3rs
04:51 <&marduk> authorized???
04:52 <@Laurelai> its just an idea to kick around
04:52 <@Laurelai> start talking
04:52 <&Sabu> for who? the feds?
04:52 <&marduk> its not any official doc, it is something that Laurelai wrote up.. and it is for.. others
04:52 <&marduk> on anonops
04:52 <&Sabu> rofl
04:52 <@Laurelai> just idea
04:52 <@Laurelai> ideas
04:52 <&Sabu> man
04:52 <&marduk> at least that is how i understand it
04:52 <@Laurelai> to talk over
04:53 <&Sabu> le sigh
04:53 <&marduk> mmmm why are we so in a bad mood?
04:53 <&Sabu> my nigga look at that doc
04:53 <&Sabu> and how ridiculous it is

[snip]

04:54 <&marduk> look, i think it was made with good intentions. and it is nothing you need to follow, if you dont like it, it is your good right
04:55 <&Sabu> no fuck that. its docs like this that WHEN LEAKED makes us look like an ORGANIZED CRIME ORGANIZATION

Members of the HQ chat were, understandably, obsessed with security. But they seemed to believe that they were safe in that chat room, candidly discussing their own efforts to distance themselves from any illegal activity. Here is Topiary, who has given a number of media interviews, discussing plans to stop speaking for Anonymous in the first person in order to "avoid being raped by Feds":

15:13 <@Topiary> also I'm going to start saying, with future press, that I'm an observer/associate of Anon that agrees with Anonymous actions, rather than say I'm Anon
15:13 <@Topiary> kind of like Barrett/Housh [Anonymous spokesmen Barrett Brown and Gregg Housh]
15:13 <@Topiary> to avoid being raped by Feds
15:14 <@tflow> aw
15:14 <@tflow> why

[snip]

15:15 <@Topiary> all I have to do is stop saying "we" and start saying "they" when referring to Anon
15:15 <@tflow> it will decrease the lulz in interviews
15:15 <@Topiary> hm, valid point

And here, in the same vein, they discuss how to interact with the press without being seen as an actual member of the group, including references to Sabu, Kayla, and Tflow's efforts to maintain plausible deniability about their roles in the HBGary hack.

23:12 <&marduk> i would refrein from using "rep" ever
23:12 <&marduk> simply because.. that makes you/us directly tiable/responsible for what happens
23:12 <&marduk> no need to
23:12 <&marduk> example: the penny lock
23:12 <&marduk> yeah sabu/kayla/tflow obviously were involved in the hack. but they never admitted to
23:13 <&marduk> from the logs, you can only deduct that they knew about the operation

Sabu didn't feel the need to be as discreet in the HQ chat. Here he is taking responsibility for the HBGary hack, which involved tricking a Nokia network security specialist named Jussi into handing over passwords:

02:39 <&Sabu> "Greatest social hack of all time: http://is.gd/duaZcG - Anonymous vs. hbgary.com."
02:39 <&Sabu> rofl
02:39 <&Sabu> people are really enjoying the socialing of jussi
02:39 <&Sabu> man I was talking to my little brother who witnessed the whole shit
02:39 <&Sabu> I think he and I were as excited as people are about it now
02:39 <&Sabu> we were fitdgeting and giggling and shit
02:40 <&Sabu> as jussi dropped firewall
02:40 <&Sabu> then reset the pw
02:40 <&Sabu> then gave us the username

The logs also seem to prove that members of Anonymous were involved in hacking into Gawker's servers last December. Gnosis, the group that claimed credit for the hack, claimed in interviews to have no affiliation with Anonymous. But Kayla, a member of the HQ chat who was intimately involved with the HBGary attack, implicitly takes credit at one point for the Gawker attacks after someone mentions a Gawker article:

18:26 * kayla h8's gawker
18:26 <@kayla> Nick Denton especially h8's me

Kayla claims to be a 16-year-old girl, and has publicly admitted involvement with the HBGary infiltration (some, including Metric and A5h3r4, doubt Kayla's claims and suspect her to be in reality Corey Barnhill, a New Jersey hacker in his late 20s who also goes by the name Xyrix). Whoever Kayla is, she was definitely involved in the attack on Gawker. The HQ chats show that Anonymous made use of a the domain internetfeds.mil.nf in preparing HBGary e-mails for release. According to Matt Keys, a journalist who infiltrated the group, the Internet Feds (and not Gnosis), were the real Gawker attackers. And Kayla was one of them. "Kayla was one of two hackers who broke into the Gawker database," Keys told Gawker. "It was her idea. She coordinated the attack. She carried it out with another hacker. A third was involved in the distribution of the torrent, but the brainchild of the Gawker hack attack was Kayla." Keys provided Gawker with screengrabs from the Internet Feds IRC chat as evidence.

Ever since Anonymous began taking down the websites of PayPal, Mastercard, and other firms that refused to do business with Julian Assange, Wikileaks has insisted that it has no connection with Anonymous. But the logs seem to show that Laurelai, one of the HQ chat members, is a Wikileaks volunteer. When Sabu asks fellow chat members who she is, they respond that she's affiliated with the group:

04:51 <&Sabu> who the fuck is laurelai and why is he/she/it questioning our owning of hbgary
04:51 <&marduk> uhm.. she is with wl
04:51 <&Sabu> and?
04:51 <&marduk> and kayla knows her.
04:51 <&Sabu> bleh

Laurelai is also involved in Crowdleaks, a site devoted to translating and disseminating Wikleaks' material. According to Metric and A5h3r4, Laurelei has claimed in chats to be affiliated with the group. They caution that it could be puffery, though, as not everything she's claimed has been reliable.

Speaking of puffery, the HQ chat's reaction to Mubarak stepping down in Egypt serves as a handy indicator of just how seriously Anonymous takes itself, and it's power:

18:13 <~Avunit> and mubarak is gone
18:13 <~Avunit> for if you dont watch the news
18:15 <&Sabu> oh wow i didnt know fuck yes
18:15 <&Sabu> congrats all
18:15 * Avunit bows to sabu.

The logs show an obsession with media coverage, and HQ members take delight in interacting with reporters, whether it's a genuine attempt to get the word out or a chance to fuck with gullible reporters. Here they are doing the latter to a Guardian reporter:

11:59 <@Topiary> Goddamnit this Guardian bitch is requesting access to "secret" inner-circle channels so she can tell everyone about how hard Anon works and to have first-hand experience at our inner workings
11:59 <@Topiary> I say we fake a secret channel and discuss in BATSHIT CODE
11:59 <@Topiary> and then invite her
11:59 <@tflow> lol

[snip]

12:01 <@Topiary> fuck niggahs, do you wanna make one on anonops called #over9000 or something?
12:01 <@Topiary> then we invite her and just, I don't know
12:01 <@Topiary> we just go to town in hackers on steroids talk
12:02 <&marduk> mhh not sure but i could utter some cryptic stuff
12:02 <~Avunit> bitch: create it

[snip]

12:03 <@tflow> Topiary: so she's not actually believing that anonymous isn't secretive?
12:03 <@tflow> if so, epic troll the guardian and teach them a lesson
12:03 <@Topiary> epic troll time
12:03 <~Avunit> speak like cryptic, only to eachother and be blunt to her
12:03 <~Avunit> god yeah
12:03 <~Avunit> lets roll
12:03 <@Topiary> she wants to delve into the secret underbelly, we'll give her a trolling hellstorm

The obsession with secrecy and security in HQ led naturally to paranoia, as seen in this account from Entropy, who became convinced when his boss called him into the office unexpectedly—earlier in the logs he referred to talking the "CCIE security written test," suggesting he's an internet security specialist—that it was some sort of sting.

14:50 <@entropy> my boss called me
14:50 <@entropy> ans asked me if i can come into work
14:50 <@entropy> they couldnt have got anythign this fast right
14:51 <@entropy> my hands are fuckign shaking
14:51 <@entropy> should i go there
14:51 <@tflow> gahh..
14:51 <@entropy> its way to fats right
14:52 <@entropy> fast
14:52 <@kayla> for what?
14:53 <@entropy> for the police to do anything?
14:53 <@kayla> i'd say so
14:53 <@entropy> thats what i think
14:53 <@kayla> why would they go to your work and not your house?
14:53 <@entropy> i have no idea
14:53 <@kayla> i think you're being paranoid
14:53 <&marduk> yah that makes no sense, rly
14:53 <@entropy> ok fuck
14:54 <@entropy> too many wierd things now im fuckign paranoid as shit
14:54 <@entropy> i need to calm the fuck down
15:10 <@entropy> theres two people with my boss in my conf room
15:10 <@entropy> two guys
15:10 <@entropy> i have no fucking idea whats goign on
15:10 <@entropy> should i call a layer before i go in there or ?
15:10 <@entropy> just to be safe?
15:16 <~Avunit> djklgadklgjdlgjak
15:16 <~Avunit> sdgmldgjklal
15:17 <~Avunit> dgjdklagjldgjkladjgkladg
15:18 <~Avunit> we're getting bullshitted badly rite?
15:18 <~Avunit> entropy
15:18 <@entropy> i fucking wish i was bullshitting
15:18 <@entropy> im goign to fucking throw up
15:19 <~Avunit> jesus shitting fuck

Turns out it was nothing!

Metric and A5h3r4 also provided us with what they say are the actual identities of Sabu, Kayla, Laurelai, Avunit, Topiary, and other members of the chat. We couldn't connect the handles to the names provided with any certainty, so we're not publishing them.

But they say they provided the same information to the FBI. When we called the special agent they gave it to, he replied, "as an agent on that case, I'm not going to discuss ongoing investigative matters" and referred us to a spokesman, who had no immediate comment. Metric and A5h3r4 also say they've handed the material to the Department of Defense, but declined to identify to whom.

Barrett Brown, who is generally regarded by Anonymous members as a spokesman for the group, said he has known about the "security breach" for some time: "We're aware of the security breach as other logs from 'HQ' have been posted before (and I should note that HQ is not really HQ anyway — you will note that the actual coordination of performed hacks will not appear in those logs). I can tell you that those who were responsible for pulling off HBGary ... no longer use that room due not only to this security breach, but other factors as well." When we repeated Metric and A5h3r4's claims that Anonymous had become megalomaniacal and vindictive, Brown replied: "I can also confirm that we have become vindicative megalomaniacs."

http://gawker.com/#!5783173/inside-anon ... t-war-room

Luesers...