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AlicetheKurious wrote:Oh, I get it, you're trying to confuse me by going all reasonable and humble on me.
barracuda wrote:Now it would seem to be just a matter of time before the official denunciation and defunding of the STL.
STL indicts 4 Hezbollah members, seeks arrests
BEIRUT: A U.N.-backed court probing the 2005 assassination of statesman Rafik Hariri handed over Thursday the Lebanon portion of the indictment, which accused four Hezbollah members, State Prosecutor Saeed Mirza said.
“I will now examine the indictment and the warrants to take the appropriate measures,” Mirza told reporters following a meeting with a three-member delegation from the Special Tribunal for Lebanon (STL).
A judicial source told The Daily Star that the indictment identified the suspects as Mustafa Badreddine, Salim al-Ayyash, Hasan Aineysseh and Asad Sabra.
The STL Thursday officially confirmed the delivery of the indictment and accompanying arrest warrants to the Lebanese authorities, following a declaration by the Lebanese authorities that they received a confirmed indictment, a statement published by the STL said.
The statement also said that Pre-Trial Judge Daniel Fransen had confirmed the indictment on June 28.
“At this time, the STL has no comment on the identity or identities of the person or persons named in the indictment. Indeed, Judge Fransen has ruled that the indictment shall remain confidential in order to assist the Lebanese authorities in fulfilling their obligations to arrest the accused,” the statement, published hours after the delegation had ended its meeting with Mirza, said.
The confirmation of the indictment meant that Fransen was satisfied that there was prima facie evidence for this case to proceed to trial. The statement also said that this was not a verdict of guilt and any accused person was presumed innocent until proven guilty.
“Under the STL’s rules of procedure and evidence, the Lebanese authorities have to report to the STL on the measures that they have taken to arrest the accused, at least within 30 days of the submission of the indictment,” the statement said, adding that U.N. Security Council Resolution 1757 was clear on the steps to be taken by Lebanon regarding the arrest, detention, transfer of the accused to the STL.
The STL delegation handed over to Mirza the sealed indictment and arrest warrants for the four suspects during a meeting held at Mirza's office at the Justice Palace in Beirut before midday Thursday.
Hezbollah has denied involvement in the Hariri assassination and has described the international court as part of an "Israeli-American project,” aimed at targeting the resistance and sowing strife in the country.
Speaking to a local radio station during a break from talks at Baabda Palace, Minister of State of Administrative Affairs and Hezbollah member Mohammad Fneish said: “When we see the [STL] indictment, we will comment on it.”
Few hours later Hezbollah's al-Manar television said the indictments showed the tribunal seeking his killers "is politicised".
Badreddine is a cousin and a brother-in-law of Hezbollah’s slain commander Imad Mughniyeh, who was assassinated in Syria in 2008. Badreddine eventually replaced Mughniyeh as Hezbollah’s chief operations officer.
According to the indictment, Badreddine masterminded and supervised the plot to assassinate the Lebanese statesman while, Ayyash, 48, is alleged to have headed the cell that carried out the assassination of Hariri.
Lebanon, according to experts, now has 30 days to serve out the arrest warrants. If the suspects are not arrested within that period, the STL will then make public the indictment and summon the suspects to appear before the court.
Nasrallah Comments on the STL Indictments
8:39: Over the past year, we have suggested to the various authorities that they investigate the Israeli hypothesis [that Israel killed Hariri]. We held a major press conference and presented all kinds of evidence, involving drone footage, witness testimony, etc. We presented all this evidence and said: “Here you go. This constitutes a lead for you to pursue.” Did they follow it? No.
8:40: The evidence we presented is circumstantial, and it is enough to suspect Israel of the crime. But they didn’t even bother looking into it, let alone taking it seriously and building a case on it.
8:42: It’s not my job or the job of Hizbullah to launch an investigation and present evidence to Mr. Bellemare. But we did, and we found once again that there was no interest because this Tribunal is completely politicized.
8:43: In 2005, Mehlis admitted to Le Figaro that he was getting information from Israel. Rather than investigating Israel, this investigation has cooperated with Israel.
...
9:27: To the final subject: the current situation. To the Lebanese people, I say to them the following: don’t worry about civil strife. Those who talk about civil strife in Lebanon actually want that to come about. There will be no Sunni-Shiite strife, and no civil war in Lebanon. Everyone should be assured that we have a responsible government and trustworthy that will confront this situation effectively. So, to the Lebanese people, don’t worry. Everything is fine.
9:29: To the March 14 forces, I say the following. You consider yourself an opposition to PM Miqati’s government, and that is your right. If you think that the international game is aiding your fortunes, that’s also your right. I have, however, two pieces of advice for you, or let us say two thoughts (since you don’t like to be advised). (1) Don’t ask PM Miqati’s government to try to arrest the indicted individuals, because you wouldn’t be able to do it yourself even if you had a 100% March 14 government. Even if you held every single portfolio, you wouldn’t be able to arrest these individuals, so don’t expect PM Miqati to do it. (2) My second piece of advice is: Don’t demand that PM Miqati be less flexible than PM Hariri was with respect to the STL. The Foreign Ministers of Qatar and Turkey gave me a document that stated that Prime Minister Saad Hariri was ready to accept a certain set of demands (with respect to the STL). I can show you this document. So don’t expect PM Miqati to refuse demands about the STL that Saad al-Hariri accepted. That document was signed by the Qataris, Turks, Syrians, Saudis, and Saad al-Hariri, and we were told that Ms. Clinton was ready to bless the agreement as well.
9:37: To the supporters of the Resistance: there has been a war waged upon us for years. This is no surprise. We have always been prepared for it. Whether the war takes the form of military conflict or media wars or psychological war or whatever, we are prepared. The path of resistance has succeeded in liberating land, and defending our country. So we will confront this issue of the Tribunal just as we have confronted other issues.
9:42: There are people in Lebanon who want to see Sunni-Shiite strife, particularly some Christians in March 14. We will not succumb to this.
barracuda wrote:And some excerpts from Nasrallah's response (full text at link)
Tribunal Concealed Evidence al-Qaeda Killed Hariri
by Gareth Porter, September 01, 2011
In focusing entirely on the alleged links between four Hezbollah activists and the 2005 bombing that killed Prime Minister Rafik Hariri, the indictment issued by the Special Tribunal for Lebanon earlier this month has continued the practice of the U.N. investigation before it of refusing to acknowledge the much stronger evidence that an al-Qaeda cell was responsible for the assassination.
Several members of an al-Qaeda cell confessed in 2006 to having carried out the crime but later recanted their confessions, claiming they were tortured.
However, the transcript of one of the interrogations, which was published by a Beirut newspaper in 2007, shows that the testimony was being provided without coercion and that it suggested that al-Qaeda had indeed ordered the assassination.
But the United Nations International Independent Investigation Commission (UNIIIC) was determined to pin the crime either on Syria or its Lebanese ally Hezbollah and refused to pursue the al-Qaeda angle.
Detlev Mehlis, the first head of UNIIIC, was convinced from the beginning that Syrian military intelligence and its Lebanese allies had carried out the bombing and went to extraordinary lengths to link Ahmed Abu Adas, who had appeared in a videotape claiming responsibility for the assassination for a previously unknown group, to Syrian intelligence.
Violating the general rule that investigators do not reveal specific witness testimony outside an actual courtroom, Mehlis described testimony from “a number of sources, confidential and otherwise,” which he said “pointed to Abu Adas being used by Syria and Lebanese authorities as scapegoat for the crimes.”
Mehlis cited one witness who claimed to have seen Adas in the hallway outside the office of the director of Syrian intelligence in December 2004, and another who said Adas had been forced by the head of Syrian military intelligence to record the video in Damascus 15 days before the assassination and was then put in a Syrian prison.
Mehlis quoted a third witness, Zouheir Saddiq, as saying that Adas had changed his mind about carrying out the assassination on behalf of Syrian intelligence “at the last minute” and had been killed by the Syrians and his body put in the vehicle carrying the bomb.
The Mehlis effort to fit the Adas video into his narrative of Syrian responsibility for the killing of Hariri began to fall apart when the four “false witnesses” who had implicated Syrian and Lebanese intelligence in the assassination, including Saddiq, were discredited as fabricators.
Meanwhile, a major potential break in the case occurred when Lebanese authorities arrested 11 members of an al-Qaeda terrorist cell in late December 2005 and early January 2006.
The members of the cell quickly confessed to interrogators that they had planned and carried out the assassination of Hariri, The Daily Star reported June 6, 2008.
Obviously based in large part on the interrogation of the cell members, the Lebanese government wrote an internal report in 2006 saying that, at one point after the assassination, Ahmed Abu Adas had been living in the same apartment in Beirut as the “emir” of the al-Qaeda cell, Sheik Rashid.
The full text of the report was leaked to Al Hayat, which published it April 7, 2007.
The report said Rashid, whose real name was Hassan Muhammad Nab’a, had pledged allegiance to Osama bin Laden in Afghanistan in 1999 and later to Abu Musab al-Zarqawi in Iraq.
Rashid had also been involved in the “Dinniyeh Group,” which launched an armed attempt to create an Islamic mini-state in northern Lebanon in 2000, only to be crushed by 13,000 Lebanese troops.
The members of the al-Qaeda cell later retracted their confessions when they were tried by military courts in summer 2008 for “plotting to commit terrorist acts on Lebanese soil,” claiming that the confessions had been extracted under torture.
But the al-Qaeda cell members were being held by the Ministry of Interior, whose top officials had a political interest in suppressing the information obtained from them. The full transcript of the interrogation of one of the members of the cell was leaked to the Beirut daily Al Akhbar in October 2007 by an official who was unhappy with the ministry’s opposition to doing anything with the confessions.
The transcript shows that the testimony of at least one of the members contained information that could only have been known by someone who had been informed of details of the plot.
The testimony came from Faisal Akhbar, a Syrian carrying a Saudi passport who freely admitted being part of the al-Qaeda cell. He testified that Khaled Taha, a figure the U.N. commission later admitted was closely associated with Adas, had told him in early January 2005 that an order had been issued for the assassination of Hariri, and that he was to go to Syria to help Adas make a video on the group’s taking responsibility for the assassination.
Akhbar recalled that Sheikh Rashid had told him in Syria immediately after the assassination that it had been done because Hariri had signed the orders for the execution of al-Qaeda militants in Lebanon in 2004. Akbar also said he was told around Feb. 3, 2005, that a team of Lebanese al-Qaeda had been carrying out surveillance of Hariri since mid-January.
Akhbar also told interrogators some details that were clearly untrue, including the assertion that Abu Adas had actually died in the suicide mission. That was the idea that the cell had promoted in a note attached to the videotape Adas made.
When challenged on that point, Akhbar immediately admitted that a youth from Saudi Arabia, who had been sent by al-Qaeda, had been the suicide bomber. He acknowledged that Rashid had told him that, if detained, he was to inform the security services that he knew nothing about the subject of Abu Adas, and that he was to warn the other members of the cell to do likewise.
But the interrogator employed a trick question to establish whether Akhbar had actual knowledge of the assassination plot or not. He gave the al-Qaeda cadre a list of 11 phone numbers, four of which were fake numbers, and asked him if he remembered which ones were used in the preparations for the assassination.
Akhbar immediately corrected the interrogator, saying there had only been seven numbers used in the preparations for the assassination, including the five members of the surveillance team. That response corresponded with the information the investigation had already obtained, and which had not been reported in the news media.
The response of UNIIIC, under its new chief, Belgian Serge Brammertz, to the unfolding of an entirely different narrative surrounding the assassination was to shift the focus away from the question of who were the actual perpetrators of the bombing.
In his March 2006 report, Brammertz said the “priority” of UNIIIC was being given not to the team that carried out the assassination but to those who ‘enabled’ the crime.
And Brammertz had still not abandoned the story originally planted by the false witnesses in 2005 that the role of Adas in making the videotape had been manipulated by Syrian intelligence.
In his June 2006 report, Brammertz said the Commission continued to entertain the idea that whoever detonated the bomb may have been “coerced into doing so.” And in the September 2006 report, he suggested that Adas may have been coerced into delivering the videotape, just as Mehlis had suggested in 2005.
Despite the official Lebanese government report confirming it, Brammertz never publicly acknowledged that Adas was deeply involved with an al-Qaeda cell, much less that its members had confessed to the killing of Hariri.
Daniel Bellemare, the prosecutor for the Special Tribunal for Lebanon, similarly chose not to pursue that evidence, which directly contradicts the assertion in his indictment that it was a Hezbollah operative — not al-Qaeda — who had convinced Adas to make the videotape.
(Inter Press Service)
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