by sunny » Mon Oct 02, 2006 4:20 pm
<!--EZCODE QUOTE START--><blockquote><strong><em>Quote:</em></strong><hr>Security forces in Latin America classified and targeted persons on the basis of their political ideas rather than illegal acts.<hr></blockquote><!--EZCODE QUOTE END--><br><br><!--EZCODE QUOTE START--><blockquote><strong><em>Quote:</em></strong><hr>Condor specialized in targeted abductions, disappearances, interrogations/torture, and transfers of persons across borders. According to a declassified 1976 FBI report, Condor had several levels. The first was mutual cooperation among military intelligence services, including coordination of political surveillance and exchange of intelligence information. <!--EZCODE BOLD START--><strong>The second was organized cross-border operations to detain/disappear dissidents.</strong><!--EZCODE BOLD END--> The third and most secret, "Phase III," was the formation of special teams of assassins from member countries to travel anywhere in the world to carry out assassinations of "subversive enemies." Phase III was aimed at political leaders especially feared for their potential to mobilize world opinion or organize broad opposition to the military states. <br><br>Victims of Condor's Phase III, conducted during the mid-1970s, included Chilean Orlando Letelier--foreign minister under President Salvador Allende and a fierce foe of the Pinochet regime--and his American colleague Ronni Moffitt, in Washington D.C., and Chilean Christian Democrat leader Bernardo Leighton and his wife, in Rome. Condor assassinations in Buenos Aires were carried out against General Carlos Prats, former Commander-in-Chief of the Chilean army; nationalist ex-president of Bolivia Juan Jose Torres; two Uruguayan legislators known for their opposition to the Uruguayan military regime, Zelmar Michelini and Hector Gutierrez Ruiz. In the first two cases, DINA assassination teams "contracted" local terrorist and fascist organizations to assist in carrying out the crimes. A U.S.-born DINA assassin--expatriate Michael Townley--admitted his role in the Prats, Letelier-Moffitt, and Leighton crimes. Clearly, Operation Condor was an organized system of state terror with a transnational reach.<br><br>According to a declassified Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) report from 1976, Condor used multinational commando teams made up of military and paramilitary operatives who carried out combined cross-border operations, and testimony from survivors of such operations confirms this. Condor also employed a telecommunications system (Condortel) to coordinate its intelligence, planning, and operations against political opponents. An Argentine military source told a U.S. Embassy contact in 1976 that the CIA had played a key role in setting up <br>the computerized links among the intelligence and operations units of the six Condor states.<br><br>Declassified U.S. documents make clear that U.S. security officers saw Condor as a legitimate "counterterror" organization. One 1976 DIA report stated, for example, that one Condor team was "structured much like a U.S. Special Forces Team," and described Condor's "joint counterinsurgency operations" to "eliminate Marxist terrorist activities." This report noted that Latin American military officers bragged about Condor to their U.S. counterparts. Numerous other CIA, DIA, and State Department documents referred to Condor as a counterterror or countersubversive organization and some described its assassination capability in a matter-of-fact manner. In 1978, for example, the CIA wrote that by July 1976 "the Agency was receiving reports that Condor planned to engage in `executive action' outside the territory of member countries." In fact, the documentary evidence shows that the CIA was fully aware of such capabilities and operations years earlier.<br><br>Known Cases of U.S. Collaboration with Condor<br><br>A key case illuminating U.S. involvement in Condor countersubversive operations was that of Chilean Jorge Isaac Fuentes Alarc=F3n, who was seized by Paraguayan police as he crossed the border from Argentina to Paraguay in May 1975. Fuentes, a sociologist, was suspected of being a courier for a Chilean leftist organization. Chile's Truth and Reconciliation Commission later learned that the capture of Fuentes was a cooperative effort by Argentine intelligence services, personnel of the U.S. Embassy in Buenos Aires, and Paraguayan police. Fuentes was transferred to Chilean police, who brought him to Villa Grimaldi, a notorious DINA detention center in Santiago. He was last seen there, savagely tortured.<br><br>Recently declassified U.S. documents include a letter from the U.S. Embassy in Buenos Aires (written by FBI official Robert Scherrer) informing the Chilean military that Fuentes had been captured. Additionally, Scherrer provided the names and addresses of three individuals residing in the United States whom Fuentes named during his interrogation, and told his counterparts in the Pinochet regime that the FBI was conducting investigations of the three. This letter, among others, confirms that U.S. officials and agencies were cooperating with the military dictatorships and acting as a link in the Condor chain. Perhaps most striking is that this coordination was routine (if secret), standard operating procedure within U.S. policy. <br><br>Two of the most explosive discoveries about U.S. links to Condor have emerged in the past few months. First is a 1978 Roger Channel cable from Robert White, then Ambassador to Paraguay, to the Secretary of State, discovered by this researcher in February 2001. This declassified State Department document links Operation Condor to the former U.S. military headquarters in the Panama Canal Zone.<br><br>In the cable, White reported a meeting with Paraguayan armed forces chief General Alejandro Fretes Davalos. Fretes identified the Panama Canal Zone base of the U.S. military as the site of a secure transnational communications center for Condor. According to Fretes Davalos, intelligence chiefs from Brazil, Argentina, Chile, Bolivia, Paraguay and Uruguay used "an encrypted system within the U.S. telecommunications net[work]," which covered all of Latin America, to "coordinate intelligence information." In the cable, White drew the connection to Operation Condor and questioned whether the arrangement was in the U.S. interest--but he never received a response.<br><br>The Panama base housed the headquarters of the U.S. Southern Command (SOUTHCOM), the U.S. Special Forces, and the Army School of the Americas (SOA), among other facilities, during most of the Cold War. Tens of thousands of Latin American officers were trained at the SOA, which used the infamous torture manuals released by the Pentagon and the CIA in the mid-1990s. Latin American officers trained in Panama have confirmed that the base was the center of the hemispheric anticommunist alliance. One military graduate of the School said, "The school was always a front for other special operations, covert operations." Another officer, an Argentine navy man whose unit was organized into kidnap commandos ("task forces"<!--EZCODE EMOTICON START ;) --><img src=http://www.ezboard.com/images/emoticons/wink.gif ALT=";)"><!--EZCODE EMOTICON END--> in 1972, said the repression was part of "a plan that responded to the Doctrine of National Security that had as a base the School of the Americas, directed by the Pentagon in Panama." A Uruguayan officer who worked with the CIA in the 1970s, said that the CIA not only knew of Condor operations, but also supervised them.<br><br>The second astonishing piece of recently-released information is the admission by the CIA itself in September 2000 that DINA chief Manuel Contreras was a CIA asset between 1974 and 1977, and that he received an unspecified payment for his services. During these same years Contreras was known as "Condor One," the leading organizer and proponent of Operation Condor. The CIA never divulged this information in 1978, when a Federal Grand Jury indicted Contreras for his role in the Letelier-Moffitt assassinations. Contreras was sentenced to a prison term in Chile for this crime, and convicted in absentia in Italy for the Leighton attack. The CIA claims that it did not ask Contreras about Condor until after the assassinations of Letelier and Moffitt in September 1976. This assertion is hardly credible, less so when one considers that the CIA was privy to earlier assassination plans by Condor. Moreover, the CIA helped organize and train the DINA in 1974, and retained Contreras as an asset for a year after the Letelier/Moffitt assassinations. The CIA destroyed its file on Contreras in 1991.<br><br>Michael Townley's relationship to the CIA is also murky. Townley turned state's evidence in the Letelier/Moffitt assassination trial, served a short sentence, and then entered the Witness Protection Program. In Chile, Townley had said that he was a CIA operative, and so did the attorney who defended the accused Cuban exiles in the Letelier/Moffitt assassination trial in the United States. In fact, declassified documents show that Townley was interviewed by CIA recruiters in November 1970 and was judged to be "of operational interest as a possible [phrase excised] of the Directorate of Operations in 1971." The memo carefully states, however, that the "Office of Security file does not reflect that Mr. Townley was ever actually used by the Agency." A separate affidavit states that "in February 1971, the Directorate of Operations requested preliminary security approval to use Mr. Townley in an operational capacity." Townley had close ties to the U.S. Embassy and to high-ranking Foreign Service officers, who knew of his ties to the fascist anti-Allende paramilitary group Patria y Libertad. The question that must be asked is whether Townley and Contreras were acting independently, or as CIA agents in Condor planning and operations.<hr></blockquote><!--EZCODE QUOTE END--><br><!--EZCODE AUTOLINK START--><a href="http://www.crimesofwar.org/print/onnews/condor-print.html">www.crimesofwar.org/print...print.html</a><!--EZCODE AUTOLINK END--><br><br>Did Pinochet say "Leave those peasants alone, they are too busy trying not to starve" ??<br><br>What about the disappeared of Guatamala? Were those children too busy playing to be noticed?<br><br><!--EZCODE AUTOLINK START--><a href="http://humanrights.jrn.msu.edu/articles/99conference/portbart.htm">humanrights.jrn.msu.edu/a...rtbart.htm</a><!--EZCODE AUTOLINK END--><br><br><!--EZCODE QUOTE START--><blockquote><strong><em>Quote:</em></strong><hr>Six weeks later, my sister-in-law, her two young children - babies really - and I arrived from our hometown to my father's home in the capital to celebrate my nephew's birthday, only to discover that my 70-year-old father had been kidnapped from his former place of work and that my stepmother, my 18-year-old sister-in-law, my 18-month-old baby sister and my two daughters had been kidnapped and disappeared in operations carried out by the national police, the military police, the Guatemalan army and the secret police. They have never been seen or heard from again. They remain part of that long, long list of men, women and children who disappeared in Guatemala.<hr></blockquote><!--EZCODE QUOTE END--><br><br>The US was/is intimately involved in the intrigues and disappearances in Latin America. Will they hesitate to do the same here? Hell no.<br><br>We must face the truth. I AM NOT SAYING SHUT UP. In fact, it is vital for humans of integrity to speak out, often and loudly.<br><br>What shall we do? Aknowledge it can happen here, and then try to arouse the people.<br><br> <p></p><i></i>
