When Facts Don’t Matter

[JackRiddler]

...

Surely among the valid questions we get to ask: what are we expected to believe on the basis of faith? By faith I mean not a personal miraculous experience but the word of a scripture, a church authority, a charismatic leader or a person who claims to have had miraculous experience.

... Behind it all, another question: Can we acknowledge how much of what's out there in the [guise of science] in fact is hucksterism, lazy repetition, or a product of social pressure (sometimes backed by horrific physical sanctions)? ...

complicating things a bit here:

"So Marxism, Freudianism: any one of these things I think is an irrational cult. They're theology, so they're whatever you think of theology; I don't think much of it. In fact, in my view that's exactly the right analogy: notions like Marxism and Freudianism belong to the history of organized religion." -- Noam Chomsky, Understanding Power

*

Note he refers to the isms and not the thinkers themselves, both of whom contain multitudes, as Whitman might put it. Here, as with my questions to religionists, I'd ask for definitions. I can't find the passage you quote at the page you link, so if Chomsky elaborated on it, you'll have to tell us. Are we talking about the "Marxism" of a David Harvey, which I would think of as empirical study employing analysis grounded in Marxian ideas? Or are we talking about the Gorky Komsomol pep rally for the launch of the Glorious Second Five-Year Plan Under the Watchful Eye of Comrade Stalin, where Marx's actual ideas may be remote and espousing some of them may be cause for arrest? The differences could be as great as those between Christian crusader Ray McGovern turning his back on Hillary Clinton and a group of Kansas sister-cousin-father-wives (they lost track) harrassing a soldier's funeral with signs that say "God Hates Fags." Similarly, are we talking about cult followers fighting over meanings in the scriptures of the eternal master Freud (a cliche, but not really true: I liked the Comparative Literature Department!), or about the earth-shaking and highly consequential discovery of the subconscious and the hidden psychodynamics driving stages of development, regardless of whether the Freudian maps of these were true (and, in fact, nobody takes those seriously any more)?

At any rate, I've often heard Chomsky be sloppy or simplify things out of what looks like catering to his perceptions of audience. He also gets shit wrong, and this may be an excellent example. (Maybe it should serve as an example to me of the dangers of having an opinion on every damn thing.) Just yesterday on Amy Goodman, the first criticism Chomsky came up with against Ronald Reagan was that Reagan was fiscally irresponsible, as though he were gingerly looking for an opening to address some Republican kiddie camp, although he did find his bearings a few minutes later and started delving into that regime's crimes before his time ran out.

But you see what I'm saying? Go ahead and make the case for "Marxism" as a religion; with regard to the self-styled Marxist states and most of the Bolshevik-inspired parties, it surely was. But the proposition means nothing without definitions of terms. In fact, I've made the case on this very board that "Christianity" itself need not be a religion; you're a Christian if you take the reported teachings of the Christ character as your guide to action in life, regardless of whether you believe the Gospels to be anything other than fictional adaptations of things that may have happened decades before they were written, which they so evidently are. You are not a Christian just because you were born again, or because you believe in the resurrection or a literal afterlife or your personal selection as a member of the elect; you are a Christian if you love thy neighbor as yourself and share all you have with your fellow humans, which is the hardest fucking thing in the world, and if you do so in the name of this Christ guy's teachings.

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Bach? Talk about his muses all you like. A lot of people loved Jesus, but lacked the internal mathematics and technical mastery that allowed him to create his works.

Oh, and I just noticed this:

edit: maybe [Bach's] music should be forbidden and the scores burned for reasons of irrationality.

Is that really how you want to play this discussion? Please. Besides, if there's an appropriate punishment along those lines, surely he should be resurrected and crucified, or burned at the stake?

.

[justdrew]

back in '91 I sat next to a 'conservative', it was a pleasant workgroup area, and we'd have lively discussions about all manner of things while doing our work (early days of desktop publishing). Eventually the conservative and I entered into debate/arguments about things and generally speaking I was able to move him on issues. The main thing was starting from the assumption that we were both good people who wanted good solutions to issues in the world. He came with all the then prevalent stereotypes about 'liberals' etc, but it's worth noting that this WAS the early 90s, and while rush limpballs was on the air, things were still reality based. Generally I was able to point out to him that the 'liberal' solution to various problems were: moral, practical, realistic, feasible, and do-able -- and -- that the standard solutions offered up by conservatives were generally pessimistic, needlessly violent, polarizing, and guaranteed to make more trouble down the line. He had 15 years on me and I was like 20 at the time, but it was do-able.

Now-a-days we're dealing with a totally different class of person when one mentions much of the conservative populace. These people are not holding opinions, they look like opinions, but technically, they're not, what they've got is indoctrinated dogma. It's an important distinction.

[wallflower]

Canadian_watcher:

this is hilarious. Academic strategy for plying people away from their belief in God.
Good luck. It'd never work on me. Logic cannot trump the experience of miracles.

In pointing to the Akin and Talisse article their atheism seemed less important than what they had to say about rhetoric. Clearly they are persuaded that atheism makes sense to them, but in their essay they concern themselves with appropriate discourse with those not so persuaded. They make the point that the objective of persuasive argumentation is not to assert: "I'm right and you're wrong." Rather that an objective of persuasive argument is dialog:

We aim not only to demonstrate the truth of our own view; we additionally endeavor to understand how our opponent arrived at her view, how she conceives of the relation between her view and her evidence.

They are recommending that an openness to the views of another is an essential aspect of reasonable debate. It's that stance of openness to which I wanted to draw attention as a characteristic of rhetoric.

vanlose kid highlights an important issue that JackRiddler raises:

Surely among the valid questions we get to ask: what are we expected to believe on the basis of faith? By faith I mean not a personal miraculous experience but the word of a scripture, a church authority, a charismatic leader or a person who claims to have had miraculous experience.

... Behind it all, another question: Can we acknowledge how much of what's out there in the [guise of science] in fact is hucksterism, lazy repetition, or a product of social pressure (sometimes backed by horrific physical sanctions)? ...

JackRiddler, if I understand correctly, is pointing to the importance that people be responsible in their beliefs. And it seems to me that vanlose kid chaffs at the thought that Aikin and Talisse are saying that belief in God is "either ." I don't think that, nor do I think that Aikin and Talisse think that way.

They write:

there are two distinct kinds of epistemic evaluation: belief-evaluation and believer-evaluation. Evaluating beliefs is a matter of seeing what evidence there is for holding them. Evaluating believers is a matter of examining whether the evidence someone has indeed supports the belief he or she holds (and if so, to what extent). It makes perfect sense to say that Aristotle’s physics is wrong (a belief evaluation), even though he was a brilliant natural scientist (a believer evaluation). Given the evidence he had and the tools at his disposal for gathering evidence, Aristotle was highly justified in holding his (false) beliefs. He was entirely wrong, yet frighteningly smart.

So It seems that Aikin and Talisse argue against proceeding from a presumption that one's interlocutor is "contemptible or cognitively beyond the pale." Rather instead that argument proceeds with appropriate respect for the beliefs of another.

That said in our interactions with others there are three codes that Aikin and Talisse don't bring up, but probably are worth adding to this discussion:

Morality: norms of how we ought to treat one another
Ethics: norms of how we ought to live
Honor: systems of codes for assigning respect

All of these are greater than oneself.

I introduced Robert Proctor's neologism, "Agnotology," the study of culturally-induced ignorance or doubt. JackRiddler's question:

Can we acknowledge how much of what's out there in the [guise of science] in fact is hucksterism, lazy repetition, or a product of social pressure (sometimes backed by horrific physical sanctions)?

seems much more clear than a new word. As far as our responsibility goes, whether a believer in God or not, such a common acknowledgement seems critically important. Morality, ethics and honor are human constructions which we must take individual responsibility for.

[justdrew]

http://www.all-about-psychology.com/dogmatism.html

dogmatism and authoritarianism are closely linked. There's a lot of research on the matter going back 50+ years.

the reinforcing self-perpetuating for-profit media steams victims self-select into are a central part of the problem. I also don't think any of this has been happening by chance. This epidemic is intentional.

[vanlose kid]

...

Surely among the valid questions we get to ask: what are we expected to believe on the basis of faith? By faith I mean not a personal miraculous experience but the word of a scripture, a church authority, a charismatic leader or a person who claims to have had miraculous experience.

... Behind it all, another question: Can we acknowledge how much of what's out there in the [guise of science] in fact is hucksterism, lazy repetition, or a product of social pressure (sometimes backed by horrific physical sanctions)? ...

complicating things a bit here:

"So Marxism, Freudianism: any one of these things I think is an irrational cult. They're theology, so they're whatever you think of theology; I don't think much of it. In fact, in my view that's exactly the right analogy: notions like Marxism and Freudianism belong to the history of organized religion." -- Noam Chomsky, Understanding Power

*

Note he refers to the isms and not the thinkers themselves, both of whom contain multitudes, as Whitman might put it. Here, as with my questions to religionists, I'd ask for definitions. I can't find the passage you quote at the page you link, so if Chomsky elaborated on it, you'll have to tell us. Are we talking about the "Marxism" of a David Harvey, which I would think of as empirical study employing analysis grounded in Marxian ideas? Or are we talking about the Gorky Komsomol pep rally for the launch of the Glorious Second Five-Year Plan Under the Watchful Eye of Comrade Stalin, where Marx's actual ideas may be remote and espousing some of them may be cause for arrest? The differences could be as great as those between Christian crusader Ray McGovern turning his back on Hillary Clinton and a group of Kansas sister-cousin-father-wives (they lost track) harrassing a soldier's funeral with signs that say "God Hates Fags." Similarly, are we talking about cult followers fighting over meanings in the scriptures of the eternal master Freud (a cliche, but not really true: I liked the Comparative Literature Department!), or about the earth-shaking and highly consequential discovery of the subconscious and the hidden psychodynamics driving stages of development, regardless of whether the Freudian maps of these were true (and, in fact, nobody takes those seriously any more)?

At any rate, I've often heard Chomsky be sloppy or simplify things out of what looks like catering to his perceptions of audience. He also gets shit wrong, and this may be an excellent example. (Maybe it should serve as an example to me of the dangers of having an opinion on every damn thing.) Just yesterday on Amy Goodman, the first criticism Chomsky came up with against Ronald Reagan was that Reagan was fiscally irresponsible, as though he were gingerly looking for an opening to address some Republican kiddie camp, although he did find his bearings a few minutes later and started delving into that regime's crimes before his time ran out.

But you see what I'm saying? Go ahead and make the case for "Marxism" as a religion; with regard to the self-styled Marxist states and most of the Bolshevik-inspired parties, it surely was. But the proposition means nothing without definitions of terms. In fact, I've made the case on this very board that "Christianity" itself need not be a religion; you're a Christian if you take the reported teachings of the Christ character as your guide to action in life, regardless of whether you believe the Gospels to be anything other than fictional adaptations of things that may have happened decades before they were written, which they so evidently are. You are not a Christian just because you were born again, or because you believe in the resurrection or a literal afterlife or your personal selection as a member of the elect; you are a Christian if you love thy neighbor as yourself and share all you have with your fellow humans, which is the hardest fucking thing in the world, and if you do so in the name of this Christ guy's teachings.

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Bach? Talk about his muses all you like. A lot of people loved Jesus, but lacked the internal mathematics and technical mastery that allowed him to create his works.

Oh, and I just noticed this:

edit: maybe [Bach's] music should be forbidden and the scores burned for reasons of irrationality.

Is that really how you want to play this discussion? Please. Besides, if there's an appropriate punishment along those lines, surely he should be resurrected and crucified, or burned at the stake?

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bro, chill. i'm with you(even though i'm a "religionist" as you say ), also i think the point "the case for "Marxism" as a religion; with regard to the self-styled Marxist states and most of the Bolshevik-inspired parties" is Chomsky's mine and yours. dogmatic and, i don't no, determinate, maybe? extremely fixed anyway. but like Marx said (quoting David Harvey) "I am not a Marxist".

as for Simone Weil and Bach, i brought that in in contrast to the OP and to point out something you also point out: definition of terms, i.e. what the heck are we talking about? as i said, i was just trying to make things more complicated. or bring them out of the realm of academic discussion of terms in a void.

i'm cool. ok?

*

ps: re the Chomsky link, i linked to that only to show that the book does in fact exist. i would love to dig out my copy because he does elaborate, but i have this thing of giving away books people pick off my shelf and seem interested in. i'll hit the library sometime this week, ok?

*

[brainpanhandler]

Interesting discussion. I played meathead to my father's Archie Bunker for decades until he finally conceded to me that he believed what he believed not on the basis of facts but because to see the world the way I did would be depressing. From that moment on, and I told him this then, we need not argue anymore. When he occasionally tries to bait me into a discussion I just roll my eyes and remind him that we need no longer argue such things.

It’s scary. We like to believe that most people know and care about what is accurate and that if presented with real facts to prove that they’re wrong they would change their views accordingly.

...

The leading backfire researcher and political scientist Brendan Nyhan performed a study in which he showed that people who were given a self-affirmation exercise were more likely to consider new and correcting information and revise their political beliefs tan people who had not. “In other words,” Keohane notes, “if you feel good about yourself, you’ll listen — and if you feel insecure or threatened, you won’t. This,” Keohane ads, “would …explain why demagogues benefit from keeping people agitated. The more threatened people feel, the less likely they are to listen to dissenting opinions, and the more easily controlled they are.”

...

The idea that self-esteem and the need to protect it is part of the backfire phenomenon is supported in Nyhan's finding that backfire falls among citizens when their sense of self-worth goes up.

So, it's not much of a stretch to imagine techniques of manipulation that have their basis in undermining people's sense of self esteem and security as a way of producing this effect, is it?

An influential experiment by University of Illinois researcher James Kuklinski determined that “conservative” citizens became more much more likely to revise their false beliefs on welfare (that it accounts for a large percentage o the federal budget, that a vast number of people receive it, that most welfare recipients are black, and that welfare payments are very high) when researchers “hit them,” in Keohane’s words, “between the eyes with bluntly presented, objective facts that contradict their preconceived ideas.” When given correct information by researchers in a direct and highly interactive fashion, backfire was significantly reduced.3

This technique puts me in mind of the Milgram Experiment and relates to various fantasies I occasionally entertain.

[vanlose kid]

oh yeah, facts do matter to me, in case it slipped anyone's notice.

it's the broad generalizing terms and classifications that bother me (that i can't imagine no one has noticed) as they do you. but the problem is fairly widespread. i mean, take 8bit's use of the term "leftist" for instance. at times i do agree with his critique but then again the "leftist" he invokes is as much of a parody or strawman as any right- or leftwing-pundit term of abuse.

and what wallflower's saying: i get that. one thing i thought of after my previous post of Bach was that rational ethics never made sense to me. i mean ethics is transcendental no matter how you look at it. – i don't think a utilitarian conception of it does justice to human life. nor does the "selfish gene" theory of altruism which is merely a reductionist take on the same philosophical nonsense.

what i thought of is that, rationally, one would have to deem a loving parent who covers their child in order to protect it knowing full well that they're both dead and having been told that if they give up the child they'd live as being insane or irrational and contemptible, because the rational utilitarian or evolutionary thing to do would be to give up the child. doesn't make sense to me (not in any rational sense, i can't argue for it, it just feels wrong). but that's me.

i had to talk once on utilitarian ethics and came up with this: if you were jewish in a camp with say 25 others and you were given a luger and faced with the choice of either killing ten people of your own choosing out of the 25 [thereby "saving" the rest] or die with the rest [all 25 of you] what would you do? as a utilitarian you take the gun and it would be ethically defensible, actually i think it would be a normative certainty if you subscribe to utilitarianism (the greatest measure of happiness or good or whatever for the greatest number of people). – but what about the consequences for human life, i.e. the life of those who have to live on?

*

edit: don't mean to be dismissive of philosophical problems of ethics or anything (if it seems so from what i've written. they're serious problems and i take them pretty seriously). i just don't have easy answers (which is probably why i'd never teach it).

*

[vanlose kid]

i want to go on a bit re this:

if you were jewish in a camp with say 25 others and you were given a luger and faced with the choice of either killing ten people of your own choosing out of the 25 [thereby "saving" the rest] or die with the rest [all 25 of you] what would you do? as a utilitarian you take the gun and it would be ethically defensible, actually i think it would be a normative certainty if you subscribe to utilitarianism (the greatest measure of happiness or good or whatever for the greatest number of people). – but what about the consequences for human life, i.e. the life of those who have to live on?

say that you gave up the gun choice and the officer offered it to someone else and he took it and picked out ten people to die. you being one of them. would you condemn him for his choice? would you understand him? would you be able to forgive? does it make a difference whether he is or isn't a utilitarian, liberal, christian, communist, or whatever?

*

edit: say he took the gun being a committed utilitarian would he be acting unethically? in whose view?

and the officer. say he is SS, never really committed himself to Nazism, was just promoting the furtherance of his own genes. is he morally culpable? if the mechanics of evolution is all there is is he guilty of any crime?

*

[justdrew]

but what reason would there be to believe that such a deal would be honored? such a deal would only be offered to toy with people, and it's unlikely to be honored. probably after you shoot ten, they come in and finish off the rest, to hell with whatever they told you.

such unclear circumstances are often present in thought experiments that show off utilitarian ethics as "monstrous" or whatever, the old, would kill kill one man to save a hundred? Well, that can't be fairly answered unless you have some sense of how sure you are that killing the one would save the hundred.

a better situation would be, say you're on a space ship. a meteor has punctured one of your air tanks. There is now only enough oxygen for half the crew to make it home. Your choice is to terminate half the crew so that half may live, or let everyone die, these outcomes being certain. (the chances of a roving oxygen supply ship coming by being as near to zero as it gets.)

speaking of children and cognitive dissonance and such, anyone see the article about the recent study about parents and kids an C.D. ?

[vanlose kid]

^ ^ because the assumption is that they do.
also, the scenario is meant to isolate that once choice: ten or twenty dead because of you.
no other reason.

*

[vanlose kid]

by the way, Jack, i'm fairly sure that David Harvey would agree with Chomsky's characterization of "Marxism" as religion.

also, here's a short piece by another supposed "Marxist" and her critique of it that might interest you:

Simone Weil’s Critique of Marxism

By Be Scofield


Simone Weil was concerned. In the name of liberation and revolution power was being abused. Ideological orthodoxy and state bureaucracy were crippling the freedom of the individual to critically engage with the world. New social forces both sacred and secular were promising salvation but delivering oppression. Weil's response was to do what she knew how to do best: think. To think however meant a radical departure from the norm, a fiercely independent critical analysis and most significantly the capability to pause. And it was with this spirit that she critiqued Marxism; one of the fastest growing and powerful political ideologies of her day. Neither her youth nor the religious fervor surrounding this new doctrine prevented her from delivering an unrelenting rebuke, "That is why it is possible to say, without fear or exaggeration, that as a theory of the workers' revolution Marxism is a nullity. The rest of his theory of social transformation is based on a number of foolish misapprehensions." Weil disagreed with almost every element of Marx’s theory, whether it was his theory of productive forces or the revolutionary potential of the proletariat. Her critique was fuelled by both an intellectual and experiential dimension as she rigorously deconstructed Marx’s theory as well as worked in the factory and participated in labor struggles. Despite her sweeping critique of Marx she still appreciated his contribution and reserved the word “genius” for him. What of Marx did Weil believe was worthy of retaining? How did Weil understand Marx and his theory? What role did power as a source of social examination play for Weil?

For Weil an analysis of societal oppression must begin with examining the nature and quality of work - something that both Marxism and capitalism mostly ignored. It was easy for her to apply a critique equally because both systems emphasized the maximization of production, albeit for different reasons. For Weil this led to the alienation of the worker and increased the mechanization of human labor resulting in less knowledge and understanding of the work being performed. Marx identified the source of oppression with the capitalist exploitation of surplus labor and thus the proletariat ownership of this surplus became a defining principle of revolution. For Weil this analysis ignored the conditions and type of work just as had the capitalist industrial system with its scientific measurements of factory labor. What was important for Weil was the relationship between the individual worker and his or her ability to comprehend the structure of the labor process. It was the connection between the workers intellectual control of his or her actions that concerned Weil the most. “…An artisan who has his own tools is more independent than a factory worker whose hands become useless as soon as it pleases the boss to stop him from working his machine….To sum up, the least evil society is that in which the general run of men are most often obliged to think while acting, have the most opportunities for exercising control over collective life as a whole, and enjoy the greatest amount of independence.”[ii] Thus, she was able to separate the systems of power relations from the machines and technology used in the work and claimed that any system could just as easily reproduce oppression.

Another pivotal area of disagreement with Marx was his theory of the revolutionary potential of the proletariat. Weil wondered how the disenfranchised workers would transform their consciousness as well as overthrow the ruling class. This question defined Weil’s critique of the Marxist theory of the proletariat revolution. For Weil the revolutionary impulse is developed from a state of consciousness that is significantly diminished by the capitalist system of production. Thus in order to carry through and sustain the revolution certain qualities of mind and attitude are necessary. Despite the tendency for the proletariat to develop a significant solidarity through factory work over and against the bourgeoisie, the oppression experienced in the capitalist system served to dispossess the worker from the revolutionary spirit. Thus any intellectual or knowledge based attempts to instruct these dispossessed workers to understand the proletarian revolution would fall short according to Weil. It must come from a cultivated sense of character and being that is developed in environments conducive to freedom and creativity. Liberty is not some external structural force that can be transferred to the worker according to Weil. Without a genuine spirit of revolution Weil is unable to see how the workers will resist reproducing oppression and the problems of state bureaucracy. She states, “And yet, though one can see very well how a revolution can “expropriate the expropriators,” one cannot see how a method of production founded on the subordination of those who do the work to those who co-ordinate could do otherwise than produce automatically a social structure of which the distinguishing mark is the dictatorship of a bureaucratic cast.”[iii]

Weil also disputes the teleology found within Marx’s conception of history. Rather than flipping Hegel’s dialectic of the spirit on its head as Marx claimed he was doing, Weil states that he simply injected the material explanation of historical force with a spirit. For her there was simply no basis to accept Marx’s claim that history is unfolding toward greater progress or increased production. Nor is there any reason to accept the 19th cult of progress that promised a positive direction to history. She states, “The whole of this doctrine, on which the Marxist conception of revolution entirely rests, is absolutely devoid of any scientific basis….The term religion may seem surprising in connection with Marx; but to believe that our will coincides with a mysterious will which is at work in the universe and helps us to conquer is to think religiously, to believe in Providence.”[iv] Thus it was a faith in “the historical mission of the proletariat”[v] that provided the mythological backdrop for Marxist ideology. If history, spirit or God is on your side revolution seems more inevitable. It was this sort of belief that led Weil to conclude that Marxism’s “religion of productive forces” served as “an opium of the people.”[vi]

For Weil revolution became a meaningless word. Both because it was used differently by many as well as because the desired revolution never actually manifested the way it was believed it would. She states, “ The word revolution is a word for which you kill, for which you die, for which you send laboring masses to their death, but which does not possess any content.”[vii] In her day violent insurrection was often thought of as a genuine form of revolution - offering a clean break from the previous system of oppression. However, Weil was quick to point out that during the French Revolution the ruling class had already lost the majority of its support by the time of the violent overthrow. Here she points out a contradiction in Marx stating that the visible revolution is primarily based upon the invisible revolution which has already occurred, albeit silently. Weil dismisses any notion of “the sudden reversal of the relationship between forces” and states that it has never occurred throughout history. Weakness cannot be the victor over force, rather a slow process of change occurs. Another example of the problem with notions of revolution is that the Russian Revolution simply transferred the oppressive systems into new hands. Weil states, “The institutions arising out of the insurrection did not perhaps effectively function for as long as a single morning; and that the real forces, namely big industry, the police, the army, the bureaucracy, far from being smashed by the Revolution, attained thanks to it, a power unknown in other countries.”[viii] Furthermore, Weil asks of Marx “…why the oppressed in revolt have never succeeded in founding a non-oppressive society?”[ix]

The distinction between revolution and reform was false according to Weil. In some ways she both accepted and rejected these two ways of approaching social change. She criticized reform tendencies for not seeing the radical nature of the critique necessary to bring about change and rejected the idea that violence could lead to drastic change. Thus the change in thinking about social solutions did indeed need to be revolutionary or radical. However, she rejected the notion that society could undergo a quick revolution that would lead to the end of oppression. Weil did however acknowledge the possibility of creating a society with less oppression. Thus, she did accept the possible use of a principle of the lesser evil. However, she was quick to point out that Marx and his followers never clearly defined what would constitute this principle and without this analysis it is impossible to properly examine the situation. Weil states, “…for as long as the worst and the best have not been defined in terms of a clearly and concretely conceived ideal, and then the precise margin of possibilities determined, we do not know which is the lesser evil, and consequently we are compelled to accept under this name anything effectively imposed by those who dispose force, since any existing evil whatever is always less than the possible evils which uncalculating action invariably runs the risk of bringing about.”[x]

Weil also rejects Marx’s reduction of society to economic forces and argues for a more complex understanding of social life. For example war is distinct from the economy and plays a central role in oppression, “However much you may resort to all kinds of subtleties to show that war is an essentially economic phenomenon, it is palpably obvious that war is destruction and not production.”[xi] Instead, force is the central determining factor in understanding social phenomenon according to Weil. Systems of production do not determine the level of oppression. Rather, Weil recognizes that regardless of the form of economy whether feudal, capitalism or communism, abuses of power can and will occur. This is simply the nature of existence. No transformation of any economic system can rid the world of the human tendency to exploit. Using the examples of command and obedience Weil points out that despite those in power being less in number they garner a force capable of controlling the masses. One example Weil gives is when one man fights twenty he will certainly lose, but at the command of one white man twenty “Annamite coolies” can be flogged by just a few. Therefore it is the system of force that is most central to understanding society. However, due to ignorance most misplace their critique and a “veil is thrown over the fundamental absurdity of the social mechanism.”[xii] Many simply accept Marx’s theory of economic determinism. Weil states, “People would rather believe that Marx has demonstrated the future, and imminent, constitution of a socialist society than study his works to see if they can discover there even the remotest attempt at demonstration.” [xiii]

Whereas Marx believed the bourgeoisie acted primarily to obtain a disproportionate amount of goods Weil believed they acted solely to retain power. And therefore Weil disagrees with Marx on the issue of scarcity. There are many contributing factors to oppression- not simply whether a society has lack of abundance or not. Here again we see power or force as central in Weil’s thought. She states, “At times war occupies the forefront, at other times the search for wealth, at other times production; but the evil remains the same…[xiv] We should be mistaken likewise in assuming that oppression to be ineluctable as soon as the productive forces have been sufficiently developed to ensure welfare and leisure for all.”[xv] Weil also disagrees that it is both possible and desirable to overcome scarcity. The idea that work might be unnecessary Weil calls “mad.” This is not surprising granted that work for Weil is a central part of life and a dignified activity when done with understanding and intelligence. However, Weil does recognize the stream of thought in Marx’s early writings, which emphasize the importance of work,

“It has to take from thence precisely that which has been almost forgotten by what is called Marxism: the glorification of productive labor, considered as man’s highest activity; the assertion that only a society wherein the act of work brought all of man’s faculties into play, wherein the man who works occupied the front rank, would realize human greatness to the full. We find in Marx’s early writings, lines concerning labour that have a lyrical accent…This new poetry, appropriate to our time, which forms perhaps its chief claim to greatness, must not be lost. Therein the oppressed must find evoked their own mother-country, which is hope.[xvi]

Therefore Weil disagrees with the orthodox interpretation of Marxism which focused on ideas with Capital and perhaps finds similarities with his earlier writings. *

Related to the issue of scarcity is that of private property. And again Weil fundamentally disagrees with Marx. He believed that once private property was abolished oppression of workers would disappear simultaneously. For Weil this is another false conclusion. Contrary to Marx she believed any societal system of production could produce oppression. Since power was the central tool for oppression in Weil’s analysis and since hierarchies are inevitable oppression will always be reproduced. Whereas private property represented the misuse of surplus labor to Marx it remained a neutral factor for Weil’s understanding of oppression. And thus the ownership of property is secondary to the structure of labor and the organization of power within the workplace.

While Weil offered a meticulous critique of Marx’s theory she did stand approvingly by his materialism, at least in its ability to analyze society.

“Marx was the first to have the twin idea of taking society as the fundamental human fact and of studying therein, as the physicist does in matter, the relationships of force[xvii]….Two things in Marx are solid, indestructible. One is the method which makes society an object of scientific study by seeking to define therein relationships of force; the other is the analysis of capitalist society as it existed in the nineteenth century…He discovered a formula impossible to surpass when he said that the essence of capitalism lies in the subordination of subject to object, of man to thing….[xviii] His mind, though of insufficient range to meet the requirements for creating a doctrine, was capable of ideas of genius.[xix]”

According to Weil Marx accurately described how the workers are enslaved in a wage-earning system which alienates them from their natural intelligible abilities. He also identified the state bureaucracy as an oppressive system of police, military and governmental control. Thus, Weil is in agreement with Marx’s overarching critique of society: the organization of labor and the state keep people in chains. And she approves of his placement of the social as the site of analysis. Weil calls society “essentially evil” and borrowing from Plato the “Great Beast,” which needs to be tamed. Therefore it is fitting that her analysis begins with the collective and that she finds Marx’s method for analyzing society useful. For Marx all phenomena were mitigated and changed through the materialism of the social and on this Weil agreed.

Conclusion

For Simone Weil understanding power was central to analyzing societal oppression. And it was through this lens that she articulated a bold and insightful critique of both Marx and orthodox Marxism. The awe of Marx and the spirit of revolution in the air couldn’t prevent her from delivering an honest analysis of what she viewed as another flawed political system that had swept over the popular imagination. In the name of science and reason Marx proposed a theory that according to Weil was almost entirely devoid of both. Keen to detect and deconstruct the underlying theology of any given political system Weil took Marx to task for what she believed was essentially a religious project. The authority of institutions, political ideologies or state bureaucracies relied upon propaganda of a mythological nature and mass obedience to the “Great Beast;” Marxism was no exception. Despite claiming to have flipped Hegel’s idealism on its head Marx simply relocated his spirit into history says Weil. She clearly illustrates how there is no evidence that society will unfold as Marx speculated. Likewise his understanding of the proletariat revolution is wholeheartedly backwards according to Weil. By the time a powerless group incites revolution they have already achieved a slow but silent ascendancy to power. Additionally no group in the slave position of society has ever simply overthrown their rulers. The abolishment of private property will not end oppression says Weil and the dream of ridding ourselves of scarcity is simply fictitious. Marx simply wedded both the cult of science and the inevitability of industrial progress to his vision with the end result being a hollow but attractive theory of revolution. Since Marx’s goal was to accumulate the exploited surplus labor this led him to a dependence on the factory. This leads to Weil’s most central critiques of orthodox Marxism: its inability to recognize how the quality and nature of work reproduce oppression. For Weil the relationship between the worker and his/her ability to understand the work process is crucial for creating a less oppressive society. While Weil focused on the role power and force played Marx reduced the entire world to the economy.

Despite a critical analysis of Marx and orthodox Marxism Weil appreciated his emphasis on the social as the source for critique. He offered both a trenchant criticism of 19th century industrial capitalism and an excellent critique of how economic and state systems oppress. Therefore his “genius” was entirely reserved for his ability to locate oppression within the social and apply a scientific analysis of it. And in his early writings she was also able to identify a stream of thought that identified productive labor as the bedrock of a healthy society.

Weil’s insightful critique provides insight into the independent nature of her mind and the role that thinking can play in understanding societal oppression. At the time she was writing, Marxism was an almost accepted norm on the left. To speak against it meant going against the grain. Yet beginning in her mid-20’s she articulated a quite thorough critique of an ideology that was quickly gaining religious status. Additionally she applied her critique to capitalism just as fervently and was still able to acknowledge positive elements within both. Her freedom of conscience illustrates her belief in the importance of removing ourselves from the dominant societal narratives. Collective ignorance blinds the masses and most often prevents the radical and bold critiques necessary to lessen oppression. In short our capacity to think is seriously deprived due to the Great Beast and we must struggle to hold on to our individuality. This certainly doesn’t mean that Weil was free from this system herself or that she didn’t fall victim to the same lack of scientific analysis that she chided Marx for. While often distinguishing between Marx and orthodox Marxism in her writings she wasn’t always clear. [this i like, vk] Additionally she often treated all states with the same disregard, seemingly unable to delineate between various forms of governments. But her critique of totalitarianism still stands as a pioneering voice in the first half of the twentieth century. And her original and independent critique of Marxism is inspiring and important to those seeking to understand power and address systems of oppression; especially in a world based on presentation and a gross obedience to the mass media.


Endnotes:

* In his 1844 Manuscripts Marx never posited the notion of a work free utopian society but these ideas can be found within Capital. Orthodox Marxism ignored his earlier writings. And there is a similarity between Weil’s emphasis on work and Marx’s early writings. See “A Truer Liberty: Simone Weil and Marxism,” p. 48


Weil, Simone. Oppression and Liberty. Routledge, Great Britain. 1958. P. 175

[ii] ibid p. 97

[iii] ibid p. 13-14

[iv] ibid p. 43

[v] ibid p. 43

[vi] ibid p. 165

[vii] ibid p. 53

[viii] ibid p. 74

[ix] ibid p. 55

[x] ibid p. 58

[xi] ibid p. 134

[xii] ibid p. 134

[xiii] ibid p. 132

[xiv] ibid p. 65

[xv] ibid p. 67

[xvi] ibid p. 144

[xvii] ibid p. 162

[xviii] ibid p. 155

[xix] ibid. p. 161

http://www.commonsensereligion.com/2010 ... rxism.html

*

edit: formatting.

*

[Canadian_watcher]

In pointing to the Akin and Talisse article their atheism seemed less important than what they had to say about rhetoric. Clearly they are persuaded that atheism makes sense to them, but in their essay they concern themselves with appropriate discourse with those not so persuaded. They make the point that the objective of persuasive argumentation is not to assert: "I'm right and you're wrong." Rather that an objective of persuasive argument is dialog:

We aim not only to demonstrate the truth of our own view; we additionally endeavor to understand how our opponent arrived at her view, how she conceives of the relation between her view and her evidence.

They are recommending that an openness to the views of another is an essential aspect of reasonable debate. It's that stance of openness to which I wanted to draw attention as a characteristic of rhetoric.

Yes, I see that, but I still find it condescending however strongly I agree with their reasoning. It *is* preferable to Dawkins' approach, but it's still more or less a strategy for 'getting through to the numbskull believers' - in this context, at least.

I don't know if I entirely agree that morality is a human construct. I think it might be quite natural and therefore have origins in something other than the mind of man.

[23]

speaking of children and cognitive dissonance and such, anyone see the article about the recent study about parents and kids an C.D. ?

I haven't, as of yet; but would love to. Can you point me to it?

[23]

I don't know if I entirely agree that morality is a human construct. I think it might be quite natural and therefore have origins in something other than the mind of man.

That depends, of course, if time exists outside of the mind. If it's a construct of the mind too, then nothing has an origin in anything.

[justdrew]

speaking of children and cognitive dissonance and such, anyone see the article about the recent study about parents and kids an C.D. ?

I haven't, as of yet; but would love to. Can you point me to it?

some writing about:

http://chrysilla.tumblr.com/post/3310509653
Raising children is hard, and any parent who says differently is lying. Parenting is emotionally and intellectually draining, and it often requires professional sacrifice and serious financial hardship. Kids are needy and demanding from the moment of their birth to … well, forever.

Don’t get me wrong. I love my children dearly, and can’t imagine my life without them. But let’s face the facts: Study after study has shown that parents, compared to adults without kids, experience lower emotional well-being—fewer positive feelings and more negative ones—and have unhappier marriages and suffer more from depression. Yet many of these same parents continue to insist that their children are an essential source of happiness—indeed that a life without children is a life unfulfilled.

How do we square this jarring contradiction? Two psychological scientists at the University of Waterloo think they have the answer. They suspect that the belief in parental happiness is a psychological defense—a fiction we imagine to make all the hard stuff acceptable. In other words, we parents have collectively created the myth of parental joy because otherwise we would have a hard time justifying the huge investment that kids require.

the actual paper:
http://pss.sagepub.com/content/early/20 ... 7.abstract