.
Evidence from a former MI6 Officer, given under oath.
16 Questions from MR MANSFIELD
17 MR MANSFIELD: Good morning. My name is Michael Mansfield
18 and I represent Mohamed Al Fayed. I have a few
19 questions for you as well.
20 We do appreciate that this is a long time ago and
21 you have been asked a number of questions about events
22 that are well over ten years ago or more. In my case
23 I am going to ask you to look at documents which
24 normally would be put to a witness to refresh their
25 memory of what they remembered at the time or nearer
47
1 the time.
2 Firstly, in principle, would it be right that
3 material that you produced in the 1990s is more likely
4 to be accurate as a memory recollection than your memory
5 now as a general principle?
6 A. I think that is a fair and logical assumption, yes.
7 Q. We have heard the difficulties about memory now, so I am
8 going to, as it were, do it through documents that are
9 yours from the past, as it were, in order to make some
10 progress.
11 We know the dates that you have already indicated of
12 your employment with MI6 and when you left. I want to
13 deal with, without compromising anyone -- I am not going
14 to deal with names and, if possible, obviously, I do not
15 want to give away any state secrets through you or put
16 you to any difficulty or embarrassment; do you
17 understand?
18 A. I understand, yes.
19 Q. Just a little about yourself: when you were recruited to
20 MI6, as far as you were concerned, was this a career
21 prospect for you; in other words, something you really
22 wanted to commit yourself to and remain in?
23 A. Yes, to me it was a career for life. I was expecting to
24 spend the rest of my career in MI6 until retirement.
25 Q. We heard that you graduated from Cambridge. Were you in
48
1 fact put on some form of fast-track, as it were, within
2 MI6 in order to progress within it?
3 A. You could put it that way. There are two tiers of
4 entering into MI6, rather similar to two ways of
5 entering the military. You can enter as a soldier or as
6 an officer and it was the same in MI6; you could enter
7 as a clerical or more administrative level or you could
8 enter as an officer, which was my case.
9 Q. You entered as an officer.
10 Now you obviously had to have training somewhere
11 near the beginning of that career, is that right?
12 A. That is correct. There was a period of intensive
13 training from the start of my career with MI6.
14 Q. That training you have described in some detail in your
15 book, "The Big Breach", have you not?
16 A. That is correct, yes.
17 Q. Now I want to deal with it in principle: fundamentally,
18 what you were being trained to do -- and I suggest this
19 is perfectly obvious in one sense -- you were being
20 trained to operate under cover, were you not?
21 A. Principally we operated under cover, either under cover
22 as a businessman or under cover as a normal diplomat on
23 overseas missions, that is correct, yes.
24 Q. You were given practical tests of how under cover in
25 the United Kingdom you might pretend to be somebody
49
1 other than you are in order to obtain information; is
2 that right?
3 A. That is correct, yes.
4 Q. In other words, the description I used the other day to
5 another witness, effectively you were being authorised
6 to deceive people into providing you with material
7 information, is that right?
8 A. You could certainly put it in those terms, yes. It was
9 not put to us in those terms when we were training. We,
10 at the time, believed that we were doing it for a good
11 cause, but -- yes, I suppose, you could use that word,
12 exact word, yes.
13 Q. In other words, if it is considered to be in the
14 national interest, it was permissible to deceive?
15 A. Yes.
16 Q. Now during the time you had training, were you shown
17 various types of equipment? Please understand, I am not
18 going it to go through all of it. There is just one
19 thing I want to ask you about. Were you shown types of
20 equipment that was used by --
21 A. Yes, we had training with both the SAS and SBS.
22 We went to visit them in their headquarters.
23 We were shown various bits of equipment by them which
24 they used on operations. We were shown all sorts of
25 other equipment as well in other parts of -- that the
50
1 British Government use on various occasions. It was
2 a very educative, formative training course that we were
3 put through.
4 Q. Now MI6 or SIS, could it be described in this way in
5 terms of its general role? Part of it was the
6 acquisition and collation of information from a variety
7 of sources. That is one role. The other role was to
8 oversee objectives which might be carried out by others?
9 A. Yes, that is the case, yes. I can think of examples of
10 that, yes.
11 Q. I am not going to ask you to give examples, but in
12 relation to the tasks that might be carried out by
13 others, is that generally termed "the increment"?
14 A. Yes, okay -- obviously I do not want to say too much on
15 this subject, but I agree, yes.
16 Q. That covers -- it may cover more -- two of the
17 organisations you have already mentioned, the SAS,
18 Special Air Service -- is that right?
19 A. That is correct, yes.
20 Q. -- and SBS, Special Boat Service?
21 A. Yes.
22 Q. Because MI6 itself does not contain operatives with
23 the relevant skills to carry out particular practical
24 tasks abroad?
25 A. That is exactly the case, yes.
51
1 Q. The one item I do want to ask you about, and you have
2 been asked about it before, is the question -- not just
3 the question but also the item -- a strobe or
4 flashlight. Now, were you, during training, ever shown
5 such an item?
6 A. I believe that I was when I went to Poole, to a visit to
7 the SBS, and they had a number of special weapons which
8 they used such as -- as weapons that could be used in
9 water. For example, they had a number of specialist
10 breathing apparatus; all sorts of very interesting and
11 specialist equipment.
12 One piece of equipment there that I remember was
13 a very bright -- a piece of equipment that could give
14 a very bright flashing light. I was told at the time
15 that this was used for -- in the case of if they wished
16 to disorient, for example a helicopter pilot, on landing
17 for example. Because clearly at night or suchlike,
18 a helicopter pilot might have been landing with night
19 vision goggles or even, at night, just using the naked
20 eye and a very, very bright flashing light would lead to
21 disorientation and being unable even to see outside
22 references and to likely being unable to control
23 the helicopter.
24 Q. Now, I am going to ask you this in the light of some
25 information which we have been provided with at this
52
1 end. Can you describe -- and I know it is a long time
2 ago and I am sorry to ask. If at any stage it is too
3 difficult, please say -- but can you describe the light
4 in any way at all that you saw in your training, which
5 would be obviously near the beginning of the period of
6 your employment?
7 A. No, I cannot remember with any clarity that anymore.
8 It was just a piece of equipment amongst several.
9 Q. But is there any doubt in your mind that you saw such
10 a thing?
11 A. I am sure I saw it, yes.
12 Q. Although perhaps you cannot remember the detail of it,
13 was it something that was portable?
14 A. Yes, I believe it was portable, yes. It was small
15 enough -- if it was not portable, I am sure I would
16 remember that it was not portable. It must have been
17 small enough to be carried quite easily.
18 Q. All right. This may be a bridge too far, but the sort
19 of size, can you remember even that, now?
20 A. There was a large table and there were several items on
21 it, so it must have been small enough to fit within
22 a small portion of the table.
23 Q. Right. Now, during training, did you become aware that
24 obviously operating abroad, as MI6 did most of the time,
25 that MI6 or SIS became involved in theatres of war
53
1 abroad where there was armed conflict between factions
2 within a country?
3 A. Yes, indeed. I was involved in one myself, yes.
4 Q. We may just come to the one you were involved in
5 yourself, but I want to ask -- and please understand,
6 it is a question that is carefully phrased and I am not
7 asking for detail -- were you at any time aware, whilst
8 you were working in this period of the early to
9 mid-1990s, of any SIS or MI6 involvement in the war that
10 was being waged within Angola?
11 A. Yes, I can say -- yes, there was --
12 Q. Don't give me the detail for the moment --
13 A. Yes.
14 Q. -- because there may be objection. I do not know.
15 A. That is what I am hesitating for, yes.
16 Q. I am not asking for the detail from you, but you
17 remember.
18 A. Mm.
19 Q. Thank you.
20 LORD JUSTICE SCOTT BAKER: Is the relevance of this
21 landmines?
22 MR MANSFIELD: It is. Sir, I am pausing because, of course,
23 what he has to say may be of importance in relation to
24 this. In view of who is coming next week, I would ask
25 permission to ask what he remembers about that in fact.
54
1 LORD JUSTICE SCOTT BAKER: Is that going to get into
2 the detail?
3 MR MANSFIELD: Well, there is a risk of it. I am happy to
4 leave it for the moment, for consideration to be given
5 to that.
6 LORD JUSTICE SCOTT BAKER: We will see what Mr Tam says
7 about this.
8 MR TAM: Sir, I was listening to see what the next question
9 was going to be, but if there is a risk of detail being
10 given, then that detail may well be detail which should
11 not be given.
12 LORD JUSTICE SCOTT BAKER: The trouble is, once the detail
13 is given, it is then too late. That is the problem.
14 MR TAM: That is why I was listening to the question to see
15 exactly sort of answer might be --
16 LORD JUSTICE SCOTT BAKER: Mr Mansfield is content to leave
17 this until next week, anyway, so that may be the way out
18 of this.
19 MR MANSFIELD: I think there may be time today to consider
20 how to deal with this because, obviously, as you have
21 rightly pointed out, it bears absolutely on what
22 Princess Diana was doing in 1997. I would want to ask
23 this witness, so that everyone knows what the question
24 is, what the role of MI6 was in Angola -- when he was
25 obviously part of MI6, what he learned to be that role.
55
1 That is all.
2 MR TAM: Can we take instructions on that and return to it?
3 LORD JUSTICE SCOTT BAKER: Yes.
4 MR MANSFIELD: I am sorry, Mr Tomlinson, we are obviously --
5 as I said at the beginning, I am not intending to put
6 you in a difficult position or anyone else for that
7 matter.
8 LORD JUSTICE SCOTT BAKER: You appreciate, Mr Tomlinson, we
9 are in delicate territory here and we all have to tread
10 rather carefully, including you.
11 A. Of course. I understand completely.
12 MR MANSFIELD: I hope that the path that I am treading with
13 you is a fairly obvious one so that you can see what is
14 coming in plenty of time and we can avoid any
15 difficulties.
16 Now I want to move on to what you remembered, not
17 today, but at a much earlier time, about obviously --
18 arising out of your work in the Balkans section; all
19 right?
20 Now, the position is this, is it not, that you were,
21 as you have indicated, dismissed? You served a prison
22 sentence -- you have explained all of that -- and then
23 you were released.
24 Now I want to ask you a little bit about what
25 happened after your release and before you reached
56
1 the doors of the juge in France in order to give an
2 account to that juge. All right?
3 It is that period of time. What I want to ask you
4 about is really matters that you have put in a statement
5 before, and, in particular, what happened at the hands
6 of the authorities during this period. Do you follow?
7 So we are dealing with the period after the spring
8 of 1995, after you have been released, but before
9 September 1998, when you see the juge. So it is that
10 period. First of all, were you arrested or detained
11 during that period?
12 A. No, after I was released from prison on May 1st, I was
13 on probation, and I had three months' probation, which
14 was the law at the time. That probation was extremely
15 strictly observed.
16 I mean throughout my prison sentence, I was made --
17 all the regulations in my case were followed
18 exceptionally hard. For example, what somebody who has
19 never been to jail before who has never committed any
20 offence, if they were sent to jail for a white collar
21 offence, they would not be held as a category A
22 prisoner. I was held as a category A prisoner in
23 Belmarsh. After I was released, I was given probation
24 and I had to go to every single probation meeting --
25 LORD JUSTICE SCOTT BAKER: Do you in fact mean "probation"
57
1 or do you mean that you were on licence?
2 A. I am sorry, that is the word, "licence". I am sorry,
3 licence. I had to observe it very, very strictly.
4 During that time, I was aware that I was under
5 surveillance. On one particular occasion that I was
6 actually followed -- because I had to go and hand my
7 passport in to a police station and I remember being
8 followed down when I went to the police station.
9 At the end of that three months, I was very
10 concerned about being re-arrested. In fact I absolutely
11 believed that I was going to be re-arrested and put back
12 into Belmarsh because I could not understand why -- if
13 that was not the case, why MI6 had not made any attempts
14 at conciliation towards me.
15 Clearly they were putting me under surveillance,
16 they were putting me under a lot of pressure, and
17 I realised at that point that the only option for me
18 really, if I wanted to try and establish some form of
19 career and to get my life back on track, was to leave
20 Britain. So at the end of my probation I left Britain.
21 MR MANSFIELD: I am looking at -- if you have the document
22 in front of you, it is an affidavit. It is headed
23 "Affidavit of Richard Tomlinson". It is not dated in
24 fact, or at least -- I have two copies of it -- neither
25 of them are dated, although they are both exactly
58
1 the same. I do not know whether you can help now,
2 perhaps you cannot, whether it was 1998 or 1999 that
3 this one was written.
4 A. No, I cannot remember.
5 Q. Very well. If you look at paragraph 9 in there, it is
6 prefaced by indicating to the juge -- because this is
7 a document that you produced for the juge in France, is
8 it not?
9 A. I believe so, yes.
10 Q. It is headed that, "Affidavit of Richard Tomlinson to
11 Judge Herve Stephan". Then, at the top of this page,
12 just before paragraph 9, what you are doing is
13 indicating in your view the lengths to which MI6,
14 the CIA and the DST have taken to deter you from giving
15 this evidence -- and I will come to what this evidence
16 was -- and "... subsequently to stop me talking about
17 it. It suggests that they have something to hide".
18 Now, do you stand you by that?
19 A. I do not -- I think that is an inference that you have
20 made. I do not know whether what they did to me was
21 because they felt that I had something to hide. I do
22 not know, but I stand by the fact that they arrested me
23 in a very violent fashion when I had not done anything
24 and I -- quite what they were afraid of that I might
25 reveal, I do not know. That is for them to answer.
59
1 Q. I understand that. I am only using your words "suggest
2 they have something to hide". It is not my suggestion.
3 It is your suggestion there.
4 Now I want to go through what has happened to you.
5 On Friday 31st July, do you see, 1998, shortly before --
6 well, your appointment was in September, I believe --
7 you were arrested by the DST -- what were the DST?
8 A. That is the Direction Surveillance Territoire, which
9 is -- I would guess the nearest equivalent in Britain is
10 the Special Branch.
11 Q. -- in your Paris hotel room. You indicate that although
12 you have no record of violent conduct, you were arrested
13 with such ferocity and at gunpoint that you received
14 a broken rib. You were taken to the headquarters of
15 the DST and interrogated for 38 hours. Is that correct?
16 A. That is correct, yes.
17 Q. What were they asking about, can you remember?
18 A. No. Principally they wanted to take my computers off me
19 and my PDA, the Psion organiser. Most of my questions
20 were who I had been talking to, who I had contact with,
21 why I had left Britain, what I was intending to do,
22 where I was intending to live and I answered them as
23 best I could. I believe the principal reason for it was
24 to take my computers off me, which they did.
25 Q. Where did these computer end up, do you know?
60
1 A. They took them back to the UK.
2 Q. They took them back to UK. In this you indicate:
3 "Despite my repeated requests, I was never given any
4 justification for the arrest, was not shown the arrest
5 warrant. Even though I was released without charge,
6 the DST confiscated from me my laptop computer and my
7 organiser. They illegally gave these to MI6 who took
8 them back to the UK. They were not returned for
9 six months, which is illegal and caused me great
10 inconvenience and financial cost."
11 At that time, were you interviewed by anyone from
12 MI6 in Paris while you were detained?
13 A. Not by MI6, but by Special Branch officers, police
14 Special Branch officers, who were in Paris, and they
15 interviewed me.
16 Q. They interviewed you. What were they wanting to know,
17 do you remember?
18 A. It was them that had requested that the French arrest
19 me, so it was the Special Branch officers who were
20 questioning me via the French officers because
21 the Special Branch could not make questions to me
22 directly on French territory. So the Special Branch
23 officers would make questions to the French officers and
24 then the French officers would make the questions to me.
25 So both French and British officers were present at
61
1 the interviews.
2 Q. Now had you in fact been doing anything illegal in
3 France?
4 A. Not at all, no. Not at all, no.
5 Q. Now, the next paragraph, 10, in the affidavit you
6 provided, you say that on Friday 7th August 1998,
7 you boarded a Qantas flight at Auckland International
8 Airport, New Zealand, for a flight to Sydney, where you
9 were due to give a television interview to an Australian
10 television company. You were in your seat awaiting
11 take-off when an official boarded the plane and told you
12 to get off.
13 "At the air bridge he told me that the airline had
14 received a fax from Canberra saying there was a problem
15 with my papers. I immediately asked to see the fax, but
16 was told it was not possible. I believe that this is
17 because it did not exist. This action was a ploy to
18 keep me in New Zealand so that the New Zealand police
19 could take further action against me. I had been back
20 in my Auckland hotel room for about half an hour when
21 the New Zealand police, the NZSIS (the New Zealand
22 Secret Intelligence Service) raided me. After being
23 detained and searched for about three hours, they
24 eventually confiscated from me all my remaining computer
25 equipment that the French DST had not succeeded from
62
1 taking from me. Again, I did not get some of these
2 items back until six months later."
3 Just dealing with that, where did the items that
4 they took from you in New Zealand end up; do you know?
5 A. Yes, they went back to the UK too.
6 Q. They went back to the UK as well.
7 Then you move to the next paragraph:
8 "Shortly after I had given this evidence to
9 Juge Stephan, I was invited to talk about this evidence
10 in a live interview on America's NBC Television. I flew
11 from Geneva to JFK Airport on Sunday 30th August to give
12 the interview in New York."
13 Can I just pause there because dates may be
14 important. Is this in 1998 or is it in 1999, this trip?
15 A. Yes, this is in 1998, I am pretty sure.
16 Q. Because was the procedure in France that you would
17 provide to the juge, before the interview, material
18 indicating what it was that you were going to tell
19 the juge?
20 A. I cannot remember now, I am sorry. I cannot remember
21 what the exact sequence was then.
22 Q. All right:
23 "Shortly after arrival at John F Kennedy Airport,
24 the captain of the Swissair flight told all passengers
25 to return to their seats. Four US Immigration Authority
63
1 officers entered the plane, came straight to my seat,
2 asked for my passport and identity, then frogmarched off
3 the plane. I was taken to the Immigration Detention
4 Centre, photographed, fingerprinted, manacled by my
5 ankle to a chair for seven hours, served with
6 deportation papers and then returned on the next
7 available plane to Geneva. I was not allowed to make
8 any telephone calls to the representatives of NBC
9 awaiting me in the airport. The US immigration
10 officers, who were all openly sympathetic to my
11 situation and apologised for treating me so badly,
12 openly admitted that they were acting under
13 the instructions of the CIA."
14 Now, again, on that occasion, was any material
15 removed or not from you or perhaps you don't remember?
16 A. No, I do not think it was. I do not think I had
17 anything left. It had all been taken from me earlier.
18 Q. There was nothing left, all right.
19 I am sorry for the interlude. We are trying to sort
20 out the date of which year --
21 A. I think -- when I said, "Moreover, shortly after I had
22 given this evidence ..." , I think that must have been
23 a letter to him by post. I had not actually been to see
24 him at that time. I think that may be what you were --
25 Q. It was what I was inferring might be the possibility.
64
1 A. That was the case, but I cannot remember --
2 Q. But --
3 A. I remember I wrote to him at some point via a lawyer in
4 France and that must have been what I was referring to
5 then.
6 Q. We know you did do that. Paragraph 12 is the one that
7 sets a slight conundrum because you say "in January of
8 this year", so the question is which year.
9 A. It must have been 1999 because I am sure I would have
10 ordered the paragraphs chronologically, so I imagine
11 that I was writing this in 1999. So on paragraph 12,
12 I was saying "In January of this year", ie 1999, and
13 that would fit with the chronological order of events as
14 well.
15 Q. Right, I think we did imagine that is what you meant.
16 You booked a chalet in the village of Samoens in the
17 French Alps for ten days snow-boarding and so forth.
18 You picked up your parents from Geneva Airport in a hire
19 car on the evening of January 8th and set off for
20 the French border. At the French Customs post, your car
21 was stopped and you were detained. Four officers from
22 the DSD held you for four hours.
23 I am going to pause there. Did they interview you?
24 A. Yes.
25 Q. What was it about this time?
65
1 A. I cannot remember. They wanted to know what I was doing
2 going to France. They did not say anything specific.
3 It was more like -- oh yes, they asked is it true that
4 I work for MI6, so I answered truthfully, and then they
5 asked me what did I do at MI6 and they asked me a lot of
6 questions about my activities in MI6, but I think that
7 was more for their personal curiosity than anything.
8 They asked me some really quite banal questions about
9 guns and weapons. But I think that the impression I had
10 was that they were -- the objective of stopping me was
11 to stop me going to France, that they were buying time
12 for someone else to come down from -- that is right,
13 because we had to wait for another officer to come down,
14 a more senior officer. So when the more senior officer
15 came down, I was served with papers telling me to get
16 out of the country and not come back again -- in fact
17 there was no time limit. I was just told I would have
18 to leave France.
19 Q. Trying to summarising the rest of what you have written
20 in paragraph 12, was it your belief at the time that
21 this resulted from MI6 activity or advice to the DST?
22 A. I am absolutely sure even now that that is the only
23 mechanism by which that would happen because I have
24 never broken any law in France, and there is no reason
25 why the French authorities would have ever intervened in
66
1 that nature if they had not been asked specifically by
2 a foreign intelligence service, and the only foreign
3 intelligence service that could be is MI6.
4 LORD JUSTICE SCOTT BAKER: But does it surprise you,
5 Mr Tomlinson, that a foreign country, France or America,
6 should be nervous about your coming to their country,
7 bearing in mind that you were convicted under the
8 Official Secrets Act in this country?
9 A. It does strike me as strange because why would France be
10 worried about me breaking the Official Secrets Act of
11 Britain? I would have no access to any French secrets.
12 So that does not at all translate into any possibility
13 of me breaking a French law because, even if I had
14 the position to do so, which I do not, I do not know any
15 French secrets, so it is of no interest at all to France
16 to -- in fact I have certainly been told by the French
17 authorities on many occasions that they don't give
18 a damn about me breaking the Official Secrets Act in
19 Britain. It is an irrelevance to them.
20 So it is quite clear that both the French and
21 the Americans were -- and indeed the Australians,
22 because I have been refused visas to visit Australia on
23 numerous occasions too -- have all been acting at the
24 request or suggestion of Britain. My belief is that
25 that request or suggestion would have come from MI6
67
1 because that is the only organisation in Britain which
2 would have been motivated to do that.
3 MR MANSFIELD: I want to move to a different period, but
4 it is the same topic.
5 After the inquests were opened in the United
6 Kingdom, and inquiry was established or an investigation
7 under Lord Stevens, and you were seen by officers in
8 that squad on two occasions, once in 2004 and again in
9 2005. You have the records. I may have to come back to
10 those later. You mentioned this morning twice
11 the pressure you felt under in relation to those
12 interviews. Now, could you just describe to the jury
13 what the pressure was that you felt during those
14 interviews?
15 A. Well, first, it was a very, very long process, a very
16 long working day, and I remember it going on to a point
17 at which I, you know, was becoming very tired. So there
18 was a question of it being a long process and I just
19 wanted to bring it to an end really.
20 You know, as in any -- the police are people who are
21 experts at, how would I say, extracting the story they
22 wish to hear from someone who is in detention with them.
23 You know, they are very, very good at that and I am not
24 necessarily very good at that. It is a long
25 inquisitorial process and there are times when you
68
1 become slightly tired and you say things that later on
2 in life you slightly regret having given into. And
3 I think that was probably the case there.
4 Q. What was the story that you felt they wanted you to
5 tell?
6 A. I think principally they realised that they had a lot of
7 work in front of them to go through all the MI6 files
8 and then trying to, I suppose -- they wanted to be able
9 to exclude as much work as possible from their workload.
10 So they asked me quite a lot about me trying to remember
11 exactly where various files were, which I was not able
12 to answer with any particular clarity. They pushed
13 very, very hard on some small details and skated over
14 things which were somewhat more significant, I thought.
15 Q. Now, does that apply to both or just the one in 2004,
16 because you are seen again in 2005 where you are --
17 we don't have a record of exactly what is put to you,
18 but if you just look at the record in 2005 -- do you
19 have that one there?
20 A. Yes.
21 Q. All right, "Interview regarding issues". It is clear,
22 as you look through it, on the various topics over
23 the page -- "Henri Paul":
24 "RT accepts because of what we have told him ..."
25 This is one in which the police are putting to you
69
1 a lot of other information that they have, by then,
2 obtained from other sources. Do you follow?
3 A. That is definitely the case. When I saw them in 2004,
4 they were asking me for information in a very
5 non-confrontational manner, but in a subsequent
6 interview they had clearly gained a lot of information
7 and it was much more adversarial.
8 Q. In relation to that one, did you get an impression of
9 what it was, in the 2005 interview, they wanted you to
10 say?
11 A. I think they certainly tried to put me under a lot of
12 pressure to withdraw the statement that I had made about
13 the assassination plot against someone in MI6, but as we
14 have subsequently seen this morning, they have
15 acknowledged that that exists. They really wanted to do
16 their best for me to try and withdraw that because they
17 didn't want that knowledge being brought out into
18 the public domain. So they did try their very best to
19 try to make me withdraw all that.
20 I told them that it is absolutely the case that
21 there is a minute within MI6 in which someone proposes
22 that they assassinate someone. They then submitted,
23 "Yes, there is, but it was not Milosevic". It could
24 well be the case, I cannot deny that, but the simple
25 fact remains that there is a minute there in which they
70
1 propose to assassinate somebody and they tried to get me
2 to withdraw that.
3 Q. I want to deal with that first of all, if I may. Again,
4 I am not going to seek to put you in any difficulty
5 about names, as has already been made clear to you. You
6 have given the broad outline, but I want to follow up
7 some details. First of all, the person, the colleague
8 who showed you the document -- so, first of all, can
9 we deal with him?
10 Now, he has a hieroglyphic of "A", as far as our
11 proceedings are concerned, so I am going to call him
12 "A". Is that all right? Can you follow if I do that?
13 I want to know a little bit about him, without
14 disclosing who he is, in order to gather the
15 significance of what you saw. First of all, was he head
16 of a section or head of an operation?
17 A. He was the subhead of a section. He was sort of second
18 in charge of a section.
19 Q. How old was he, roughly speaking? Do you know?
20 A. I would guess he was about 30; in his early 30s.
21 Q. How long had he been with MI6 by this stage?
22 A. About seven years, I believe, about six or seven years.
23 He had been in for a long enough period of time to have
24 done at least one overseas posting, so he was quite an
25 experienced officer.
71
1 Q. You indicated earlier, in partly dealing with this, that
2 he was an ambitious individual.
3 A. Yes, he was a serious, hardworking and diligent person,
4 like most people in MI6 are. He would not have been
5 recruited if he was not of that nature. He was someone
6 who wanted to make a career and to get on and to impress
7 his superiors and what have you, but that is perfectly
8 normal in MI6. I think we all were like that.
9 Q. The question I want to ask you here is: it is going to
10 be suggested that this sort of thing would never even be
11 contemplated. If the policy was never to contemplate
12 even this kind of activity, have you any idea why
13 somebody of his experience and his responsibility would
14 be bothered to draft such a document?
15 MR TAM: Sir, normally I would not object to a question like
16 that but this is asking the witness to speculate about
17 somebody else's motives and I am concerned, not because
18 it is a question that is arguably not one that the
19 witness can really help with, but because, in answering
20 it, sensitive details might get revealed if he is
21 invited to speculate in this way about something which
22 he probably knows nothing about.
23 LORD JUSTICE SCOTT BAKER: Well, I am not sure that it goes
24 quite that far. But in a sense, it is really comment,
25 isn't it, Mr Mansfield?
72
1 MR MANSFIELD: Yes, it is bordering on that. We are dealing
2 with somebody here who is, in a sense, an expert. He
3 would normally be regarded as an expert because he has
4 had that experience within MI6.
5 LORD JUSTICE SCOTT BAKER: Well, you could ask him if they
6 were encouraged to think laterally.
7 MR MANSFIELD: Yes. Well, I will ask that question.
8 I think you heard the question. I think I know
9 the answer, but anyway. Were you encouraged to think
10 laterally in MI6?
11 A. Well, yes, very much so. We were always encouraged to
12 be imaginative and to think of new operations and
13 suchlike. But nevertheless, I was -- at the time I was
14 very surprised. I think I have already said this
15 already. My first reaction was: is this a practical
16 joke? Is he just winding me up? This was my absolute
17 first reaction, but then -- I am sure it is okay for me
18 to say this -- I know that it was not because it was an
19 accountable minute.
20 There are different forms of paperwork, some of
21 which are held accountable and some which are not in MI6
22 at the time, and this was a document that was
23 accountable, ie it was going to be held on record. So
24 you wouldn't -- no one would write a joke memo on an
25 accountable memo because that would go into your
73
1 personal record. It is something that you do not mess
2 around with, basically.
3 LORD JUSTICE SCOTT BAKER: Mr Mansfield, I think there is
4 a question that might be asked here, if Mr Tam does not
5 see any dangers in it: what I was proposing to ask was,
6 when you were trained by MI6, were you instructed that
7 MI6 agents were required to operate within the
8 restraints of the criminal law?
9 A. Yes, we were. We were advised that, yes, but at
10 the same time there are various facets to that because
11 when you are overseas, whether that is the case or not,
12 which legal system you come under when you are overseas,
13 and there was definitely, during our training,
14 a sufficient amount of speculation within the group of
15 officers who were training together that we would talk
16 about it amongst ourselves, and we were never entirely
17 sure if what we were being told was always strictly held
18 to and accounted to.
19 I do remember during my training programme another
20 trainee specifically asked a question to a senior
21 officer about whether MI6 do break the law or do kill
22 people. The senior officer -- and this was in one of
23 the training talks that we were given -- and the senior
24 officer evaded the question and did not answer directly.
25 His entire countenance and bearing towards this question
74
1 was such that he did not want to answer it in any more
2 detail.
3 This led to a lot of speculation amongst us
4 afterwards: well, what is the case, do we keep always
5 within the law or do we not?"
6 I think you also have to bear in mind that we are
7 talking about 1992, which was at the time when MI6 was
8 avowed and became completely accountable, and I think
9 that prior to 1992, there was a lot less accountability
10 to the law.
11 After a period, after 1992, MI6 became more
12 accountable, but during that period there was no doubt
13 a transition period where a lot of new restrictions and
14 laws were being discussed and sored out and drafted and
15 discussed with the Government. So there was
16 a transition period and I was in MI6 during that
17 transitionary period.
18 There were other occasions I can remember talking to
19 another senior officer and asking them about the death
20 of someone in circumstances which were slightly odd.
21 Again the answer was not direct -- was not a direct,
22 "Absolutely no way do we get involved in that sort of
23 thing". It was an obfuscated answer.
24 So I think it is fair to say -- I am sure now, and
25 we are now in 2008, that MI6 is probably very, very
75
1 accountable because the laws in accountability have been
2 tightened and that is the case with the American
3 intelligence agencies and other intelligence agencies,
4 but I was there when there was a period of transition
5 and I think there was a lack of clarity at the time.
6 MR MANSFIELD: I will have a little more to ask you on that
7 in light of a letter that you wrote. Still dealing with
8 A and his background and so on in relation to this
9 proposal -- I have two more questions on this.
10 The remembrance that you had much nearer the time,
11 in other words -- I think you said you began writing
12 about this plan for the purposes of a book -- I think
13 you said "1997". Is that when you think you started
14 writing it?
15 A. I honestly just cannot remember anymore. I started
16 writing it when I moved to Spain. I would have to dig
17 around to know what date I moved to Spain, but it was
18 when I moved to Spain.
19 Q. Yes. Very well. At that time, whatever time it was,
20 either 1996/1997/1998, somewhere in that region, those
21 years, the person who was the target of the proposal was
22 Milosevic; is that how you remember it?
23 A. That is how I remember it. Subsequently the police said
24 to me that it was not Milosevic, it was someone else,
25 but I cannot dispute that because I cannot specifically
76
1 remember now and it may well be that it was someone
2 else, but the fact is, they did propose to assassinate
3 someone.
4 Q. The reason I ask you is this: Milosevic is obviously and
5 was at that time a well-known figure, particularly in
6 the theatre that you were operating in and a significant
7 name, was he not?
8 A. Yes.
9 Q. What I am trying to get to is whether, you see, what you
10 saw was a proposal that did relate to Milosevic and
11 there was yet another one relating to the person that
12 Mr A says he did write. Now is that a possibility?
13 A. It is a possibility, yes. You know, I did not have
14 access to everything there at the time and I cannot
15 remember the dates exactly now.
16 MR MANSFIELD: Sir, what I would like to do -- it is
17 the only question in relation to a name. I am not going
18 to do it publicly. Our copies are redacted in any
19 event -- is, if it is permissible, for him to see
20 the name of the target in private, as suggested by A, to
21 see whether in fact there was any possibility that what
22 he saw originally was that. I do not know whether he
23 has ever been told that.
24 LORD JUSTICE SCOTT BAKER: Mr Tam?
25 MR TAM: Again, that is something on which we will have to
77
1 take instructions. Apart from anything else, with the
2 technical difficulties or possible technical
3 difficulties --
4 LORD JUSTICE SCOTT BAKER: Yes, well, I do not think you are
5 concerned about the technical difficulties. You are
6 concerned about rather more wide-ranging difficulties.
7 MR TAM: Those as well, yes.
8 MR MANSFIELD: Well, I am wondering if therefore I can leave
9 that until it can be resolved because I would ask that
10 he is allowed to see the name that A suggests.
11 LORD JUSTICE SCOTT BAKER: Maybe it can be resolved over
12 the midday adjournment.
13 Can I put one other thing? I do not know if it has
14 been put to you. I think you don't know what A may say
15 when he comes here, but this is what he says in relation
16 to you. He says:
17 "Before shredding my copy of the memo, I showed it
18 to Tomlinson and explained the content and the reaction
19 that it had received."
20 Now, did he ever, first of all, tell you that he was
21 shredding that document?
22 A. No, he gave no indication that he was going to do that,
23 and I am very, very surprised that he did it because
24 we were not allowed to shred things like that. That is
25 like -- in parlance at the time, that would be regarded
78
1 as a hanging offence. You just don't shred accountable
2 documents and I am astonished at that claim that it was
3 shredded.
4 LORD JUSTICE SCOTT BAKER: Was it an accountable document
5 because of the minute reference you say that it had
6 attached to it?
7 A. Yes, indeed.
8 LORD JUSTICE SCOTT BAKER: If it had not had that, then it
9 would not have been an accountable document, is that
10 right?
11 A. Yes, if it had been what is called a "memo slip", which
12 is like a pink document which quite often would be
13 handwritten and just passed around, those could be
14 destroyed. They generally were not, but they could be.
15 But this was a minute and I do distinctly remember that
16 it was a minute because that is what made me think that
17 he was not joking, because if it had just been a memo,
18 I could have accepted it was a practical joke, but
19 it was a minute board.
20 It was detachable -- the way it worked was you had
21 little squares that you could take off this minute
22 board. Every time you passed the minute board, the
23 minute, to another colleague you took off a little
24 square and put this in your out-tray. This was how
25 the documents were traced around MI6 at the time. So
79
1 this was where -- every document was accountable.
2 The centralised clerical system would know where each
3 accountable document particularly was in the office.
4 So the fact that it had a --
5 LORD JUSTICE SCOTT BAKER: So just to be --
6 A. No, sorry -- the fact that it had a minute board on the
7 back meant that it was an accountable document and it
8 could not be shredded, because every minute board had an
9 individual number or was sequentially numbered.
10 So as soon as you asked for a minute board, that
11 meant that you were preparing an accountable document
12 and there would be a gap in the minute boards if it was
13 destroyed. It is just not permissible; it is just
14 a hanging offence, as we used to call it.
15 LORD JUSTICE SCOTT BAKER: In short does it come to this:
16 documents with a minute board attached could not be
17 shredded and documents that didn't have a minute board
18 attached could be shredded?
19 A. You know, at the time I never heard of things being
20 shredded at all. We didn't shred things at all at the
21 time. But potentially something that did not have a
22 minute board could be shredded, but something that did
23 have a minute board on the back could not be and would
24 never be. To be honest I am really surprised at anyone
25 saying that they shredded anything at MI6 because, in
80
1 general terms, we did not, and anything that was
2 shredded -- if it was destroyed, it went through
3 a vetting process before it was destroyed as well. So
4 I find that quite a surprising claim.
5 MR MANSFIELD: I want you to look -- I think you have it
6 there. I mentioned it a moment ago. You not only wrote
7 to the magistrate or juge in France before you actually
8 spoke to the juge, do you recall you also wrote at the
9 time to the head of a British organisation called
10 Liberty in South London, and a man called John Wadham,
11 who was then in charge. Do you remember doing that?
12 A. Look, I wrote many letters to him because he was my
13 solicitor who represented me at my trial, so I had a lot
14 of correspondence with him.
15 Q. The letter should be there amongst your bundle, with
16 this at the top; in other words, it is your initials,
17 "RJCT/6". Do you have that?
18 A. No, I am afraid we don't have it, no.
19 Q. I am sorry, because we thought at our end that all
20 the documents that related to you had been taken. This
21 was a document, this letter, that you provided in
22 fact -- you provided six documents to the police
23 earlier.
24 I am going to ask therefore, unless there is an
25 objection -- because all the sensitive parts of
81
1 the letter have been redacted, so I am just pausing to
2 make sure there is no -- sorry -- I will give the label.
3 It is RJCT/6. It was one of six documents provided.
4 LORD JUSTICE SCOTT BAKER: This is one of a number of
5 documents that reached me this morning, I think from
6 those instructing you, via the inquest office.
7 MR MANSFIELD: No. This was a document that did not come
8 via us. This was a document that was originally --
9 we asked for it, a copy of it. It was originally
10 provided in fact --
11 LORD JUSTICE SCOTT BAKER: Well, I do not think it is in
12 bundle 12.
13 MR MANSFIELD: No, it is not. But if you look at --
14 I am sorry to do this in your presence,
15 Mr Tomlinson.
16 If you look at the very first page of divider 10,
17 you will see a statement in French from a French,
18 Nicolas Pajani.
19 In that he specifies a number of documents, 1, 2, 3,
20 4, 5 and 6. We had the others, but we did not have 6,
21 so we asked for the sixth one, which was dated
22 11th September 1998.
23 LORD JUSTICE SCOTT BAKER: It has a couple of Paget stamps
24 on it, hasn't it?
25 MR MANSFIELD: Yes, it does. It came to us and it may have
82
1 come to you, sir, yesterday, from Mr Smith. So that is
2 where it has come from. There were other documents that
3 we also provided that Paget had seen, but they are much
4 the same as others. But this letter, unless there is
5 a --
6 LORD JUSTICE SCOTT BAKER: I would not have thought there
7 would be any objection.
8 MR MANSFIELD: No, there is not. I am going to ask for it
9 to go on screen because -- again, I am not going to ask
10 you to try to remember something without the document.
11 It is going to go on screen and hopefully you are going
12 to be able to see it.
13 There we are. This was -- so you have the context,
14 the dates on the top are in fact dates when various
15 Metropolitan Police officers took custody of it or
16 produced it or whatever. In fact, this letter was
17 attached to a letter you sent to John Wadham on
18 11th September 1998. We have the accompanying letter.
19 I am not troubling with you that.
20 So, you can see the title, "MI6, 1992, proposal to
21 assassinate Milosevic of Serbia ..." and so on. Then
22 you write this:
23 "Dear sir, I would like to bring to your attention
24 a proposal by MI6 to assassinate President Milosevic of
25 Serbia. My motive in doing this is to draw to your
83
1 attention the casual and cavalier attitude that many MI6
2 officers have to British and international law."
3 I pause there. This may relate to the question you
4 have already been asked about attitudes to law. Did
5 that properly represent, at that time, in 1998, why you
6 were in part revealing this material?
7 A. Yes, at the time, yes.
8 Q. The officer who wrote this proposal clearly could (and
9 in my view, should) be charged with conspiracy to
10 murder. He will no doubt escape unpunished, like many
11 other MI6 officers who routinely break the law. This
12 lack of legal accountability of MI6 officers needs to be
13 addressed urgently."
14 Now, I want to ask you about those sentences. First
15 of all, in fact, consideration has been given to any
16 prosecution of him and he is not going to be. Did you
17 know that?
18 A. No, I did not know that, no.
19 Q. Does that surprise you?
20 A. No, it does not surprise me, no.
21 Q. Secondly, "... like many other MI6 officers who
22 routinely break the law ..."
23 Did you have something in mind there?
24 A. No, not really. It needs to be -- bearing -- the tone
25 of that is quite a strong statement. I had just spent
84
1 six months of my life in a maximum security jail for
2 revealing absolutely nothing at all to a New Zealand
3 citizen in Sydney, Australia, and I was pretty annoyed
4 at the fact that I had been prosecuted for doing
5 absolutely nothing at all whereby MI6 and MI5 officers
6 propose to commit very serious crimes and escape any
7 sort of legal accountability whatsoever. So I think
8 I was very angry at the double standards of the Crown
9 Prosecution Service towards MI6 and MI5 at the time.
10 Q. Right. Now, the next paragraph you indicate that from
11 March 1992 until September 1993, you worked in the East
12 European controllerate of MI6 under the staff
13 designation UKA/7:
14 "My role was to carry out natural cover operations
15 (undercover as a businessman or journalist, et cetera)
16 in Eastern Europe."
17 Pausing there, in your book you do deal with some of
18 those operations and the sort of work that you had to
19 do, do you not?
20 A. That is correct, yes.
21 Q. "The Balkan War was in its early stages at this time so
22 my responsibilities were increasingly directed to this
23 arena. My work thus involved frequent contact with
24 the officer responsible for developing and targeting
25 operations in the Balkans. At the time this was ...
85
1 [it is redacted]."
2 We assume that that is A, is it, who should be in
3 there?
4 A. I think so, yes.
5 Q. I am sorry that you don't have the original there:
6 "... who worked under the staff designation P4/OPS."
7 Does that have any particular meaning?
8 A. I hesitate to answer that because I do not think it is
9 necessary or directly relevant and perhaps the --
10 Q. Very well. I do not press you.
11 "We would frequently meet in his office on the
12 11th floor of Century House to discuss proposed and
13 ongoing operations that I was involved in and, indeed,
14 many other operations which I was not myself involved
15 in.
16 "During one such meeting in the summer of 1992 [and
17 again I am assuming it is A] casually mentioned that he
18 was working on a proposal to assassinate
19 President Milosevic of Serbia. I laughed and dismissed
20 his claim as an idle boast as I (naively) thought that
21 MI6 would never contemplate such an operation. [I am
22 inserting A on the assumption it is correct]. [A]
23 insisted that it was true and appeared somewhat offended
24 that I did not believe him."
25 Is that how you recollect it at the time, that is in
86
1 1998, when you wrote this letter?
2 A. Yes. I was a new boy there. I was a probationer and
3 there was a lot of leg pulling and practical jokes in
4 that organisation and I assumed that he was winding me
5 up.
6 Q. "However, I still presumed that he was just pulling my
7 leg and thought nothing more of the incident.
8 "A few days later, I called in again to [I assume
9 A's] office. After a few moments of conversation, he
10 triumphantly pulled out a document from a file on his
11 desk, tossed it over to me and suggested I read it. To
12 my astonishment, it was indeed a proposal to assassinate
13 President Milosevic of Serbia.
14 "The minute was approximately two pages long and had
15 a yellow minute card attached to it [and you dealt with
16 this already]which signified that it was an accountable
17 document rather than a draft proposal. It was entitled
18 'The need to assassinate President Milosevic of Serbia'.
19 In the distribution list in the margin were P4 (head of
20 Balkan operations, then ... ), SBO1/T (security officer
21 responsible for the Eastern European operations [and
22 then there is a name and I am not interested in the
23 names]) and then C/CEE (controller of East European
24 operations [and then there was the possibility of two
25 names]) and last, Modus/SO the SAS liaison officer
87
1 attached to MI6 [and then you put a name] and H/SECT
2 (the private secretary to ..."
3 Sir, I would want to suggest the status of
4 the person, not the name, but if that is objected to,
5 I will wait and see.
6 LORD JUSTICE SCOTT BAKER: No objection.
7 MR MANSFIELD: This is where I might have got it wrong.
8 Again, I do not know, but I have tried to piece it
9 together. Was the person to whom he was private
10 secretary the head of MI6?
11 A. That is correct, yes.
12 Q. The first page of the document was a political
13 'justification' because there was evidence that he was
14 providing arms and so forth. We can see what that is
15 and you have touched on it before.
16 "The remainder of the document proposed three
17 methods ..."
18 These are in your book as well and I just want to
19 ask you about this.
20 "The remainder of the document proposed three
21 methods to assassinate Milosevic."
22 Before I ask you a little bit about the detail
23 without again compromising anyone, if this was not on
24 that document, where could you have possibly got this
25 from? In other words, what is the source of these
88
1 methods? I mean, have you imagined them yourself or
2 have you got it from somewhere?
3 A. It is such a long time ago that I was there at the time
4 and that I wrote that document. As I have said before,
5 it is very difficult for me now to remember what
6 I remembered at the time and what I subsequently
7 learned. I think there is -- it could well be that
8 there is -- I have to say, it strikes me now, looking at
9 that document now, that there is a lot of detail in
10 there which potentially might not have been in
11 a broad-brush appraisal. So it could be that I was
12 mixing with what I had subsequently learned there.
13 I just cannot remember. It is just too long ago for me
14 now to remember that with any great clarity.
15 Q. I appreciate that about now, but this is a document that
16 was written some time in the summer of 1998. Do you
17 follow? In other words, it is only a few years,
18 three/four/five years, since you had left the service.
19 Do you follow?
20 A. Yes.
21 Q. "The first method was to train and equip a Serbian
22 paramilitary opposition group to assassinate Milosevic
23 in Serbia."
24 I am assuming it is A:
25 "[A] argued that this method would have
89
1 the advantage of deniability ..."
2 Now, was that a concept that was discussed inside
3 MI6?
4 A. Frequently, yes, making an operation deniable was always
5 a consideration so that, if things went wrong, you could
6 plausibly demonstrate that the British Government had
7 nothing to do with it.
8 Q. So it is not just a question of operating under cover,
9 perhaps with a false cover; it is also operating in
10 a way that nobody knows this is what you are doing and
11 then, if it happens, denying that you have done it.
12 That is what it comes to, doesn't it?
13 A. Yes.
14 Q. Just continuing:
15 "... but the disadvantage that control of
16 the operation would be low and the chances of success
17 unpredictable."
18 Now, again, are these the kind of concepts --
19 control and predictability -- that you would necessarily
20 have been talking about in MI6?
21 A. Yes, indeed. All our training was -- in designing
22 operations and carrying out them, they were constant
23 considerations in our training, as you would expect
24 really.
25 Q. Yes. I am not suggesting that you would not expect all
90
1 of this.
2 "The second method was to use the increment [I have
3 already asked you about this], a small cell of the SAS
4 or SBS which is especially selected and trained to carry
5 out operations exclusively for MI5/MI6 to infiltrate
6 Serbia and attack Milosevic, either with a bomb or
7 sniper ambush. [A] argued that this plan would be
8 the most reliable, but would be undeniable if it went
9 wrong."
10 Does it follow that if it went right, it would be
11 deniable?
12 A. Well, if it went right anonymously, they would have got
13 out of the country anonymously so there would never have
14 been any question of them being caught and interrogated.
15 But clearly, if it went wrong and they were caught and
16 interrogated, it would be very difficult to deny them
17 because no British Government would really leave their
18 highly trained and very loyal soldiers to be imprisoned
19 in that fashion, so the British Government would have to
20 be involved if they were, for some reason, compromised
21 and caught.
22 Q. Then we get to the third proposal, which is A again,
23 I assume:
24 "The third proposal was to kill Milosevic in
25 a staged car crash, possibly during one of his visits to
91
1 the ICFY (International Conference on the former
2 Yugoslavia) in Geneva, Switzerland. [A] even provided
3 a suggestion about how this could be done, such as
4 disorientating Milosevic's chauffeur using a blinding
5 strobe light as the cavalcade passed through one of
6 Geneva's motorway tunnels."
7 Now, of course, it is now many years later.
8 I appreciate the difficulty of remembering. Could these
9 options have in fact been discussed with you by A, in
10 fact, but not actually written down at that point? Is
11 that a possibility?
12 A. Yes I suppose it is because I am sure we would have
13 discussed it a little bit. Normally if we were looking
14 at some something together, we would talk about it. It
15 would be normal, yes.
16 Q. "There was no doubt in my mind, when I read [A's]
17 proposal, that he was entirely serious about pursuing
18 his plan. [A] was an ambitious and serious officer who
19 would not frivolise his career by making such a proposal
20 in jest or merely to impress me. However, I heard no
21 more about the progress of this proposal and did not
22 expect to, as I was not on its distribution list.
23 "I ask you to investigate this matter fully.
24 I believe that legal action should be taken ..."
25 Now that was that letter.
92
1 I want to ask you -- it is still on that topic --
2 just a little bit more about MI6 and involvement, do you
3 follow, in the light of answers you have given today.
4 What you have said today is that a plan of this kind
5 you would not expect to have been conducted by
6 "the service". You said not impossible but very
7 difficult. All right? Institutionally difficult.
8 What you have said today and before today is that it
9 could have been done independently and it is that that
10 I want to ask you about. First of all, what did you
11 mean when you said that today and you have said it
12 before, as I have said, that it could be done
13 independently?
14 A. I think nowadays that would not be the case, but I think
15 in the olden days there could potentially -- there
16 was -- the intelligence services were not as tightly
17 controlled as I have no doubt they are nowadays.
18 I think that that has been controlled a lot more deeply.
19 There were -- as in the public domain, there was, at the
20 time of the Harold Wilson Government -- I think it was
21 quite well established now -- there was a cabal of MI5
22 officers who were interested in -- or were talking
23 loosely about a plot and there have been other
24 incidences where MI5 and MI6 officers have done things
25 independently well outside of the control of
93
1 the organisation. I don't think it is something that
2 happens regularly and I don't think it could ever happen
3 nowadays.
4 Q. In relation to those days -- and we are talking about
5 the 1990s as opposed to since 2000 -- if an MI5
6 officer -- and if there is an objection, please say --
7 if a MI5 officer or an MI6 officer felt that what was
8 happening in the United Kingdom or elsewhere was in
9 the interests of the United Kingdom and was subversive,
10 undermining the state or the Monarchy, that might
11 generate discussion about what to do about it, mightn't
12 it, then?
13 A. I think that is possibly the case, yes. I think that is
14 the case, yes.
15 Q. Once again it might range across a number of options.
16 It might not be a car crash in order to murder; it could
17 be a car crash in order to frighten. That is another
18 possibility, another option, isn't it?
19 A. Well, I think that we are getting into speculation.
20 It is a possibility but, you know, it is speculation.
21 At the time in MI6 I think there was not as strict
22 control over their activities as there is now and that
23 is all I can really say on that matter.
24 Q. Very well. What I want to ask you now, turning from
25 that issue -- that is the plan or proposal -- I want to
94
1 ask you about the issue of Henri Paul. Once again, you
2 have been asked about your present recollections in
3 relation to that. I want to summarise it so that you
4 can look at the documents if you wish, but when you were
5 first reflecting on this matter, there were certain
6 features that stood out in your mind and, as
7 I understand it, still do, about the person, whoever
8 it was, that you were reading about in a file.
9 Firstly, he was French; is that right?
10 A. That is correct, yes.
11 Q. Secondly, he worked at the Ritz in Paris; is that right?
12 A. That is correct, yes.
13 Q. Thirdly, perhaps in your case most importantly because
14 of your interests, he had an interest in flying?
15 A. That is correct, yes.
16 Q. Now, looking back, do you have any doubt about those
17 features, even now?
18 A. Now, look, I cannot remember very well at all.
19 I remember having written that. It is fixed very, very
20 strongly in my mind, so it is certainly still fixed very
21 strongly in my mind. I can say that.
22 Q. Now, just in relation to that person, you mentioned
23 today a P file. Assuming nothing has been shredded, if
24 one was trying to locate a file that might have this
25 information, what are the files that one might be
95
1 looking for? Would they be headed in a particular way
2 in the days before computerised files?
3 A. Before computerised files it was an absolute labyrinth
4 of cross-referenced files. A lot of it actually
5 depended upon the fantastic memory of the clerical staff
6 who worked in the filing cabinet system who remembered
7 which files were which and the way they were
8 cross-referenced.
9 Before the days of computers it was a phenomenally
10 difficult thing to try to keep track of all the
11 information that MI6 had on institutions, on people, on
12 operations. Nowadays of course it is all done on
13 computers so it is much easier.
14 Q. Now, what is accepted -- and we have heard quite a lot
15 of evidence here so it is not a problem -- is one would
16 expect the security services to have a relationship with
17 the head of security at a large hotel. So there is
18 nothing controversial in that, is there?
19 A. No. In our training we were -- actually, this is what
20 we were told, the security heads of hotel were people
21 we should try to target on overseas operations because
22 they were very useful people.
23 LORD JUSTICE SCOTT BAKER: I think now might be a convenient
24 time for a break.
25 MR MANSFIELD: We perhaps could have the lunch break.
96
1 LORD JUSTICE SCOTT BAKER: We could have the lunch break.
2 That would be one way of dealing with it. We did start
3 at half past nine this morning. Which would be more
4 convenient from your point of view?
5 MR MANSFIELD: Either, but I think having the lunch break
6 now might be --
7 LORD JUSTICE SCOTT BAKER: Very well. Mr Tomlinson, we are
8 going to break off for the lunch break now and we will
9 resume at 25 minutes to 2. I hope that is not
10 inconvenient for you.
11 A. No, that is okay.
12 (12.35 pm)
13 (The short adjournment)
http://www.scottbaker-inquests.gov.uk/h ... 0208am.htm
Continuing this afternoon.