FBI WATCH MAKING CRUELTY VISIBLE

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Re: FBI WATCH MAKING CRUELTY VISIBLE

Postby fruhmenschen » Fri Aug 27, 2010 1:39 pm

Ask yourself why all information has been removed about the 2003 conference dealing with
the President Kennedy assassination
see my previous post about Cyril Wecht
http://www.duq.edu/forensics/conference.cfm
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Re: FBI WATCH MAKING CRUELTY VISIBLE

Postby fruhmenschen » Fri Aug 27, 2010 1:51 pm

http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/loca ... 3898.story


Celebrating a radical
150th birthday parties for Jane Addams will honor the social worker the FBI considered dangerous
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Re: FBI WATCH MAKING CRUELTY VISIBLE

Postby fruhmenschen » Fri Aug 27, 2010 9:22 pm

see link for full gotcha journalism


Wednesday, Aug. 11, 2010
Fla. FBI worker charged in dog theft
By MIKE STUCKA - mstucka@macon.com


A civilian FBI employee from Florida turned himself in at the Dodge County jail to face a felony charge of stealing a bird dog.
http://www.macon.com/2010/08/11/1225016 ... n-dog.html

Denmark, also known as Matt Denmark, is accused of stealing the German shorthaired dog when he was part of a hunting party in Eastman on Aug. 1. The dog is valued at $800, enough to count as a felony charge of theft. Denmark is accused of taking the dog between 4 a.m. and 6 a.m. Winborn said investigators found security footage of Denmark loading the dog onto his truck.
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Re: FBI WATCH MAKING CRUELTY VISIBLE

Postby 82_28 » Fri Aug 27, 2010 9:54 pm

fruhmenschen wrote:If there was ever a turning point in the FBI 's incredible run of good luck since it was created in 1920 it was the airing of the show in 1995 (circa)
on PBS Frontline called The Secret Files of J Edgar Hoover based on the book by Anthony Summers .
The program detailed the long friendship J Edgar Hoover ,the Director of the FBI , had with the Mafia.
In investigating the role FBI agents played in assassinating President Kennedy you first have to understand that members of the Mafia helped members of the FBI assassinate the President of the United States.
In studying the FBI your mantra should be : "a law enforcement agency investigating a crime it just committed can almost always get away with the crime".

In the Secret Files of J Edgar Hoover a woman named Rosensteil is interviewed about her seeing FBI Director Hoover engage in Pedophilia.
Here is that excerpt http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Wkc-e5qqKMg
I urge you to watch the entire program and read Anthony Summer's book.


Fuckin' good call. This is exactly what I was saying in some other thread, only through speculation though. Oh, the thread about some bush fuck who is now "out of the closet". Never ever thought about it from the angle of J. Edgar Hoover. Somebody knows what the fuck they're doing, which kinda kills the Onion thread we got going about now.
There is no me. There is no you. There is all. There is no you. There is no me. And that is all. A profound acceptance of an enormous pageantry. A haunting certainty that the unifying principle of this universe is love. -- Propagandhi
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Re: FBI WATCH MAKING CRUELTY VISIBLE

Postby fruhmenschen » Tue Aug 31, 2010 4:26 pm

more gotcha journalism

FBI agent pleads guilty in Hershey bathroom peeping
see link for full story

http://www.abc27.com/Global/story.asp?S=13073413

Ex-FBI agent pleads guilty in Hershey bathroom peeping
Posted: Aug 31, 2010 11:42 AM EDT Updated: Aug 31, 2010 12:05 PM EDT
Ryan Seese, 36, pleaded guilty Tuesday to charges of criminal trespass, invasion of privacy, and disorderly conduct. (Provided photo) Ryan Seese, 36, pleaded guilty Tuesday to charges of criminal trespass, invasion of privacy, and disorderly conduct.

A former FBI agent has pleaded guilty to all charges stemming from an incident in a girls' bathroom at the Hershey Middle School.

Ryan Seese, 36, of Hershey, entered the plea Tuesday morning in Dauphin County court. The charges include criminal trespass, invasion of privacy, and disorderly conduct.

Authorities said Seese went into a bathroom stall during a May 15 evening concert and peered over a wall to watch a 14-year-old girl.
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Re: FBI WATCH MAKING CRUELTY VISIBLE

Postby fruhmenschen » Wed Sep 01, 2010 3:23 pm

Don't you just love the spin with the title "behaving badly"
FBI Public Relations Department just became a buddy on AOL's
Facebook page. Aol also left out a few more Texas FBI agents like Lori Bailey
who took down EARTH FIRST in THERMICON
Feb 6, 2008 4:41 pm US/Central
Dallas FBI Agent Arrested For DWI
http://cbs11tv.com/local/FBI.agent.arre ... 47699.html
An FBI agent was arrested on an accusation of drunken driving after authorities say she drove in the wrong direction and was involved in an accident.

The FBI vs. the Monkeywrenchers
http://articles.latimes.com/1990-04-15/ ... foreman/15

http://www.phoenixnewtimes.com/1991-07- ... e-lambs/2/


see link for full gotcha

http://www.aolnews.com/discuss/4-fbi-ag ... s/19615782

FBI Agents Behaving Badly in Texas


But lately, down in Texas, for some inexplicable reason, FBI agents have found themselves on the wrong side of the law. In fact, in the past nine months, four agents --


(Aug. 31) --2010 FBI agents deal with trouble. That's what they do for a living.

But lately, down in Texas, for some inexplicable reason, FBI agents have found themselves on the wrong side of the law. In fact, in the past nine months, four agents -- who are all now ex-agents -- from Dallas to Waco have been grabbing headlines for alleged indiscretions.

One was busted on charges of hiring illegal immigrants to work at her suburban Dallas deli. Another illegally sold guns, then lied to investigators. One agent killed a neighbor's Chihuahua with a pellet rifle. And one is accused of making death threats against folks at the FBI.



The latest embarrassment for the FBI in the Lone Star State involves Carlos Ortiz, 48, a Dallas agent. He was fired last Wednesday -- the same day he was arrested on charges of threatening to kill his wife and the head of the Dallas FBI, Robert Casey Jr.


Meanwhile, court records indicate Dallas FBI Agent Ann Cox has signed a guilty plea agreement to charges that she hired six illegal immigrants in 1997 to 2008 to work at the Schlotzsky's deli she owned in Rockwall, Texas.


So far, El Paso FBI agent John Shipley, 40, has taken the hardest hit among the troubled Texas agents. Last week, he was sentenced to two years in prison for illegally selling more than $118,000 worth of guns without a license and lying to agents from the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives about the sales while he was still with the FBI.


ATF agents had arrested Shipley last year after tracing back to him a .50-caliber rifle that was used in a drug cartel shootout in Chihuahua, Mexico. Court records show that between 2005 and 2008, he posted at least 280 firearms for sale on just one site alone, GunBroker.com.

And speaking of Chihuahuas, FBI agent Lovett Leslie Ledger Jr., who was detailed to the Waco FBI, was dismissed from his job near the end of 2009 after he shot and killed a neighbor's 3-pound Chihuahua dog with a pellet rifle in 2008. The dog, named Sassy, belonged to a girl down the street.
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Re: FBI WATCH MAKING CRUELTY VISIBLE

Postby fruhmenschen » Wed Sep 01, 2010 11:25 pm

2 reads

1st read
man sitting on bench with handcuffs is a FBI agent who is the subject of the 2nd read

http://www.zpub.com/notes/fbi-shame.html


2nd read


FBI KNEW AGENT DRANK BEFORE FATAL I-95 CRASH FHP WASN'T TOLD HE'D BEEN AT BAR
LISA ARTHUR AND JACQUELINE CHARLES,

Within hours after two Lauderhill brothers died in a Nov. 23 wrong-way crash, the second-in-command of Miami's FBI office learned that agent David Farrall had been drinking with another agent before his Honda collided with the brothers' Kia on Interstate 95.

Paul Mallett, associate special agent in charge, didn't pass that information on to Florida Highway Patrol investigators looking into the crash until a month later, even though he knew that on the night of the crash troopers believed Farrall had not been drinking.

see link for full story

http://www.floridalawusa.com/Articles/fbi.php
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Re: FBI WATCH MAKING CRUELTY VISIBLE

Postby fruhmenschen » Thu Sep 02, 2010 10:10 am

The material I post here about crimes committed by FBI agents comes from several sources.
I will teach you how to access this material from one of my primary sources.
1. go to google and type in fbi agent in the news
http://www.google.com/#hl=en&source=hp& ... 6d440c1f33

2. When the page opens scroll to the top and in the upper left hand corner in small print you will see the word news. It is to the left of the word shopping . click on it.

3. This will open a page that has all stories dealing with the
FBI that includes the word fbi agent.

4. You now want to see the most recent stories so you will look to
the left hand side of the page near the top and see the phrase
sort by date. click on it.

http://www.google.com/#hl=en&q=fbi%20ag ... 6d440c1f33

5. It is useful to repeat this same exercise expect this time type into google the phrase fbi in the news .
Repeat all the steps including sorting by date.

Voila. I have taught you how to fish and made you a concerned consumer of the criminal justice system who cares about how your tax dime is spent assassinating american presidents and civil rights leaders.
The crime family called the FBI cannot exist in sunshine. You do know what to do?
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Re: FBI WATCH MAKING CRUELTY VISIBLE

Postby fruhmenschen » Thu Sep 02, 2010 12:06 pm

Here is a breaking gotcha story providing more evidence linking FBI agents to the creation of the 1993 1st World Trade Center bombing.
Who is Peter Lance really working for? He sounds like a mouthpiece for the FBI muddying the waters.
The only thing correct about this disinformation piece is
Emad Salem worked for the FBI as a agent provocateur. It was Salem who organized the group into building the truck bomb that was detonated under the World Trade Center in 1993. It was Emad Salem who provided the materials and know how on building the bomb. When the cell was ready to detonate the bomb Emad Salem went back to his FBI handlers FBI agent Anticev and FBI agent Floyd and told them the group was getting ready to detonate the bomb. His FBI handlers fired Amed Salem , after paying him close to $1 million dollars of our tax dime to work for the FBI . The New York City FBI office then allowed the bomb to be detonated. see whatreallyhappened.com/WRHARTICLES/wtcbomb.html
also see lectlaw.com/files/cur46.htm





see link for full story
http://www.tabletmag.com/news-and-polit ... ood/print/

First Blood
Was Meir Kahane’s murder al-Qaida’s earliest attack on U.S. soil?

By Peter Lance | Sep 2, 2010 7:00 AM



Last fall I received a cryptic email from Emad Salem, the ex-Egyptian Army major who was the FBI’s first undercover asset in what would become known as the war on terror. I’d told Salem’s remarkable story in my last three books, which were critical of the bureau’s counterterrorism record. Because I had treated him fairly, Salem reached out to me after years in the Federal Witness Protection Program.
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Re: FBI WATCH MAKING CRUELTY VISIBLE

Postby fruhmenschen » Thu Sep 02, 2010 12:39 pm

Henley-Putnam University Experts Set Sail With SpyCruise(R) Sponsorship
President Dr. Michael Corcoran Featured Speaker on Unique Educational Excursion

* Email Contact Email PDF Version PDF Printer Friendly Version Print


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Re: FBI WATCH MAKING CRUELTY VISIBLE

Postby norton ash » Thu Sep 02, 2010 1:05 pm

Danke, frumenschen. Just letting you know that some of us are reading your contributions with interest.
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Re: FBI WATCH MAKING CRUELTY VISIBLE

Postby fruhmenschen » Thu Sep 02, 2010 3:25 pm

Here is some dated material.

to view a partial list of crimes committed by FBI agents over 1500 pages long see
forums.signonsandiego.com/showthread.php?t=59139

to view a partial list of FBI agents arrested for pedophilia see
campusactivism.org/phpBB3/viewforum.php?f=29


also see
ctka.net/pr500-king.html
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Re: FBI WATCH MAKING CRUELTY VISIBLE

Postby fruhmenschen » Thu Sep 02, 2010 3:34 pm

http://www.bordc.org/nsl/

BORDC and ETS Pictures present a video on DVD:
FBI Unbound: How National Security Letters Violate Our Privacy

Approximate running time: 26 minutes

Featuring: Lisa Graves, Bruce Fein, and George Christian

Additional Resources:

* Discussion Guide
* Event Flier - "National Security Letters: Seven Things Every American Should Know"
* Other Fliers, Transcript, and Additional Resources



BORDC, 8 Bridge Street, Suite A, Northampton, MA 01060, and write "FBI Unbound DVD" in the memo line.
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Re: FBI WATCH MAKING CRUELTY VISIBLE

Postby fruhmenschen » Fri Sep 03, 2010 10:10 pm

Here is a story within a story for you.
1st read

Former FBI Assistant Director (and Mormon)Oliver Revell was demoted by FBI Director William Sessions to the FBI Dallas office after stories broke linking Revell and other FBI agents to collaborating with the death squads in El Salvador to disappear union activists, school teachers, politicians, etc. Retired Boston Globe reporter and Pulitzer Prize winner Ross Gelbspan wrote about it in his book BREAK INS DEATH THREATS AND THE FBI published by South End Press.
But wait, it gets even better. FBI Assistant Director Revell has also been accused of pulling his son (also a FBI agent) and his wife off the plane just before it took off and exploded over Lockerbie Scotland. see
http://aangirfan.blogspot.com/2009/08/m ... rs-to.html

Wait there is even more. Assistant FBI Director Revell was the lead FBI supervisor investigating the Lockerbie bombing see
http://news.scotsman.com/lockerbie/FBI- ... 3466435.jp
http://www.constitution.org/ocbpt/ocbpt_08.htm
http://plane-truth.com/Aoude/geocities/hartlidov.html

2nd read
Ex-official wanted to fire FBI agent held in murder plot after 1992 standoff
see link for full story
http://www.dallasnews.com/sharedcontent ... 95b5d.html
September 3, 2010

By JASON TRAHAN / The Dallas Morning News
jtrahan@dallasnews.com

A former special agent in charge of the Dallas FBI office said he tried to fire Carlos Ortiz 18 years ago after the troubled agent was involved in a seven-hour armed standoff with SWAT team members.

But Oliver "Buck" Revell said his recommendation was rejected by his FBI superiors in Washington because Ortiz, who is currently accused of plotting to kill his wife and his former boss, was deemed fit for duty by psychiatrists.
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Re: FBI WATCH MAKING CRUELTY VISIBLE

Postby fruhmenschen » Mon Sep 06, 2010 4:08 pm

http://www.judibari.org/Ryan050701.html


Statement of John C. Ryan

May 7, 2001

I, John C. Ryan, was a Special Agent of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) from Feb. 28, 1966 to Oct. 11, 1987, assigned to Phoenix and Yuma, AZ (1 yr), Utica, NY (9 yrs), East St. Louis, IL (5 yrs) and Peoria, IL (7yrs). Most of my career I specialized in organized crime (OC) investigations. I also worked general criminal and applicant cases, and near the end of my Career I specialized in Foreign Counterintelligence & Terrorist cases.

My duties were to investigate violations of federal laws (those assigned to FBI jurisdiction), make arrests, serve search warrants, or as directed by the President of the United States.

I was fired from FBI on Oct 11, 87 for refusing a direct order to investigate non-violent peace groups as saboteurs/terrorists, based on my religious beliefs. I sued for re-instatement, (John C. Ryan vs. US Dept of Justice, Case No. 88C 2410, Central District of Illinois). Reinstatement was denied. The case was heard 10/15/91 by 7th US Circuit Court of Appeals, Case No. 91-1467 -- appeal denied.

Informant development and informant handling was my specialty throughout most of my FBI career. I worked OC for approximately 16 of my 22 years. I worked, handled, developed or attempted to develop literally hundreds of individuals as informants. I handled 7 Top Echelon (TE) informants including a Mafia member informant, and paid several thousand dollars to informants, both as "regularly paid" or in individual payments. I received two cash incentive awards for my work with informants. My two letters of censure from the FBI, neither of which I am ashamed, were because of overzealousness in my informant work. I attended a specialized informant In-Service training which gathered agents around the FBI that specialized or excelled in informant development.

During my entire FBI career, all agents working criminal matters were expected to have informants, also known as a source, asset, snitch, stool-pigeon, a 137 (the informant file number). One's informant coverage was a major portion of all performance reviews and inspection reports. During the late 1960s and early 1970s, with the inner-city rioting and unrest, every field agent had to have at least one "ghetto informant" meaning an Afro-American informant. In the late 60s, early 70s, the Top-Echelon Criminal Informant Program (TECIP) began, targeting OC figures, particularly Mafia members.

There were an overwhelming amount of rules and restrictions on the program, ostensibly to assure the "integrity" of bureau informants, and to prevent abuse by the informant or the agent.

The reality is that many agents either had no ability or desire to develop informants, some were simply unable to converse with somebody in the "criminal element" in a civil manner. By and large, the informant program was an internal game between the field and headquarters, almost all on paper, to meet the bureau requirements, and fraud on the part of the agents became rampant.

It was the unwritten policy of the field offices that all fugitive apprehensions, recovered stolen cars, and many other statistical accomplishments be attributed to an informant. A new informant was designated a Potential Criminal Informant, (PCI). This PCI needed 3 accomplishments (i.e., a fugitive located, a stolen car recovered), to become a Criminal Informant, (CI). After that all you had to do was contact the CI at least every 30 days, and fill out a background sheet. I heard these specific instructions, several times, from the informant coordinator at all-agent conferences. "Phony informants," or "paper informants" were the rule. Subsequently, the bureau rules governing informant development, handling. and reporting pertained almost entirely to this type of informant.

On the other hand there was always a scattering of agents that worked legitimate informants. Some of these informants were extremely competent and productive. Sometimes the informant was a "walk-in," a person that contacts us with some information, for some reason, and volunteers to continue providing information. There were agents with hoodlum friends or relatives that turned informant. Then, often in the course of a case, especially in prosecution stages, a subject would turn informant in return for leniency or release.

Then there were agents that had the desire and ability to develop informants. From my experience and from numerous contacts with other agents that specialized working informants, it became obvious that not many agents fell into this category. Many FBI divisions, mainly smaller ones, had no such agent, some with only one. Some of the larger divisions were not much different.

As a rule, the more productive an informant, the more paperwork and administrative problems he or she caused. Any agent familiar with real informants knows this, and often the agent found him/herself at frequent odds with the field office or the bureau and found it essential to cut corners with the paperwork, and subsequently with the content of the informant's information.

The rule said every informant had to be contacted at least once every thirty days. In reality, some informants were contacted on a regular basis, sometimes daily, while others were difficult to find, it was dangerous to meet, did not like to be contacted, or were generally unavailable. One productive informant could, in effect, carry several lesser productive informants. By this, I mean, it was common to take information from one informant and attribute it to another, or several others, to keep all productive, but especially to meet the 30 day contact rule. It was also common to use police intelligence information, information from illegal wire-taps and microphones, even news stories, by attributing the information to informants, both as a means of inflating an informant's worth, and/or masking an illegal eavesdropping operation.

All agents were required to certify upon every informant contact that the informant did not hold back any information and that the informant showed no signs of emotional or mental instability. Both statements, in my estimation and that of most agents I knew that handled informants, were absurd. Informants frequently held track Information or altered the information to fit their agenda, which was often revenge, or to provide what the agent was hoping to learn, especially if payment was involved. I found this aspect so common that I regularly maintained informants to inform on my informants.

Informant development and informant handling was my specialty throughout most of my FBI career. I worked OC for approximately 16 of my 22 years. I worked, handled, developed or attempted to develop literally hundreds of individuals as informants. I handled 7 TE informants including a Mafia member informant, and paid several thousand dollars to informants, both as "regularly paid" or individual payments. I received two cash incentive awards as well as two letters of censure from the bureau for informant matters.

The informant program was haphazardly maintained, by the bureau and by the field. There was little security given to informants. On a PCI case, the informant's actual name was the title and used throughout all paperwork. (CI's names were concealed and given symbol numbers.) The informant files were shelved with all other files and were available to any agent or clerk in the office. It was presumed that most of the informants were either totally fictional, or at least exaggerated.

The bureau requires a case agent to certify that they have instructed the informant that he/she is not an employee of the FBI, and that they are not to portray themselves as such. This is a problem that probably every agent that worked real informants has encountered. I recall a former mob muscle, hit-man that turned informant and who took to his new role with the same enthusiasm he had as he did for the mob. Once, after reading a newspaper column that trashed the FBI, he became so upset and took it so personal that he wanted to go and "mess-up" the columnist that wrote the article.

One secretary that handled informant payments became extremely resistant and uncooperative to me because the informant was earning more than she was, and she complained openly to others in the office about this. One SAC (Special Agent in Charge) commented when an agent was forced to pay several hundred dollars to repair a bureau car he damaged, "I thought that's what informant money was for."

In my first assignment I was told by an experienced agent to read "Our Man in Havana," a novel by Graham Green, if I wanted to know how the bureau informant program is best worked. In this story an "agent" in Havana, Cuba, manufactures all of the information he sends to his superiors using the diagram of a vacuum cleaner as the sinister weapon he spying on. I Worked at the Mexican border, and, as a favor to another agent responsible for "security" information from Mexico, would periodically go into Mexico, buy every Mexican newspaper I could find and give them to that agent, who told me he would read to find intelligence information to attribute to his security informant.

I was working OC cases when the TECIP was initiated. The program was pointed at the Mafia, or organized crime in general, (for offices that did not have Italian Mafia affiliations) seeking major OC figures as informants. It was a highly successful program but rarely operated as the bureau instructed and was led to believe it was run.

I attended an informant in-service training session at Quantico in which the director of the CI and TECI programs (both designed the particular programs and were with then from their start) both admitted they had never, in their field days, worked actual informants. Both were being very candid, and admitting the programs had great shortfalls.

One agent that had two good OC informants feared and mistrusted the bureau informant system so much that he never put either informant on paper, but instead attributed any information either told him to any one of several marginal or non-existent informants he carried on paper.

I know of an instance where an agent, in a division needing a Mafia member informant, took a person he was friendly with, a low level street con-man, with an Italian last name, and by quoting police intelligence sources and other informants, made him into a Mafia member -- or so the bureau thought. At the same time there was a highly productive illegal microphone in a local Mafia member's premises. The individual was "targeted" as a possible informant, successfully developed, greatly enhanced the agent's reputation, the field office's reputation and provided a vehicle to report the information from the microphone. Further, this informant was paid significantly on a regular basis (which also made the agent, office, and the information more appealing). When another, legitimate Mafia member informant, from the same Mafia family and the same city was developed, but did not validify the other so-called member, neither the field division nor the bureau balked, and the bogus member informant continued to be paid on a regular basis.

I had an informant that was on federal probation, but deeply involved with OC friends. Bureau rules prohibited contacting a federal parolee or probationer without permission of his Probation Officer. I contacted the Probation Officer who was convinced the source was going straight and told me he would violate him if he caught him talking to me. Instead of violating the bureau rule I made his girlfriend an informant and normally contacted them together, attributing all the information to her file. At a later point it became necessary to use some of his information in court. The situation was explained to the bureau. Although I was given a letter of censure, the bureau permitted me to provide the information as testimony. Although prepared to, I never testified in this, case. I would have, honestly, but the FBI file in which I reported the informant information to the bureau was fraudulent. The OC section of the bureau recognized the problem but the Office of Professional Responsibility did not.

With the advent of the Federal Strike Forces, the Media, PA break-in, (where, for the first time, actual internal FBI files, including informant contact forms, were stolen and seen by the public), the death of J. Edgar Hoover, then the Watergate scandal and the Senator Frank Church Guidelines that resulted, a great deal of change began to take place regarding informants.

Prior to all of this, rarely was the majority of informant information used for prosecuting crimes. It was gathered primarily for intelligence purposes (as was security type information). Intelligence gathering had become an end in itself, to impress one's own supervisor or the bureau, or just to gather intelligence for its own sake.

When wiretaps became legal, (early 1970s) informant information became imperative to obtain the affidavits necessary for the court authorized wiretaps. Often, especially when working with Strike Force attorneys, we would be tasked to obtain specific informant information to strengthen the affidavit, make it more specific, or to update the information due to the delays that occurred getting the affidavit approved. Sometimes it was dangerous -- dangerous for the informant's security, or dangerous for the case if the informant realized the target of the affidavit -- contacting the informant, or the informant was reluctant to be contacted, as when didn't like being an informant, or when the informant did not know he was an informant. Often in such cases, either the update would be invented. At this stage too much was at stake logistically, (eavesdropping equipment, manpower, surveillance, extra clerical help, etc.) for any informant problems, especially when it was the agent that testified as to what the informant said, not the informant. Regardless of the integrity of that agent, that informant's file was already so full of falsehoods that another one wouldn't matter.

One day, sometime in the early 1980s, all agents were contacted, by phone, not by memo, and told to close all "non-productive," (meaning phony) informants, with "no questions asked." Gradually many changes were made, such as removing informant files from the general files and keeping them in a special locked area, inaccessible to one and all, supposedly only the case agent. At the same time a new policy overtook the bureau; "quality not quantity." This applied to informants as well as all of the case work. But at the same time an addendum was whispered; "but we want a lot of quality."

As I have noted, there were numerous rules and procedures established at different times for the handling of informants at different stages of their development, and for maintaining files and records of contacts and dealings between informants and the agents who worked with them. Those rules were honored as much in the breach as in the observance in my experience. There were periodic announcements from the bureau of reforms, reconstitution of procedures and other supposed improvements in the system, but the same practices always continued, or were re-established over time.

Because of these experiences and observations, it would come as no surprise that FBI agents in the Judi Bari case, or any case, would distort, exaggerate, misrepresent, falsify or otherwise manipulate information about an informant, or about information supposedly received from an informant, or meetings, or the contents of reports and files, etc., regardless of the untruthfulness or unlawfulness of their actions. Anyone -- supervisors, bureau headquarters, a court or magistrate in a given case, prosecutors, city police officers -- might have been a target (victim) of such fraud and deception regarding informants and informant information in the circumstances and atmosphere I am describing.



(signed)

John C. Ryan May 7, 2001
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