When Facts Don’t Matter

[bks]

bhp wrote:

My guess is that it's the ism-ness of Marxism and Freudianism that Chomsky is referring to when he makes the theological analogy. It is precisely the ism-ness that turns these living bodies of thought into irrational (inflexible) cults. It's the inflexibility that is irrational. Hence it seems unlikely that you are correct when you assert that Chomsky "believes (without being able to 'sketch it out' precisely) that there's an 'absolute' sense of justice that can be articulated to justify (or fail to justify) revolutionary action", revolutionary action being inclusive of violence, since he states, "I'm not saying there is an absolute.. . For example, I am not a committed pacifist. I would not hold that it is under all imaginable circumstances wrong to use violence, even though use of violence is in some sense unjust. I believe that one has to estimate relative justices."

I don't think this is so, bhp. As evidence I would call your attention to the following part of the exchange between Chomsky and Foucault. The second bolded passage is the key one:

FOUCAULT:
If you like, I will be a little bit Nietzschean about this; in other words, it seems to me that the idea of justice in itself is an idea which in effect has been invented and put to work in different types of societies as an instrument of a certain political and economic power or as a weapon against that power. But it seems to me that, in any case, the notion of justice itself functions within a society of classes as a claim made by the oppressed class and as justification for it.

CHOMSKY:
I don't agree with that.

FOUCAULT:
And in a classless society, I am not sure that we would still use this notion of justice.

CHOMSKY:
Well, here I really disagree. I think there is some sort of an absolute basis--if you press me too hard I'll be in trouble, because I can't sketch it out-ultimately residing in fundamental human qualities, in terms of which a "real" notion of justice is grounded.

Chomsky clearly thinks there's an ideal notion of justice that can be drawn on, even if it can't be fully sketched out. The 'non-absolutist' aspect of his formulation you referenced earlier refers to his not being an absolutist about nonviolence, I believe.

bph:
Foucault contends that the notion of "justice" is a proletarian construct intended as a weapon to oppress the oppressors. Ridiculous. I think Chomsky misunderstood Foucault, but Chomsky does not simply occupy the opposite of an either/or concept of justice in response, as you suggest, and claim that there is some absolute sense of justice that exists apart from imperfect human beings.

Actually, I think what Foucault is saying is that justice is a construct whomever uses it, proletarian, bourgeois, whomever. It's true he uses the proletariat in the example above, but in the first bolded section I quoted right above he makes it clear that justice, as a discursive weapon, can be deployed by any group or class in a society.

For me the significance of this in the context of current reality is that it's appears to be a consequence of Chomsky's outlook that serious political resistance would only be justified if it could reasonably be claimed that a more just society would foreseeably issue from it. Chomsky would say you're responsible for the foreseeable consequences of your actions, but just what the limits on the 'foreseeable' are in an extended political struggle, it's very difficult to say. All actions have the possibility of producing unintended and unforeseen consequences, some of which are foreseeable and some of which will never be.

[JackRiddler]

Whatever happens in Egypt, someone will have foreseen it.

If it's judged to be bad -- let's say, in some way similar to how the people I'd call reactionaries still judge the French Revolution to have been "bad" -- then some will argue as though the people should have foreseen it and chosen otherwise. They will do so implicitly if they say the revolution was a bad idea, or a good idea with fatal flaws and thus bound to go wrong.

Utter nonsense. Given the realization of their power and what they could do with it, the Egyptians could not have done otherwise but finally to use that power and break out of the unbearable that they had borne only because they had believed nothing else was possible. To think otherwise is to deny fundamental human drives.

Furthermore, the consequences are not foreseeable. Since so many scenarios are already being devised, whatever happens, it will fit one of the scenarios; but that doesn't mean whatever happens will therefore have been inevitable.

By contrast, the overthrow of the Mubarak regime, or the decision of the people to pursue it without compromise once they realized their own power to enact it, was inevitable. I think that was the case from January 25th forward, as fragile as it appeared even up to the eve of the abdication.

This is also how I see the French revolution. At some point shortly before, it became an inevitability, and not due to anyone's decision. The people realized their power in a time of desperation; at that point they were going to overthrow the Ancien Regime no matter what. It was no longer something for later reactionaries to judge as a decision. It was an outbreak of their long-suppressed essential humanity.

It also came because the Ancien Regime was already finished; incapable of reform, presiding over an acute famine, bankrupt, determined to remain unchanged by repression, unaware of its weakness, to its bitter end willing to insult and trample and provoke the people and the institutions of the Estates (which it might have coopted).

What followed was just as much a product of the reaction as of the revolution. The reaction did its damndest to surrender nothing, to restore everything. We can never know how things would have gone without the reaction, without the furious counter-attack of the royalist nobility and their foreign allies upon the French people who had, to begin with, accepted a constitutional monarchy.

We can never know how things would have gone if we could re-run the events 1000 times and build a statistical picture of the likeliest outcomes. We can know with some certainty that without the year reviled today as the Terror, when the Jacobins suppressed the reaction, executed the royalty, and rallied the people with a terrible force, the Revolution would have almost certainly fallen, and even worse massacres would have followed with a Restoration at that time.

Anyway, Chomsky's idea of justice would, whether he is willing to be explicit about it or not, be consistent with his idea of language: that there is an organ within the mind that carries it, and determines certain aspects of it that are universal to all languages. Similarly, he seems to see a justice-organ as inherent to the natural mind. Assuming that's a fair description I would tend to agree, with the caveat that this organ arises or develops in interaction with the social environment, but inevitably, like the growth of any other inherent part of us; a caveat which for all I know he shares. While loath to take on two guys who are both smarter than me (Chomsky and Foucault) I'm not sure that Chomsky's concept is in necessary opposition to Foucault's idea of justice as a weapon in the service of whoever invokes it. Like our hardwired language, or our limbs, the sense of justice is capable of stretching, of different uses; it doesn't always live up to a perfect idea, it isn't always the best it can be.

.

[23]

Regarding the idea of justice, I have always treated it as a relative proposition. Any notion of an objective (fill in the blank) is almost always subjectively perceived, IMO.

When I participated in efforts to change certain social conditions, it wasn't an effort to replace an unjust condition with a just one. Rather, I saw it more more of an effort to transform the prevailing perception of an acceptable condition to an unacceptable one.

"We no longer accept this" was the desired perceptional change that I efforted towards. Not "this is unjust".

[vanlose kid]

When Facts Don’t Matter

Left Reflections on Backfire, Propaganda, and How to Fight (or Not Fight) the Right

February 17, 2011

By Paul Street


...

How to Respond

So what’s a good, reasonably informed left progressive supposed to do about typically white and Middle American right-wing backfire in their midst? If you must engage your right wing uncle or neighbor or colleague on political matters, the research indicates that you should do so in a particular kind of way. Be very direct and personable in your presentation of evidence. Avoid the argument that their beliefs don’t serve their interests – this could only deepen their attachment to those beliefs. Avoid anger and shaming – this will only hook them into ego defense and sharpen their belief attachments. Be sure to highlight affirmation – of the legitimacy of their anger, of their reasonable alienation from liberal elites (who really exist and can be quite infuriating, as all good leftists know), of their sense that the world is going to Hell in a hand basket (it is, actually) – in your approach. Do not ridicule. Gently suggest alternative explanations – relating to corporate and military power – for the economic and social pain and insecurity that attacks their sense of self-esteem (thereby deepening their attachment to preposterous rightist ideas) and which they attribute to the supposed socialism of Obama and the Democrats. Along the way consider the insights of Buddhist thinker Pema Chodron on what triggers shenpa, the Tibetan word for attachment:

“Here’s how shenpa shows up in everyday experience. Somebody says a harsh word and something in you tightens: instantly you’re hooked….The chain reaction of speaking or acting or obsessing happens fast…This is very personal. What was said gets to you – it triggers you…The fundamental, most basic shenpa is to ego itself: attachment to our identity, the image of who we think we are. When we experience our identity as being threatened, our self-absorption gets very strong, and shenpa automatically arises. Then there is the spin-off – such as attachment to our possessions or to our views and opinions. For example, someone criticizes your politics, they criticize your appearance, they criticize your dearest friend …As soon as the words have registered – boom its there. Shenpa is not the thoughts or emotions per se. Shenpa is preverbal, but it breeds thoughts and emotions very quickly. If we’re attentive, we can feel it happening.”11

...

didn't know where best to start so i'll start here, somewhat at the beginning. the highlighted is actually good advice. but how is it framed? (consider/remember what Street quoted of Chomsky further above re real grievances and answers (crazy ones) or the lack thereof). – as advice to the "leftist" when arguing with a "believing moron" for whom facts supposedly don't matter. but here (as in the piece as a whole) too many things are conflated into a single monolithic position with which one either engages from a superior position (whether moral/ethical or political) or shrugs off as too absurd and dangerous to deal with in any meaningful way. these are the alternatives on offer.

my question is, as this is coming from Street, someone for whom facts supposedly really do matter: does this characterization of the "believing moron" square with the facts? well, Street having quoted Chomsky earlier (Chomsky who has in fact many times over many many years, gone on speaking tours to speak with "believing morons" so what he's saying about them: that one can engage is rather factual) is in fact citing a rebuttal of Street's own position. let's untangle a few things. the facts that matter to the "believing moron" are fairly clear to all of us here. Chomsky also makes it very clear what they are:

“Right now…there is a right-wing populist uprising. It’s very common, even on the left, to just ridicule them, but that’s not the right reaction. If you look at those people and listen to them on talk radio, these are people with real grievances….And in fact they are getting shafted. For 30 years their wages have stagnated or declined, the social conditions have worsened…so somebody must be doing something to them, and they want to know who it is. Well Rush Limbaugh has answered—‘it’s the rich liberals who own the banks and run the government, and of course run the media, and they don’t care about you.’

these (the highlighted) are the facts. now, knowing these facts Street's "believing moron" is looking for answers, i.e. explanations as to why this is happening and the only ones available are those offered by the "corporatist media" (and it's all corporatist media all the time whether "leftist" or "rightist"). but is this exclusive to Tea Partiers and the like? – it's fine for Street to cite examples of their "beliefs" re Obama and how wrong they are, but what about progressive beliefs re Obama (the beliefs of those who bought into "Hope and Change"), why doesn't he bring those up? are they more factual? – we've just seen the same "rah rah rah" from so-called progressives at the latest Clinton rally for freedom and democracy and whatever else where Ray McGovern got knocked down and arrested. what does one say about the beliefs of these "more rational", highly educated people for whom facts really do matter?

is it easier to engage with them? are they absurdly ignorant? are their explanations any better because they at least vote democrat and support a black president? don't they suffer from "shenpa" in much the same way when questioned? – is the proposition" that the irrationals who listen to Glenn Beck etc., are farther out than the rationals who listen to the Clinton and the democratic media machine a factual claim, or is it a valuation, a belief? are they more enlightened and less subject to "shenpa" than the common tea-party supporter? is Street? any of us?

honestly, how many of you here have not had your certainties, your beliefs shattered in recent years – say, since 9/11? isn't that how we got here in the first place? – how many of you have not at some point or other said: "the US was different once, it was better, more fair, a light to the world, the home of freedom, the cradle of revolution…" and the like, actually believing it to be the case? don't the Tea Partiers say the same?how much of it was/is based on fact(s)? how many of you do not get shivers listening the the Star Spangled banner belted out in semi-gospel while the bombs blast during the super bowl while a tiny tear guests the corner of your eye? are you all superfactual and naught else? is Street? do you knock on wood?

notice that i'm not saying that there are no facts of the matter, only that the explanations on offer differ.

is the proposition "a misguided (hard core or not) religious tea partier is more entrenched and harder to convince of his mistakes that a misguided (hard core or not) atheist progressive" really a statement of fact? who is more or less rational here?

i think i can say that all os us here often cite the "laws" of physics in argument. i do so myself despite being a "religionist" as Jack says (and i do in some sense object to the term based on the fact that i did not become a "religionist" in order to become part of some greater club of people but for entirely personal reasons. i think Jack's distinction re faith and religion is more accurate and that i fall on the faith side of things, but whatever) – we cite the "laws" of physics. but we don't always do so meaningfully. we don't always note the different use of "laws" when talking physics.

here's the thing: there's a big difference between obeying a law of traffic and "obeying" a law of physics. the stone dropped from the tower of Pisa does not obey that laws of physics. the laws of physics are not laws. – how often do we say: "correlation is not causation" without taking into account the finer point?

here's a brief outline of the problems re "laws" of physics (that have implications for belief, knowledge, ontology, metaphysics) that we normally don't take into account when citing them as originally posed (by an atheist for those to whom this is important):

Hume, induction and justification

The source for the problem of induction as we know it is Hume's brief argument in Book I, Part III, section VI of the Treatise, (Hume THN). The great historical importance of this argument, not to speak of its intrinsic power, recommends that reflection on the problem begin with a rehearsal of it. The brief summary in sections 10 and 11 of the entry on Hume provides what is needed, and those who are not familiar with the argument are well advised to read them in conjunction with the present section; It will also be helpful in understanding the deceptively simple argument to have some idea of Hume's project in the Treatise. For this section 4 of that entry is most useful. Indeed, the first twelve sections of the article serve as a brief and comprehensive introduction to Hume's theory of knowledge. Reference to this article permits an abbreviated account here of his classic argument.

First two notes about vocabulary. The term ‘induction’ does not appear in Hume's argument, nor anywhere in the Treatise or the first Inquiry, for that matter. Hume's concern is with inferences concerning causal connections, which, on his account are the only connections “which can lead us beyond the immediate impressions of our memory and senses” (Hume THN, 89). But the difference between such inferences and what we know today as induction is largely a matter of terminology. Secondly, Hume divides all reasoning into demonstrative, by which he means deductive, and probabilistic, by which he means the generalization of causal reasoning. In what follows we paraphrase and interpolate freely so as to ease the application of the argument in contemporary contexts.

It should also be remarked that Hume's argument applies just to enumerative induction, and primarily to singular predictive inference, but, again, its generalization to other forms of inductive reasoning is straightforward.

The argument should be seen against the background of Hume's project as he announces it in the introduction to the Treatise: This project is the development of the empirical science of human nature. The epistemological sector of this science involves describing the operations of the mind, the interactions of impressions and ideas and the function of the liveliness that constitutes belief. But this cannot be a merely descriptive endeavor; accurate description of these operations entails also a considerable normative component, for, as Hume puts it, “[o]ur reason [to be taken here quite generally, to include the imagination] must be consider'd as a kind of cause, of which truth is the natural effect; but such-a-one as by the irruption of other causes, and by the inconstancy of our mental powers, may frequently be prevented” (Hume THN, 180). The account must thus not merely describe what goes on in the mind, it must also do this in such a way as to show that and how these mental activities lead naturally, if with frequent exceptions, to true belief. (See Loeb 2006 for further discussion of these questions.)

Now as concerns the argument, its conclusion is that in induction (causal inference) experience does not produce the idea of an effect from an impression of its cause by means of the understanding or reason, but by the imagination, by “a certain association and relation of perceptions.” The center of the argument is a dilemma: If inductive conclusions were produced by the understanding, inductive reasoning would be based upon the premise that nature is uniform; “that instances of which we have had no experience, must resemble those of which we have had experience, and that the course of nature continues always uniformly the same.” (Hume THN, 89) And were this premise to be established by reasoning, that reasoning would be either deductive or probabilistic (i.e. causal). The principle can't be proved deductively, for whatever can be proved deductively is a necessary truth, and the principle is not necessary; its antecedent is consistent with the denial of its consequent. Nor can the principle be proved by causal reasoning, for it is presupposed by all such reasoning and any such proof would be a petitio principii.

The normative component of Hume's project is striking here: That the principle of uniformity of nature cannot be proved deductively or inductively shows that it is not the principle that drives our causal reasoning only if our causal reasoning is sound and leads to true conclusions as a “natural effect” of belief in true premises. This is what licenses the capsule description of the argument as showing that induction cannot be justified or licensed either deductively or inductively; not deductively because (non-trivial) inductions do not express logically necessary connections, not inductively because that would be circular. If, however, causal reasoning were fallacious, the principle of the uniformity of nature might well be among its principles.

The negative argument is an essential first step in Hume's general account of induction. It rules out accounts of induction that view it as the work of reason. Hume's positive account begins from a constructive dilemma: Inductive inference must be the work either of reason or of imagination.; Since the negative argument shows that it cannot be a species of reasoning, it must be imaginative.

Hume's positive account of causal inference can be simply described: It amounts to embedding the singular form of enumerative induction in the nature of human, and at least some bestial, thought. The several definitions offered in (Hume EHU, 60) make this explicit:

[W]e may define a cause to be an object, followed by another, and where all objects similar to the first are followed by objects similar to the second. Or, in other words, where, if the first object had not been, the second never had existed.

Another definition defines a cause to be:

an object followed by another, and whose appearance always conveys the thought to that other.

If we have observed many Fs to be followed by Gs, and no contrary instances, then observing a new F will lead us to anticipate that it will also be a G. That is causal inference.

It is clear, says Hume, that we do make inductive, or, in his terms, causal, inferences; that having observed many Fs to be Gs, observation of a new instance of an F leads us to believe that the newly observed F is also a G. It is equally clear that the epistemic force of this inference, what Hume calls the necessary connection between the premises and the conclusion, does not reside in the premises alone:

All observed Fs have also been Gs,
and

a is an F,
do not imply

a is a G.
It is false that “instances of which we have had no experience must resemble those of which we have had experience” (Hume EHU, 89).

Hume's view is that the experience of constant conjunction fosters a “habit of the mind” that leads us to anticipate the conclusion on the occasion of a new instance of the second premise. The force of induction, the force that drives the inference, is thus not an objective feature of the world, but a subjective power; the mind's capacity to form inductive habits. The objectivity of causality, the objective support of inductive inference, is thus an illusion, an instance of what Hume calls the mind's “great propensity to spread itself on external objects” (Hume THN, 167).

It is important to distinguish in Hume's account causal inference from causal belief: Causal inference does not require that the agent have the concept of cause; animals may make causal inferences (Hume THN, 176–179; Hume EHU, 104–108) which occur when past experience of constant conjunction leads to the anticipation of the subsequent conjunct upon experience of the precedent. Causal beliefs, on the other hand, beliefs of the form

A causes B,
may be formed when one reflects upon causal inferences as, presumably, animals cannot (Hume THN, 78).

Hume's account raises the problem of induction in an acute form: One would like to say that good and reliable inductions are those that follow the lines of causal necessity; that when

All observed Fs have also been Gs,
is the manifestation in experience of a causal connection between F and G, then the inference

All observed Fs have also been Gs,
a is an F,
Therefore, a, not yet observed, is also a G,

is a good induction. But if causality is not an objective feature of the world this is not an option. The Humean problem of induction is then the problem of distinguishing good from bad inductive habits in the absence of any corresponding objective distinction.

Two sides or facets of the problem of induction should be distinguished: The epistemological problem is to find a method for distinguishing good or reliable inductive habits from bad or unreliable habits. The second and deeper problem is metaphysical. This is the problem of saying what the difference is between reliable and unreliable inductions. This is the problem that Whitehead called “the despair of philosophy” (Whitehead 1948, 35). The distinction can be illustrated in the parallel case of arithmetic. The by now classic incompleteness results of the last century show that the epistemological problem for first-order arithmetic is insoluble; that there can be no method, in a quite clear sense of that term, for distinguishing the truths from the falsehoods of first-order arithmetic. But the metaphysical problem for arithmetic has a clear and correct solution: the truths of first-order arithmetic are precisely the sentences that are true in all arithmetic models. Our understanding of the distinction between arithmetic truths and falsehoods is just as clear as our understanding of the simple recursive definition of truth in arithmetic, though any method for applying the distinction must remain forever out of our reach.

Now as concerns inductive inference, it is hardly surprising to be told that the epistemological problem is insoluble; that there can be no formula or recipe, however complex, for ruling out unreliable inductions. But Hume's arguments, if they are correct, have apparently a much more radical consequence than this: They seem to show that the metaphysical problem for induction is insoluble; that there is no objective difference between reliable and unreliable inductions. This is counterintuitive. Good inductions are supported by causal connections and we think of causality as an objective matter: The laws of nature express objective causal connections. Ramsey writes in his Humean account of the matter:

Causal laws form the system with which the speaker meets the future; they are not, therefore, subjective in the sense that if you and I enunciate different ones we are each saying something about ourselves which pass by one another like “I went to Grantchester”, “I didn't” (Ramsey 1931, 241).

A satisfactory resolution of the problem of induction would account for this objectivity in the distinction between good and bad inductions.

It might seem that Hume's argument succeeds only because he has made the criteria for a solution to the problem too strict. Enumerative induction does not realistically lead from premises

All observed Fs have also been Gs
a is an F,
to the simple assertion

Therefore, a, not yet observed, is also a G.
Induction is contingent inference and as such can yield a conclusion only with a certain probability. The appropriate conclusion is

It is therefore probable that, a, not yet observed, is also a G.

Hume's response to this (Hume THN, 89) is to insist that probabilistic connections, no less than simple causal connections, depend upon habits of the mind and are not to be found in our experience of the world. Weakening the inferential force between premises and conclusion may divide and complicate inductive habits, it does not eliminate them. The laws of probability alone have no more empirical content than does deductive logic. If I infer from observing clouds followed by rain that today's clouds will probably be followed by rain this can only be in virtue of an imperfect habit of associating rain with clouds...

http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/induc ... 2HumIndJus

that should tell us something about the "laws" of physics that we should always keep sight of. but let me cite a passage from the above to show what i mean. the author of the entry writes:

"They seem to show that the metaphysical problem for induction is insoluble; that there is no objective difference between reliable and unreliable inductions. This is counterintuitive. Good inductions are supported by causal connections and we think of causality as an objective matter: The laws of nature express objective causal connections."

when he says Hume's conclusion is counterintuitive, he means that it cannot be right, i.e. "this is not how we usually think of these things".

but in his reply one can see, if one has understood the problem, that his objection against the "counterintuitive" is merely a restatement of Hume's "psychological" explanation of our reliance on causal inference, only couched in more "scientific" terms. – "the laws of nature express objective causal connections" is not a statement of fact. but a rule. or as Hume says: a belief. it cashes out frequently, yes. but things could well turn out otherwise. it does not necessarily do so. nothing in nature is necessary. nature is contingent. – and i say this recognizing that it is nonsense. it cannot be said. the problem is akin to that raised by Gödel: "Any effectively generated theory capable of expressing elementary arithmetic cannot be both consistent and complete. In particular, for any consistent, effectively generated formal theory that proves certain basic arithmetic truths, there is an arithmetical statement that is true,[1] but not provable in the theory (Kleene 1967, p. 250)."

to take the "laws" of nature as objective statements about nature as seen from "above" or "outside" is to somehow claim that doing so is possible.

to say that it belongs within the descriptive account of nature as part of nature is to render it unprovable within the system. – so it is either a rule of description: a bit of grammar, or it is nonsense.

this shows us the limits of rationality, of thought. it is actually fairly trivial in that we can't think outside thought. thought is bounded by nonsense. – but are we bounded by thought? remember, the laws of nature do not dictate how things go. to think that they do leads to the idea that everything can be mapped out in a system with which everything can be made to conform.

imagine a theory of psychology or politics based on that. or don't, just think of behaviorism or stalinism. – food for thought.

*

[brainpanhandler]

Sigh. I guess I should just learn to keep my mouth shut if I don't want to have to think this hard, but this conversation has particular salience for me at the moment.

FOUCAULT:
If you like, I will be a little bit Nietzschean about this; in other words, it seems to me that the idea of justice in itself is an idea which in effect has been invented and put to work in different types of societies as an instrument of a certain political and economic power or as a weapon against that power. But it seems to me that, in any case, the notion of justice itself functions within a society of classes as a claim made by the oppressed class and as justification for it.

CHOMSKY:
I don't agree with that.

FOUCAULT:
And in a classless society, I am not sure that we would still use this notion of justice.

CHOMSKY:
Well, here I really disagree. I think there is some sort of an absolute basis--if you press me too hard I'll be in trouble, because I can't sketch it out-ultimately residing in fundamental human qualities, in terms of which a "real" notion of justice is grounded.

Chomsky clearly thinks there's an ideal notion of justice that can be drawn on, even if it can't be fully sketched out. The 'non-absolutist' aspect of his formulation you referenced earlier refers to his not being an absolutist about nonviolence, I believe.

I don't thnk it's clear at all that Chomsky is positing the existence of an Platonic "ideal" of justice. Throughout the entire excerpted conversation Chomsky is clear that justice is relative and contextual. I will grant you however that what he was going to say but stopped short of is, "Well, look, I'm not saying there is an absolute...(here he stops short but would have said, "sense of justice"). He wants to say that but doesn't because he does want to sketch out the opposite, namely that there is an absolute sense of justice. The evidence I offer for this is the bolded bit you highlight above, namely, "...if you press me too hard I'll be in trouble...". In which case I think you are correct to believe that Chomsky wants to say that there is an objective standard by which we can judge actions as just or unjust but does not want to paint himself into a rhetorical corner.

I think the answer to our difference of opinion lies in, and I will be extrapolating, pursuing the end of the bolded sentence you refer to, to whit, "...ultimately residing in fundamental human qualities, in terms of which a "real" notion of justice is grounded". Chomsky goes on to say, "I think it's too hasty to characterise our existing systems of justice as merely systems of class oppression; I don't think that they are that. I think that they embody systems of class oppression and elements of other kinds of oppression, but they also embody a kind of groping towards the true humanly, valuable concepts of justice and decency and love and kindness and sympathy, which I think are real."

Although Chomsky does not say it, and I wish he had because then I would not have to guess at what he meant, I believe what he is suggesting is that decency, love, kindness, sympathy are "real" and when these are the principles and forces which guide our actions "better justice" (Chomsky's terminology) is more likely to be the end result.

So to respond to Jack when he says,

Anyway, Chomsky's idea of justice would, whether he is willing to be explicit about it or not, be consistent with his idea of language: that there is an organ within the mind that carries it, and determines certain aspects of it that are universal to all languages. Similarly, he seems to see a justice-organ as inherent to the natural mind. Assuming that's a fair description I would tend to agree, with the caveat that this organ arises or develops in interaction with the social environment, but inevitably, like the growth of any other inherent part of us; a caveat which for all I know he shares. While loath to take on two guys who are both smarter than me (Chomsky and Foucault) I'm not sure that Chomsky's concept is in necessary opposition to Foucault's idea of justice as a weapon in the service of whoever invokes it. Like our hardwired language, or our limbs, the sense of justice is capable of stretching, of different uses; it doesn't always live up to a perfect idea, it isn't always the best it can be.

I had considered Chomsky's generative grammar when I initially responded. It's a sensible consideration. However, I think that is comparing apples and oranges. They're both fruit, but... Are there rules of grammar which apply across all times and places? If there are then it is not unreasonable to suppose that there is something intrinisic and organic in our nature which gives rise to those universal structures. I've read Chomsky's linguistic theories, more as an exercise in humility than anything else. So I don't want to give the false impression I'm a linguist of any sort or have answer I want to offer on Generative Grammar theories. But the point I want to make is that there is evidence that there may well be intrinsic, organic rules of grammar and that there is much shakier evidence, if any at all really, that there is some sort of inherent justice organ in us all. Sadly, it seems there is more evidence of an inherent injustice function in us all. But that is a value judgement and I immediately retract it.

I think what I want to suggest is that "love is all you need". Does not justice flow from reason governed and guided by love and compassion?
Even though "love" is just as abstract a notion as "justice" is it not more sensible to imagine that love is what is intrinsic and organic to our nature? And, please, no one ask me to define love.

And BKS, am I making a religious statement when I suggest that love is real? I don't think so.

One other thing I wanted to respond to:

Actually, I think what Foucault is saying is that justice is a construct whomever uses it, proletarian, bourgeois, whomever. It's true he uses the proletariat in the example above, but in the first bolded section I quoted right above he makes it clear that justice, as a discursive weapon, can be deployed by any group or class in a society.

What I was pointing at was his reference to Nietzsche (s included you-know-who) where I believe he was making the distinction between sklavenmoral and herrenmoral, which are two distinct sets of values and tactics within the eternal class struggle.

I'm sure I've only succeeded in muddying the waters and making myself even more unclear, but these are difficult concepts and I'm just thinking out loud here.


Sigh.... edited for slightly more clarity.

[Hammer of Los]

Don't write so much you guys, I can't keep up. Too many chores to do. Oh well.

VK, for your defense of libertarianism, and your quoting of Hume, you are now officially my new favourite poster.

If I had more time to read and consider, I would offer something more substantive by way of contribution.

I'm sorry about that.

[Joe Hillshoist]

I think what I want to suggest is that "love is all you need". Does not justice flow from reason governed and guided by love and compassion?
Even though "love" is just as abstract a notion as "justice" is it not more sensible to imagine that love is what is intrinsic and organic to our nature? And, please, no one ask me to define love.

And BKS, am I making a religious statement when I suggest that love is real? I don't think so.

"Love" isn't an abstract notion, its a real thing (not just familial or sexual love either). There's a genuine thing I get when I see some things in my local environment (like 2 days ago when an endangered Richmond Birdwing flew around the avo tree.) Its a reqal feeling of connection to soething, its also a feeling of being part of that something (so perhaps on that level it is familial, if the world is your family.)

Perhaps Justice is an abstract concept, but it does seem to stem from that feeling of connection and belonging. It a reaction to seeing and feeling the pain that someone or something you are connected to and part of.

[hanshan]

...

from the vk post above:

when he says Hume's conclusion is counterintuitive, he means that it cannot be right, i.e. "this is not how we usually think of these things".

but in his reply one can see, if one has understood the problem, that his objection against the "counterintuitive" is merely a restatement of Hume's "psychological" explanation of our reliance on causal inference, only couched in more "scientific" terms. – "the laws of nature express objective causal connections" is not a statement of fact. but a rule. or as Hume says: a belief. it cashes out frequently, yes. but things could well turn out otherwise. it does not necessarily do so. nothing in nature is necessary. nature is contingent. – and i say this recognizing that it is nonsense. it cannot be said. the problem is akin to that raised by Gödel: "Any effectively generated theory capable of expressing elementary arithmetic cannot be both consistent and complete. In particular, for any consistent, effectively generated formal theory that proves certain basic arithmetic truths, there is an arithmetical statement that is true,[1] but not provable in the theory (Kleene 1967, p. 250)."

to take the "laws" of nature as objective statements about nature as seen from "above" or "outside" is to somehow claim that doing so is possible.

to say that it belongs within the descriptive account of nature as part of nature is to render it unprovable within the system. – so it is either a rule of description: a bit of grammar, or it is nonsense.



this shows us the limits of rationality, of thought. it is actually fairly trivial in that we can't think outside thought. thought is bounded by nonsense. – but are we bounded by thought? remember, the laws of nature do not dictate how things go. to think that they do leads to the idea that everything can be mapped out in a system with which everything can be made to conform.

imagine a theory of psychology or politics based on that. or don't, just think of behaviorism or stalinism. – food for thought.

*

he doesn't mean: that it cannot be right; he means: "this is not how we usually think of these things"..
However, clearly, from the example quoted, Hume believes
one cannot comprehend (grasp) the natural world through reason alone. QED.
He goes to rather convoluted lengths to demonstrate that but, hey, that's philosophy.(redundant)

It's actually both: it's a rule of description, & it's nonsense; because, you can't objectively
be outside the system you're inside, simultaneously. Capisce? There is, however, bi-locality,
but not within a rational system; i.e., if you experienced it, your rational self would deny it.

We're not bounded by thought as defined by words/language.
There is awareness not accompanied by words; i.e., there is knowledge without language...


( edited for style)

( edited 2nd time: fix typo)
...

[Belligerent Savant]

In short, one can theorize at length as to the 'true' nature of what we understand or collectively experience as reality, though ultimately, no one can know anything with any level of certainty or 'true' objectivity -- though it surely doesn't stop many from trying.

Perhaps in a few hundred years, we'll have a better grasp of it all, when we presumably discover clearer understandings of the physics of nature/reality.. or not [or perhaps, the answers to all of life's mysteries shall be revealed next week, during prime time]. In the meantime, our species will continue with the mental masturbations ad infinitum

[gnosticheresy_2]

there is knowledge without language

The tao that can be told
is not the eternal Tao.
The name that can be named
is not the eternal Name.

The unnamable is the eternally real.
Naming is the origin
of all particular things.

Free from desire, you realize the mystery.
Caught in desire, you see only the manifestations.

Yet mystery and manifestations
arise from the same source.
This source is called darkness.

Darkness within darkness.
The gateway to all understanding.

[Plutonia]

FYI, scientists have found nuanced fairness and altruistic behaviors in chimp troops and bat colonies. It shouldn't be a surprise really, but there you have it.

http://brembs.net/ipd/vampire.html

http://scienceblogs.com/primatediaries/ ... play_o.php

[bks]

so much to reply to here, but for the moment:

to take the "laws" of nature as objective statements about nature as seen from "above" or "outside" is to somehow claim that doing so is possible.

to say that it belongs within the descriptive account of nature as part of nature is to render it unprovable within the system. – so it is either a rule of description: a bit of grammar, or it is nonsense.

A short way of saying what I think you are claiming here, vk, is: while the world is 'out there', descriptions of the world are not. Saying that the world is governed by laws of physics is to describe the world, and the world does not contain descriptions.

This was Rorty's formulation, but I think he missed something. Calling the world, "the world", is already to (minimally) describe it. There's no way around minimal descriptions of anything if you want to talk about them.

It would seem the laws of physics are not part of nature, strictly speaking, but an effort at description. No law of nature can be 'found'; because laws aren't empirically knowable [Hume understood this perfectly well]. Positing laws of nature will always be an inference from experience.

With respect to the riddles of induction: Nelson Goodman took a crack at it in the mid-20th century, and came up with a 'new' riddle of induction. It seems some predicates give us confidence that their presence in all observed objects will continue to be a feature of those objects when new ones are discovered, while other predicates do not:

'Suppose that all emeralds examined before a certain time t are green. At time t, then, our observations support the hypothesis that all emeralds are green; and this is in accord with our definition of confirmation. Our evidence statements assert that emerald a is green, that emerald b is green, and so on; and each confirms the general hypothesis that all emeralds are green. So far, so good.

Now let me introduce another predicate less familiar than 'green'. It is the predicate 'grue' and it applies to all things examined before t just in case they are green but to other things just in case they are blue. Then at time t we have, for each evidence statement asserting that a given emerald is green, a parallel evidence statement asserting that that emerald is grue. And the statements that emerald a is grue, that emerald b is grue, and so on, will each confirm the general hypothesis that all emeralds are grue. Thus according to our definition, the prediction that all emeralds subsequently examined will be green and the prediction that all will be grue are alike confirmed by evidence statements describing the same observations. But if an emerald subsequently examined is grue, it is blue and hence not green. Thus although we are well aware which of the two incompatible predictions is genuinely confirmed according to our present definition. Moreover, it is clear that if we simply choose an appropriate predicate, then on the basis of these same observations we shall have equal confirmation, by our definition, for any prediction whatever about other emeralds - or indeed anything else.'

[vanlose kid]

...

from the vk post above:

when he says Hume's conclusion is counterintuitive, he means that it cannot be right, i.e. "this is not how we usually think of these things".

but in his reply one can see, if one has understood the problem, that his objection against the "counterintuitive" is merely a restatement of Hume's "psychological" explanation of our reliance on causal inference, only couched in more "scientific" terms. – "the laws of nature express objective causal connections" is not a statement of fact. but a rule. or as Hume says: a belief. it cashes out frequently, yes. but things could well turn out otherwise. it does not necessarily do so. nothing in nature is necessary. nature is contingent. – and i say this recognizing that it is nonsense. it cannot be said. the problem is akin to that raised by Gödel: "Any effectively generated theory capable of expressing elementary arithmetic cannot be both consistent and complete. In particular, for any consistent, effectively generated formal theory that proves certain basic arithmetic truths, there is an arithmetical statement that is true,[1] but not provable in the theory (Kleene 1967, p. 250)."

to take the "laws" of nature as objective statements about nature as seen from "above" or "outside" is to somehow claim that doing so is possible.

to say that it belongs within the descriptive account of nature as part of nature is to render it unprovable within the system. – so it is either a rule of description: a bit of grammar, or it is nonsense.



this shows us the limits of rationality, of thought. it is actually fairly trivial in that we can't think outside thought. thought is bounded by nonsense. – but are we bounded by thought? remember, the laws of nature do not dictate how things go. to think that they do leads to the idea that everything can be mapped out in a system with which everything can be made to conform.

imagine a theory of psychology or politics based on that. or don't, just think of behaviorism or stalinism. – food for thought.

*

he doesn't mean: that it cannot be right; he means: "this is not how we usually think of these things"..

[i can't see the disagreement here unless you have a different private definition of "counterintuitive": "The word "counterintuitive" literally means counter to intuition, and so it essentially means that something does not seem right or correct. A counterintuitive proposition is one that does not seem likely to be true when assessed using intuition or gut feelings.[1] Scientifically discovered, objective truths are often called counterintuitive when intuition, emotions, and other cognitive processes outside of deductive rationality interpret them to be wrong."

– so what the author is saying re Hume's conclusion that "the metaphysical problem for induction is insoluble; that there is no objective difference between reliable and unreliable inductions" is that he thinks, pace Hume, that the conclusion is counterintuitive, i.e. that it seems wrong, that it feels wrong, that it goes against the way we are thought to think of these things, i.e. that there must be an objective difference between reliable and unreliable deductions that is to be found in the deductions themselves. – is that clear?]


...However, clearly, from the example quoted, Hume believes
one cannot comprehend (grasp) the natural world through reason alone. QED.
He goes to rather convoluted lengths to demonstrate that but, hey, that's philosophy.(redundant)

[flip.]

It's actually both: it's a rule of description, & it's nonsense; because, you can't objectively
be outside the system you're inside, simultaneously. Capisce?

[which is a somewhat muddled recap of the post you replied to. what the point of the recap is, however, i have no idea. an attempt to show me up or something?]

There is, however, bi-locality,
but not within a rational system; i.e., if you experienced it, your rational self would deny it.

[there may well be bi-locality, it would still be local, would still be bounded to two loci at one/two times, or if n-locality then n-loci at n-time(s). which is beside the point. you see, the point made about the common view of natural laws was that they are taken to be descriptions of nature, the world, cosmos, the universe, everything, [in no locale] at no time from no point of view, i.e. "objective", "universal", sub specie aeterni. i.e. "the view from non-locality". – capisce?]

We're not bounded by thought as defined by words/language.
There is awareness not accompanied by words; i.e., there is knowledge without language...

[again, there may be, there is, whatever. i wasn't talking about thought as defined by words and language (whatever the heck that means). i was saying thought, much like the universe, is bounded, and not by anything. that there is no such thing as "non-thinking thinking".]


...

*

[vanlose kid]

so much to reply to here, but for the moment:

to take the "laws" of nature as objective statements about nature as seen from "above" or "outside" is to somehow claim that doing so is possible.

to say that it belongs within the descriptive account of nature as part of nature is to render it unprovable within the system. – so it is either a rule of description: a bit of grammar, or it is nonsense.

A short way of saying what I think you are claiming here, vk, is: while the world is 'out there', descriptions of the world are not. Saying that the world is governed by laws of physics is to describe the world, and the world does not contain descriptions.

This was Rorty's formulation, but I think he missed something. Calling the world, "the world", is already to (minimally) describe it. There's no way around minimal descriptions of anything if you want to talk about them.

It would seem the laws of physics are not part of nature, strictly speaking, but an effort at description. No law of nature can be 'found'; because laws aren't empirically knowable [Hume understood this perfectly well]. Positing laws of nature will always be an inference from experience.

...'

was wondering when goodman would show up.

apart from that, yeah, but again the point to be made is that we usually normally all of us the hoi polloi whatever [are taught to] take science [as] the final arbiter in all things. and we can't. or at least we can't justify it without the threat of circularity which [raises] another problem re defining knowledge (big K) as justified true belief.

what justifies me in the belief that i have two hands?

the fact that the earth goes round the sun?
that there is an oak in my garden?
that my name is NN?
that "a rose is a rose is a rose"?
that 2 + 2 = 4?

and what justifies the latter beliefs?

*

[Joe Hillshoist]

I don't need science to make me believe in gravity.

I've experienced it all my life.

Science does explain how it happens tho, in a way that's potentially very useful.

It is interesting that for most practical purposes the best description of Gravity is Newton's, which is not the most "scientifically accurate". Tho it is, for most humans most of the time, the most useful.