Top Secret America

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Re: Top Secret America

Postby cptmarginal » Sun Dec 30, 2012 11:50 pm

From Cypherpunks, the recent book by Julian Assange et al:

Utopia to me would be a dystopia if there was just one. I think Utopian ideals must mean the diversity of systems and models of interaction. If you look at the churning development of new cultural products and even language drift, and sub-cultures forming their own mechanisms of interaction potentiated by the internet, then yes I can see that that does open this possible positive path.

But I think in all probability tendencies to homogenization, universality, the whole of human civilization being turned into one market, mean you will have normal market factors such as one market leader, one second, a third niche player, and then stragglers that don’t make any difference at all, for every service and product. I think it will perhaps mean massive language homogenization, massive cultural homogenization, massive standardization in order to make these rapid interchanges efficient. So I think the pessimistic scenario is also quite probable, and the transnational surveillance state and endless drone wars are almost upon us.

Actually I’m reminded of a time when I smuggled myself into Sydney Opera House to see Faust. Sydney Opera House is very beautiful at night, its grand interiors and lights beaming out over the water and into the night sky. Afterwards I came out and I heard three women talking together, leaning on the railing overlooking the darkened bay. The older woman was describing how she was having problems with her job, which turned out to be working for the CIA as an intelligence agent, and she had previously complained to the Senate Select Committee for Intelligence and so on, and she was telling this in hushed tones to her niece and another woman. I thought, “So it is true then. CIA agents really do hang out at the Sydney opera!” And then I looked inside the Opera House through the massive glass panels at the front, and there in all this lonely palatial refinement was a water rat that had crawled up in to the Opera House interior, and was scurrying back and forth, leaping on to the fine linen-covered tables and eating the Opera House food, jumping on to the counter with all the tickets and having a really great time. And actually I think that is the most probable scenario for the future: an extremely confining, homogenized, postmodern transnational totalitarian structure with incredible complexity, absurdities and debasements, and within that incredible complexity a space where only the smart rats can go.

That’s a positive angle on the negative trajectory, the negative trajectory being a transnational surveillance state, drone-riddled, the networked neo-feudalism of the transnational elite—not in a classical sense, but a complex multi-party interaction that has come about as a result of various elites in their own national countries lifting up together, off their respective population bases, and merging. All communications will be surveilled, permanently recorded, permanently tracked, each individual in all their interactions permanently identified as that individual to this new Establishment, from birth to death. That’s a major shift from even ten years ago and we’re already practically there. I think that can only produce a very controlling atmosphere. If all the collected information about the world was public that might rebalance the power dynamic and let us, as a global civilization, shape our destiny. But without dramatic change it will not. Mass surveillance applies disproportionately to most of us, transferring power to those in on the scheme who nonetheless, I think, will not enjoy this brave new world much either. This system will also coincide with a drones arms race that will eliminate clearly defined borders as we know them, since such borders are produced by the contestation of physical lines, resulting in a state of perpetual war as the winning influence-networks start to shake down the world for concessions. And alongside this people are going to just be buried under the impossible math of bureaucracy.

How can a normal person be free within that system? They simply cannot, it’s impossible. Not that anyone can ever be completely free, within any system, but the freedoms that we have biologically evolved for, and the freedoms that we have become culturally accustomed to, will be almost entirely eliminated. So I think the only people who will be able to keep the freedom that we had, say, twenty years ago—because the surveillance state has already eliminated quite a lot of that, we just don’t realize it yet— are those who are highly educated in the internals of this system. So it will only be a high-tech rebel elite that is free, these clever rats running around the opera house.
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Re: Top Secret America

Postby justdrew » Mon Dec 31, 2012 12:11 am

We must be as stealthy as rats in the wainscoting of their society. It was easier in the old days, of course, and society had more rats when the rules were looser, just as old wooden buildings have more rats than concrete buildings. But there are rats in the building now as well. Now that society is all ferrocrete and stainless steel there are fewer gaps in the joints. It takes a very smart rat indeed to find these openings. Only a stainless steel rat can be at home in this environment.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_Stainless_Steel_Rat



These words are taken almost exactly from a conversation between Harry Harrison and author Katherine MacLean.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Katherine_MacLean

"Feedback" (1951). A sociological setback occurs when conformity becomes a closed circle, prompting even more conformity; a teacher who speaks in favor of individuality is regarded as subversive. Originally in Astounding Science Fiction (July, 1951).

"Syndrome Johnny" (1951). Published before it was even certain that DNA carried genetic information, this story is about a series of engineered retroviral plagues, initially propagated by blood transfusion, that are genetically re-engineering the human race. First published in Galaxy Science Fiction (July, 1951).
By 1964 there were 1.5 million mobile phone users in the US
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Lockheed, Orbital Sciences Corp, SpaceX | Top Secret America

Postby Allegro » Mon Jan 07, 2013 12:59 am

Highlights mine. Links in original.

_________________
Lockheed-Boeing Launch Monopoly to Be Ended by Pentagon
Bloomberg, Brendan McGarry & Tony Capaccio | 04DEC12

    The U.S. Defense Department plans to open more than a dozen rocket launches to competition, moving to end a monopoly held by a Lockheed Martin Corp.-Boeing (BA) Co. joint venture.

    The Air Force is authorized to buy as many as 14 booster cores over the next five years from potential challengers such as Space Exploration Technologies Corp., known as SpaceX and headed by billionaire Elon Musk, and Orbital Sciences Corp., Frank Kendall, the Pentagon’s top weapons buyer, wrote in a Nov. 27 memo obtained by Bloomberg News. A booster core is the main component of a rocket.

    The service may also buy as many as 36 cores from the Lockheed-Boeing venture over the same period, with an option to purchase the additional 14 from it, if competitors aren’t ready, Kendall wrote. The venture, United Launch Alliance LLC, is the sole supplier of medium- and heavy-lift rockets for military and spy satellites in a program estimated to cost $70 billion through 2030.

    “I direct the Air Force to aggressively introduce a competitive procurement environment,” Kendall wrote.

    The contracts for newcomers may be awarded as early as fiscal 2015 for missions that can be flown as early as fiscal 2017, Kendall wrote. The missions could still go to the alliance, though, “if competition is not viable at time of need,” he wrote.

    Cost Increases

    The Pentagon is trying to control rising launch costs. It estimates the program, known as Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle, will cost $69.6 billion for 150 launches through fiscal 2030. The government’s fiscal year begins Oct. 1.

    The average launch cost, including research and development, has more than doubled to $464 million from a previous figure of $230 million, according to the Pentagon.

    Driving the increases are “unstable demand for launch services, turbulence in the international civil-commercial launch market and its associated supply base, and a business relationship with the supplier that has not been conducive to controlling costs,” Kendall wrote in a July 12 letter to congressional defense committees.

    Also a factor was last year’s retirement of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration’s shuttle fleet, which forced engine suppliers to spread reduced demand over large fixed costs.

    ‘Good Step’

    The joint venture between the government’s two largest contractors -- Bethesda, Maryland-based Lockheed and Chicago- based Boeing -- was created in 2006 to provide reliable and affordable launch services.

    Jessica Rye, a spokeswoman for Centennial, Colorado-based United Launch Alliance, didn’t immediately return a phone call and e-mail seeking comment.

    “This appears to be a good step as there has been uncertainty about opportunities for competition,” Cristina Chaplain, a Government Accountability Office official who follows military space programs, said in an e-mailed statement. “We will be assessing the implementation of the directive.”

    Musk, chief executive officer of Hawthorne, California- based SpaceX, welcomed the Pentagon’s decision.

    “This is a watershed moment for the US Government’s national security missions,” he said in a statement. “The United States Air Force should be commended for opening launches to new entrants and restoring competition to the EELV program.”


    Resupply Missions

    SpaceX in October completed its first of at least a dozen planned resupply missions to the International Space Station under a $1.6 billion contract with NASA. The company lists its Falcon 9 rocket for $54 million per liftoff.

    Orbital (ORB), based in Dulles, Virginia, has a similar contract with NASA valued at $1.9 billion for at least eight cargo missions to the station. The company plans to offer its new Antares (ANT) rocket for less than $100 million per launch. The rocket is scheduled to make its first flight this month or next.

    Barron Beneski, a spokesman for Orbital, didn’t immediately respond to a phone call and e-mail requesting comment.

    Separately, SpaceX, Orbital and Lockheed yesterday won seats on a $900 million contract with the Air Force to launch smaller satellites. The deal is part of an effort by the service to set aside at least two missions to certify that the smaller companies are capable of carrying larger national-security payloads.
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PBS Frontline | Top Secret America

Postby Allegro » Mon Jan 07, 2013 12:59 am


I’ve found the PBS Frontline Top Secret America
documentary in four parts on YouTube.


^ Top Secret America | Part 1


^ Top Secret America | Part 2


^ Top Secret America | Part 3


^ Top Secret America | Part 4 of 4

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Art will be the last bastion when all else fades away.
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Re: Top Secret America

Postby cptmarginal » Mon Jan 07, 2013 8:04 pm

It's also available for free on the PBS Video website. I watched it using the excellent PBS plugin for XBMC, if anyone else here uses that program.

http://video.pbs.org/video/2117159594/

Disappointing show; it's no wonder they delayed its airing. It's defanged - and the original articles/book weren't even that harsh or threatening in the first place. They only get into the really interesting stuff towards the end, and then only briefly.
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Re: Top Secret America

Postby hanshan » Thu Mar 14, 2013 6:00 pm

...

http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2013/03/govt-wont-even-give-page-counts-of-secret-patriot-act-documents/

Gov’t won’t even give page counts of secret PATRIOT Act documents
At a hearing today, a judge insisted the documents must be described.


by Joe Mullin - Mar 12 2013, 7:35pm MDT

OAKLAND, California—Lawsuits challenging government secrecy have fared pretty terribly in the post-9/11 era, with the most recent example being the Supreme Court's ruling last month that a group of journalists and activists have no right to sue over the FISA spying law.

Only a few cases of this sort are left, including two Bay Area lawsuits being pushed forward by the Electronic Frontier Foundation. One is the San Francisco case over NSA wiretapping, which the government is trying to shut down using the "state secrets" privilege. The other is EFF's case demanding to see documents about how the government is interpreting Section 215 of the PATRIOT Act.

It isn't just activists that are concerned, either. In 2009, Sen. Dick Durbin (D-IL) said the government's use of "Section 215 is unfortunately cloaked in secrecy. Some day that cloak will be lifted, and future generations will ask whether our actions today meet the test of a democratic society." In 2011, two US Senators, Ron Wyden (D-OR) and Mark Udall (D-CO), publicly voiced their concerns, too, suggesting the government had a pretty wild interpretation of what it was allowed to do under the PATRIOT Act. "When the American people find out how their government has secretly interpreted the Patriot Act, they will be stunned and they will be angry,” Wyden told The New York Times.

It isn't known what kind of investigation those records would reveal, but there is some speculation that the Section 215 records are related to cell phone geolocation data. EFF's lawyer in charge of the case says if that is true, such data is probably being gathered on a "massive" scale.

Later that year, EFF filed a lawsuit [Complaint, PDF] insisting that some of those documents should be publicly disclosed. The government had stonewalled EFF's Freedom of Information Act request, so now the group wanted a federal judge to enforce its request.

Department of Justice lawyers said the FOIA couldn't be complied with, because it would reveal classified information about a "sensitive collection program."

The “list itself is classified”

In January, the government filed a declaration [PDF] signed by Mark Bradley, the FOIA director of DOJ's National Security Division, explaining what records would be responsive to EFF's request. The descriptions of the documents are extremely basic. For instance, Bradley explains that there are 200 relevant documents dated from May 2006 to Sept. 2011 that were provided to a key House intelligence committee, and that they total 799 pages. It goes on in that fashion.

At today's hearing in Oakland federal court, US District Judge Yvonne Gonzalez Rogers suggested that the document wasn't going to be sufficient.

"Why can't I have a basic categorization of what the documents are?" asked Gonzalez Rogers.

"That list itself is classified," responded Steven Bressler, the DOJ attorney present for the hearing.

"Are you suggesting the number of pages of each document is classified?" asked the judge. "What's been provided is: '200 documents consisting of 799 pages.' That doesn't tell me anything. It doesn't tell the public anything. It was never explained to me how something as basic as a list with page numbers could, in any way, shape, or form, be contrary to the interests of the government."

"Mr. Bradley has sworn, under penalty of perjury, that to say more would tend to reveal classified information," said Bressler. "A wealth of information is available for in camera review." Information like page numbers and timing of documents "may be put together by targets of investigation, or adversaries of the United States," he said.

"What the defendant [DOJ] is doing isn't a national security concern," said Mark Rumold, the EFF lawyer arguing to release the documents. "It's a litigation tactic, used since the beginning of FOIA, to make it impossible for FOIA to challenge the government. The defendant can't even describe why they can't describe the records in more detail."

It's an extremely incremental step, but Gonzalez Rogers seemed to side with EFF today. She said she was inclined to issue an order that would ask for more detail about the documents.

"What I have here is, 'We sent them 200 documents.' That's not good enough," she said.



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Re: Top Secret America

Postby hanshan » Thu Mar 14, 2013 6:01 pm

...

http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2013/03/govt-wont-even-give-page-counts-of-secret-patriot-act-documents/

Gov’t won’t even give page counts of secret PATRIOT Act documents
At a hearing today, a judge insisted the documents must be described.


by Joe Mullin - Mar 12 2013, 7:35pm MDT

OAKLAND, California—Lawsuits challenging government secrecy have fared pretty terribly in the post-9/11 era, with the most recent example being the Supreme Court's ruling last month that a group of journalists and activists have no right to sue over the FISA spying law.

Only a few cases of this sort are left, including two Bay Area lawsuits being pushed forward by the Electronic Frontier Foundation. One is the San Francisco case over NSA wiretapping, which the government is trying to shut down using the "state secrets" privilege. The other is EFF's case demanding to see documents about how the government is interpreting Section 215 of the PATRIOT Act.

It isn't just activists that are concerned, either. In 2009, Sen. Dick Durbin (D-IL) said the government's use of "Section 215 is unfortunately cloaked in secrecy. Some day that cloak will be lifted, and future generations will ask whether our actions today meet the test of a democratic society." In 2011, two US Senators, Ron Wyden (D-OR) and Mark Udall (D-CO), publicly voiced their concerns, too, suggesting the government had a pretty wild interpretation of what it was allowed to do under the PATRIOT Act. "When the American people find out how their government has secretly interpreted the Patriot Act, they will be stunned and they will be angry,” Wyden told The New York Times.

It isn't known what kind of investigation those records would reveal, but there is some speculation that the Section 215 records are related to cell phone geolocation data. EFF's lawyer in charge of the case says if that is true, such data is probably being gathered on a "massive" scale.

Later that year, EFF filed a lawsuit [Complaint, PDF] insisting that some of those documents should be publicly disclosed. The government had stonewalled EFF's Freedom of Information Act request, so now the group wanted a federal judge to enforce its request.

Department of Justice lawyers said the FOIA couldn't be complied with, because it would reveal classified information about a "sensitive collection program."

The “list itself is classified”

In January, the government filed a declaration [PDF] signed by Mark Bradley, the FOIA director of DOJ's National Security Division, explaining what records would be responsive to EFF's request. The descriptions of the documents are extremely basic. For instance, Bradley explains that there are 200 relevant documents dated from May 2006 to Sept. 2011 that were provided to a key House intelligence committee, and that they total 799 pages. It goes on in that fashion.

At today's hearing in Oakland federal court, US District Judge Yvonne Gonzalez Rogers suggested that the document wasn't going to be sufficient.

"Why can't I have a basic categorization of what the documents are?" asked Gonzalez Rogers.

"That list itself is classified," responded Steven Bressler, the DOJ attorney present for the hearing.

"Are you suggesting the number of pages of each document is classified?" asked the judge. "What's been provided is: '200 documents consisting of 799 pages.' That doesn't tell me anything. It doesn't tell the public anything. It was never explained to me how something as basic as a list with page numbers could, in any way, shape, or form, be contrary to the interests of the government."

"Mr. Bradley has sworn, under penalty of perjury, that to say more would tend to reveal classified information," said Bressler. "A wealth of information is available for in camera review." Information like page numbers and timing of documents "may be put together by targets of investigation, or adversaries of the United States," he said.

"What the defendant [DOJ] is doing isn't a national security concern," said Mark Rumold, the EFF lawyer arguing to release the documents. "It's a litigation tactic, used since the beginning of FOIA, to make it impossible for FOIA to challenge the government. The defendant can't even describe why they can't describe the records in more detail."

It's an extremely incremental step, but Gonzalez Rogers seemed to side with EFF today. She said she was inclined to issue an order that would ask for more detail about the documents.

"What I have here is, 'We sent them 200 documents.' That's not good enough," she said.



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Re: Top Secret America

Postby JackRiddler » Tue Mar 19, 2013 2:30 am

RELATED THREADS

Very interesting 2001 interview with Deborah Davis, author of WashPo expose Catherine the Great, posted by HMW some time ago:
viewtopic.php?f=33&t=17859

The Militarization of the Police - Steve Martinot, posted by WR:
viewtopic.php?f=8&t=34301
Absolute must reading.

Sibel Edmonds talks about Gladio B
viewtopic.php?f=8&t=36091
Still haven't listened to this radio series but looks very intriguing: "Gladio B is defined as a NATO-directed effort to radicalize, enable and protect Islamic terrorists to further their own geopolitical ends."

Court Docs Reveal Blackwater’s Secret CIA Past, posted by SLAD
viewtopic.php?f=8&t=36169

Ah, what the hell, let's throw that one in here:

Exclusive: Court Docs Reveal Blackwater’s Secret CIA Past
by Eli Lake Mar 14, 2013 4:45 AM EDT
It was the U.S. military’s most notorious security contractor—but it may also have been a virtual extension of the CIA. Eli Lake reports.

Last month a three-year-long federal prosecution of Blackwater collapsed. The government’s 15-felony indictment—on such charges as conspiring to hide purchases of automatic rifles and other weapons from the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives—could have led to years of jail time for Blackwater personnel. In the end, however, the government got only misdemeanor guilty pleas by two former executives, each of whom were sentenced to four months of house arrest, three years’ probation, and a fine of $5,000. Prosecutors dropped charges against three other executives named in the suit and abandoned the felony charges altogether.


via office of the King of Jordan

But the most noteworthy thing about the largely failed prosecution wasn’t the outcome. It was the tens of thousands of pages of documents—some declassified—that the litigation left in its wake. These documents illuminate Blackwater’s defense strategy—and it’s a fascinating one: to defeat the charges it was facing, Blackwater built a case not only that it worked with the CIA—which was already widely known—but that it was in many ways an extension of the agency itself.

Founded in 1997 by Erik Prince, heir to an auto-parts family fortune, Blackwater had proved especially useful to the CIA in the early 2000s. “You have to remember where the CIA was after 9/11,” says retired Congressman Pete Hoekstra, who served as the Republican chairman of the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence from 2004 to 2006 and later as the ranking member of the committee. “They were gutted in the 1990s. They were sending raw recruits into Afghanistan and other dangerous places. They were looking for skills and capabilities, and they had to go to outside contractors like Blackwater to make sure they could accomplish their mission.”

But according to the documents Blackwater submitted in its defense—as well as an email exchange I had recently with Prince—the contractor’s relationship with the CIA was far deeper than most observers thought. “Blackwater’s work with the CIA began when we provided specialized instructors and facilities that the Agency lacked,” Prince told me recently, in response to written questions. “In the years that followed, the company became a virtual extension of the CIA because we were asked time and again to carry out dangerous missions, which the Agency either could not or would not do in-house.”

A prime example of the close relationship appears to have unfolded on March 19, 2005. On that day, Prince and senior CIA officers joined King Abdullah of Jordan and his brothers on a trip to Blackwater headquarters in Moyock, North Carolina, according to lawyers for the company and former Blackwater officials. After traveling by private jet from Washington to the compound, Abdullah (a former Jordanian special-forces officer) and Prince (a former Navy SEAL) participated in a simulated ambush, drove vehicles on a high-speed racetrack, and raided one of the compound’s “shoot houses,” a specially built facility used to train warriors in close-quarters combat with live ammo, Prince recalls.

At the end of the day, company executives presented the king with two gifts: a modified Bushmaster AR-15 rifle and a Remington shotgun, both engraved with the Blackwater logo. They also presented three Blackwater-engraved Glock pistols to Abdullah’s brothers. According to Prince, the CIA asked Blackwater to give the guns to Abdullah “when people at the agency had forgotten to get gifts for him.”

Three years later, the ATF raided the Moyock compound. In itself, this wasn’t unusual; the ATF had been conducting routine inspections of the place since 2005, when Blackwater informed the government that two of its employees had stolen guns and sold them on the black market. Typically, agents would show up in street clothes, recalled Prince. “They knew our people and our processes.”

But the 2008 visit, according to Prince, was different. “ATF agents had guns drawn and wore tactical jackets festooned with the initials ATF. It was a cartoonish show of force,” he said. (Earl Woodham, a spokesman for the Charlotte field division of the ATF, disputes this characterization. “This was the execution of a federal search warrant that requires they be identified with the federal agency,” he says. “They had their firearms covered to execute a federal search warrant. To characterize this as anything other than a low-key execution of a federal search warrant is inaccurate.”)

During the raid, the ATF seized 17 Romanian AK-47s and 17 Bushmaster AR-13 rifles the bureau claimed were purchased illegally through the sheriff’s office in Camden County, North Carolina. It also alleged that Blackwater illegally shortened the barrels of rifles and then exported them to other countries in violation of federal gun laws. Meanwhile, in the process of trying to account for Blackwater’s guns, the ATF discovered that the rifles and pistols presented in 2005 to King Abdullah and his brothers were registered to Blackwater employees. Prosecutors would subsequently allege that Gary Jackson—the former president of Blackwater and one of the two people who would eventually plead guilty to a misdemeanor—had instructed employees to falsely claim on ATF forms that the guns were their own personal property and not in the possession of Jordanian royalty.

In all of these instances—the purchase of the rifles through the Camden County sheriff, the shipment of the guns to other countries, and the gifts to Abdullah—Blackwater argued that it was acting on behalf of the U.S. government and the CIA. All of these arguments, obviously, were very much in Blackwater’s legal interest. That said, it provided the court with classified emails, memoranda, contracts, and photos. It also obtained sealed depositions from top CIA executives from the Directorate of Operations, testifying that Blackwater provided training and weapons for agency operations. (A CIA spokesman declined to comment for this story.)

One document submitted by the defense names Jose Rodriguez, the former CIA chief of the Directorate of Operations, and Buzzy Krongard, the agency’s former executive director, as among those CIA officers who had direct knowledge of Blackwater’s activities, in a section that is still partially redacted. This document is the closest Blackwater has come to acknowledging that Prince himself was a CIA asset, something first reported in 2010 by Vanity Fair. One of the names on the list of CIA officers with knowledge of Blackwater’s work in the document is “Erik P”—with the remaining letters whited out.

This document made Blackwater’s defense clear: “the CIA routinely used Blackwater in missions throughout the world,” it said. “These efforts were made under written and unwritten contracts and through informal requests. On many occasions the CIA paid Blackwater nothing for its assistance. Blackwater also employed CIA officers and agents, and provided cover to CIA agents and officers operating in covert and clandestine assignments. In many respects, Blackwater, or at least portions of Blackwater, was an extension of the CIA.”

When I asked Prince why Blackwater would often work for free, he responded, “I agreed to provide some services gratis because, in the wake of 9/11, I felt it my patriotic duty. I knew that I had the tools and resources to help my country.”

Moreover, according to still-sealed testimony described to The Daily Beast, the agency had its own secure telephone line and a facility for handling classified information within Blackwater’s North Carolina headquarters. CIA officers trained there and used an area—fully shielded from view inside the rest of the Blackwater compound by 20-foot berms—to coordinate operations.


Sara D. Davis/AP

In the wake of the major charges being dropped, the U.S. attorney who prosecuted the case against Blackwater, Thomas Walker, told me that it would be wrong to dismiss the prosecution as a waste of time. “The company looks completely different now than before the investigation,” he said. “For example, in 2009, Erik Prince was the sole owner. This company now has a governing board that is accountable.”

In 2010 Prince sold Blackwater, which is now known as Academi, for an estimated $200 million. Prince retains control of numerous companies affiliated with Academi, but he told me that he had “ceased providing any services” to the U.S. government.

Walker would not discuss Blackwater’s relationship with the CIA. But he did say the defense that the company was acting for the government did not excuse any violations of federal law. “Our evidence showed there was a mentality at the company that they considered themselves above the law,” Walker said. “That is a slippery slope. There came a time when there had to be accountability at Blackwater.”

David Boies, the lawyer who represented Al Gore in Bush v. Gore, took up Gary Jackson’s case last fall. Boies told me he did so because he saw the prosecution as an abuse of power. “These people were functioning really as an arm of the CIA at a time when the CIA’s resources were strained,” he said. “I think that Erik Prince and Mr. Jackson and other people at Blackwater thought they were being patriots.”

Reflecting on the prosecution and the scrutiny of the company he founded, Prince said the charges against Blackwater executives left him “perplexed and angry.” “Blackwater carried out countless life-threatening missions for the CIA,” he said. “And, in return, the government chose to prosecute my people for doing exactly what was asked of them.”
We meet at the borders of our being, we dream something of each others reality. - Harvey of R.I.

To Justice my maker from on high did incline:
I am by virtue of its might divine,
The highest Wisdom and the first Love.

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SpaceX lands first US military launch contracts

Postby Allegro » Sun Apr 07, 2013 11:43 pm

If you wish, see this Bloomberg article dated December 4, 2012, which, as the article below, directs attention to SpaceX’s contracts with U.S. military.

This copy is for your personal, non-commercial use only. Highlights mine.

_________________
SpaceX lands first US military launch contracts
Private company gets Air Force backing for space trips in 2014 and 2015
NBCNEWS.com, Irene Klotz | updated 12/5/2012 8:07:16 PM ET

    Startup rocket company Space Exploration Technologies, which flies NASA cargo to the International Space Station, has landed its first launch contracts for the U.S. military, the company said on Wednesday.

    The U.S. Air Force will pay $97 million for a Falcon 9 rocket to launch in 2014 the Deep Space Climate Observatory, a solar telescope that will be operated by NASA. It will also pay $165 million for a Falcon Heavy rocket for the military’s Space Test Program-2 satellite, which is expected to fly in 2015.

    Both spacecraft will be launched from Space Exploration Technologies’ Cape Canaveral, Florida, site.

    The company, also known as SpaceX, has been pursuing U.S. military launch business for years, hoping to break the monopoly held by United Launch Alliance, a partnership of Boeing and Lockheed Martin.

    "SpaceX deeply appreciates and is honored by the vote of confidence shown by the Air Force in our Falcon launch vehicles," SpaceX founder and chief executive Elon Musk said in a statement.

    In addition to a 12-flight, $1.6 billion space station cargo delivery contract with NASA, SpaceX has a backlog of about 20 commercial and non-U.S. government satellites and payloads to fly on its Falcon family of rockets over the next five years.

    The privately owned company plans to begin using a second launch site at Vandenberg Air Force Base in California in 2013.

    SpaceX also is one of three companies hired by NASA to design a spaceship that can fly astronauts to the station, a $100 billion research laboratory that flies about 250 miles above Earth.

    SpaceX’s Air Force contracts are part of a four-year, $900 million program that also includes Orbital Sciences Corp and Lockheed Martin, which is offering a new Athena rocket outside the United Launch Alliance partnership.

    (Editing by Kevin Gray and Mohammad Zargham)
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Re: Top Secret America

Postby semper occultus » Tue Apr 30, 2013 6:41 pm

'The Way Of The Knife': Soldiers, Spies And Shadow Wars

April 10, 201311:07 AM

The CIA has morphed from a traditional espionage service concerned with stealing the secrets of foreign governments into an organization consumed with hunting down its enemies. New York Times journalist Mark Mazzetti chronicles this transformation in a new book, The Way of the Knife.

http://www.npr.org/2013/04/10/176778712/the-way-of-the-knife-soldiers-spies-and-shadow-wars


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TERRY GROSS, HOST:
This is FRESH AIR. I'm Terry Gross. The CIA and the military have been transformed in ways that have blurred the boundaries between them. The shape of the new military intelligence complex is the subject of my guest Mark Mazzetti's new book, "The Way of the Knife." He writes: The CIA is no longer a traditional espionage service, devoted to stealing the secrets of foreign governments. The CIA has become a killing machine, an organization consumed with man-hunting.
Meanwhile, the American military has commando teams running spying missions that Washington would never have dreamed of before 9/11. These changes are connected to the shadow wars America is fighting, pursuing its enemies with drones and special operations troops.
Mazzetti's new book examines the successes and consequences of this new way of war. Mazzetti is a Pulitzer Prize-winning national security correspondent for the New York Times.
Mark Mazzetti, welcome back to FRESH AIR. So one of the basic premises of your book is that the CIA has become more like the military, and the military has become more like the CIA. Give us an example.
MARK MAZZETTI: Well, one of the things I talked about is how right after the September 11th attacks, the CIA was given this lethal authority by President Bush to go out and hunt al-Qaida operatives, capture or kill them. This was something that the CIA hadn't had for quite some time.
I spend a lot of time in the book talking about how, for several decades, the CIA had gotten out of the killing business. After the revelations of the Church Committee of the 1970s that talked about attempts to kill Castro and other world leaders, a whole generation of CIA officers came through the ranks thinking that the real mission they should be doing is espionage, not hunting and killing.
In the years since they got this lethal authority, they've been doing a whole lot of man-hunting and killing. So it really has changed the agency, in many ways, into this paramilitary organization, less a sort of classic espionage service. On the other hand, the Pentagon has, as I said, become more like the CIA, because from the early days after 9/11, the Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld was furious that soldiers couldn't go into countries where he thought al-Qaida was operating, because there were restrictions about where soldiers could go. They couldn't go beyond declared war zones, so it was hard for them to get in and do spying.
And so a lot of those authorities were expanded under - during those years, and so you have soldiers going into what I call the dark corners of the world that are not traditional places where soldiers go, and they're doing sort of espionage missions. So there's been this sort of convergence in the mission.
GROSS: You write that this new military intelligence complex has short-circuited the normal mechanisms for how we go to war. How so?
MAZZETTI: Well, one of the things I write early on is after 9/11, the CIA was given this mission to basically run this secret war. And in contrast to the military, where you have layers and layers of bureaucracy and four-star generals and large staffs briefing all different levels about their war plans, you have the CIA, which is a small organization, a very small group of people in charge of running a war.
Now, the CIA points out that this gives it greater flexibility to take on an organization like al-Qaida, but at the same time, you have a different chain of command. You have the head of the counterterrorism at the CIA working with the CIA director, going right to the White House, going to Bush and Cheney and then later to President Obama, being able to sort of craft a war plan in secret.
And not that the Pentagon isn't secret, but you have the entire structure for how the U.S. goes to war in fewer hands and briefed to small members - select members of Congress in closed-door hearings. Very little is discussed with the public. So the public doesn't have as much understanding about how war is conducted, because it's all done in secrecy.
GROSS: Do you think that the CIA's expanded role in hunting down terrorists and assassinating them is coming at the price of the CIA getting intelligence? Are we missing intelligence?
MAZZETTI: It's always hard to prove what they're not doing, because - and I should point out that I don't want to make the case, and I don't make the case in the book that, you know, the CIA doesn't do traditional espionage. There are CIA stations in China. There are CIA stations in Russia doing this. But really, because the White House has wanted the CIA's focus to be man-hunting and killing, that has been its focus.
And one example I point out is when the Arab Spring really started blowing up in early 2011, there was a lot of concern at the White House that the CIA was just missing each revolution as it happened - not that they should have predicted the spark of the revolution in Tunisia, but as it cascaded through Egypt and Libya, they were behind the curve.
And there is one reason for that, because when you do man-hunting, you are necessarily going to become very tight with foreign spy services who know their turf. So, for instance, the CIA became very close with the Egyptian intelligence service, the Libyan intelligence service, and - in order to hunt down operatives in those countries.
But at the same time, those spy services are not going to be the ones that are going to be the most honest about ferment in the streets of those countries. So if there's opposition growing in Egypt or opposition growing in Tunisia, the CIA's not going to get it from these foreign spy services. They need to get it from the ground. They need to get it from talking to opposition groups.
And that's one of the things that has been lost, I think, in this tight embrace with these foreign spy services, and therefore, what the CIA is less able to do is make predictions about world events before they happen.
GROSS: Is there a controversy within the CIA about this new emphasis in direction, the emphasis on man-hunting and killing, as opposed to just collecting intelligence?
MAZZETTI: There is. And certainly, former CIA officers believe that the CIA should get back to a more traditional mission. And you've heard recently, just in the last couple months, the new CIA Director, John Brennan - who was a career CIA officer, then went and worked at the White House for the last four years - talk about how some of these paramilitary activities possibly should move to the Pentagon.
It's interesting that Brennan says that. I mean, Brennan has been at the center of the targeted killing operations over the last four years from his job at the White House. But I think he's heard from a lot of people that the CIA really has changed. And there's this question of: Does the United States need a spy service that is, you know, maybe first and foremost, a paramilitary service, when we already have a Pentagon?
GROSS: My guest is Mark Mazzetti, and he's a national security correspondent for the New York Times and author of the new book "The Way of the Knife: The CIA, a Secret Army and a War at the Ends of the Earth."
In talking about how the CIA became more of a man-hunting and killing operation and how the military became more of an intelligence-gathering operation than it had been before, let's go back to the Bush administration. You describe Vice President Cheney as having signed off on CIA hit squads after September 11th. What was the first program that he signed off on?
MAZZETTI: Well, one of the very earliest that I discuss in the book is a program that had been briefed to him not long after the September 11th attacks by two CIA officers in the Counterterrorism Center. The idea was to put together hit teams of officers and foreign agents who could go into foreign countries, even go into crowded cities and kill the enemies of the United States. They had put a list together of possible people who would be the number one targets.
This was an early sort of plan that the CIA hadn't quite thought through yet. And - but they briefed it to Cheney and Cheney's staff, and, I mean, the order was OK, proceed. See how this goes, and see if you can develop this capability.
There were several sort of iterations of this program. After Cheney approved the program in the early days, they tried it. They did some training. To my knowledge, there was never an actual operation carried out. And then it was resurrected a couple years later, in 2004, when the CIA decided to basically outsource the mission to a couple senior executives at Blackwater, the private security firm, including Erik Prince and Enrique Prado, who - Prado was a former CIA officer, and actually one of the people who had briefed Cheney in the first place.
And then that phase ended in 2006. So this program had different phases. It was, to my knowledge, never executed. But what the CIA found was the armed drone as its weapon of choice in order to carry out these targeted killing operations around the world.
GROSS: So once Vice President Cheney was signing off on CIA operations - whether it was hit squads or drones - you say at that point, there was a secret war being run at the direction of the White House. Would you consider that unprecedented?
MAZZETTI: I think it's unprecedented, certainly in the scope of it. I mean, we've seen throughout American history - or at least since the beginning of the CIA in the late '40s. I mean, we know that the CIA has run a lot of covert operations. They've been involved in paramilitary operations, but not to the extent and not for the duration that we've seen it in the 12 years since the September 11th attacks, to the point where it really has, I think, changed the DNA of the agency and really brought a new generation of officers who came in after 9/11 and who got brought into the counterterrorism mission. That is what they have known.
And the concern you hear is that it is - even if tomorrow John Brennan said OK, we're going to get out of this paramilitary business. You've got people trained, and some of the very best people trained for these kinds of operations. And so the sort of classic work of spycraft is harder to train to do, or at least it's different, and they might need to be retrained.
So this is going to be, I think, something that I'm skeptical that the CIA really will get out of this any time immediately. And even if they were, it will take a long time to sort of shift course.
GROSS: If you're just joining us, my guest is Mark Mazzetti, and he's a national security correspondent for the New York Times and author of the new book "The Way of the Knife: The CIA, a Secret Army and a War at the Ends of the Earth." Mark, let's take a short break here, and then we'll talk some more about your new book. This is FRESH AIR.
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GROSS: This is FRESH AIR. If you're just joining us, my guest is Mark Mazzetti. He's a national security correspondent for the New York Times and author of the new book "The Way of the Knife: The CIA, a Secret Army and a War at the Ends of the Earth." And the book is, in part, about how the CIA has taken on certain military tasks - like hunting down and killing people - and how the military has become a little bit more of a spy agency, and what that means for current and future wars.
So now that we have this overlap between the CIA and the Special Operations forces of the military, where the CIA is hunting down and killing people and the Special Ops are conducting intelligence operations - in addition to other things - who decides, like, which mission is best for which agency?
MAZZETTI: It's a good question. There's still a lot of overlap. I mean, for instance, you have right now, in Yemen, both the CIA and JSOC carrying out parallel drone wars. They have different kill lists, and they operate drones with different missions, but very similar missions, because they're basically hunting and killing.
It's unclear whether that will remain, and it's still unclear to me why there is this redundancy in the system in Yemen. There has been, over time, a little bit of a detente between the CIA and the Pentagon on where they go. I describe in the book a period of time where, around 2005 and 2006, they basically got together and they said we're tripping over each other all over the world, and we need to work out arrangements, where the Pentagon takes the lead and where the CIA takes the lead.
And so they worked out these memorandum. So, in Pakistan, for instance, the CIA took the lead, meaning that any operations in Pakistan would be under Title 50, which is the U.S. law that governs CIA activities. Any soldiers who were operating in Pakistan to do cross-border raids into the tribal areas were operating under CIA authority. They were - I use the term sheep-dipped, as CIA officers. We saw this example...
GROSS: What do you mean by sheep-dipped?
MAZZETTI: Well, sheep-dipped, it's like - you know, in an instant, you become a CIA officer. You're a Navy SEAL, and in an instant, or for this mission, you become a CIA operative under covert action authority. And it's a bureaucratic trick that allows you to operate in places where you wouldn't normally operate.
And we saw this most famously in May of 2011, when the - a team of Navy SEALs went into Pakistan, deep into Pakistan, and killed Osama bin Laden, and they were acting under CIA authority. Technically, Leon Panetta, the CIA director, was in charge of the mission. This is the most famous example of this, but this has happened a number of times.
There were other places where the Pentagon was taking the lead, because they had a little bit easier time convincing the government to give them a presence - for instance, in the Philippines. The Navy SEALs have had a presence in the southern part of the Philippines for some time, and it was acknowledged by the government of the Philippines. And so it's easier for the Pentagon to operate.
So there has been better collaboration in recent years, but as you said, there is still some redundancy, and the question is: Is that going to continue in the future?
GROSS: So with the sheep-dipping...
(LAUGHTER)
MAZZETTI: Right.
GROSS: With the arrangement where, like, military forces can suddenly become CIA agents just by putting them under the authority of the CIA, this is a way of, for instance, getting around the Pakistan government that doesn't want military forces in Pakistan, but they already have an agreement that the CIA can operate there?
MAZZETTI: Right. I mean, Pakistan - I spend a lot of time in the book talking about Pakistan, because I just think it's a fascinating country, and the whole American relationship with Pakistan, I think, has been the most interesting and important relationship since the September 11th attacks.
And so very early on, President Pervez Musharraf of Pakistan basically said: You're not going to have American troops in any large numbers on the ground in Pakistan. It is too inflammatory. And so the CIA can operate, and we will do joint operations, but there can't be, quote-unquote, "boots on the ground."
Any military forces that did exist there at the time were basically under - for all intents and purposes - CIA authority. Later on, you found that Musharraf finally allowed armed drones into Pakistan, and this was in 2004. The CIA kept pushing, you know, pushing the envelope to get more and more authorities for Pakistan and pushing Musharraf to allow more activities into the country.
And one of the things that I describe is that the first CIA drone strike in Pakistan was in 2004, against a militant tribal leader named Nek Muhammad, who was helping facilitate al-Qaida activities in the tribal areas in the mountains. He was more a problem for Pakistan than he was the United States, and part of the deal was that the CIA said, well, we'll take care of your Nek Muhammad problem if we can have regular drone flights in the tribal areas.
GROSS: So let me just get back to the sheep-dipping one more time.
MAZZETTI: Sure.
GROSS: Did this really work? So did disguising military people as CIA people really fool the Pakistan government that didn't want military, you know, that didn't want the military in Pakistan? I mean, like with the bin Laden mission, the fact that they were operating - you said special forces were operating under this jurisdiction of the CIA, didn't help the Pakistan government respond favorably to the action.
MAZZETTI: Right. There are several different phases of the U.S.-Pakistan relationship, and in the early days, certainly. I spoke, for the book, to a Pakistani intelligence officer, former, who was the station chief in Peshawar, a western city in Pakistan, a very interesting man named Asad Munir. And he talked about some of the military people who were operating with him and doing joint operations, and they were under different authorities, but he knew what was going on. And they were working much more closely together.
Over time - starting really at around 2008 - the U.S. started doing more and more inside Pakistan without the knowledge of Pakistan's government, because the relationship between the CIA and the ISI, which is Pakistan's spy service, really became toxic. And the U.S. came to think that the ISI was playing what they called a double game, where they were helping out the militants, helping out the Taliban. And so the U.S. needed to be much more unilateral.
So what the U.S. did was start sending more and more spies into Pakistan without the knowledge of the ISI, under different false covers. And this all came to a head in early 2011, when a CIA contractor named Raymond Davis shot two people on the street in Lahore. And this seemed to confirm all of the big conspiracies in Pakistan that the CIA had deployed this secret army inside Pakistan.
It was really the worst thing that could happen for the CIA, because in - even in Pakistan, sometimes conspiracies are true. And there had been this great expansion of CIA ground activities in Pakistan, and the Raymond Davis matter confirmed some of those fears.
GROSS: Mark Mazzetti will be back in the second half of the show. He's a national security correspondent for the New York Times and author of the new book "The Way of the Knife." I'm Terry Gross, and this is FRESH AIR.
(SOUNDBITE OF SONG, "GET RHYTHM")
JOHNNY CASH: (Singing) When you get the blues. Get a rock and roll feeling in your bones. Put taps on your toes, and get goin'. Get rhythm.
GROSS: This is FRESH AIR. I'm Terry Gross back with Mark Mazzetti, a national security correspondent for The New York Times and author of the new book, "The Way of the Knife." It's about the new military intelligence complex, which has blurred the roles of the military and the CIA. Military commandoes conduct spy missions, Mazzetti says, while the CIA - with the help of drones - has become a killing machine, consumed with man hunting.
Let's look some more at their agreement between the United States and Pakistan that allowed the United States to fly drones over Pakistan and target extremists. You had just mentioned that early on in this agreement, the United States offered to kill Nek Muhammad, who was an extremist that posed a greater problem to Pakistan than the United States, but the United States offered to do Pakistan a favor and kill him in return for access to Pakistan to fly drones. So tell us more about the agreement that was made between the U.S. and Pakistan enabling the U.S. to fly drones over parts of Pakistan and target suspected terrorists.
MAZZETTI: The CIA had been trying to get armed drones into Pakistan for some time. There had been unarmed drones, previously, in Pakistan - surveillance flights, but not actual armed drones that fired missiles. And the way that the targeted killing program in Pakistan began was the offer of killing Nek Muhammad. I should say that Nek Muhammad was facilitating, you know, helping al-Qaida build a base in Pakistan and was engaged in cross-border attacks into Afghanistan. So the U.S. was concerned about him, certainly, but he was not a senior al-Qaida leader. He was a problem for Pakistan because he was the sort of his first figure since 9/11 that created big problems for Pakistan's government. He was fomenting a tribal rebellion in South Waziristan and launching attacks on Pakistani soil.
This was when Pervez Musharraf, the president, started to see the future of, you know, this war in Afghanistan is spreading into my country and I got a big problem. So Musharraf sends troops into the tribal areas. The entire operation is a disaster, civilians are killed, Pakistani troops are killed, and he pulls back and signs a peace deal with Nek Muhammad. That peace deal doesn't last very long and pretty soon when the CIA presents this offer to Musharraf to kill Nek Muhammad, it seems very appealing. And one of the things Musharraf would later say about why he - he didn't say this publicly but he said this privately - why he thought that this ruse could be kept up was that in Pakistan things fall out of the sky all the time. So in other words, missiles can be fired, people can be killed and we, the Pakistani government, can take credit for it and no one will be the wiser.
GROSS: Pakistan also wanted to be paid. What was the cash arrangement?
MAZZETTI: Well, Pakistan has been the recipient of billions of dollars, in both public money and secret money, from the United States since September 11th. Musharraf did align himself with the United States in agreeing to go after al-Qaida after 9/11, and part of it was that he needed to be compensated for the work that his troops and his spies do. And so there have been billions of dollars of what they call reimbursements for counterterrorism operations. So, for instance, if Pakistani troops go into the tribal areas and launch military operations, the Pakistani government's argument is well, we're doing this because the U.S. wants us to and so the U.S. should pay us for it. This has led to a lot of mistrust and bad feelings between the two governments. The U.S. feels that Pakistan isn't doing enough for U.S. money. Pakistani officials have felt used in many ways, like this is just a transactional arrangement.
GROSS: The Bush administration started this direction that you write about in your new book, where the CIA starts emphasizing, hunting down suspected terrorists and assassinating them, and the Special Operation Forces and the military become more specialized in intelligence gathering than they had been before, so you see this kind of blending or swapping of CIA and military responsibilities. So when President Obama enters the White House, what did he keep and what did he change from this direction that the Bush administration started us in?
MAZZETTI: The first act that President Obama - one of the first acts that he did was to announce the end of the CIA interrogation and detention program, closing the secret prisons. I mean for all intensive purposes they had effectively been empty for a couple years and the program was not much of anything at this point. But he made the statement that the United States would not be doing these interrogation methods again - the CIA was out of the detention business. At the same time, what he did preserve and indeed expand, was the drone program, the targeted killing program. And by 2010, you saw a dramatic escalation in drone strikes in Pakistan. The escalation had begun under Bush in 2008, continued in 2009, but 2010 was really a very critical year.
Another thing that President Obama famously said was that he was going to shut down Guantanamo Bay - the prison at Guantanamo Bay - as we've seen, that has proved harder than he thought and the prison remains open. But it's interesting that a very core part of the Bush administration's counterterrorism program has been embraced by the Obama administration, and in many ways expanded, in places where it didn't really exist under Bush. For instance, in Yemen. I mean there had been one CIA drone strike in Yemen and that was in 2002. There's been dozens of strikes in Yemen since 2009, partly that's because the Obama administration saw a threat that was escalating in Yemen from an al-Qaida affiliate in Yemen named al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula. And so they saw the threat morphing and decided that the counterterrorism operations, the drone strikes, needed to be escalated there. Also, Somalia is another place that has been - seen a lot more activity under the Obama administration.
GROSS: Do you think President Obama came into the White House wanting to run these like secret wars with the drones and Special Operations Forces, or do you think he came to embrace that later on after seeing what was going on and after considering the alternatives?
MAZZETTI: If you've read President Obama's speeches during his first campaign, he said he made it clear that he would be aggressive in Pakistan. He famously said that, you know, if he knew where Osama bin Laden was in Pakistan he would go in and kill him in Pakistan and not tell the Pakistani government. He was talking about ending the war in Iraq and focusing on Afghanistan, but also being very tough on terrorism. So it shouldn't have been a surprise to anyone that he, you know, believes in drone strikes. But what has been surprising, I think, is the extent that these shadow wars really have come to define Obama's foreign policy. That, you know, he ended the war in Iraq and after the surge in Afghanistan he's now winding down. And it was interesting, he said during his second inaugural address, a decade of war is now coming to an end. But that's a decade of the wars that we know about, it's the decade of the public wars. What are continuing are these more secret wars and there really isn't any evidence, yet, of them abating. The drone strikes continue and we'll see what happens in the second term.
One of the things I write about is how interesting it is that the CIA really has been ascendant in the Obama administration. Obama's first CIA director, Leon Panetta, had a tremendous amount of authority and respect in the White House and the CIA got what it wanted during the first term of the Obama administration. And this is a liberal, Democratic president who has really given the CIA a long leash in order to carry out these operations.
It's not entirely new in history. You've seen Democratic presidents in some cases really embrace these secret wars. Jimmy Carter did toward the end of his presidency. Of course, John F. Kennedy did. So Obama has embraced this kind of warfare that has its benefits, certainly. It's cheaper and less costly in American lives than the big wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. But certainly, these other wars are not as surgical as some would like to make them out to be.
GROSS: My guest is Mark Mazzetti, a national security correspondent for The New York Times and author of the new book "The Way of the Knife." We'll talk more after a break. This is FRESH AIR.
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GROSS: If you're just joining us, my guest is Mark Mazzetti. He's a national security correspondent for The New York Times and author of the new book "The Way of the Knife: The CIA, a Secret Army, and a War at the Ends of the Earth."
In talking about drones, which you've been reporting on for some time - and there's a lot about drones in your new book - Robert Gibbs, President Obama's former press secretary, now that he's no longer press secretary, recently acknowledged that because the CIA drone program was classified, he could never acknowledge that it existed at press conferences, even though everybody knew it existed and that it put him in this really ridiculous position.
I'm wondering what that was like on your end, you know, knowing that this program existed, knowing that everybody knew, but at the same time it's a classified program, so I don't know how hard it was to get people to actually talk to you on the record about it.
MAZZETTI: Well, certainly no one who was serving in the government could talk about it on the record. It was obviously the most overt/covert action in world history, probably, because everyone knew it was going on and there was no - I mean a covert action is supposed to be deniable. In other words, the very definition of it is that the U.S. is supposed to deny any knowledge or any role in these activities, but, I mean that became such a farce. As the drone strikes increased you couldn't deny that the U.S. played a role, but at the very least, they could acknowledge it. So it was very strange. We certainly reported about them and we reported that the CIA was carrying out these strikes but he found public officials talking about the very vaguely.
Now in the last couple of years, President Obama has taken steps to at least acknowledge the program. And John Brennan, in his previous role as White House counterterrorism advisor, gave a speech last year saying, for the record, that the U.S. uses drones to carry out targeted killings. And so that allowed the administration to acknowledge that these strikes exist, but it's not as if they're acknowledging each one as it happens. So, for instance, if there's a drone strike in Pakistan a week ago, it's not as if the U.S. government says last week the U.S. carried out a drone strike in South Waziristan and killed this person and this number of people were killed. That part all remains secret. And there has been a push inside the government, especially you hear it in the State Department of, we would like to come out and talk about this program more. Because in their minds, it is a more precise program and a program that has fewer civilian casualties than get reported, but if we can't talk about it then the vacuum gets filled by people who have other agendas - whether it's the Pakistani spy service or whatever. And so there is a constituency in the U.S. government to be more open about the drone strikes, and this is what we're seeing the Obama administration wrestle with right now. There's now calls by Congress, Republicans and Democrats, to be more transparent, to have more public accountability. You saw Rand Paul, a libertarian senator, filibuster on the Senate floor - which is really an extraordinary moment, considering where we've been over the last 12 years.
GROSS: So one of the stories that you write about in your book is how the United States negotiated with Saudi Arabia so that the United States could use Saudi Arabia as a drone base for strikes in Yemen. And this was, you know, this was a big secret and I'm sure the Saudis are not happy that the story was revealed. Before your book was published, this was revealed in The New York Times and in The Washington Post. What was that like for you to have this information for your book - you weren't publishing it in The New York Times - but the story kind of beat out your book? And a related question, is when you're doing a story like the stories you've covered for your book, what do you feel obligated to kind of publish in The New York Times as you get it, and what is OK to hold until the publication of your book?
MAZZETTI: Well, The Times was nice enough to give me a long book leave and so I was away from the paper for 15 months. And I did write stories during that time. It's a judgment call. There are some stories you come across in your book writing that, or your book research that you know won't hold. Books obviously have a much longer deadline. And so you decide, well, I can write the story for the Times because there's no way this going to hold and I'd rather the Times got it first. So I did that a few times during my book leave. On the Saudi story, I was prepared to report it in the book and when I got back to the Times, actually, in January, had some discussions with my editors about what's in my book.
And we decided that we wanted to publish the fact about the Saudi base in the paper and my publisher was nice enough to go along with that. But we thought it was an important story. We knew others were on to it and we thought it should be in the paper.
GROSS: So you co-wrote that story with Scott Shane.
MAZZETTI: Yes. Me and Scott Shane and Robert Worth.
GROSS: Were there any stories that you tracked down for this book that where you weren't sure whether they should remain secret or not? Because sometimes the government or the military or the CIA keep things secret for a good reason. Because you can't afford to show your hand to your enemy. Um, and, you know, by definition the CIA is a secret.
So even a story like the Saudi base for the drones that would be flying over Yemen, how do you decide whether that's something that should be made public or not?
MAZZETTI: These are decisions that we get confronted with all the time when you're covering national security. Pretty much everything you're writing about is classified in some way. And we will report our stories. We will talk to as many people as possible. We will call the government for comment. And, you know, there's sometimes a process where the government will come back and say, you know, we ask you not to report a story.
And it escalates up the chain of command at the Times and usually goes to the executive editor of the paper. And we always listen and hear them out. You have to sort of assess the case that's being made. If someone is making the case that your story will directly lead to people's lives being lost or people being killed, I mean, that is a very - that makes you sit up and take notice.
And you certainly ask for more information about why that's the case. And that is something that the paper always listens to very carefully. There's other arguments that get made along the lines of other governments aren't going to like it if this is published. They will be embarrassed. They don't want to show that they are helping the United States. It will hurt our diplomatic relations.
Now, that's a lower bar, and more often than not, you know, the Times will not see that as a really strong reason t hold a story or to withhold details of a story. Because, you know, it's not a matter of strict national security where you're talking about lives being lost. You're talking about diplomatic embarrassment.
GROSS: Well, Mark Mazzetti, I want to thank you so much for talking with us.
MAZZETTI: Thanks so much for having me.
GROSS: Mark Mazzetti is the author of the new book "The Way of the Knife." He's a national security correspondent for the New York Times. Coming up, rock historian Ed Ward considers Johnny Cash's Columbia years. There's a new 63-CD box set of his albums and singles. This is FRESH AIR.
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Re: Top Secret America

Postby Six Hits of Sunshine » Wed May 01, 2013 9:47 am

Pulitzer Prize-winning reporter Dana Priest traces the journey from 9/11 to the Marathon bombings and investigates the secret history of the 12-year battle against terrorism.

http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline ... etamerica/
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Re: Top Secret America

Postby semper occultus » Sat Jun 29, 2013 3:49 pm

The Secret History of Silicon Valley

http://steveblank.com/secret-history/



all links at site :

The Secret History of Silicon Valley – Backstory
•Part 1: The Vietnam War
•Part 2: B-52′s and the Soviet Air Defense System
•Part 3: Bill Perry/ESL and the Cold War
•Part 4: Undisclosed Locations
•Part 5: Silicon Valley, the 2nd 100 years
•Part 6: Stanford, Terman and WWII
•Part 7: Stanford, Terman and the Cold War
•Part 8: Stanford and the rise of Cold War Entrepreneurship
•Part 9: Stanford and Electronic Intelligence
•Part 10: Stanford and Weapons Systems
•Part 11: The Rise of Venture Capital
•Part 12: The First Valley IPO’s
•Part 13: Startups with Nuclear Missiles
•Part 14: Spy Satellites in Silicon Valley
•Part 15: Lockheed – Silicon Valley largest employer

More backstory here and here

Sources I used for The Secret History of Silicon Valley. Thanks to the authors of this wonderful material. Special note; read everything Alfred Price has written for WWII and Electronic Warfare. Steuart Leslie, Charles Lecuyer and Rebecca S. Lowen for Stanford and the Cold War.

World War II Sources – Books
•Scientists Against Time – James Baxter
•Tuxedo Park: A Wall Street Tycoon and the Secret Palace of Science - Jennet Conant
•The Tizard Mission: The Top Secret Operation that Changed the Course of WWII
•A Radar History of WWII: Technical and Military Imperatives - Louis Brown
•Confounding the Reich: The RAF’s Secret War of Electronic Countermeasures in WWII – Martin Bowman
•Confound and Destroy: 100 Group and the Bomber Support Campaign – Martin Streetly
•Echoes of War, the Story of H2S Radar – Sir Bernard Lovell
•Boffin: A Personal Story of the Early Days of Radar, Radio Astronomy and Quantum Optics – R. Hanbury Brown
•Radar Development to 1945 – Russell Burns
•The Invention that Changed the World: How a Small Group of Radar Pioneers Won The Second World War - Robert Buderi
•Wizard War, British Scientific Intelligence 1939-1945 - R.V. Jones
•History of Air Intercept Radar and the British Nightfighter 1939-1945 – Ian White
•The Luftwaffe Over Germany: Defense of the Reich – Donald Caldwell
•Battle Over The Reich: The Strategic Bomber Offensive Over Germany: Volume One, 1939-1943 – Alfred Price
•Warriors and Wizards – development and defeat of radio controlled glide bombs – Martin Bollinger
•Battle Over the Reich: The Strategic Bomber Offensive against Germany Volume 2 Nov 1943-May 1945 – Alfred Price
•Japanese Radar and Related Weapons of World War II – Yasuzo Nakagawa
•Instruments of Darkness: The History of Electronic Warfare – Alfred Price
•Volume I: The History of US. Electronic Warfare to 1946 – Alfred Price

Cold War Sources — Books
•Volume II: The History of US. Electronic Warfare: Renaissance Years - Alfred Price
•Volume III: The History of US. Electronic Warfare: Rolling Thunder Through Allied Force, 1964 to 2000 - Alfred Price
•Body of Secrets: Anatomy of the Ultra-Secret NSA – James Bamford
•The Puzzle Palace: Inside the NSA – James Bamford
•Deep Black: Space Espionage and National Security – William Burrows
•Secrets of Signals Intelligence During the Cold War and Beyond – M. Aid, C. Wiebes
•The Black Bats: CIA Spy Flights Over China From Taiwan – Chris Pocock
•Eternal Vigilance? 50 Years of the CIA- J. Jones, R. Jones, C. Andrew
•High-Cold-War-Strategic Air Reconnaissance and the Electronic Intelligence War - Robert Jackson
•Spy Flights of the Cold War – Paul Lashmar
•By Any Means Necessary: America’s Secret Air War in the Cold War – W. Burrows
•Shadow Flights: America’s Secret Airwar Against the Soviet Union: A Cold War History – C. Peebles
•Secret Empire: Eisenhower, The CIA and the hidden story of America’s Space Espionage – P. Taubman
•The Wizards of Langley: Inside the CIA’s Directorate of Science and Technology -Jeffery Richelson
•GCHQ: The uncensored story of Britain’s most secret intelligence agency -Richard J. Aldrich
•Spyplane: The U-2 History – Norman Polmar
•Eye in the Sky: The Story of the Corona Spy Satellites – Dwayne Day
•Corona: America’s First Satellite Program – Kevin Ruffner
•Corona Between the Sun and the Earth: The First NRO Reconnaissance Eye in Space – Robert McDonald
•Trust but Verify: Imagery Analysis in the Cold War – David Lindgren
•Spy Capitalism: Itek and the CIA – Jonathan Lewis
•America’s Space Sentinels: DSP Satellites and National Security – Jeffery Richelson
•Shades of Gray: National Security and the Evolution of Space Reconnaissance – L. Parker Temple
•NRO Satellite History – Quest
•Inventing Accuracy: A Historical Sociology of Nuclear Missile Guidance – Donald MacKenzie
•From Polaris to Trident – The Development of US Fleet Ballistic Missile Technology – Graham Spinardi
•When Computers Went to Sea: The Digitization of the U.S. Navy - David Boslaugh
•From Whirlwind to MITRE: The R&D Story of the SAGE Air Defense Computer – Kent Redmond, Thomas Smith
•A Fiery Peace in a Cold War: Bernard Schriever and the Ultimate Weapon – Neal Sheehan
•Titan II: A History of a Cold War Missile Program - David Stumpf
•The Kremlins’s Nuclear Sword: The Rise and Fall of Russia’s Strategic Nuclear Forces, 1945-2000 – Steven Zaloga
•Russian Strategic Nuclear Forces – Pavel Podvig, Frank von Hippel
•The Eleven Days of Christmas: America’s Last Vietnam Battle – Marshall Michel
•Flying From the Black Hole – Robert Harder
•US Strategic and Defensive Missile Systems 1950-2004 – Mark Berhow
•SA-2 (S-75) Surface to Air Missile Simulator
•The Archangel and the OXCART: the Lockheed A-12 – J. Remak, J. Ventolo
•Design and Development of the Blackbird – Peter Merlin
•From Rainbow to Gusto: Stealth and the Design of the Lockheed Blackbird – Paul Suhler
•Radar Handbook – Merrill I. Skolnik
•EW 101: a first course in electronic warfare – David Adamy
•First in Last Out: Stories by the Wild Weasels
•Threat Warning for Tactical Aircraft: A Technical History
•Beyond Expectations: Recollections of the Pioneers and Founders of National Reconnaissance

National Reconnaissance Office (NRO) Sources – Web
•Corona - first CIA film recovery spacecraft
•Corona, Lanyard and Argon records - GWU archives
•Gambit - Corona follow-on, film recovery spacecraft
•Hexagon - Gambit follow-on, last film recovery and ferret spacecraft
•Gambit/Hexagon History and Videos
•Midas - 1st Infrared Missile Warning program
•DMSP - real-time Military Weather Satellites
•SAMOS to the Moon - NASAs Lunar Orbiter and the NRO spy satellites
•GRAB and POPPY - NSA’s first ELINT satellites
•Founders of National Reconnaissance
•Pioneers of National Reconnaissance 1960-2000
•NRO Special Collections - fun reading

ELINT Sources – Web

Air Force
•A Need to Know: Air Force Reconnaissance 1945-1953
•IMINT and Analysis

Engineering/ELINT in the CIA/NSA
•CIA: Telemetry Analysis
•Engineering in the CIA; ELINT and Stealth
•Science, Technology and the CIA
•Stealth, Countermeasures and ELINT – 1960-1975
•CIA: Soviet ABM Defenses: Status and Prospects – 1970
•CIA: Quality ELINT
•CIA: Moon Bounce ELINT
•CIA: Hiding OXCART in plain sight
•NSA: A Dangerous Business- the US Navy and National Reconnaissance
•NSA tasking to CIA for ELINT
•First description of the NSA
•Intelligence programs listing
•Secret Spy-planes, Balloons and Satellites

ELINT Aircraft Losses
•U.S. Cold War Aerial Reconnaissance Losses
•U.S. Cold War Navy Reconnaissance Losses

Analyst Demos
•http://www.palantirtech.com/government/analysis-blog

Post Cold War Sources — Books
•Chinese Aerospace Power – Andrew S. Erickson & Lyle J. Goldstein
•Peoples Liberation Army Navy: Combat Systems Technology, 1949-2010
•China Naval Modernization: Implications for U.S. Navy Capabilities—Background and Issues for Congress
•Chinese Air and Naval Power – blog

Silicon Valley Sources – Books

Terman/Shockley/Fairchild/Intel/National
•Fred Terman at Stanford – Stewart Gilmore
•IEEE Oral History – Fred Terman Associates
•Broken Genius: The Rise and Fall of William Shockley- Joel Shurkin
•Makers of the Microchip: A Documentary History of Fairchild Semiconductor – Christophe Lecuyer and David Brock
•The Man Behind the Microchip: Robert Noyce – Leslie Berlin
•Spinoff: A Personal History of the Industry That Changed The World – Charles Sporck

Silicon Valley History
•Electronics in the West: the First Fifty Years – Jane Morgan
•The Origins of the Electronics Industry on the Pacific Coast- The Origins of the Electronics Industry on the Pacific Coast
•Revolution in Miniature: The History and Impact of Semiconductor Electronics – Ernest Braun
•Creating the Cold War University: The Transformation of Stanford – Rebecca S. Lowen
•The Closed World: Computers and the Politics of Discourse in Cold War America – Paul Edwards
•Understanding Silicon Valley – Martin Kenney
•The Man Who Invented the Computer: The Biography of John Atanasoff, Digital Pioneer – Jane Smiley
•How Silicon Valley Came to Be – Timothy Sturgeon
•The Inventor and the Pilot: Russell and Sigurd Varian - Dorothy Varian
•The Tube Guys – Norman Pond
•The Cold War and American Science: The Military-Industrial-Academic Complex at MIT and Stanford – Stuart W. Leslie
•Making Silicon Valley: Innovation & the Growth of High Tech - Charles Lecuyer
•Dealers of Lightening: Xerox PARC and the Dawn of the Computer Age – Michael Hilzick
•Regional Advantage: Culture and Competition in Silicon Valley and Route 128 – AnnaLee Saxenian
•The New Argonauts: Regional Advantage in a Global Economy – AnnaLee Saxenian
•Bill and Dave: How Hewlett and Packard Built the World’s Greatest Company – Michael Malone

Venture Capital
•Creative Capital: Georges Doriot and the Birth of Venture Capital – Spencer E. Ante
•Done Deals: Venture Capitalists Tell Their Stories -Udayan Gupta
•Semiconductor Timeline to 1976: Semi and Don C. Hoefler
•The Startup Game – William Draper III

Oral Histories
•Computer History Museum Oral Histories
•IEEE Oral Histories
•ACM Oral Histories

Photo and Movie Sources – Web
•B-24 Ferret ELINT equipment photos

WWII Radar History/Photos/Radar Order of Battle
•www.gyges.dk
•http://www.luftarchiv.de/
•http://www.vectorsite.net/ttwiz.html The Wizard War
•http://www.museumwaalsdorp.nl/en/german_radar.html
•http://www.baermann.biz/pauke/index.php?catid=9&blogid=1

Movie Clips
•12 O’Clock High
•Memphis Belle
•Dr. Strangelove
•Easter Egg


....interfaces to Ann Finkbeiner's work...

'The Jasons: The Secret History of Science's Postwar Elite,'
by Ann Finkbeiner

By JOHN HORGAN
www.nytimes.com

THE JASONS
The Secret History of Science's Postwar Elite.
By Ann Finkbeiner.

304 pp. Viking. $27.95.
Published: April 16, 2006

Last summer, I received an e-mail message from a defense contractor that was advising a federal security agency and wanted my ideas on fighting terrorism. I assumed it was a joke. But when I called the contractor's number, a woman named Debbie convinced me that the firm and the offer were real. Her firm's client was seeking advice from non-experts who could "think outside the box."

Image
Members of Jason have included, from left: Hans Bethe, Freeman Dyson, Richard Garwin, Steven Weinberg and Murray Gell-Mann.

I loathe militarism, so I worried that accepting the assignment would be hypocritical. But the invitation was flattering and challenging — and the money was tempting. So I agreed. As long as I didn't propose anything that violated my principles, I told myself, what would be the harm?

It seems only fair to reveal my own ethical elasticity before I pass judgment on Jason, the subject of the journalist Ann Finkbeiner's fascinating, disturbing new book. I first heard about this secretive group of independent government science advisers in 1993 from the physicist Freeman Dyson, one of Jason's longest-serving members. Dyson made Jason sound like fun: a bunch of brilliant iconoclasts brainstorming during summer vacations about problems ranging from nuclear missile defense to climate change. But Finkbeiner shows that at times, Jason seethed with ethical conflict.

Of the 100 or so scientists who have served on Jason, Finkbeiner has interviewed 36. A few spoke anonymously, and others refused to talk at all. That reticence is not surprising, given that as much as three-quarters of Jason's work has consisted of classified military projects, some of them morally questionable. Like Errol Morris's film "The Fog of War," in which Robert McNamara painfully revisits Vietnam, Finkbeiner's book shows how even the smartest people with the noblest intentions can end up committing shameful acts.

Jason (the term refers both to the group as a whole and to individual members) was conceived in the late 1950's, when the physicist John Wheeler proposed assembling a few dozen top academic scientists to give the government no-holds-barred advice. In 1960 the group began gathering each June and July in various locations. Physics was still riding the wave of prestige generated by the Manhattan Project, and all the original Jasons were physicists. Mildred Goldberger, the wife of the early member Murph Goldberger (and herself a physicist), proposed naming the group after the mythical Greek hero. Funding came primarily from the Advanced Research Projects Agency at the Pentagon (known today as Darpa).

Those who eventually enlisted included giants like Dyson, Murph Goldberger and the future Nobel laureates Steven Weinberg, Val Fitch, Charles Townes, Murray Gell-Mann and Leon Lederman. Some of their motives, like serving their country and reducing the threat of nuclear war, were altruistic. Others were less so: becoming an insider with access to secret information; finding "sweet" solutions to technical puzzles (to borrow Robert Oppenheimer's description of the Manhattan Project); and getting paid ($850 per diem today).

The Jasons interviewed take pride in some of their accomplishments. They have excelled at "lemon detection," finding the flaws in ideas like "dense pack" nuclear-missile sites, which one Jason, Sid Drell, called "dunce pack." In the 1980's, Jason helped establish a Department of Energy program to improve the accuracy of climate models. In 1996 Bill Clinton signed the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, in part because Jason had concluded that tests were no longer needed to ensure the viability of America's nuclear arsenal.

Jasons also contributed to the invention of adaptive optics, which boosts the power of telescopes by correcting for atmospheric distortion. On the other hand, the Pentagon kept the technology classified for almost a decade to reserve it for a project that many Jasons opposed, the Strategic Defense Initiative. Episodes like these made some Jasons wonder how much good they were really doing. Dyson complained that "the secrecy held up progress in adaptive optics for 10 years."

The Vietnam War was the group's nadir. In 1966, Dyson, Steven Weinberg and two other Jasons compiled a classified report that weighed the pros and cons of using low-yield nuclear weapons to destroy bridges, roads, airfields, missile sites and troops in Vietnam. The report concluded that using nukes made no military sense. Dyson told Finkbeiner that he and his colleagues would "probably" not have issued a report that reached any other conclusion. Yet the disturbing implication is that, under different circumstances, nuclear attacks might make sense. Finkbeiner accuses Dyson and his co-authors of "supping with the devil."

Meanwhile, other Jasons designed an electronic "infiltration barrier" to keep Communist troops out of South Vietnam. The barrier consisted of minuscule land mines and microphones that could be dropped from airplanes. The mines were intended not only to maim but also to make a noise detectable by the microphones. The microphones would radio a computer that analyzed the signals to determine if they came from peasants, animals or enemy troops. If convinced that enemies were in the region, American commanders would order an airstrike of cluster bombs. The Jasons argued that their barrier represented a relatively humane alternative to the wholesale bombing of North Vietnam. But the electronic barrier failed to stop either the bombing or Communist infiltration.

Jason's Vietnam-related research was exposed in 1971 when The New York Times published its articles on the Pentagon Papers, a secret history of the Vietnam War commissioned by McNamara. Antiwar activists denounced them as war criminals. A woman sitting on a plane next to the Jason Richard Garwin stood and proclaimed: "This is Dick Garwin. He is a baby killer."

Finkbeiner clearly likes most of her subjects. But she doesn't let them off the hook. She gently yet firmly keeps asking, What were you thinking? Most seem to agree with Murph Goldberger that Jason's involvement with Vietnam, while well intentioned, was "the greatest mistake that any of us ever made."

Steven Weinberg apparently agreed; he resigned from Jason in the early 1970's "because I had no idea whether what I was doing was useful or not." But he rejoined in the 1980's as a senior adviser, and Jason continues to attract new members. Even before 9/11, Finkbeiner notes, Jason had increasingly turned to counterterrorism projects, but she offers few details. Nor does she mention whether Jasons are advising the United States on the war in Iraq.

One current Jason, a chemist called Professor Y, defends her military research as an ethical responsibility. "If I tell the truth, even about frightening weapons systems, that's got to be the right thing to do." But this seems naïve in light of Jason's history. Professor Y, and indeed all scientists advising the military, would do well to question whether they are really making the world a safer, better place.

Finkbeiner's book also carries a message for those who fear we are entering an anti-science age, in which right-wing politicians, religious fundamentalists, Luddites and postmodernists challenge science's authority. Some scientists are circling the wagons, depicting science as the embodiment of enlightenment and all its critics as knaves or buffoons. But science is and always has been as morally fallible as any other human activity. Indeed, because of its immense potential for altering our lives for good or ill, science needs critics like Finkbeiner now more than ever.

John Horgan is director of the Center for Science Writings at the Stevens Institute of Technology. His latest book is "Rational Mysticism."






...adjacently : a hagiographic but still fascinating account of the Israeli MIC : http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Start-up_Nation

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Re: Top Secret America

Postby hanshan » Mon Jul 08, 2013 4:15 pm

...

http://www.washingtonsblog.com/2013/07/everything-you-wanted-to-know-about-spying-but-were-afraid-to-ask.html

Everything You Wanted to Know about Spying … But Were Afraid to Ask

Posted on July 8, 2013 by WashingtonsBlog

Spying: The Big Picture

If you’ve been too busy to keep up with the spying scandal, here’s an overview:

The government is spying on virtually everything we do

The government’s mass spying doesn’t keep us safe

NSA spying did not prevent a terror attack on Wall Street

There is no meaningful oversight of the spying programs by either Congress or the courts

We can keep everyone safe without violating the Constitution … more cheaply and efficiently than the current system

The top counter-terrorism Czar under Clinton and Bush says that revealing NSA spying programs does not harm national security

Whistleblowers on illegal spying have no “legal” way to get the information out

A high-level intelligence source says “we hack everyone everywhere”

Some people make a lot of money off of mass spying

Spying started before 9/11 … and may have stemmed from an emergency program only meant to be activated in the case of a nuclear war

Governments and big corporations are doing everything they can to destroy anonymity

Mass spying creates an easy mark for hackers

Polls show that the public doesn’t believe the NSA

Surveillance can be used to frame you if someone in government happens to take a dislike to you

An NSA whistleblower says that the NSA is spying on – and blackmailing – top government officials and military officers (and see this)

High-level US government officials have warned for 40 years that mass surveillance would lead to tyranny in America

Government spying has always focused on crushing dissent … not on keeping us safe

While the Obama administration is spying on everyone in the country – it is at the same time the most secretive administration ever (background). That’s despite Obama saying he’s running the most transparent administration ever

Top constitutional experts say that Obama is worse than Nixon … and the Stasi East Germans


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Re: Top Secret America

Postby hanshan » Tue Jul 09, 2013 11:49 am

...

WashBlog links his assertions w/ article/links so it can be worthwhile
to check his site if anyone is interested in some depth. Certainly this is somewhat
obvious to those paying attention; vast sums of money generate their own inertia.


http://www.washingtonsblog.com/2013/07/the-fact-that-mass-surveillance-doesnt-keep-us-safe-goes-mainstream.html

The Fact that Mass Surveillance Doesn’t Keep Us Safe Goes Mainstream
Posted on July 9, 2013 by WashingtonsBlog

Top Terrorism Experts Say that Mass Spying Doesn’t Work to Prevent Terrorism

The fact that mass spying on Americans isn’t necessary to keep us safe is finally going mainstream.

The top counter-terrorism czar under Presidents Clinton and Bush – Richard Clarke – says:

The argument that this sweeping search must be kept secret from the terrorists is laughable. Terrorists already assume this sort of thing is being done. Only law-abiding American citizens were blissfully ignorant of what their government was doing.

***

If the government wanted a particular set of records, it could tell the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court why — and then be granted permission to access those records directly from specially maintained company servers. The telephone companies would not have to know what data were being accessed. There are no technical disadvantages to doing it that way, although it might be more expensive.

Would we, as a nation, be willing to pay a little more for a program designed this way, to avoid a situation in which the government keeps on its own computers a record of every time anyone picks up a telephone? That is a question that should have been openly asked and answered in Congress.

William Binney – the head of NSA’s digital communications program – says that he set up the NSA’s system so that all of the information would automatically be encrypted, so that the government had to obtain a search warrant based upon probably cause before a particular suspect’s communications could be decrypted. But the NSA now collects all data in an unencrypted form, so that no probable cause is needed to view any citizen’s information. He says that it is actually cheaper and easier to store the data in an encrypted format: so the government’s current system is being done for political – not practical – purposes. Binney’s statements have been confirmed by other high-level NSA whistleblowers.

Binney also says:

Massive surveillance doesn’t work to make us safer
The government is using information gained through mass surveillance in order to go after anyone they take a dislike to (a lieutenant colonel for the Stasi East German’s agrees)
NSA whistleblower J. Kirk Wiebe has long said that such intrusions on Americans’ privacy were never necessary to protect national security. NSA whistleblower Thomas Drake agrees. So does NSA whistleblower Russell Tice.

Israeli-American terrorism expert Barry Rubins points out:

What is most important to understand about the revelations of massive message interception by the U.S. government is this:

In counterterrorist terms, it is a farce. Basically the NSA, as one of my readers suggested, is the digital equivalent of the TSA strip-searching an 80 year-old Minnesota grandmothers rather than profiling and focusing on the likely terrorists.

***

And isn’t it absurd that the United States can’t … stop a would-be terrorist in the U.S. army who gives a power point presentation on why he is about to shoot people (Major Nadal Hassan), can’t follow up on Russian intelligence warnings about Chechen terrorist contacts (the Boston bombing), or a dozen similar incidents must now collect every telephone call in the country? A system in which a photo shop clerk has to stop an attack on Fort Dix by overcoming his fear of appearing “racist” to report a cell of terrorists or brave passengers must jump a would-be “underpants bomber” from Nigeria because his own father’s warning that he was a terrorist was insufficient?

And how about a country where terrorists and terrorist supporters visit the White House, hang out with the FBI, advise the U.S. government on counter-terrorist policy (even while, like CAIR) advising Muslims not to cooperate with law enforcement….

***

Or how about the time when the U.S. Consulate in Jerusalem had a (previously jailed) Hamas agent working in their motor pool with direct access to the vehicles and itineraries of all visiting US dignitaries and senior officials.

***

Suppose the U.S. ambassador to Libya warns that the American compound there may be attacked. No response. Then he tells the deputy chief of mission that he is under attack. No response. Then the U.S. military is not allowed to respond. Then the president goes to sleep without making a decision about doing anything because communications break down between the secretaries of defense and state and the president, who goes to sleep because he has a very important fund-raiser the next day. But don’t worry because three billion telephone calls by Americans are daily being intercepted and supposedly analyzed.

In other words, you have a massive counterterrorist project costing $1 trillion but when it comes down to it the thing repeatedly fails. In that case, to quote the former secretary of state, “”What difference does it make?”

If one looks at the great intelligence failures of the past, these two points quickly become obvious. Take for example the Japanese surprise attack on Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941. U.S. naval intelligence had broken Japanese codes. They had the information needed to conclude the attack would take place. [Background.] Yet a focus on the key to the problem was not achieved. The important messages were not read and interpreted; the strategic mindset of the leadership was not in place.

***

And remember that the number of terrorists caught by the TSA hovers around the zero level. The shoe, underpants, and Times Square bombers weren’t even caught by security at all and many other such cases can be listed. In addition to this, the U.S.-Mexico border is practically open.

**

The war on al-Qaida has not really been won, since its continued campaigning is undeniable and it has even grown in Syria, partly thanks to U.S. policy.

***

So the problem of growing government spying is three-fold.

–First, it is against the American system and reduces liberty.

–Second, it is a misapplication of resources, in other words money is being spent and liberty sacrificed for no real gain.

–Third, since government decisionmaking and policy about international terrorism is very bad the threat is increasing.

Senators Wyden and Udall – both on the Senate Intelligence Committee, with access to all of the top-secret information about the government’s spying programs – write:

“We are quite familiar with the bulk email records collection program that operated under the USA Patriot Act and has now been confirmed by senior intelligence officials. We were very concerned about this program’s impact on Americans’ civil liberties and privacy rights, and we spent a significant portion of 2011 pressing intelligence officials to provide evidence of its effectiveness. They were unable to do so ….

***

In our judgment it is also important to note that intelligence agencies made statements to both Congress and the Court that significantly exaggerated this program’s effectiveness. This experience demonstrates to us that intelligence agencies’ assessments of the usefulness of particular collection programs – even significant ones – are not always accurate. This experience has also led us to be skeptical of claims about the value of the bulk phone records collection program in particular.

***

Assertions from intelligence agencies about the value and effectiveness of particular programs should not simply be accepted at face value by policymakers or oversight bodies any more than statements about the usefulness of other government programs should be taken at face value when they are made by other government officials. It is up to Congress, the courts and the public to ask the tough questions and press even experienced intelligence officials to back their assertions up with actual evidence, rather than simply deferring to these officials’ conclusions without challenging them.

NBC News reported 2 days ago:

“I’ve never liked the idea of security vs. privacy, because no one feels more secure in a surveillance state,” said Bruce Schneier, security expert and author of Beyond Fear: Thinking Sensibly About Security in an Insecure World. “There’s plenty of examples of security that doesn’t infringe on privacy. They are all around. Door locks. Fences … Firewalls. People are forgetting that quite a lot of security doesn’t affect privacy. The real dichotomy is liberty vs. control.”

Dan Solove, a privacy law expert at George Washington University Law School, said the privacy vs. security framing has interfered with what could be a healthy national debate about using high-tech tools to fight terror.

“You have pollsters and pundits and (National Intelligence Director James) Clapper saying, ‘Do you want us to catch the terrorists or do you want privacy?’ But that’s a false choice. It’s like asking, ‘Do you want the police to exist or not?’” he said. “We already have the most invasive investigative techniques permissible with the right oversight. With probable cause you can search my home. … People want limitations and transparency, so they can make a choice about how much surveillance (they) are willing to tolerate.”

By creating an either/or tension between privacy and security, government officials have invented a heavy weapon to wield against those who raise civil liberties concerns, he said. It’s easy to cast the choice in stark terms: Who wouldn’t trade a little personal data to save even one American life?

An honest, open examination of surveillance programs might show the choice is not so simple, says Ashkan Soltani, an independent security researcher.

“The government feels like they need all this information in order to do its job, that there can’t be security without them having access to everything. Well, that’s a lazy or shortsighted way of seeing things,” he says. “The idea I reject is that you need to violate everyone’s privacy rather than be better at your job of identifying specific (targets).’”

An article on Bloomberg notes that real terrorists don’t even use the normal phone service or publicly-visible portions of the web that we innocent Americans use:

The debate over the U.S. government’s monitoring of digital communications suggests that Americans are willing to allow it as long as it is genuinely targeted at terrorists. What they fail to realize is that the surveillance systems are best suited for gathering information on law-abiding citizens.

***

The infrastructure set up by the National Security Agency, however, may only be good for gathering information on the stupidest, lowest-ranking of terrorists. The Prism surveillance program focuses on access to the servers of America’s largest Internet companies, which support such popular services as Skype, Gmail and iCloud. These are not the services that truly dangerous elements typically use.

In a January 2012 report titled “Jihadism on the Web: A Breeding Ground for Jihad in the Modern Age,” the Dutch General Intelligence and Security Service drew a convincing picture of an Islamist Web underground centered around “core forums.” These websites are part of the Deep Web, or Undernet, the multitude of online resources not indexed by commonly used search engines.

The Netherlands’ security service, which couldn’t find recent data on the size of the Undernet, cited a 2003 study from the University of California at Berkeley as the “latest available scientific assessment.” The study found that just 0.2 percent of the Internet could be searched. The rest remained inscrutable and has probably grown since. In 2010, Google Inc. said it had indexed just 0.004 percent of the information on the Internet.

Websites aimed at attracting traffic do their best to get noticed, paying to tailor their content to the real or perceived requirements of search engines such as Google. Terrorists have no such ambitions. They prefer to lurk in the dark recesses of the Undernet.

“People who radicalise under the influence of jihadist websites often go through a number of stages,” the Dutch report said. “Their virtual activities increasingly shift to the invisible Web, their security awareness increases and their activities become more conspiratorial.”

***

Communication on the core forums is often encrypted. In 2012, a French court found nuclear physicist Adlene Hicheur guilty of, among other things, conspiring to commit an act of terror for distributing and using software called Asrar al-Mujahideen, or Mujahideen Secrets. The program employed various cutting-edge encryption methods, including variable stealth ciphers and RSA 2,048-bit keys.

***

Even complete access to these servers brings U.S. authorities no closer to the core forums. These must be infiltrated by more traditional intelligence means, such as using agents posing as jihadists or by informants within terrorist organizations.

Similarly, monitoring phone calls is hardly the way to catch terrorists. They’re generally not dumb enough to use Verizon.

***

At best, the recent revelations concerning Prism and telephone surveillance might deter potential recruits to terrorist causes from using the most visible parts of the Internet. Beyond that, the government’s efforts are much more dangerous to civil liberties than they are to al-Qaeda and other organizations like it.

(And see this.)

Mass Spying Actually HURTS – Rather than Helps – Anti-Terror Efforts

Not yet convinced?

Former NSA executive William Binney – who was the head of the NSA’s entire digital spying program – told Daily Caller that the spying dragnet being carried out by the government is less than useless:

Daily Caller: So it seems logical to ask: Why do we need all of this new data collection when they’re not following up obvious leads, such as an intelligence agency calling and saying you need to be aware of this particular terrorist?

Binney: It’s sensible to ask, but that’s exactly what they’re doing. They’re making themselves dysfunctional by collecting all of this data. They’ve got so much collection capability but they can’t do everything.

***

[All this data gathered is] putting an extra burden on all of their analysts. It’s not something that’s going to help them; it’s something that’s burdensome. There are ways to do the analysis properly, but they don’t really want the solution because if they got it, they wouldn’t be able to keep demanding the money to solve it. I call it their business statement, “Keep the problems going so the money keeps flowing.” It’s all about contracts and money.

***

The issue is, can you figure out what’s important in it? And figure out the intentions and capabilities of the people you’re monitoring? And they are in no way prepared to do that, because that takes analysis. That’s what the big data initiative was all about out of the White House last year. It was to try to get algorithms and figure out what’s important and tell the people what’s important so that they can find things. The probability of them finding what’s really there is low.

Indeed, even before 9/11 – when Binney was building the precursor to the NSA’s current digital collection system – there weren’t enough analysts to look through the more modest amount of data being collected at the time:

The danger of the mass collection of data by the NSA is that it “buries” analysts in data, said Binney, who developed a surveillance program called ThinThread intended to allow the NSA to look at data but not collect it. The NSA dumped that program in favor of more extensive data collection.

“The biggest problem was getting data to a manageable level,” he said. “We didn’t have enough people, we couldn’t hire enough people east of the Mississippi to manage all the data we were getting.”

Terrorism expert Barry Rubins writes:

There is a fallacy behind the current intelligence strategy of the United States, the collection of massive amounts of phone calls, emails, and even credit card expenditures, up to 3 billion phone calls a day alone, not to mention the government spying on the mass media. It is this:

The more quantity of intelligence, the better it is for preventing terrorism.

In the real, practical world this is—though it might seem counterintuitive—untrue. You don’t need–to put it in an exaggerated way–an atomic bomb against a flea. The intelligence budget is not unlimited, is it? Where should hiring priorities be put?

***

It is not the quantity of material that counts but the need to locate and correctly understand the most vital material. This requires your security forces to understand the ideological, psychological, and organizational nature of the threat.

***

If the U.S. government can’t even figure out what the Muslim Brotherhood is like or the dangers of supporting Islamists to take over Syria, or the fact that the Turkish regime is an American enemy, or can’t even teach military officers who the enemy is, what’s it going to do with scores of billions of telephone call traffic to overcome terrorism? It isn’t even using the intelligence material it already has!

If, however, the material is almost limitless, that actually weakens a focus on the most needed intelligence regarding the most likely terrorist threats. Imagine, for example, going through billions of telephone calls even with high-speed computers rather than, say, following up a tip from Russian intelligence on a young Chechen man in Boston who is in contact with terrorists or, for instance, the communications between a Yemeni al-Qaida leader and a U.S. army major who is assigned as a psychiatrist to Fort Hood.

That is why the old system of getting warrants, focusing on individual email addresses, or sites, or telephones makes sense, at least if it is only used properly. Then those people who are communicating with known terrorists can be traced further. There are no technological magic spells. If analysts are incompetent … and leaders unwilling to take proper action, who cares how much data was collected?

***

Decision-makers and intelligence analysts only have so many hours in the day. There can only be so many meetings; only so many priorities. And the policymaking pyramid narrows rapidly toward the top. There is a point of diminishing returns for the size of an intelligence bureaucracy. Lower-priority tasks proliferate; too much paper is generated and meetings are held; the system clogs when it has too much data.

PC World reports:

“In knowing a lot about a lot of different people [the data collection] is great for that,” said Mike German, a former Federal Bureau of Investigation special agent whose policy counsel for national security at the American Civil Liberties Union. “In actually finding the very few bad actors that are out there, not so good.”

The mass collection of data from innocent people “won’t tell you how guilty people act,” German added. The problem with catching terrorism suspects has never been the inability to collect information, but to analyze the “oceans” of information collected, he said.

Mass data collection is “like trying to look for needles by building bigger haystacks,” added Wendy Grossman, a freelance technology writer who helped organize the conference.

New Republic notes:

This kind of dragnet-style data capture simply doesn’t keep us safe.

First, intelligence and law enforcement agencies are increasingly drowning in data; the more that comes in, the harder it is to stay afloat. Most recently, the failure of the intelligence community to intercept the 2009 “underwear bomber” was blamed in large part on a surfeit of information: according to an official White House review, a significant amount of critical information was “embedded in a large volume of other data.” Similarly, the independent investigation of the alleged shootings by U.S. Army Major Nidal Hasan at Fort Hood concluded that the “crushing volume” of information was one of the factors that hampered the FBI’s analysis before the attack.

Multiple security officials have echoed this assessment. As one veteran CIA agent told The Washington Post in 2010, “The problem is that the system is clogged with information. Most of it isn’t of interest, but people are afraid not to put it in.” A former Department of Homeland Security official told a Senate subcommittee that there was “a lot of data clogging the system with no value.” Even former Defense Secretary Robert Gates acknowledged that “we’ve built tremendous capability, but do we have more than we need?” And the NSA itself was brought to a grinding halt before 9/11 by the “torrent of data” pouring into the system, leaving the agency “brain-dead” for half a week and “[unable] to process information,” as its then-director Gen. Michael Hayden publicly acknowledged.

National security hawks say there’s a simple answer to this glut: data mining. The NSA has apparently described its computer systems as having the ability to “manipulate and analyze huge volumes of data at mind-boggling speeds.” Could those systems pore through this information trove to come up with unassailable patterns of terrorist activity? The Department of Defense and security experts have concluded that the answer is no: There is simply no known way to effectively anticipate terrorist threats.

***

The FBI’s and NSA’s scheme is an affront to democratic values. Let’s also not pretend it’s an effective and efficient way of keeping us safe.

Fortune writes that the NSA’s “big data” strategy is ineffective:

The evidence for big data is scant at best. To date, large fields of data have generated meaningful insights at times, but not on the scale many have promised. This disappointment has been documented in the Wall Street Journal, Information Week, and SmartData Collective.

***

According to my firm’s research, local farmers in India with tiny fields frequently outperform — in productivity and sustainability — a predictive global model developed by one of the world’s leading agrochemical companies. Why? Because they develop unique planting, fertilizing, or harvesting practices linked to the uniqueness of their soil, their weather pattern, or the rare utilization of some compost. There is more to learn from a local Indian outlier than from building a giant multivariate yield prediction model of all farms in the world. The same is true for terrorism. Don’t look for a needle in a giant haystack. Find one needle in a small clump of hay and see whether similar clumps of hay also contain needles.

You need local knowledge to glean insights from any data. I once ran a data-mining project with Wal-Mart (WMT) where we tried to figure out sales patterns in New England. One of the questions was, “Why are our gun sales lower in Massachusetts than in other states, even accounting for the liberal bias of the state?” The answer: There were city ordinances prohibiting the sale of guns in many towns. I still remember the disappointed look of my client when he realized the answer had come from a few phone calls to store managers rather than from a multivariate regression model.

So, please, Mr. President, stop building your giant database in the sky and quit hoping that algorithm experts will generate a terrorist prevention strategy from that data. Instead, rely on your people in the field to detect suspicious local patterns of behavior, communication, or spending, then aggregate data for the folks involved and let your data hounds loose on these focused samples. You and I will both sleep better. And I won’t have to worry about who is lurking in the shadows of my business or bedroom.

Security expert Bruce Schneier explained in 2005:

Many believe data mining is the crystal ball that will enable us to uncover future terrorist plots. But even in the most wildly optimistic projections, data mining isn’t tenable for that purpose. We’re not trading privacy for security; we’re giving up privacy and getting no security in return.

***

The promise of data mining is compelling, and convinces many. But it’s wrong. We’re not going to find terrorist plots through systems like this, and we’re going to waste valuable resources chasing down false alarms.

***

Data-mining systems won’t uncover any terrorist plots until they are very accurate, and that even very accurate systems will be so flooded with false alarms that they will be useless.

All data-mining systems fail in two different ways: false positives and false negatives.

***

Data mining for terrorist plots will be sloppy, and it’ll be hard to find anything useful.

***

When it comes to terrorism, however, trillions of connections exist between people and events — things that the data-mining system will have to “look at” — and very few plots. This rarity makes even accurate identification systems useless.

Let’s look at some numbers. We’ll be optimistic — we’ll assume the system has a one in 100 false-positive rate (99 percent accurate), and a one in 1,000 false-negative rate (99.9 percent accurate). Assume 1 trillion possible indicators to sift through: that’s about 10 events — e-mails, phone calls, purchases, web destinations, whatever — per person in the United States per day. Also assume that 10 of them are actually terrorists plotting.

This unrealistically accurate system will generate 1 billion false alarms for every real terrorist plot it uncovers. Every day of every year, the police will have to investigate 27 million potential plots in order to find the one real terrorist plot per month. Raise that false-positive accuracy to an absurd 99.9999 percent and you’re still chasing 2,750 false alarms per day — but that will inevitably raise your false negatives, and you’re going to miss some of those 10 real plots.

This isn’t anything new. In statistics, it’s called the “base rate fallacy,” and it applies in other domains as well. For example, even highly accurate medical tests are useless as diagnostic tools if the incidence of the disease is rare in the general population. Terrorist attacks are also rare, any “test” is going to result in an endless stream of false alarms.

This is exactly the sort of thing we saw with the NSA’s eavesdropping program: the New York Times reported that the computers spat out thousands of tips per month. Every one of them turned out to be a false alarm.

And the cost was enormous — not just for the FBI agents running around chasing dead-end leads instead of doing things that might actually make us safer, but also the cost in civil liberties.

***

Finding terrorism plots is not a problem that lends itself to data mining. It’s a needle-in-a-haystack problem, and throwing more hay on the pile doesn’t make that problem any easier. We’d be far better off putting people in charge of investigating potential plots and letting them direct the computers, instead of putting the computers in charge and letting them decide who should be investigated.

Schneier noted in 2008:

According to a massive report from the National Research Council, data mining for terrorists doesn’t work.

NBC News reports:

Casting such wide nets is also ineffective, [security researcher Ashkan Soltani] argues. Collecting mountains and mountains of data simply means that when the time comes to find that proverbial needle in a haystack, you’ve simply created a bigger haystack.”Law enforcement is being sold bill of goods that the more data you get, the better your security is. We find that is not true,” Soltani said.

Collecting data is a hard habit to break, as many U.S. corporations have discovered after years of expensive data breaches. The NSA’s data hoard may be useful in future investigations, helping agents in the future in unpredictable ways, some argue. Schneier doesn’t buy it.

“The NSA has this fetish for data, and will get it any way they can, and get as much as they can,” he said. “But old ladies who hoard newspapers say the same thing, that someday, this might be useful.”

Even worse, an overreliance on Big Data surveillance will shift focus from other security techniques that are both less invasive and potentially more effective, like old-fashioned “spycraft,” Soltani says.

Nassim Taleb writes:

Big data may mean more information, but it also means more false information.

***

Because of excess data as compared to real signals, someone looking at history from the vantage point of a library will necessarily find many more spurious relationships than one who sees matters in the making; he will be duped by more epiphenomena. Even experiments can be marred with bias, especially when researchers hide failed attempts or formulate a hypothesis after the results — thus fitting the hypothesis to the experiment (though the bias is smaller there).

This is the tragedy of big data: The more variables, the more correlations that can show significance. Falsity also grows faster than information; it is nonlinear (convex) with respect to data (this convexity in fact resembles that of a financial option payoff). Noise is antifragile. Source: N.N. Taleb

If big data leads to more false correlations, then mass surveillance may lead to more false accusations of terrorism.

(Just what we need …)

...

hanshan
 
Posts: 1673
Joined: Fri Apr 22, 2005 5:04 pm
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Re: Top Secret America

Postby hanshan » Tue Jul 09, 2013 11:50 am

...

WashBlog links his assertions w/ article/links so it can be worthwhile
to check his site if anyone is interested in some depth. Certainly this is somewhat
obvious to those paying attention; vast sums of money generate their own inertia.


http://www.washingtonsblog.com/2013/07/the-fact-that-mass-surveillance-doesnt-keep-us-safe-goes-mainstream.html

The Fact that Mass Surveillance Doesn’t Keep Us Safe Goes Mainstream
Posted on July 9, 2013 by WashingtonsBlog

Top Terrorism Experts Say that Mass Spying Doesn’t Work to Prevent Terrorism

The fact that mass spying on Americans isn’t necessary to keep us safe is finally going mainstream.

The top counter-terrorism czar under Presidents Clinton and Bush – Richard Clarke – says:

The argument that this sweeping search must be kept secret from the terrorists is laughable. Terrorists already assume this sort of thing is being done. Only law-abiding American citizens were blissfully ignorant of what their government was doing.

***

If the government wanted a particular set of records, it could tell the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court why — and then be granted permission to access those records directly from specially maintained company servers. The telephone companies would not have to know what data were being accessed. There are no technical disadvantages to doing it that way, although it might be more expensive.

Would we, as a nation, be willing to pay a little more for a program designed this way, to avoid a situation in which the government keeps on its own computers a record of every time anyone picks up a telephone? That is a question that should have been openly asked and answered in Congress.

William Binney – the head of NSA’s digital communications program – says that he set up the NSA’s system so that all of the information would automatically be encrypted, so that the government had to obtain a search warrant based upon probably cause before a particular suspect’s communications could be decrypted. But the NSA now collects all data in an unencrypted form, so that no probable cause is needed to view any citizen’s information. He says that it is actually cheaper and easier to store the data in an encrypted format: so the government’s current system is being done for political – not practical – purposes. Binney’s statements have been confirmed by other high-level NSA whistleblowers.

Binney also says:

Massive surveillance doesn’t work to make us safer
The government is using information gained through mass surveillance in order to go after anyone they take a dislike to (a lieutenant colonel for the Stasi East German’s agrees)
NSA whistleblower J. Kirk Wiebe has long said that such intrusions on Americans’ privacy were never necessary to protect national security. NSA whistleblower Thomas Drake agrees. So does NSA whistleblower Russell Tice.

Israeli-American terrorism expert Barry Rubins points out:

What is most important to understand about the revelations of massive message interception by the U.S. government is this:

In counterterrorist terms, it is a farce. Basically the NSA, as one of my readers suggested, is the digital equivalent of the TSA strip-searching an 80 year-old Minnesota grandmothers rather than profiling and focusing on the likely terrorists.

***

And isn’t it absurd that the United States can’t … stop a would-be terrorist in the U.S. army who gives a power point presentation on why he is about to shoot people (Major Nadal Hassan), can’t follow up on Russian intelligence warnings about Chechen terrorist contacts (the Boston bombing), or a dozen similar incidents must now collect every telephone call in the country? A system in which a photo shop clerk has to stop an attack on Fort Dix by overcoming his fear of appearing “racist” to report a cell of terrorists or brave passengers must jump a would-be “underpants bomber” from Nigeria because his own father’s warning that he was a terrorist was insufficient?

And how about a country where terrorists and terrorist supporters visit the White House, hang out with the FBI, advise the U.S. government on counter-terrorist policy (even while, like CAIR) advising Muslims not to cooperate with law enforcement….

***

Or how about the time when the U.S. Consulate in Jerusalem had a (previously jailed) Hamas agent working in their motor pool with direct access to the vehicles and itineraries of all visiting US dignitaries and senior officials.

***

Suppose the U.S. ambassador to Libya warns that the American compound there may be attacked. No response. Then he tells the deputy chief of mission that he is under attack. No response. Then the U.S. military is not allowed to respond. Then the president goes to sleep without making a decision about doing anything because communications break down between the secretaries of defense and state and the president, who goes to sleep because he has a very important fund-raiser the next day. But don’t worry because three billion telephone calls by Americans are daily being intercepted and supposedly analyzed.

In other words, you have a massive counterterrorist project costing $1 trillion but when it comes down to it the thing repeatedly fails. In that case, to quote the former secretary of state, “”What difference does it make?”

If one looks at the great intelligence failures of the past, these two points quickly become obvious. Take for example the Japanese surprise attack on Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941. U.S. naval intelligence had broken Japanese codes. They had the information needed to conclude the attack would take place. [Background.] Yet a focus on the key to the problem was not achieved. The important messages were not read and interpreted; the strategic mindset of the leadership was not in place.

***

And remember that the number of terrorists caught by the TSA hovers around the zero level. The shoe, underpants, and Times Square bombers weren’t even caught by security at all and many other such cases can be listed. In addition to this, the U.S.-Mexico border is practically open.

**

The war on al-Qaida has not really been won, since its continued campaigning is undeniable and it has even grown in Syria, partly thanks to U.S. policy.

***

So the problem of growing government spying is three-fold.

–First, it is against the American system and reduces liberty.

–Second, it is a misapplication of resources, in other words money is being spent and liberty sacrificed for no real gain.

–Third, since government decisionmaking and policy about international terrorism is very bad the threat is increasing.

Senators Wyden and Udall – both on the Senate Intelligence Committee, with access to all of the top-secret information about the government’s spying programs – write:

“We are quite familiar with the bulk email records collection program that operated under the USA Patriot Act and has now been confirmed by senior intelligence officials. We were very concerned about this program’s impact on Americans’ civil liberties and privacy rights, and we spent a significant portion of 2011 pressing intelligence officials to provide evidence of its effectiveness. They were unable to do so ….

***

In our judgment it is also important to note that intelligence agencies made statements to both Congress and the Court that significantly exaggerated this program’s effectiveness. This experience demonstrates to us that intelligence agencies’ assessments of the usefulness of particular collection programs – even significant ones – are not always accurate. This experience has also led us to be skeptical of claims about the value of the bulk phone records collection program in particular.

***

Assertions from intelligence agencies about the value and effectiveness of particular programs should not simply be accepted at face value by policymakers or oversight bodies any more than statements about the usefulness of other government programs should be taken at face value when they are made by other government officials. It is up to Congress, the courts and the public to ask the tough questions and press even experienced intelligence officials to back their assertions up with actual evidence, rather than simply deferring to these officials’ conclusions without challenging them.

NBC News reported 2 days ago:

“I’ve never liked the idea of security vs. privacy, because no one feels more secure in a surveillance state,” said Bruce Schneier, security expert and author of Beyond Fear: Thinking Sensibly About Security in an Insecure World. “There’s plenty of examples of security that doesn’t infringe on privacy. They are all around. Door locks. Fences … Firewalls. People are forgetting that quite a lot of security doesn’t affect privacy. The real dichotomy is liberty vs. control.”

Dan Solove, a privacy law expert at George Washington University Law School, said the privacy vs. security framing has interfered with what could be a healthy national debate about using high-tech tools to fight terror.

“You have pollsters and pundits and (National Intelligence Director James) Clapper saying, ‘Do you want us to catch the terrorists or do you want privacy?’ But that’s a false choice. It’s like asking, ‘Do you want the police to exist or not?’” he said. “We already have the most invasive investigative techniques permissible with the right oversight. With probable cause you can search my home. … People want limitations and transparency, so they can make a choice about how much surveillance (they) are willing to tolerate.”

By creating an either/or tension between privacy and security, government officials have invented a heavy weapon to wield against those who raise civil liberties concerns, he said. It’s easy to cast the choice in stark terms: Who wouldn’t trade a little personal data to save even one American life?

An honest, open examination of surveillance programs might show the choice is not so simple, says Ashkan Soltani, an independent security researcher.

“The government feels like they need all this information in order to do its job, that there can’t be security without them having access to everything. Well, that’s a lazy or shortsighted way of seeing things,” he says. “The idea I reject is that you need to violate everyone’s privacy rather than be better at your job of identifying specific (targets).’”

An article on Bloomberg notes that real terrorists don’t even use the normal phone service or publicly-visible portions of the web that we innocent Americans use:

The debate over the U.S. government’s monitoring of digital communications suggests that Americans are willing to allow it as long as it is genuinely targeted at terrorists. What they fail to realize is that the surveillance systems are best suited for gathering information on law-abiding citizens.

***

The infrastructure set up by the National Security Agency, however, may only be good for gathering information on the stupidest, lowest-ranking of terrorists. The Prism surveillance program focuses on access to the servers of America’s largest Internet companies, which support such popular services as Skype, Gmail and iCloud. These are not the services that truly dangerous elements typically use.

In a January 2012 report titled “Jihadism on the Web: A Breeding Ground for Jihad in the Modern Age,” the Dutch General Intelligence and Security Service drew a convincing picture of an Islamist Web underground centered around “core forums.” These websites are part of the Deep Web, or Undernet, the multitude of online resources not indexed by commonly used search engines.

The Netherlands’ security service, which couldn’t find recent data on the size of the Undernet, cited a 2003 study from the University of California at Berkeley as the “latest available scientific assessment.” The study found that just 0.2 percent of the Internet could be searched. The rest remained inscrutable and has probably grown since. In 2010, Google Inc. said it had indexed just 0.004 percent of the information on the Internet.

Websites aimed at attracting traffic do their best to get noticed, paying to tailor their content to the real or perceived requirements of search engines such as Google. Terrorists have no such ambitions. They prefer to lurk in the dark recesses of the Undernet.

“People who radicalise under the influence of jihadist websites often go through a number of stages,” the Dutch report said. “Their virtual activities increasingly shift to the invisible Web, their security awareness increases and their activities become more conspiratorial.”

***

Communication on the core forums is often encrypted. In 2012, a French court found nuclear physicist Adlene Hicheur guilty of, among other things, conspiring to commit an act of terror for distributing and using software called Asrar al-Mujahideen, or Mujahideen Secrets. The program employed various cutting-edge encryption methods, including variable stealth ciphers and RSA 2,048-bit keys.

***

Even complete access to these servers brings U.S. authorities no closer to the core forums. These must be infiltrated by more traditional intelligence means, such as using agents posing as jihadists or by informants within terrorist organizations.

Similarly, monitoring phone calls is hardly the way to catch terrorists. They’re generally not dumb enough to use Verizon.

***

At best, the recent revelations concerning Prism and telephone surveillance might deter potential recruits to terrorist causes from using the most visible parts of the Internet. Beyond that, the government’s efforts are much more dangerous to civil liberties than they are to al-Qaeda and other organizations like it.

(And see this.)

Mass Spying Actually HURTS – Rather than Helps – Anti-Terror Efforts

Not yet convinced?

Former NSA executive William Binney – who was the head of the NSA’s entire digital spying program – told Daily Caller that the spying dragnet being carried out by the government is less than useless:

Daily Caller: So it seems logical to ask: Why do we need all of this new data collection when they’re not following up obvious leads, such as an intelligence agency calling and saying you need to be aware of this particular terrorist?

Binney: It’s sensible to ask, but that’s exactly what they’re doing. They’re making themselves dysfunctional by collecting all of this data. They’ve got so much collection capability but they can’t do everything.

***

[All this data gathered is] putting an extra burden on all of their analysts. It’s not something that’s going to help them; it’s something that’s burdensome. There are ways to do the analysis properly, but they don’t really want the solution because if they got it, they wouldn’t be able to keep demanding the money to solve it. I call it their business statement, “Keep the problems going so the money keeps flowing.” It’s all about contracts and money.

***

The issue is, can you figure out what’s important in it? And figure out the intentions and capabilities of the people you’re monitoring? And they are in no way prepared to do that, because that takes analysis. That’s what the big data initiative was all about out of the White House last year. It was to try to get algorithms and figure out what’s important and tell the people what’s important so that they can find things. The probability of them finding what’s really there is low.

Indeed, even before 9/11 – when Binney was building the precursor to the NSA’s current digital collection system – there weren’t enough analysts to look through the more modest amount of data being collected at the time:

The danger of the mass collection of data by the NSA is that it “buries” analysts in data, said Binney, who developed a surveillance program called ThinThread intended to allow the NSA to look at data but not collect it. The NSA dumped that program in favor of more extensive data collection.

“The biggest problem was getting data to a manageable level,” he said. “We didn’t have enough people, we couldn’t hire enough people east of the Mississippi to manage all the data we were getting.”

Terrorism expert Barry Rubins writes:

There is a fallacy behind the current intelligence strategy of the United States, the collection of massive amounts of phone calls, emails, and even credit card expenditures, up to 3 billion phone calls a day alone, not to mention the government spying on the mass media. It is this:

The more quantity of intelligence, the better it is for preventing terrorism.

In the real, practical world this is—though it might seem counterintuitive—untrue. You don’t need–to put it in an exaggerated way–an atomic bomb against a flea. The intelligence budget is not unlimited, is it? Where should hiring priorities be put?

***

It is not the quantity of material that counts but the need to locate and correctly understand the most vital material. This requires your security forces to understand the ideological, psychological, and organizational nature of the threat.

***

If the U.S. government can’t even figure out what the Muslim Brotherhood is like or the dangers of supporting Islamists to take over Syria, or the fact that the Turkish regime is an American enemy, or can’t even teach military officers who the enemy is, what’s it going to do with scores of billions of telephone call traffic to overcome terrorism? It isn’t even using the intelligence material it already has!

If, however, the material is almost limitless, that actually weakens a focus on the most needed intelligence regarding the most likely terrorist threats. Imagine, for example, going through billions of telephone calls even with high-speed computers rather than, say, following up a tip from Russian intelligence on a young Chechen man in Boston who is in contact with terrorists or, for instance, the communications between a Yemeni al-Qaida leader and a U.S. army major who is assigned as a psychiatrist to Fort Hood.

That is why the old system of getting warrants, focusing on individual email addresses, or sites, or telephones makes sense, at least if it is only used properly. Then those people who are communicating with known terrorists can be traced further. There are no technological magic spells. If analysts are incompetent … and leaders unwilling to take proper action, who cares how much data was collected?

***

Decision-makers and intelligence analysts only have so many hours in the day. There can only be so many meetings; only so many priorities. And the policymaking pyramid narrows rapidly toward the top. There is a point of diminishing returns for the size of an intelligence bureaucracy. Lower-priority tasks proliferate; too much paper is generated and meetings are held; the system clogs when it has too much data.

PC World reports:

“In knowing a lot about a lot of different people [the data collection] is great for that,” said Mike German, a former Federal Bureau of Investigation special agent whose policy counsel for national security at the American Civil Liberties Union. “In actually finding the very few bad actors that are out there, not so good.”

The mass collection of data from innocent people “won’t tell you how guilty people act,” German added. The problem with catching terrorism suspects has never been the inability to collect information, but to analyze the “oceans” of information collected, he said.

Mass data collection is “like trying to look for needles by building bigger haystacks,” added Wendy Grossman, a freelance technology writer who helped organize the conference.

New Republic notes:

This kind of dragnet-style data capture simply doesn’t keep us safe.

First, intelligence and law enforcement agencies are increasingly drowning in data; the more that comes in, the harder it is to stay afloat. Most recently, the failure of the intelligence community to intercept the 2009 “underwear bomber” was blamed in large part on a surfeit of information: according to an official White House review, a significant amount of critical information was “embedded in a large volume of other data.” Similarly, the independent investigation of the alleged shootings by U.S. Army Major Nidal Hasan at Fort Hood concluded that the “crushing volume” of information was one of the factors that hampered the FBI’s analysis before the attack.

Multiple security officials have echoed this assessment. As one veteran CIA agent told The Washington Post in 2010, “The problem is that the system is clogged with information. Most of it isn’t of interest, but people are afraid not to put it in.” A former Department of Homeland Security official told a Senate subcommittee that there was “a lot of data clogging the system with no value.” Even former Defense Secretary Robert Gates acknowledged that “we’ve built tremendous capability, but do we have more than we need?” And the NSA itself was brought to a grinding halt before 9/11 by the “torrent of data” pouring into the system, leaving the agency “brain-dead” for half a week and “[unable] to process information,” as its then-director Gen. Michael Hayden publicly acknowledged.

National security hawks say there’s a simple answer to this glut: data mining. The NSA has apparently described its computer systems as having the ability to “manipulate and analyze huge volumes of data at mind-boggling speeds.” Could those systems pore through this information trove to come up with unassailable patterns of terrorist activity? The Department of Defense and security experts have concluded that the answer is no: There is simply no known way to effectively anticipate terrorist threats.

***

The FBI’s and NSA’s scheme is an affront to democratic values. Let’s also not pretend it’s an effective and efficient way of keeping us safe.

Fortune writes that the NSA’s “big data” strategy is ineffective:

The evidence for big data is scant at best. To date, large fields of data have generated meaningful insights at times, but not on the scale many have promised. This disappointment has been documented in the Wall Street Journal, Information Week, and SmartData Collective.

***

According to my firm’s research, local farmers in India with tiny fields frequently outperform — in productivity and sustainability — a predictive global model developed by one of the world’s leading agrochemical companies. Why? Because they develop unique planting, fertilizing, or harvesting practices linked to the uniqueness of their soil, their weather pattern, or the rare utilization of some compost. There is more to learn from a local Indian outlier than from building a giant multivariate yield prediction model of all farms in the world. The same is true for terrorism. Don’t look for a needle in a giant haystack. Find one needle in a small clump of hay and see whether similar clumps of hay also contain needles.

You need local knowledge to glean insights from any data. I once ran a data-mining project with Wal-Mart (WMT) where we tried to figure out sales patterns in New England. One of the questions was, “Why are our gun sales lower in Massachusetts than in other states, even accounting for the liberal bias of the state?” The answer: There were city ordinances prohibiting the sale of guns in many towns. I still remember the disappointed look of my client when he realized the answer had come from a few phone calls to store managers rather than from a multivariate regression model.

So, please, Mr. President, stop building your giant database in the sky and quit hoping that algorithm experts will generate a terrorist prevention strategy from that data. Instead, rely on your people in the field to detect suspicious local patterns of behavior, communication, or spending, then aggregate data for the folks involved and let your data hounds loose on these focused samples. You and I will both sleep better. And I won’t have to worry about who is lurking in the shadows of my business or bedroom.

Security expert Bruce Schneier explained in 2005:

Many believe data mining is the crystal ball that will enable us to uncover future terrorist plots. But even in the most wildly optimistic projections, data mining isn’t tenable for that purpose. We’re not trading privacy for security; we’re giving up privacy and getting no security in return.

***

The promise of data mining is compelling, and convinces many. But it’s wrong. We’re not going to find terrorist plots through systems like this, and we’re going to waste valuable resources chasing down false alarms.

***

Data-mining systems won’t uncover any terrorist plots until they are very accurate, and that even very accurate systems will be so flooded with false alarms that they will be useless.

All data-mining systems fail in two different ways: false positives and false negatives.

***

Data mining for terrorist plots will be sloppy, and it’ll be hard to find anything useful.

***

When it comes to terrorism, however, trillions of connections exist between people and events — things that the data-mining system will have to “look at” — and very few plots. This rarity makes even accurate identification systems useless.

Let’s look at some numbers. We’ll be optimistic — we’ll assume the system has a one in 100 false-positive rate (99 percent accurate), and a one in 1,000 false-negative rate (99.9 percent accurate). Assume 1 trillion possible indicators to sift through: that’s about 10 events — e-mails, phone calls, purchases, web destinations, whatever — per person in the United States per day. Also assume that 10 of them are actually terrorists plotting.

This unrealistically accurate system will generate 1 billion false alarms for every real terrorist plot it uncovers. Every day of every year, the police will have to investigate 27 million potential plots in order to find the one real terrorist plot per month. Raise that false-positive accuracy to an absurd 99.9999 percent and you’re still chasing 2,750 false alarms per day — but that will inevitably raise your false negatives, and you’re going to miss some of those 10 real plots.

This isn’t anything new. In statistics, it’s called the “base rate fallacy,” and it applies in other domains as well. For example, even highly accurate medical tests are useless as diagnostic tools if the incidence of the disease is rare in the general population. Terrorist attacks are also rare, any “test” is going to result in an endless stream of false alarms.

This is exactly the sort of thing we saw with the NSA’s eavesdropping program: the New York Times reported that the computers spat out thousands of tips per month. Every one of them turned out to be a false alarm.

And the cost was enormous — not just for the FBI agents running around chasing dead-end leads instead of doing things that might actually make us safer, but also the cost in civil liberties.

***

Finding terrorism plots is not a problem that lends itself to data mining. It’s a needle-in-a-haystack problem, and throwing more hay on the pile doesn’t make that problem any easier. We’d be far better off putting people in charge of investigating potential plots and letting them direct the computers, instead of putting the computers in charge and letting them decide who should be investigated.

Schneier noted in 2008:

According to a massive report from the National Research Council, data mining for terrorists doesn’t work.

NBC News reports:

Casting such wide nets is also ineffective, [security researcher Ashkan Soltani] argues. Collecting mountains and mountains of data simply means that when the time comes to find that proverbial needle in a haystack, you’ve simply created a bigger haystack.”Law enforcement is being sold bill of goods that the more data you get, the better your security is. We find that is not true,” Soltani said.

Collecting data is a hard habit to break, as many U.S. corporations have discovered after years of expensive data breaches. The NSA’s data hoard may be useful in future investigations, helping agents in the future in unpredictable ways, some argue. Schneier doesn’t buy it.

“The NSA has this fetish for data, and will get it any way they can, and get as much as they can,” he said. “But old ladies who hoard newspapers say the same thing, that someday, this might be useful.”

Even worse, an overreliance on Big Data surveillance will shift focus from other security techniques that are both less invasive and potentially more effective, like old-fashioned “spycraft,” Soltani says.

Nassim Taleb writes:

Big data may mean more information, but it also means more false information.

***

Because of excess data as compared to real signals, someone looking at history from the vantage point of a library will necessarily find many more spurious relationships than one who sees matters in the making; he will be duped by more epiphenomena. Even experiments can be marred with bias, especially when researchers hide failed attempts or formulate a hypothesis after the results — thus fitting the hypothesis to the experiment (though the bias is smaller there).

This is the tragedy of big data: The more variables, the more correlations that can show significance. Falsity also grows faster than information; it is nonlinear (convex) with respect to data (this convexity in fact resembles that of a financial option payoff). Noise is antifragile. Source: N.N. Taleb

If big data leads to more false correlations, then mass surveillance may lead to more false accusations of terrorism.

(Just what we need …)

...

hanshan
 
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