Declassified CIA doc. propaganda-"controlled..assets&am

[Hugh Manatee Wins]

A declassified March 1960 CIA plan for a coup against Fidel Castro in Cuba includes-

"Controlled Western Hemisphere assets (press, radio, television) will support this mission as will selected American journalists who will be briefed prior to Latin American travel."

That almost 50 years ago. Consider how "controlled" the CIA's press assets are now.
Here's a document planning what later became the Bay of Pigs disastrously failed CIA coup of April 1961.

****

http://www.shafr.org/newsletter/2002/sep/covert.htm

RESEARCH NOTE: "A PROGRAM FOR COVERT ACTION AGAINST THE CASTRO REGIME, 16 MARCH 1960"

by David J. Ulbrich, Temple University

The end of the Cold War precipitated the release of many previously classified documents. This in turn has allowed historians to determine with a greater degree of certainty what actually took place during the Cold War. For example, full declassification of "A Program for Covert Action Against the Castro Regime, 16 March 1960" occurred in 9 April 1998 under the auspices of the John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Review Board.(1)

The "Program for Covert Action" provides a window into an inner circle of the Eisenhower Administration. Although he admitted later in 1965 to directing the Central Intelligence Agency to train an armed force of Cuban exiles in March 1960, Dwight D. Eisenhower refused to acknowledge any discussion of operational or tactical plans during his presidency. He did not wish to be associated with the fiasco at the Bay of Pigs (Playa GirÛn) in April 1961.(2) Before 1998, evidence about Eisenhower's role in the programming stages for covert operations in Cuba remained unclear. Historians have nonetheless gleaned much of the content of the "Program for Covert Action" through their use of earlier redactions and other primary sources.

This research note briefly recounts the historical context of the "Program for Covert Action." Next, the fully declassified text appears in total. This research note then traces the declassification process over time. Almost twenty secondary sources cite this document's various incarnations. Lastly, this research note makes some observations about this document's significance in light of Eisenhower's efforts to distance himself from what would become the Bay of Pigs invasion.

In the months after Fidel Castro seized power in Cuba in January 1959, Eisenhower and his advisors assessed his regime to be a threat to American interests in the region. They attempted to apply lessons learned in Guatemala in 1954 to the situation in Cuba.(3) The president feared that Latin American nations might fall like dominos if Castro exported his revolution. The spread of communism threatened economic stability and political harmony would be lost. U.S.-Cuban relations soured commensurately.(4) By early 1960, Eisenhower went so far as to call Castro a "mad man,"(5) and a "little Hitler.(6)

Consideration of covert activities directed against the Castro regime began in earnest many weeks before the "Program for Covert Action" appeared in document form. In January 1960, the secretive "5412 Group" took up the task or reviewing and approving possible CIA covert operations to get Castro out of Cuba.(7) The 5412 Group had been created by National Security Council policy directive NSC 5412/2 in December 1955.(8) Although authorization for covert operations ultimately came from the president, the 5412 Group acted as a buffer between President Eisenhower and his National Security Council, the latter of which did not deal with covert operations. Shrouded in secrecy, the 5412 Group allowed Eisenhower to maintain plausible deniability regarding his direct involvement in covert operations. Its membership included the undersecretary of state, the deputy secretary of defense, the special assistant for national security affairs, the director of central intelligence, and "designated representatives" from the Departments of State and Defense.(9)

After much work within the CIA, Director of Central Intelligence Allen W. Dulles presented a draft of "A Program for Covert Action Against the Castro Regime, 16 March 1960" to the 5412 Group.

[The fully declassified text follows in its entirety.]

16 March 1960

A PROGRAM OF COVERT ACTION AGAINST THE CASTRO REGIME

1. Objective: The purpose of the program outlined herein is to bring about the replacement of the Castro regime with one more devoted to the interests of the Cuban people and more acceptable to the U.S. in such a manner as to avoid any appearance of U.S. intervention. Essentially the method of accomplishing this will be to induce, support, and so far as possible direct action, both inside and outside of CUBA, by selected groups of Cubans of a sort that they might be expected to and could undertake on their own initiative. Since a crisis inevitably entailing drastic action in or toward Cuba could be provoked by circumstances beyond control of the U.S. before the covert action program has accomplished its objective, every effort will be made to carry it out in such a way as progressively to improve the capability of the U. S. to act in a crisis.

2. Summary Outline: This program contemplates four major courses of action:
a. The first requirement is the creation of a responsible, appealing and unified Cuban opposition to the Castro regime, publicly declared as such and therefore necessarily located outside of Cuba. It is hoped that within one mouth a political entity can be formed in the shape of a council or junta, through the merger of three acceptable opposition groups with which the Central Intelligence Agency is already in contact. The council will be encouraged to adopt as its slogan "Restore the Revolution", to develop a political position consistent with that slogan, and to address itself to the Cuban people as an attractive political alternative to Castro. This vocal opposition will: serve as a magnet for the loyalties of the Cubans; in actuality conduct and direct various opposition activities; and provide cover for other compartmented CIA controlled operations. (Tab A)
b. So that the opposition may be heard and Castro's basis of popular support undermined, it is necessary to develop the means for mass communication to the Cuban people so that a powerful propaganda offensive can be initiated in the name of the declared opposition. The major tool proposed to be used for this purpose is a long and short wave gray broadcasting facility, probably to be located on Swan Island. The target date for its completion is two months. This will be supplemented by broadcasting from U.S. commercial facilities paid for by private Cuban groups and by the clandestine distribution of written material inside the country. (Tab B)
c. Work is already in progress in the creation of a covert intelligence and action organization within Cuba which will be responsible to the orders and directions of the "exile" opposition. Such a network must have effective communication and be selectively manned to minimize the risk of penetration. An effective organization can probably be created within 60 days. Its role will be to provide hard intelligence, to arrange for the illegal infiltration and exfiltration of individuals, to assist in the internal distribution of illegal propaganda, and to plan and organize for the defection of key Individuals and groups as directed.
d. Preparations have already been made for the development of an adequate paramilitary force outside of Cuba, together with mechanisms for the necessary logistic support of covert military operation on the island. Initially a cadre of leaders will be recruited after careful screening and trained with military instructors. In a second phase a number of paramilitary cadres will be trained at secure locations outside of the U.S. so as to be available for immediate deployment into Cuba to organize, train and lead resistance forces recruited there both before and after the establishment of one or more active centers of resistance. The creation of this capability will require a minimum of six months and probably closer to eight. In the meanwhile, a limited air capability for resupply and for infiltration and exfiltration already exists under CIA control and can be rather easily expanded if and when the situation requires. Within two months it is hoped to parallel this with a small air resupply capability under deep cover as a commercial operation in another country.

3. Leadership: It is important to avoid distracting and devisive rivalry among the outstanding Cuban opposition leaders for the senior role in the opposition. Accordingly, every effort will be made to have an eminent, non ambitious, politically uncontentious chairman selected. The emergence of a successor to Castro should follow careful assessment of the various personalities active in the opposition to identify the one who can attract, control, and lead the several forces. As the possibility of an overthrough of Castro becomes more imminent, the senior leader must be selected, U.S. support focused upon him, and his build up undertaken.

4. Cover: All actions undertaken by CIA in support and on behalf of the opposition council will, of course, be explained as activities of that entity (insofar as the actions become publicly known at all). The CIA will, however, have to have direct contacts with a certain number of Cubans and, to protect these, will make use of a carefully screened group of U.S. businessmen with a stated interest in Cuban affairs and desire to support the opposition. They will act as a funding mechanism and channel for guidance and support to the directorate of the opposition under controlled conditions. CIA personnel will be documented as representatives of this group. In order to strengthen the cover it is hoped that substantial funds can be raised from private sources to support the opposition. $100,000 has already been pledged from U.S. sources. At an appropriate time a bond issue will be floated by the council (as an obligation on a future Cuban government) to raise an additional $2,000,000.

5. Budget: It to anticipated that approximately $4,400,000 of CIA funds will be required for the above program. On the assumption that it will not reach its culmination earlier than 6 to 8 months from now, the estimated requirements for FY 1960 funds is $900,000 with the balance of $3,500,000 required in FY 1961. The distribution of costs between fiscal years could, of course, be greatly altered by policy decisions or unforeseen contingencies which compelled accelerated paramilitary operations. (Tab C)

6. Recommendations: That the Central Intelligence Agency be authorized to undertake the above outlined program and to withdraw the funds required for this purpose as set forth in paragraph 5. from the Agency's Reserve for contingencies.

Tab A

THE POLITICAL OPPOSITION

1. The CIA is already in close touch with three reputable opposition groups (the Montecristi, Autentico Party and the National Democratic Front). These all meet the fundamental criteria conditional to acceptance, i.e. they are for the revolution as originally conceived--many being former 26th of July members and are not identified with either Batista or Trujillo. They are anti Castro because of his failure to live up to the 26th of July platform and his apparent willingness to sell out to Communist domination and possible ultimate enslavement. These groups, therefore, fit perfectly the planned opposition slogan of "Restore the Revolution".

2. An opposition Council or Junta will be formed within 30 days from representatives of these groups augmented possibly by representatives of other groups. It is probably premature to have a fixed platform for the Council but the Caracas Manifesto of 20 July 1958 contains a number of exploitable points. Two of the CIA group leaders were signers of the Manifesto. The following points are suggested as a few possibilities:
a. The Castro regime is the new dictatorship of Cuba subject to strong Sino Soviet influence.
b. Cuba is entitled to an honest, democratic government based on free elections. There is no hope of this as long as Castro throttles the rights of legitimate political parties and the freedom of expression.
c. A realistic agrarian reform program providing for individual ownership of the land must be put into effect.
d. Individual freedoms must be restored and collectivism in commerce and education must be eliminated
e. Sino-Soviet influence in the affairs of Cuba must be eliminated. A special research group of Cubans with American support is planned to refine and expand these planks and to produce propaganda materials based on the above platform for use by and on behalf of the opposition Council.

Tab B

PROPAGANDA

1. Articulation and transmission of opposition views has already begun. Private opposition broadcasts (i.e. purchase of commercial time by private individuals) have occurred In Miami (medium wave) and arrangements have been made with Station WRUL for additional broadcasts from Massachusetts (short wave) and Florida (broadcast band). Presidents Betancourt and Ydigoras have also agreed to the use of commercial stations for short wave broadcasts from Caracas and Guatemala City. CIA has furnished support to these efforts through encouragement, negotiating help and providing some broadcast material.

2. As the major voice of the opposition, it is proposed to establish at least one "gray" U.S.-controlled station. This will probably be on Swan Island and will employ both high frequency and broadcast band equipment of substantial power. The preparation of scripts will be done in the U.S. and these will be transmitted electronically to the site for broadcasting. After some experience and as the operation progresses, it way be desirable to supplement the Swan Island station with at least one other to ensure fully adequate coverage of all parts of Cuba, most especially the Havana region. Such an additional facility might be installed on a U.S. base in the Bahamas or temporary use might be made of a shipborne station if it is desired to avoid "gray" broadcasting from Florida.

3. Newspapers are also being supported and further support is planned for the future. Avance, a leading Cuban daily (Zayas' paper), has been confiscated as has El Mundo, another Cuban daily. Diario de la Marina, one of the hemisphere's outstanding conservative dailies published in Havana, is having difficulty and may have to close soon. Arrangements have already been made to print Avance weekly in the U.S. for introduction into Cuba clandestinely and mailing throughout the hemisphere on a regular basis. As other leading newspapers are expropriated, publication of "exile" editions will be considered.

4. Inside Cuba, a CIA controlled action group is producing and distributing anti Castro and anti Communist publications regularly. CIA is in contact with groups outside Cuba who will be assisted in producing similar materials for clandestine introduction into Cuba.

5. Two prominent Cubans are on lecture tours in Latin America. They will be followed by others of equal calibre. The mission of these men will be to gain hemisphere support for the opposition to Castro. Controlled Western Hemisphere assets (press, radio, television) will support this mission as will selected American journalists who will be briefed prior to Latin American travel.

Tab C

Financial Annex
I. Political Action FY-1960 FY-1961

Support of Opposition Elements and other Group Activities 150,000 800,000

II. Propaganda

Radio Operations and Programming (including establishment of transmitters) 400,000 700,000

Press and Publications 100,000 500,000

III. Paramilitary

In-Exfiltration Maritime and Air Support Material and Training 200,000 1,300,000

IV. Intelligence Collection 50,000 200,000

Totals 900,000 3,500,000



*These figures are based on the assumption that major action will not occur until FY-1961. If by reason of policy decisions or other contingencies over which the Agency cannot exercise control, the action program should be accelerated, additional funds will be required.

[End of documents]

After endorsing it, the 5412 Group sent it on to Eisenhower for approval. An unsigned, undated memorandum accompanying the "Program for Covert Action" stated that, "This document is our basic policy paper. It was approved by the president at a meeting in the White House on 17 March 1960."(10) The minutes for this meeting depict a supportive president. Following his modus operandi, Eisenhower allowed discussion and debate among his advisors and asked questions as he saw fit. He emphasized that any CIA or American involvement in ousting Castro should remain indirect and untraceable. Operation PLUTO was born.(11) Later in 1960, PLUTO evolved into Operation TRINIDAD, an operation that called for anti-Castro forces to invade Cuba near the city of Trinidad and then carry on a guerilla war in the Escambray Mountains. When these objectives became impractical, Operation ZAPATA replaced TRINIDAD in March 1961. ZAPATA called for the invasion at the Bay of Pigs that occurred one month later on 17 April. (12)

The "Program for Covert Action" has surfaced in several redacted forms over the last few decades. Researchers often made requests for declassification because of some historical incident or political influence. Likewise, historical incidents or political influences certainly affected decisions to deny or limit the release of information in those requests. Thus, tracking the various redactions reveals as much about the declassification process as it does about American foreign relations.(13)

Historians cite sanitized segments of the "Program for Covert Action" in the "Taylor Committee Report and Memorandum for Record of Paramilitary Study Group Meetings."(14) In the immediate aftermath of the botched Bay of Pigs operation in April 1961, then-President John F. Kennedy appointed U.S. Army General Maxwell Taylor to preside over a board of inquiry. His so-called "Taylor Committee" investigated Operation ZAPATA in May and June of 1961. Many people vital in both planning and operational stages offered testimony, most of which was classified. One of the Taylor Committee's memoranda contained an overview of the "Program for Covert Action." Historians have teased some basic tenets out of this document, but Eisenhower's involvement remains unclear.(15)

Other historians make reference to President Eisenhower's own Waging Peace as evidence about his role in covert activities directed against the Castro regime. Eisenhower's memoir briefly mentions the meeting on 17 March 1960 in which the CIA "was ordered to organize the training of Cuban exiles, mainly in Guatemala, against a possible future day when they might return to their homeland." He clearly feared that Cuba was becoming a communist satellite, an outcome "that the United States could not tolerate."(16) Specific plans, however, do not appear in Waging Peace. Because Eisenhower neither cited nor mentioned the "Program for Covert Action," historians have used his memoir primarily to gauge his temperament in March 1960.(17)

The most frequently cited version of the "Program for Covert Action" can be found, albeit in sanitized form, in the records of the "Church Committee."(18) Chaired by Senator Frank Church (D-Idaho) during 1975 and 1976, this U.S. Senate Select Committee investigated the CIA for plotting assassinations and performing other covert operations. Increased awareness of the CIA's clandestine activities had alarmed Congress and the American people. Moreover, the Watergate scandal and the Vietnam debacle had offered scant reassurance that the United States government was trustworthy or dependable. Documents in the Congressional Record have allowed historians to determine many elements of the Operations PLUTO, TRINIDAD, and ZAPATA. Likewise, attitudes of individuals and groups also show through in the transcripts and other evidence. Still, specific details of the "Program for Covert Action" in the Church Committee's records remain excised.(19)

Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958-1960 (FRUS), Volume VI, Cuba contains a redaction of the "Program for Covert Action." Document selection for this volume occurred during 1985 and 1986, and the finished product appeared in print in 1991.(20) This much-sanitized and fragmented redaction leaves the reader with an incomplete understanding of the document's significance. It mentions four "courses of action" to be taken against the Castro regime and the authorization for the CIA to perform those courses of action. But, because much information in the Tabs A, B, and C remains sanitized in this version, historians can make only cursory observations about the "Program for Covert Action."(21)

Other secondary sources refer to various redactions of the "Program for Covert Action" held by the Dwight D. Eisenhower Library in Abilene, Kansas. The Eisenhower Library received its copy of the document from CIA Archives in December 1974.(22) Researchers have since filed mandatory review requests for the declassification of this document because they realized its potential value.

According to the mandatory review process outlined in Executive Order 11652 in 1972 and subsequent executive orders, government agencies of origin must review classified documents. In the case of the CIA, only its own authorized personnel may perform such reviews because requested documents may contain sensitive material. Gaining access to classified materials becomes further complicated because the Freedom of Information Act of 1966 (FOIA) and its amendments do not necessarily apply to presidential paper collections created prior to 20 January 1981, a date set by the Presidential Records Act of 1978 to coincide with the beginning of the Reagan presidency. The previous Presidential Libraries Act of 1955 covers the vast majority of materials at the Eisenhower Library.(23)

Access to the particular copy of the "Program for Covert Action" held at the Eisenhower Library could not be obtained through the FOIA review process. Researchers filed mandatory review requests for the "Program for Covert Action" in 1977 and again in 1979. The CIA denied both requests in full in 1979 and 1981, respectively. Another researcher submitted another request for the document in 1984. Responding in 1986, the CIA permitted the release of portions of the document that had already been declassified under E.O. 12965. In 1988 and later in 1995, the CIA approved declassification of more portions of the "Program for Covert Action."(24) Even when successful in the mandatory review process, however, researchers only received a sanitized version of the document.(25) Although the exact reasons for mandatory review requests have not been ascertained, the furor over the Iran-Contra Affair in the late 1980s doubtlessly sparked attempts by researchers to break down classification barriers.

Independent of other efforts, the National Security Archive submitted a FOIA request in 1996 directly to the CIA for "The Inspector General's Survey of the Cuban Operation," otherwise known as the "Kirkpatrick Report" to acknowledge CIA Inspector General Lyman Kirkpatrick as its author. This report contains the "Program for Covert Action" in an appendix. The Kirkpatrick Report represents the "holy grail" among documents on the Bay of Pigs operation. Two years later in 1998, the CIA released this important report to the National Security Archive. It should be noted that Tab A, Paragraph 2, Sections b, c, d, and e, and several proper names in Tab B Paragraph 1 in the "Program for Covert Action" remain excised in the Kirkpatrick Report as it appears in the Bay of Pigs Declassified.(26)

Scholars founded the National Security Archive in 1985. Receiving no government support, this entity sustains itself with grants from private sources and revenues from publications. The National Security Archive has attempted to open classified materials for the public and has then served as a non-governmental repository for those materials. Many documents are available in print or on line. Its systematic use of the FOIA helped to spur the declassification process.(27)

All of the sources cited above, nevertheless, do contain excised sections. They do not reveal the extent of Eisenhower's interest in overthrowing Castro. Nor do they indicate the specificity of the "program" prepared with his knowledge and authorization. The story would become clearer by 1998.

In 1991, Oliver Stone's film JFK served as the "final catalyst," albeit an unintended catalyst, for the eventual release of thousands government documents such as the "Program for Covert Action." Stone's film, though more fiction than history, aroused suspicions about conspiracies surrounding President John F. Kennedy's assassination in 1963. As a result, a bipartisan Congress passed the President John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992 (hereafter JFK Act) to open the classified records and calm the public's anxieties. This act, according to diplomatic historian Anna K. Nelson, also helped "crack open the doors to the inner sanctums of the CIA, FBI, and other intelligence agencies."(28)

To hold government agencies accountable, the JFK Act established the John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Review Board (KARRB) to be composed of several scholars in April 1994. This independent review board worked over the next four years "to re-examine for release the records that the agencies still regarded as too sensitive to open to the public" and "to help restore government credibility."(29) The KARRB received "extraordinary powers of oversight" to release previously classified documents such as the "Program for Covert Action." Only a sitting president could overturn its decisions. The KARRB expanded its scope of archival inquiry as widely as possible by opening all documents relevant to the assassination that could "enrich the historical record." As of September 1998, the KARRB voted to release 29,420 documents including the "Program for Covert Action." Government agencies often released the requested documents in question independently on the assumption that the KARRB would vote to do so; these so-called "consent releases" allowed for declassification of another 33,176 documents. In all, the KARRB's drew from almost forty Record Groups and six Presidential Libraries.(30) Not all these thousands of documents were completely declassified, however. Nelson and other historians lament the fact that a "culture of secrecy" prevails in so many government agencies.(31)

In conclusion, Eisenhower denied responsibility in 1965 for what would become the failed invasion at the Bay of Pigs. He argued instead that his role in 1960 included only formulating a preliminary "program" rather than constructing any operational or tactical "plans" to oust Castro. Although perhaps correct in a rigidly defined sense, Eisenhower's statements did not tell the whole story. The "Program for Covert Action" included no tactical matters such as the number of support aircraft or the size of an invasion force.(32) Yet, it did mention specific people, groups, places, contingencies, timetables, budgets, and recommendations. Eisenhower's disavowal of his involvement in "programming" but not "planning" thus seems to be semantic and evasive.(33) The "Program of Covert Action" also bears witness to commercial, security, and ideological considerations as well as belligerent and paranoid mindsets that affected the Eisenhower Administration to one degree or another.

The full declassification "Program for Covert Action" provides a more accurate representation of President Eisenhower's interest in covert operations in Cuba. Herein lies this document's historical value. The evolution of its redactions serves as a case study of the declassification process and adds to the understanding of the historiography of Eisenhower's foreign policy.

[David J. Ulbrich is currently a doctoral student in history at Temple University and an adjunct instructor in history at the University of Delaware. Thanks should go to William Brinker, David Haight, Linda Jones Hall, James W. Hilty, Richard H. Immerman, Peter Kornbluh, Jim Leyerzapf, Anna K. Nelson, and Kevin E. Smith for their advice and assistance. Special thanks should also go to Bennett Lovett-Graff and Barbara Pandaru of Gale Group's Primary Source Media for funding the project out of which this research note grew.]

1. "A Program for Covert Action Against the Castro Regime, 16 March 1960," Folder "CIA Policy re Cuba (17 March 1960)," White House Office, Office of the Staff Secretary, International Series, Box 4, Dwight D. Eisenhower Library, Abilene, Kansas (hereafter EL). For other archival materials on the Bay of Pigs, see "Records Relating to the Paramilitary Invasions of Cuba at the Bay of Pigs, April 1960," 5 Boxes, Record Group 263 National Archives and Records Administration, College Park, Maryland (hereafter NA).

2. Earl Mazo, "Ike Speaks Out: Bay of Pigs was all JFK's," Newsday, 10 September 1965, 50; see also Folder "May [2]," "Principle Files," Post-Presidential Papers, 1965, Box 38, EL. Stephen E. Ambrose, with Richard H. Immerman, Ike's Spies: Eisenhower and the Espionage Establishment (Doubleday, 1981; Mississippi Press, 1999), 315.

3. See Richard H. Immerman, The CIA in Guatemala: The Foreign Policy of Intervention (U of Texas Press, 1982); Piero Gleijeses, Shattered Hope: The Guatemalan Revolution and the United States, (Princeton, 1991); Nick Cullather, Secret History: The CIA's Classified Account of its Operations in Guatemala, 1952-1954, Introduction by Nick Cullather and Afterword by Piero Gleijeses (Stanford U Press, 1999).

4. For examples, see Edward Gonzalez, "The United States and Castro: Breaking the Deadlock," Foreign Affairs 50 (July 1972): 722-30; Peter Wyden, The Bay of Pigs: The Untold Story (Simon and Schuster, 1979); Ambrose with Immerman, Ike's Spies; Richard E. Welch, Jr., The Response to Revolution: The United States and the Cuban Revolution, 1959-1961 (U of North Carolina Press, 1985); John Prados, Presidents' Secret Wars: CIA and Pentagon Covert Operations Since World War II (Morrow, 1986), Stephen Rabe, Eisenhower and Latin America: The Foreign Policy of Anticommunism (U of North Carolina Press, 1988); Thomas G. Paterson, Contesting Castro: The United States and the Triumph of the Cuban Revolution (Oxford, 1994); Louis A. PÈrez, Cuba and the United States: Ties of Singular Intimacy, 2nd ed. (U of Georgia Press, 1997). See also memoranda and minutes from 1959 and 1960 in Foreign Relations of the United States 1958-1960, vol. VI, Cuba (GPO, 1991), 541-543, 740-746, 750-751, 760-765, (hereafter FRUS, 1958-1960, VI, Cuba).

5. FRUS, 1958-1960, VI, Cuba, 764; see also James M. Keagle, "The Eisenhower Administration, Castro, and Cuba, 1959-1961," in Dwight D. Eisenhower, ed. Joann P. Krieg, (Greenwood, 1987), 212.

6. Notations in Eisenhower's personal calendar, 5-6 July 1960, Ann C. Whitman Diary, July, 1960 (2) File, Ann Whitman Diary Series, Ann Whitman File, Box 11, EL, cited in Steven F. Grover, "U.S.-Cuban Relations, 1953-1958: A Test of Eisenhower Revisionism," in Eisenhower: A Centenary Assessment, ed. Gunter Bischof and Stephen E. Ambrose (Louisiana State Press, 1995), 243.

7. Anna K. Nelson, "The Importance of Foreign Policy Process: Eisenhower and the National Security Council," in Eisenhower: A Centenary Assessment, ed. Gunter Bischof and Stephen E. Ambrose, (Louisiana State U Press, 1995), 113; Prados, The Presidents' Secret Wars, 175-176; Ambrose with Immerman; Ike's Spies, 307-310.

8. For more information, see Folder "NSC 5412 - Covert Operations," NSC Series, Policy Papers Subseries, Records of the White Office of the Special Assistant for National Security Affairs, Box 10, EL; Folders "President's Papers 1955 (1)" and "President's Papers 1955 (7)," Special Assistant's Series, Presidential Subseries, Records of the Special Assistant for National Security Affairs, Box 2, EL; Folder "Pending Material 1957 (4)," Special Assistant's Series, Presidential Subseries, Records of the Special Assistant for National Security Affairs, Box 3, EL.

9. William Leary, ed., The Central Intelligence Agency: History and Documents (U of Alabama Press, 1984), 63; Wayne G. Jackson, Allen Welch Dulles as Director of Central Intelligence: 26 February 1953 - 29 November 1961, vol. III, Covert Activities, 115-118, 161-162, (1973 [partially declassified in 1994]), Accession Number NN3-263-94-011, NA; Wyden, The Bay of Pigs, 24; Ambrose with Immerman, Ike's Spies, 240-241.

10. Unsigned and undated document, Folder "CIA Policy re Cuba (17 March 1960)," White Office, Office of the Staff Secretary, International Series, Box 4, EL.

11. For meeting minutes, see FRUS, 1958-1960, VI, Cuba, 861-863; for one sentence which has since been declassified, see "Memorandum of a Conference with the President," 17 March 1960, Folder "Intelligence Matters (14)," Records of the White House Staff Secretary, Subject Series, Alphabetical Subseries, Box 15, EL. Jackson, Allen Welsh Dulles as Director of Central Intelligence, 116-119; Ambrose with Immerman, Ike's Spies, 307-310; Prados, The Presidents' Secret Wars, 175-179; Piero Gleijeses, "Ships in the Night: The CIA, the White House and the Bay of Pigs," Journal of Latin American Studies 27 (February 1995): 2-13; Wyden, Bay of Pigs, 24-25.

12. Immerman, The CIA in Guatemala, 194; Wyden, Bay of Pigs, 89, 99-102; Richard M. Bissell, Jr., et al., Reflections of a Cold Warrior: From Yalta to the Bay of Pigs (Yale U Press, 1996), 156, 170, 190; James G. Blight and Peter Kornbluh, eds., Politics of Illusion: The Bay of Pigs Invasion Reexamined (Lynne Rienner, 1998), 38-58.

13. For a general discussion of "declassificaton analysis," see Marc Trachtenberg, A Constructed Peace: The Making of the European Settlement, 1945-1963 (Princeton U Press, 1999), 403; http://www.polisci.ucla.edu/faculty/trachtenberg (26 August 2002).

14. Memorandum No. 1, "Narrative of the Anti-Castro Cuban Operation Zapata," 13 June 1961, cited in Operation Zapata: The 'Ultrasensative' Report and Testimony of the Board of Inquiry on the Bay of Pigs, with an Introduction by Luis Aguilar (Frederick, MD: UPA, 1981), 3-4. A partially declassified version of the Taylor Committee's report can be found in FRUS, 1961-1963, vol. X, Cuba, 1961-1962 (Washington, DC: GPO, 1997), 675-700; document selection and declassification review for this FRUS volume was completed in 1996. Excerpts of the Taylor Committee's report which were declassified in 2000 are also available on the National Security Archive's website at http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB29/insex.html (3 August 2002). (3 August 2002).

15. For references, see Immerman, CIA In Guatemala, 188-197; Richard E. Welch, Jr., The Response to Revolution: The United States and the Cuban Revolution, 1959-1961 (U of North Carolina, 1985), 48-49; Trumbull Huggins, The Perfect Failure: Kennedy, Eisenhower, and the CIA at the Bay of Pigs (W.W. Norton, 1987), 49-51; Jackson, Allen Welch Dulles as Director of Central Intelligence, 118; Rabe, Eisenhower and Latin America, 127-130.

16. Dwight D. Eisenhower, Waging Peace, 1956-1961 (Doubleday, 1965), 520-525, 533-4, 630-631.

17. For references, see Ambrose with Immerman, Ike's Spies, 309-313; Welch, The Response to Revolution, 48-49; Huggins, The Perfect Failure, 49-51; Loretta Sharon Wyatt, "Reform, Yes; Communism, No! Eisenhower's Policy on Latin American Revolutions," in Dwight D. Eisenhower, ed. Joann P. Krieg (Greenwood, 1987), 229-230.

18. United States Congress, Senate, Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligent Activities, Alleged Assassination Plots Involving Foreign Leaders, 94th Congress, 1st Session (GPO, 1975), 92-93, 114-116, 126-127.

19. For references, see Ray S. Cline, Secrets, Spies, and Scholars: Blueprint of the Essential CIA (Acropolis Books, 1976),284; Wyden, Bay of Pigs, 24-31; Ambrose with Immerman, Ike's Spies, 309; Prados, The Presidents' Secret Wars, 175-180; John Ranelagh, The Agency: The Rise and Decline of the CIA, rev. ed. (Simon and Schuster, 1987), 337, 353-363; Huggins, The Perfect Failure, 49-51; Keagle, "The Eisenhower Administration, Castro, and Cuba," 210-211; Christopher Andrew, For the President's Eyes Only: Secret Intelligence and the American Presidency from Washington to Bush (Harper Collins, 1995), 250-253; Bissell, Reflections of a Cold Warrior, 152-157.

20. FRUS, 1958-1960, VI, Cuba, iv, 850-851. See also Geoffrey Warner, "Eisenhower and Castro: US-Cuban Relations, 1958-1960," International Affairs 75 (October 1999): 803-817.

21. For references, see Andrew, For the President's Eyes Only, 250-253; Alexsandr Fursenko and Timothy Naftali, "One Hell of a Gamble": Khrushchev, Castro, and Kennedy, 1958-1964 (W.W. Norton, 1997), 43-44; John Lewis Gaddis, We Now Know: Rethinking Cold War History (Oxford U Press, 1997), 179-185.

22. Letter of transmittal, Robert S. Young to John E. Wickman, 24 December 1974, Folder "CIA Policy re Cuba (17 March 1960)," White Office, Office of the Staff Secretary, International Series, Box 4, EL.

23. Email correspondence between author and David Haight on 9 January 2002 and 19 June 2002; email messages in author's possession. For more information regarding FOIA, see http://www.archives.gov/research_room/f ... _room.html (5 August 2002); and for more information regarding access to Presidential records, see http://www.archives.gov/presidential_li ... cords.html (5 August 2002).

24. Email correspondence between author and Haight on 11 June 2002 and 19 June 2002; email messages in author's possession.

25. For references, see Prados, President's Secret Wars, 178, 429; Fursenko and Naftali, One Hell of a Gamble, 43-44; Thomas G. Paterson, "The Limits of Hegemony: The United States and the Cuban Revolution," Occasional Paper (Latin American Studies Consortium of New England), 5. Gleijeses also mentions a "heavily sanitized" version of the "Program for Covert Action" found in the National Security Files, Box 61A, John F. Kennedy Library, Boston, Massachusetts.

26. Peter Kornbluh, ed., The Bay of Pigs Declassified: The Secret CIA Report on the Invasion of Cuba (The New Press, 1998), 1-17, 103-109. Partially sanitized excerpts from the "Program for Covert Action" also appear as an appendix in Blight and Kornbluh, Politics of Illusion, 205-208. See also Michael Warner, "Lessons Unlearned: The CIA's Internal Probe of the Bay of Pigs Affair," Studies in Intelligence 42 (Winter 1998-1999) http://www.odci.gov/csi/studies/winter98-99/art08.html (1 February 2002).

27. http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/ (26 July 2002).

28. Anna K. Nelson, "The John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Review Board," in A Culture of Secrecy: The Government Versus the Peoples' Right to Know, ed. Athan G. Theoharis (U Press of Kansas, 1998), 213-217, 229. For the text of the JFK Act, see Final Report os the Assassination Records Review Board (Washington, DC: GPO, 1998), 183-195; and also http://www.archives.gov/research_room/j ... eport.html (14 June 2002).

29. Nelson, "The John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Review Board," 213; and Final Report of the Assassination Records Review Board, 1-2. The Honorable John R. Tunheim chaired the KARRB, and Henry F. Graff, Kermit L. Hall, and William L. Joyce also served Nelson. The KARRB's papers can be found in "President John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection," Record Group 541, NA; and http://www.archives.gov/research_room/j ... board.html (14 June 2002).

30. Final Report of the Assassination Records Review Board, xxvi, 34, 41-56, 91-96, 203-204. Phone conversation between author and Anna K. Nelson, 17 January 2002; notes from conversation in author's possession.

31. Nelson, "The John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Review Board," 211; Zachary Karabell and Timothy Naftali, "Research Note: The Perils and Promise of CIA Documents," Diplomatic History 18 (Fall 1994): 615-26; J. Kenneth McDonald, "Research Note: Commentary on 'History Declassified,'" Diplomatic History 18 (Fall 1994): 627-634; James X. Dempsey, "The CIA and Secrecy," in A Culture of Secrecy: The Government Versus the Peoples' Right to Know, ed. Athan G. Theoharis, (U Press of Kansas, 1998), pp. 37-59.

32. Wyden, Bay of Pigs, 24-25. Additional material can be found in oral history interviews with Gordon Gray; see "Gordon Gray," OH 342, interview conducted by Maclyn Burg, EL, June 25, 1975; and Gordon Gray, OH 73, interview conducted by staff, Columbia Oral History Project, December 7, 1966, January 23, 1967, January 27, 1967, February 7, 1967, March 7, 1967, May 23, 1967, July 9, 1967 and November 30, 1967, also held by EL. For more specific operational and tactical plans drawn up in early 1961, see various memoranda and meeting minutes in FRUS, 1961-1963, X, Cuba, 1961-1962, ix-x, 10-17, 21-24, 36-40.

33. For a similar indictment based on much less information than is currently available, see John Lewis Gaddis, Strategies of Containment: A Critical Appraisal of Postwar American National Security Policy (Oxford U Press, 1982), 157-159.